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I NTRouucTioN
This issue marks the first quarter of a cent ury of publication for the Boston College
Law Review. As in past years, the December issue is dedicated exclusively to Labor and
Employment matters and includes the 1982-1983 Annual Survey of Labor and Employment
Discrimination Law. This Annual Survey is the twenty-second in a series of annual efforts to
keep the legal community abreast of significant developments in labor and employment
discrimination law. The Annual Survey covers a period from June of one year until lute of
the following year. The Annual Survey does not attempt to cover all decisions rendered
during the year. Instead, working within this dynamic area of law, the A nnual Survey seeks
to provide a comprehensive treatment of selected cases which consolidate, amplify', or
depart Him) prior law,
LABOR RELATIONS LAW
I. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. Elections
1. *Prohibitions of Contributions to Union Elections by Nonunion Members:
United Steelworkers of America v. Sadlowski'
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) 2 includes a
"Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations- (Bill of Rights). 3 The Bill of Rights,
contained in Section 101(a)(2) of the LM RDA, secures the rights of free speech and
assembly for labor organization members.'' This section of the LM RDA, however, subjects
these basic rights to the "reasonable" rule-making authority of the labor organization.'
The Bill of Rights also grants members the right to sue for violations of these rights under
section 101(a)(4) of the LM RDA." In potential conflict with the exercise of these statuto-
* By Kristina Hansen Wardwell, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 102 S. Ct. 2339 (1982).
• 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1976).
• 
Section 101(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part:
Freedom of speech and assembly — Every member orally labor organization shall have
the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views,
arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views,
upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any bitsiness properly
before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules
pertaining to the conduct of meetings . .
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1976).
5 Section 101(a)(2) continues:
Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organiza-
tion to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member
toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining nom conduct that would
interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1976).
" Section 101(a)(4) provides, in pertinent part, that a union may not "limit the tight of any
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rily conferred rights is the adoption of an "outsider rule" by the United Steelworkers of
America (USWA), a labor organization which has over 1,300,000 members. This rule,
adopted as part of the USWA constitution at its 1978 convention, prohibits nirnwtion
members from making contributions to election campaigns for major union positions and
raises two issues.' The first issue, whether the USWA outsider rule violates the union
members' rights of free speech and assembly, essentially turns out whether the LM RDA's
Bill of Rights was intended to extend the full scope of first amendment protection to
union members. The second issue, the potential conflict between the outsider rule and the
LMRDA's guarantee of the right to sue for violations, raises concerns over the USWA's
implementation of the rule as it applies to campaign-related litigation. The USWA
prohibition on campaign contributions by nonunion members for candidates for union
office is the first of its kind adopted by any American labor organization."
During the Sturm year, the United States Supreme Court considered the permissibil-
ity of the USWA's outsider rule in light of the right of free speech and assembly and the
right to sue conferred by the LMRDA's Bill of Rights. In United Steelworkers of America v.
Sadlowski," a sharply divided Supreme Court upheld the outsider rule as a valid exercise
of a union's reasonable rule-making authority conferred under section 101(a)(2) of the
LMRDA. 1 ' The majority concluded that the LMRDA's Bill of Rights did not incorporate
the entire body of first amendment law." In upholding the USWA's outsider rule, the
Supreme Court also rejected a challenge to the rule under the right to sue guarantee of
section 101(a)(4).' 2 In SadIewski, the Supreme Court reversed the holdings of the lower
courts" and granted labor organizations considerable latitude in matters relating to
self-governance.''
The respondent. Edward Sadlowski, Jr., was a canilidate for president of the USWA
in its 1977 elections.'"' Sadlowski, whose financial support came largely front sources
outside the union, lost to Lloyd McBride, the candidate endorsed by incumbent manage-
ment." At the USWA convention in the year following Sadlowski's unsuccessful bid for
election, the USWA adopted the rule prohibiting financial support of candidates in union
member thereof to institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding !rehire any administrative
agency . ..." 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(4) (1976).
The outsider rule, Article V, Section 27 of the USWA Constitution, provides, in pertinent
part: "No candidate (including a prospective candidate) for any position set forth in Article IV,
section 1, and supporter of a candidate may solicit or accept linancial support, or any other direct or
indirect support of any kind (except an individual's own volunteered personal time) from any
non-member," 102 S. Ct. 2339, 2342 (1982). The full text of section 27 is set out in the Appendix to
the court of appeals' decision. 645 F.2d 1114, 1126-28 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of America, 645 F.2d 1114, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1981), citing
Note, Restriction On "Outsider" Participation in Union Politics, 55 CHI.-KET L. Rev. 769, 769 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Restriction On "Outsider" Participation].
102 S. Ct. '2339 (1982).
" Id. at 2350.
" Id. at 2344 -45. First amendment jurisprudence, and the impact of the Sadlowski opinion
thereon, is beyond the scope of this SW-1r chapter.
" Id. at 2349.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 36-41.
' 4 See infra text accompanying notes 42-76.
' 5 102 S. Ct. 2339, 2342 (1982).
" Id. at 2342. Sadlowski attracted 43 percent of the vote, while his opponent won with 57
percent. Id.
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elections by non-union members.'' Sadlowski filed suit against the USWA in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia.' 8 The complaint alleged that the
USWA's outsider rule violated the right to sue provision of the LAIRDA,'" because it
would prohibit. a candidate from accepting non-member contributions to finance
campaign-related litigation. 2 " Such a restriction, according to the plaintiffs, was a viola-
tion of section 101(a)(4) of the LM RDA which prohibits a union front limiting a member's
right to institute any action, either in court or before an administrative agency. 2 '
In ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court struck down the
outsider rule as a violation of the right to sue provision of section 101(a)(4)." The district
court rejected the advisory opinion" of the USWA's Campaign Contribution Administra-
tive Committee which suggested that the outsider rule had a limited scope where cam-
paign related litigation was concerned. 24 First, the court found that the Committee could
change its opinion on the scope of the rule at any time. 25 Second, the court stated, the
Committee's opinion conflicted with the clear language of the rule." Furthermore, the
district court found that section 101(a)(4) previously had been construed to prohibit any
limitations on the exercise of the right to sue. 27 In issuing a permanent injunction against
the implementation of the rule, the district court held that the outsider rule unduly and
unlawfully limited union members' rights "to collect funds necessary to bring suit., to
retain counsel and initiate suits or administrative proceedings without fear of disqualifica-
tion or discipline." 2 H The USWA appealed the court's decision to the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals.
The appeals court affirmed the district court's opinion, agreeing that the outsider
12 Id. The delegates on the floor of the USWA convention approved the rule by a margin of 10
to 1. Id. For a detailed review of the events and emotions leading up to the outsider rule's adoption,
see Note, Restriction On "Outsider - Participation, supra note 8, at 770-772.
18 102 S. Ct. 2339, 2343 (1982). Sadlowski was one of several plaintiffs. Among the other
plaintiffs was Edward Sadlowski, Sr., a retired union member who had campaigned for his son in the




22 507 F. Supp. 623, 625 (D.D.C. 1981).
23 In addition to the "outsider rule", section 27 contained a number of related provisions.
Among them was one which conferred authority upon the International Executive Board to adopt
necessary regulations to implement the rule. It also created a Campaign Contribution Administrative
Committee. This Committee was given the power to administer the provisions of section 27 and to
disqualify a candidate who violated the outsider rule. 102 S. Ct. 2339, 2342-43 (1982). The full text
of section 27 is set out in the Appendix to the court of appeals' decision. 645 .F,2d 1114, l 126-28
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
24 507 F. Supp, 623, 624 (D.D.C. 1981).
25 Id.
" Id. Presumably, the clear language to which the district court was referring was the outsider
rule's prohibition on "financial support, or any other direct or indirect support of any kind . . . from a
non-member." See supra note 7.
" 507 F. Supp. at 625 (citing NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Shipbuilding Workers, 39i
U.S. 418, 424-25 (1968) and Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 v. Burroughs, 417 F.2d 370
(9th Cir. 1969)).
" Id.
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rule violated the right to sue provision of the LMRDA . 2" In addition, the appeals court
accepted Sadlowski's contention, first raised on appeal,''" that the outsider rule also
violated the freedom of speech and assembly provision of section 101(a)(2) of the
LM RDA." In so holding, the appeals court construed section 101(a)(2) as placing "essen-
tially the same limits on labor unions with respect to outside campaign contributions that.
the First Amendment would if' it applied to labor unions  '' The appeals ctairt
expressed particular concern over the difficulties a candidate would encounter in mount-
ing a campaign against entrenched union leadership, even if he were able to obtain the
aid of outside contributions." As a result, the court found that the outsider rule flew
'squarely in the face of the intent of the LMRDA to 'insure union democracy.' " 34 The
appeals court held that the outsider rule ran counter to the section 101(a)(2) proviso,
rejecting the USWA's arguments that the comp/e/e prohibition on outside financial support
was a valid exercise of the union's authority to make rules designed to prevent undesir-
able outside influences from interfering with internal union affairs,"
The Supreme Court granted the USN,IA's petition for certiorari and, in a live-tt)-four
decision, reversed the lower courts' invalidation of the outsider rule." The Court's
opinion addressed three substantive issues. First, the Court held that the LM RDA's right
of free speech and assembly did not incorporate the entire body of first amendment law."
Second, the Court employed a two-tiered analysis to determine whether the outsider rule
violated section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA. 38 Under this method of analysis, the Court first
examined the impact of the rule on the interests of free speech and assembly protected by
section 101(a)(2). 3" It then concluded that, while the USWA's outsider rule did interfere
with rights shielded by section 10 I (a)(2), the rule nevertheless was valid under the union's
reasonable rule-making prenigative. 4 " Finally, the Court considered and rejected Sad-
lowski's contention that the outsider rule violated the right to sue guaranteed under
section 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA:"
In upholding the USWA's outsider rule, justice Marshall, writing for the Court, first
addressed the nexus between the LM RDA's five speech protections and those extended
by the first amendment.'" in contrast to the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
2" 645 F.2d 1114, 1125 (D,C. Cir. 1981).
" In deciding to consider the plaintiffs' 102(a)(2) claims which were first raised on appeal, the
appeals court first noted the "widely acknowledged rule" that an appellate (anal has discretion to
uplit Ad summary judgment under a legal theory different than that applied by the trial court M. at
1120. It then found that in this case it was permissible because the union was not prejudiced. N. "The
issue of the denial of free speech under section 101(a)(2) was implicit in the question whether
plaintiffs had been denied free speech under the First Amendment, as alleged in their complaint.''
Id. The union, then, had been presented with an opportunity to litigate the matter, M.
31
 Id, at 1122.
32
 14. at 1120.
" Id. at 112.1-22.
" 14. at 1122.
3' Id. at 1122-23.
"" 102 S. Ct. 2339, 2342 (1982). Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the Court. Id. at 2341-50.
justice White, who authored the dissent, was joined by Chief justice Burger. justic.es Brennan and
Blackmun. Id. at 2350-55 (White, j., dissenting).
" Id. at 2344-45.
38 Id. at 2345-49.
" N. at 2346-47.
4 " Id, at 2345-48,
4' Id. at 2349-50.
42 Id, at 2344-45.
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concluded that section 101(a)(2) "should [not.] he react as incorporating the entire body of
First Amendment law." 43 The Court based this portion of its opinion on the legislative
history olsect ion 101(a)(2). Specifically, the Court focused on Congress' adoption of an
amendment to the originally proposed LM RDA.'" This amendment reserved the union's
authority to adopt reasonable rules related to the responsibilities of its members," This
reservation of union prerogative, the Court found, squarely refuted Sadlowski's conten-
tion that Co ngress intended the scope of sect ion 101(0(2) to be identical to that of the first.
amendment.'" The opinion noted that union rules were valid under section 101(a)(2) and
concluded, "so limg as they [were] reasonable: they need not pass the stringent tests
applied in the First Amendment context.' 17
After the Court decided that reasonable union rules would not be subject to a
rigorous first amendment analysis, it next examined the impact of the USWA outsider rule
on the interests protected under section 101(a)(2)." The Court noted that even if the rule
interfered with an interest protected under the section, the rule would still be valid if it
reasonably related 10 the protection of the organization as an institution." Applying the
first step of' this two-tiered analysis, the Supreme Court found that the outsider rule did
affect union members' rights protected by section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA. 5 " The Court
acknowledged that Congress adopted the freedom of speech and assembly provision in
order to promote union democraCy and that this freedom was "particularly critical" in the
context of union election campaigns.'' Furthermore, the Court conceded that. a candi-
date's ability to mount effective challenges to union leadership "may be weakened" by the
outsider rule.''` In so stating, the Court took note of its first amendment decisions
protecting contribution and solicitation of financial support in order to further effective
advocacy." Moreover, the Court acknowledged that in Buckley v. ['afro" it held that first
amendment rights of contributors as well as candidates may be infringed by contribution
limitations.' The Court dismissed this line of precedent, in spite of these considerations
which woukl suggest that the rule does interfere with protected interests, because "non-
member conIribulors have no right of expression protected by the statute.""
The Court continued its inquiry into the interference of the rule with protected
interests by finding that the impact of the outsider rule on section 10 1(a)(2) rights "may
43 Id. at 2344.
" 1(1. at 2344-45.
45 See supra note 4. The Kuchel amendment prevailed over the McClellan amendment. Senator
McClellan said of his amendment that it would "bring to the conduct of union affairs and to union
members the reality of some freedoms from oppression that we enjoy as citizens by virtue of the
Constitution . 105 CONG. REC. 6472 (1959). The Kuchel amendment, offered as a substitution for
the McClellan amendment, was said to "remove the extremes" of the McClellan amendment, 105
CoNo. REe.. 6721 (1959) (Sen. Cooper) and not to "unduly harass and obstruct legitimate unionism."
105 Colic. REC. 6722 (1959) (Sen. Church).
46 102 S. Ct. 2339, 2345 (1982).
" Id. See infra text accompanying notes 62-71 for the Court's reasoning in finding the outsider
rule "reasonable...
" 102 S. Ct. 2339, 2345-49.





53 Id. at 4346 11.6.
'4 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
55 102 S. Ct. 2339, 2346 n.6 (1982) (citing Buckley v. Valet), 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam)).
517 id.
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not be substantial."57
 Central to this finding was the Court's reliance on uncontradicted
evidence submitted by the USWA that the outsider rule did not have an adverse effect on
the 1981 USWA campaigns:" In addition to relying on evidence of successful insurgent
campaigns mounted without the aid of outside contributions, the Court noted several
factors that. lessened the advantages of incumbency in a union election. First, USIATA rules
forbid staff employees from campaigning on union time or from using union funds and
facilities for campaign purposes." Second, staff officers have a contractual right to decide
whether or not to participate in any USWA campaign without being subjected to disci-
pline or reprisal!'" Lastly, the union indicated that the rule would not prohibit the use of
outside funds by members not involved in a campaign for the purpose of focusing the
attention of the rank and file on a specific problem."'
Once it determined that the outsider rule did interfere with section 101(2)(2) pro-
tected rights, the Court then turned to the second tier of its analysis by examining the
reasonableness of the union's prohibition on the use of outside financial support for
union elections."' The Court noted the union's fear that the first allegiance of an official
who had received outside support might not be to the union." The Court concluded that
the outsider rule served a legitimate union purpose and, therefore, was a valid exercise of
the union's rule-making authority." The Court examined relevant legislative history and
determined that Congress desired to permit unions, rather than outsiders, to control their
own of
In upholding the validity of the outsider rule, the Court analogized it to the
LNI RDA's prohibition of employer contributions to union campaigns."'' The outsider
rule, found the Court, was clearly consistent with the LMRDA's ban on employer con-
tributions designed to minimize the danger of outside inHuence. 87 The Court rejected
several of the plaintiff's' arguments that the rule was not rationally related to the desire to
reduce outside influences on union activities."" Although the plaintiffs advocated con-
tribution ceilings as a more appropriate alternative than a complete prohibition, the
Court noted that ceilings would not affect the solicitation of many small contributors."
Similarly, the Court. rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that relatives arid friends should not
be prohibited from making contributions as a "loophole". 7° Finally, the Court stated that
57 Id. at 2346.
`" Id. at 2347. The case was before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment;
therefore, the Court assumed all evidence submitted by Sadlowski was true. Id. at 2347 n.7. In
addition, evidence submitted by USWA was relied on only when uncontradicted. Id.
5" /4. at 2347. Specifically, the USWA offered evidence that a non-incumbent candidate fOr
district director in a small district raised over $30,000 from rank and file members fifteen months
prior to the election. Id. at 2347 n.8.
6" M. at 2347.
61
62 Id. See supra note 5.
" 102 S. Ct. 2339, 2347 (1982), The Court stated "USWA feared that officers who received
campaign contributions from non-members might be beholden to those individuals and might allow
their decisions to be influenced by considerations other than the best interests of the union." Id.
" M. at 2397-48,
" 5 Id. at 2348.
"" Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 481(g) (1976).
" 7
 102 S. Ct. 2339, 2349 (1982).
68
 Id. at 2348-49.
"" Id. at 2349. Sadlowski conducted extensive mail solicitation of small, non-union contributors
in the 1977 election. Id.
14,
December 1983]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 81
the disclosure rule, which was advocated by the plaintiff's as an alternative to the outsider
rule, did not "eradicate the threat of outside influence" on anion activity. 7 '
After concluding that the bar on outside contributions to union election campaigns
was valid under the rule-making provision of section 101(a)(2), the Court then addressed
the second major issue of Sadlowski: the challenge to the rule under the right to sue
provision of the Bill of Rights of the LMRDA. Unlike the district court and court of
appeals, the Supreme Court held that the outsider rule did net violate the labor organiza-
tion members' right to sue granted under section 101(a)(4). 72 In contrast to the lower
courts, the Supreme Court did not interpret the outsider rule as prohibiting union
members from accepting financial or other support from non-members for the purpose
of conducting campaign-related litigation." In making this determination, the Court
emphasized the issuance of an opinion by the Campaign Contribution Administration
Committee that the outsider rule did not apply to the financing- of lawsuits for the
purpose of asserting the legal rights of candidates or other union members in connection
with elections." In addition, the Court accepted the USWA's explanation of language in
the Election Manual which prohibited outside financial support for " '[a]ctivities which are
designed to extract political gain from legal proceedings.' "" According to the USWA, the
prohibition was only intended to cover non-litigation activities which refer to litigation,
such as a flyer announcing a legal vicun.y. 7 " In summary, a five member majority of the
Supreme Court upheld the USWA's "outsider rule." The Court acknowledged t hat the
rule would have some impact. on rights Congress intended to protect." It stated however,
that the rule was "rationally related to a legitimate and protected purpose -7 K and thus was
sheltered by the union's rule-making prerogative under section 101(a)(2). 73
Four dissenting justices sharply disagreed with the majority's opinion. Justice White,
in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justices Brennan and Blackmun, examined
the legislative history underlying section 101(a)(2)." The dissent noted a dear con-
gressional concern with protecting union members from "entrenched corrupt leaders.""'
In addition, the dissenters drew upon Supreme Court. cases which identified the LM RDA
as a major effort by Congress "to insure union democracy." 83 Specifically, the opinion
cited United Steelworkers of America v. U.ierv," wherein the Supreme Court struck clown a
contract provision which limited eligibility for local union office to members who had
attended at least one-half of the regular union meetings for three years prior to the
election." The dissenting justices also relied on Wirtz. v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees





" Id. at 2349-50.




" The Court used the terms "rationally related" and "reasonable" interchangeably.
71 , Id.
8" Id. at 2350-51 (White, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 2351 (White, J., dissenting).
82 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
" 3 429 U.S. 305 (1977).
84 Id. at 307-08.
85 391 U.S. 492 (1968).
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to those who had previously held a union office."
Having interpreted both legislative intent and judicial precedent in a light most
unfavorable to the USWA's outsider rule, the dissent then suggested that the "rea-
sonableness" of a union's rule promulgated under section 101(a)(2) should be evaluated
in such a context.. 87 According to the dissenters, the inescapable fact was that the union's
internal political machine supports incumbents, thereby making it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for the democratic process to operate within a union electoral process which has such
severe financial restrictions."" The dissent., therefore, fOund that the outsider rule "con-
tradicted the values the LM RDA was designed to protect and thwarted its purposes.""
Furthermore, continued the minority opinion, the outsider rule went far beyond the
political contribution limitations previously approved by the Supreme Court in Buckley Ti.
Vale(' in the context of federal elections." In Brickley, the Court upheld an amendment to
the Federal Election Campaign Act of I 971 (the Act)'" which limited personal omtribu-
tions to a federal political candidate to $1,000 per candidate per election." 2 The Act,
however, did permit a candidate to combine his financial resources with those of hisfamity,
subject to ceilings of between $25,000 and $50,000 depending upon the federal office
sought. 93 Moreover, in Buckler, expenditure ceilings placed on a candidate's campaign
were invalidated as substantial and direct restrictions on the rights of candidates and
citizens to engage in protected political expression." 4 The dissent in Sadlowski fOund that
the outsider rule severely limited expenditures." 5 Finally, the dissent was concerned with
the severity of the otttsider rule which could operate to disqualify a candidate unable to
rebut the rule's presumption that he "accepted" the prohibited support."
The dissent also stressed the difficulties a candidate faces, in the best of circum-
stances, in attempting to unseat. an
 incumbent."' There is, according to the dissent, no
permanent opposition party within the union.''' According to authorities cited by the
dissent, a candidate's initial campaign must be largely financed through his own funds
and loans and gifts from friends." Only when a candidate has crossed the threshold and
demonstrated himself to be a viable candidate will he get substantial support from union
members.'""
In upholding the USWA's outsider rule, the Sadlowski Court decided three significant
issues. First, the Court clearly stated that the so-called "Bill of Rights" of the LMRISA did
8' Id. at 499.
$ 7 102 S. Ct. 2339, 2351 (1982). 	 the reasonableness of a particular rule must surely be
judged with reference to the paradigmatic situation that Congress intended to address by guarantee-
ing free elections: a large union with entrenched autocratic leadership bent on maintaining itself by
fair means or foul." Id. (White, J., dissenting).
"H Id. at '1352-34 (White, J., dissenting). The broad scope of the regulations adopted by the
union in defining "financial support" were of . particular concern to the dissenters. Id. at 2352 (White,
J., dissenting).
"" Id. at 2355 (White, J., dissenting).
"" Id. at 2353 (White, J., dissenting).
" 18 U.S.C. §§ 591-613 (Stipp. IV 1970).
"2 424 U.S. 1, 23-38 (1976).
" 18 U.S.C. § 608(a) (Supp. 1V 1970).
"' 424 U.S. at 39-59.
"5 102 S. CI. at 23.53 (White, J., dissenting).
"" Id. at 2352-53 (White, J., dissenting).
17 Id. at 2354 (White, J., dissenting).
" Id. (White, J., dissenting).
"" Id. (White, J., dissenting).
"" Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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not extend to union members a right of free speech and assembly equal to that protected
by first amendment law."' Second, the Supreme Court upheld the USWA's prohibition
on outside financial support to union campaigns as a "reasonable - rule which was ra-
tionally related to the union's right to reduce outside interference with its internal
affitirs. 112 Third, the Court interpreted the outsider rule so as to find that it did not violate
the right to sue guaranteed under section 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA.'" 3 The union's
authority to make reasonable rules was of paramount importance to the majority in
deciding li()th the first and second issues. The existence of this rule-making proviso was
primarily responsible for the Court's finding that the stringent first amendment analysis
which is generally applied to situations where the rights of free speech might be ittfringecl
need not be applied to restrictions of the rights secured under section 101(a)(2) of the
LIVIRDA.'"
In Sadlowski, the Court gave a permissive interpretation to the meaning of rea-
sonableness.'" In other union campaign-related cases, reasonableness has not been so
broadly construed. In Wirtz,'" where the Court struck down the union bylaw limiting
eligibility for office to those who had previously held office, for example, the Court stated
that the LMRDA's command of free and democratic union elections must. be consid-
ered'" when determining whether a candidacy qualification requirement meets the
reasonableness requirement of section 401(e) of the RDA," In Wirtz, the union bylaw
would have disqualified ninety-three percent of the rank awl file union members from
eligibility for union office.'" Similarly, in United Steelworkers of America v. Usety," 1) the
Court struck down a bylaw which would have resulted in disqualification of over ninety-
six percent of members from eligibility to run in a union election.'" While the rules
struck down in Wirtz and United Steelworkers v. Usety may have presented more grievous
interferences with the democracy of the union's electoral process than the outsider rule,
Sadlowski nonetheless represents a reduction in the level of scrutiny exercised by the
Supreme Court when reviewing rules affecting internal union elections. Furthermore,
these precedents highlight the paramount importance previously placed by the Supreme
Court on protecting the rank and file from abuses of entrenched union leadership
through the preservation of a democratic election process.
In Sad/owski, the Supreme Court demonstrated significant deference to a union's
right to self-governance. This respect for the union's power is further manifested by the
Court's acceptance of the union's internal administrative interpretation of the impact of
the rule on the right to site guarantee of section 101(a)(4). 112 In conclusion, in United
"" Id. at 2344-45. It should be noted that the Court acknowledged that contribution limitations
potentially infringe first amendment rights of contributors as well as candidates. Id. at 2346 n.6
(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1976)). In the instant case, however, the Court pointed
out that "the non-member contributors have no right of expression protected by thelLNIRDAJ." 102 S.
Ct. 2339, 2346 n.6 (1982) {emphasis in original).
'°' Id. at 2346.
1U3 Id. at 2349-50.
"4 Id. at 2344-45.
"5 Id. at 2346-47.
148 See supra notes 85 & 86 and accompanying text.
1 "T 391 U.S. 492, 499 (1968).
um 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1976).
1"B 391 U.S. at 502.
110
 429 U.S. 305 (1977).
111 Id. at 306-07.
l" See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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Steelworkers of America v. Sadlowski, a majority of the Supreme Court indicated a decided
willingness to leave to the union the management and control of its internal affairs,
including its electoral process. In so doing, the Supreme Court ignored the real and
significant obstacles an insurgent candidate faces in a union election.
2. *Representation Elections arid Employer Interference: RCA Del Caribe, Inc.' and
Bruckner Nursing Home'
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) provides "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it
. . . "3
 The National Labor Relations Board (the Board) has interpreted this section to
require strict employer neutrality in the context of competing union claims regarding the
representation of a recognized unit of workers. The leading case in this area is Midwest
Piping.' In rival union situations, Midwest Piping dictates that when two or more labor
organizations have filed representation petitions, an employer may not negotiate with the
competing organizations until such time as the "real question concerning representation"
has been resolved through the mechanism of a Board-conducted election." Where an
incumbent union is being challenged, the Board has held that an employer faced with a
pending petition from an outside union must not bargain with the incumbent or challeng-
ing union until such time as one or the other has been certified f011owing a Board-
conducted election.' Since its inception, the Midwest Piping doctrine has encountered
resistance, particularly from the circuit courts asked to enforce it.' In this Survey year, the
Board examined the Midwest Piping doctrine and changed it substantially.
In RCA Del Caribe, Inc., the Board established new guidelines concerning sit nations
wherein an incumbent union is challenged by an "outside" union 
. 8 The Board concluded
that an employer should not he required to withdraw from bargaining with an incumbent
union merely because a representation petition has been filed.° in Bruckner Nursing
* By Patrick McNamara, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLECE LAW REVIEW.
' 262 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 110 L.R.R.M. 1369 (1982).
• 262 N.L.R.B. No. 115, 110 L.R.R.M. 1374 (1982).
3
 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2). 29 U.S.C. § 158(2) (1981).
Midwest Piping and Supply Co., Inc., 63 N.L.R.R, 1060, 17 LR.R.M. 40 (1945).
• Id. at 1061, 17 L.R.R.M. at 40. Whether or not there is in fact a "real question concerning
representation" is determined by the validity of the union's petitions. The union is required to show a
minimum of support in order to establish a "real question." See infra notes 20-26 and accompanying
text.
• Shea Chemical Corporation, 121 N.L.R.B. 1027, 1029, 42 L.R.R.M. 1486 (1958). A union is
"certified" after the N.L.R.B. accepts the results of the election and formally recognizes that one
union has the power to bargain for a defined group of employees.
• See, e.g., liner- Island Resorts, Ltd. dlb/a Kona Surf Hotel, 20! N.L.R.B. 139, 82 L.R.R.M. 1279
(1973), Fry: denied, 507 F.2d 411, 87 1„R.R.M. 2075 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042, 89
L.R.R.M. 2614 (1975); Playskool. Inc., a Division of Milton Bradley Company, 195 N.L.R.B. 560, 79
L.R.R.M 1507 (1972), erif. denied, 477 F.2(1 66, 82 L.R.R.M. 2916 (7th Cir. 1973), supp. op., 205
N.L.R.B. 1009, 84 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1973); Pittsburgh Valve Company, 114 N.L.R.B. 193, 36 L.R.R.M.
1550 (1955), eqf. denied, 234 F.2d 565, 38 L.R.R.M. 2294 (4th Cir. 1956); American Bread Company,
170 N.L.R.B. 85, 67 L.R.R.M. 1430 (1968), enf. denied, 411 F.2d 147, 71 L.R.R.M. 2243 (6th Cir.
1969).
• RCA Del Caribe, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 110 L.R.R.M. 1369 (1982).
Id. at 9-10, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1370-71.
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Home," the Board set forth a new policy with respect to the requirements of employer
neutrality in rival union initial-organizing situations." The Board indicated that it would
no longer find section 8(a)(2) violations in rival union situations when an employer
recognized a labor organization which represents an uncoerced, unassisted majority,
before a valid petition for an election has been filed with the Board.' 2 The intended effect
of these two decisions was to stabilize further the collective-bargaining process by injecting
more precise definitions of employer choices and risk extant in recognition of labor
organizations.' 3
This chapter will first examine the Midwest Piping doctrine as it existed prior to this
Survey year." To fully appreciate the significance of RCA Del Caribe and Bruckner Nursing
Home, familiarity with the background and evolution of the Midwest Piping doctrine is also
necessary." Next, the RCA Del Caribe and Bruckner Nursing Home decisions will be ex-
plained, and the Board's analysis will be outlined in an effort to understand the effect of
these decisions,' 6 Finally, the positive and negative aspects of each case will be discussed to
discover the import of the new analyses." It will be suggested that these two cases do, as
intended by the Board, work to stabilize and define the neutrality required of' employers
by section 8(a)(2) of' the the Act."
As originally formulated, the Midwest Piping doctrine was an attempt by the Board to
ensure that, in a rival union situation, an employer would not render aid to one of two or
more unions competing for exclusive bargaining representative status. The "aid" feared
by the Board often took the form of a grant of recognition in advance of a Board-
conducted election." In Midwest Piping, the Board held that rival claims from competing
unions (in the form of representation petitions) would best be resolved if' the employer
followed a course of strict neutrality with respect to the competing unions until such time
as the "real question concerning representation" had been resolved through the mecha-
nism of a Board-conducted election,"
In the initial cases following Midwest Piping, the Board established the principle
that the duty of strict employer neutrality and the necessity of a Board-conducted election
were operative only when a representation petition had been filed with the Board. 21 In
later decisions, however, the Board removed the requirement that a petition was a
10 262 N.L.R.B. No. 115, 110 L.R.R.M. 1374 (1982).
" Id. at 9-14. 110 L.R.R.M. at 1376-78. "Rival union initial-organizing situations" arise when
two or more unions face each other in an election, and neither can claim the benefits associated with
incumbency.
12 Id. at 9-10, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1376.
' 2 Id. at 10-12, 110 L.R.R.M, at 1376-78.
14 See infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 27-46 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 47-109 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 110-123 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 124-137 and accompanying text.
19 "Rival union situation" refers to those occasions in which there is no incumbent union
involved in the bargaining. Id. at 4, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1375. In Midwest Piping itself, the Board found
that an employer gave unlawful assistance to a labor organization when the employer recognized one
of two competing labor organizations, both of which had filed representation petitions. and both of
which had campaigned extensively for the mantle of exclusive bargaining representative. In the
context of that case, the Board hckl that the employer had arrogated the resolution of the represen-
tation issue, and that a Board-conducted election was the "best" means of ascertaining the true
desires of employees. Midwest Piping, 63 N.L.R.B. at 1060-61, 17 L.R.R.M. at 40-41.
20 Id. at 1061, 17 L.R.R.M. at 40.
21 See, e.g., Fustier, Alexander & Barsoom, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 1443, 1444-45, 20 L.R.R.M. 1282
(1947).
86	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 25:73
prerequisite to the finding of a "real" or "genuine" question concerning representation. 22
This action was due in part to the Board's desire to recognize the existence of a rival union
contest even before l'ormal invocation of the Board's election procedures to ensure that
those procedures would be available," Thus, if more than one union enjoyed at least.
some employee support, the Board considered the election procedure the best way to
guarantee employees a fair, free opportunity to choose their bargaining representative."
The Board described the "support" that a union m ust have to trigger the operation of the
Midwest Piping doctrine as a claim that was not a "naked claim," "clearly unsupportable,"
or a claim that was at least "colorable." 2 ' Thus, prior to Bruckner Nursing Home, the
Board's policy effectively required strict employer neutrality where our question existed
concerning representation in rival union initial-organizing situations, even though no
petition had been filed unless and until a Board-conducted election had been held and the
results certified.'"
The primary difficulties arising out of this modification of the original representa-
tion petition-tied Midwest Piping doctrine were concerned largely with definitional prob-
lems inherent in the terms "naked claint," 27 "clearly supportable claim , "28 and "colorable
claim."'" These problems prevented the Board from providing any clear standards
concerning the fine line between a colorable claim and a naked one." A court's applica-
tion of the evolving Midwest Piping doctrine, therefore, frequently allowed a minority
union with link support to forestall the recognition of a majority union in an effort to buy
time and enable it to gather support or to frustrate its ► ivals.' The result was Board
intervention, in the name of employee choice, that actually worked to impede and
frustrate the expression of employee preference, and ultimately, the collective-bargaining
process." Moreover, this result was often the basis for the circuit courts' refusal to enforce
many Board decisions. 33 The courts took the view that the question concerning represen-
tation was resolved whenever an employer recognized a bona fide majority claimant and
had not actually aided the unrecognized labor organization.' The Board resisted crin-
cisms by the courts, maintaining that the Board's election machinery was still the optimum
means of resolving the rival union representation question. 35
22
 See, e.g., Pittsburgh Valve Company, Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. 193, 194-96, 36 L.R.R.M. 1550,
1551-52 (1955), eq. denied, 234 1 7 .24 565, 38 I,.R.R.M. 2294 (4th Cir. 1956).
23
 Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. at 5, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1375.
24 Id. at 56, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1375.
2' Playskool, Inc., a Division of Milton Bradley Company, 195 N.L.R.B, 560, 560, 79 L.R.R.M.
1507, 1507 (1982), eq., denied, 477 1".2d 66, 82 L.R.R.M. 2916 (7th Cir. 1973), supp. op., 205 N.L.R.B,
1009, 84 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1973).
" Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. at 5-9, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1375-76.
" Robert Hall Gentilly Road Corporation, d/b/a Robert. Flail Clothes, et al., 207 N.L.R.B. 692,
693, 84 L.R.R.M. 1538, 1539 (1973).
Playskool, Inc., a Division of Milton Bradley Company, 195 N.L.R.B. 560, 560, 79 L.R.R.M.
1507, 1507 (1972), enf, denied, 477 F.2d 66, 82 L.R.R.M. 2916 (7th Cir. 1973).
2"
 American Bread Company, 170 N.L.R.B, 85, 88, 67 L.R.R.M. 1430, 1433 (1968), enf: denied,
411 •.2d 147, 71 L.R.R.M. 2243 (6th Cir. 1969).
" See Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. at 7, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1376.
3' Id.
"' Id. at 8, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1376.
" See eases cited supra, at note 5.
" See Air Master Corporation, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 181, 184, 53 L.R.R.M. I004, 1007 (1963), en/.
denied, 339 F.2c1 553, 57 L.R.R.M. 2657 (3rd C:ir. 1964).
" See Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., d/b/a Kona Surf Hotel, 201 N.L.R.B. 139, 142 n.2., 82
L.R.R.M. 1279, 1282 11.12 (1973), en]: denied, 507 F.2d 411, 87 L.R.R.M. 3075 (9th Cir. 1974).
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The application of the Midwest Piping doctrine in the setting of an incumbent being
challenged by a rival union was somewhat different. In decisions immediately following
Midwest Piping. the Board held that the continued negotiation of a contract after the filing
of a representation petition was not a violation of section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor -
Relations Act within the meaning of Midwest Piping. 3 ' The Board later reversed this
holding in Shea Chemical Corporation," holding that an employer faced with a pending
petition from an outside union must cease bargaining with the incumbent and maintain a
posture of strict neutrality with respect to both the incumbent and the challenging labor
organization, until such time as one or the other has been certified following a Board-
conducted election. 3 ' The Board in Shea Chemical Corporation explained that by defining
neutrality so as to prevent continued negotiation between an incumbent and an employer
in the face of a validly supported petition, a challenging union could make its case to the
unit employees free front possible undue influence by the incumbent presence in continu-
ing negotiations. 3 " As in the initial-organizing situation, the Board required strict em-
ployer neutrality and a Board-conducted election in the incumbent setting out. of concern
that employees have the greatest possible freedom in the selection of their collective
bargaining representatives."
The Shea Chemical adaptation of Midwest Piping was problematic in situations involv-
ing incumbent representatives because it failed to accord the incumbent the advantages
which it would otherwise enjoy. The Board had previously encouraged the adoption of
these advantages in the interest of industrial stability.' Shea Chemical had effectively
allowed the promotion of employee free choice to he at the price of effective representa-
tion. With the threat of impending election and without. the advantages of incumbency, a
union is likely to ignore employee concerns, and instead focus its energies on the
retention of this majority status."
Thus, on the eve of the Bruckner Nursing Home and RCA Del Carlie decisions. the
Board's original Midwest Piping decision had evolved into a wide-reaching doctrine that
defined section 8(a)(2) of the Act's "strict neutrality" requirement so as to prevent
employer recognition in initial-organizing, rival union situations, even when one union's
"colt ffable" claim was in fact tenuous at best. The Midwest Piping doctrine as applied to
situations involving a rival union's challenge in an incumbent situation was similarly
restrictive. The incumbent majority status was effectively presumed to be questionable
with no more evidence than a pending election petition. The consequent disruption of the
bargaining process, the circuit courts' refusal to uniformly enforce Board applications of
this doctrine made it increasingly evident that the Board's effort to promote employee
free choice was at the price of the stability of the collective bargaining process, and
that some reexamination of the Midwest Piping doctrine was necessary to correct these
problems.
During the Survey year the Board redefined the longstandingMithuest. Piping doctrine
as it applied in organizational situations in which nu:anthem. unions were involved and
when an initial organization campaign was underway. In RCA Del Caribe, Inc., the Board
3" William D. Gibson Co., Division of Associated Spring Corporation, 110 N.L.R.B. 660, 662, 35
L.R.R.M. 1092, 1093 (1954).
" 121 N.L.R.B. 1027, 42 L.R.R.M. 1486 (1958).
38 Id. at 1029, 42 L.R.R.M. at 1487.
3.1
	id.
40 RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. at 8, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1370.
41 See id.
42 Id.
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re-examined its application of the Midwest Piping case to incumbent situations, and
established new guidelines concerning instances where an incumbent union is challenged
by an "outside" union."' The Board concluded that requiring an employer to withdraw
from bargaining after a petition has been filed with the Board was not the best means of
assuring employer neutrality." in another decision, Bruckner Nursing Home, the Board set.
forth a new policy with respect to the requirements of employer neutrality in rival union
initial-organizing situations." The Board indicated that it would no longer find section
8(a)(2) violations in rival union situations when an employer recognizes a labor organiza-
tion which represents att uncoerced, unassisted majority, before a valid petition for an
election has been filed with the Board.46 The Board decided RCA Del Caribe and Bruckner
Nursing Home as companion cases. RCA Del Caribe will be examined first.
In RCA Del Caribe, the parties consisted of Local 2333 of the International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), Union Independiente, and the employer RCA Del
Caribe, Inc," IBEW had been functioning as the exclusive representative of a unit
consisting of hourly paid production and maintenance employees of RCA Del Caribe,
Inc. since April 30, 1971, 4 " Pursuant to such recognition, RCA Del Caribe and IBEW had
executed a collective bargaining agreement effective from April 30, 1971 until February
1, 1972, which was thereafter renewed for a period effective from January 8, 1972 until
January 2, 1975. 4 " During the month of November 1974, RCA Del Caribe and IBEW
commenced negotiations for a new collective-bargaining agreement to succeed the con-
tract which was In expire on January 2. 5 " The negotiations continued until January 8, at
which time IBEW submitted RCA Del Caribe's final offer to the unit employees, who
subsequently rejected the offer." Thereafter, beginning on January 9, unit employees
engaged in a strike authorized by IBEW in support of IBM's bargaining demands.'
On January 27, Union Independiente filed a petition for certification of representa-
tion, seeking to represent RCA Del Caribe's production and maintenance employees 53
Also on January 27, RCA Del Caribe and IBEW were served with copies of that petition."
In view of the pendency of the petition filed by Union Independiente, RCA Del Caribe
refused to recognize or negotiate with IBEW." Consequently, on February 24, IBEW
submitted to RCA separate sheets signed by 157 unit employees, a majority of the 227
bargaining unit employees, which authorized IBEW to continue to represent the employ-
ees as their collective-bargaining representative." The evidence indicated that the signa-
tures on the authorization sheets had been affixed between February 17 and 24. They
were obtained voluntarily and without coercion or other unlawful means. 57 On February
24, RCA determined that the signatures of the 157 employees were bona fide after
" RCA Del Caribe, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 110 L.R.R.M. 1369 (1982).
44 Id. at 9, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1370.
Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. No. 115, 110 1..R.R.M. 1374 (1982).
46 Id. at 9-10, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1376-77.
" RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. at 2-4, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1369.
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comparing them with the employees' signatures in its records." In addition, on February
23, a petition was also signed by appioximately 157 unit employees requesting that the
National labor Relations Board dismiss the representation petition filed by Union Inde-
pendiente. 59 On February 24, RCA Del Caribe determined that the signatures of this
petition were also bona fide by comparing the signatures on the petition with the employ-
ees' signatures in its records." On February 25, upon IBM's request, RCA Del Caribe
agreed to resume negotiations for a new collective-bargaining agreement, and, on Feb-
ruary 26, RCA and IBEW executed a new collective-bargaining agreement to succeed the
1972-75 agreement.'
Union 1ndependiente filed a charge, alleging that the employer had assisted the
incumbent union in violation of section 8(a)(2) of the Act. The General Counsel agreed
with Union lndependiente, and contended that, by executing a contract with IBEW with
full knowledge of the representation petition filed by Union Independiente, RCA Del
Carihe had violated the requirement established in Midwest Piping, that an employer
maintain strict neutrality in the face of competing representational claims. 62 The General
Counsel argued further that., through its conduct, RCA had rendered unlawful assistance
to IBEW in violation of sections 8(0( I ) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act and
that it also had violated section 8(a)(3) of the Act because the executed agreement
contained a union-security clause. 63 RCA Del Carihe claimed that it was not obligated to
refrain from recognizing IBEW because the mere filing of the representation petition by
Union Independiente did not raise a "real question concerning representation," as re-
quired by Midwest Piping," RCA argued that an employer does not violate the Act if he
verifies the union's apparent majority before executing a collective-bargaining agreement
with that majority representative. 6 '
The Board concluded that requiring an employer to withdraw from bargaining after
a petition had been filed was not the best means of assuring employer neutrality. Thus,
the mere filing of a representation petition by a challenging union no longer forces an
employer to withdraw from bargaining or executing a contract with an incumbent
union." Under this new rule, an employer may conduct post-petition negotiations or -
execute a contract with an incumbent without violating section 8(a)(2) of' the National
Labor Relations Aci. 67 An employer would, however, violate section 8(a)(5) of the Act by
withdrawing front bargaining with the incumbent based solely on the fact that a petition
had been filed by an outside union."' The new rule would not preclude an employer from
withdrawing recognition of the incumbent in good faith based on other objective consid-
erations."
Applying the new rule to the facts in RCA Del Caribe, the Board founcl that the




61 Id. at 5-6, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1370.




66 Id. at 10-11, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1371.
67 Id. at 11, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1371.
68 hi .
69 Id. at n.13, 110 L.R.R.M. at n.13.
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were not violations of the Act within the meaning of section 8(a)(2). The complain( was
accordingly dismissed. 7 ')
The Board's conclusions were based on its recognition that the National Labor
Relations Act's concern for stability in collective-bargaining relationships, embodied in
the doctrine of the presumption of continuing majority status, had not been given due
consideration." The Board explained that while the filing of a valid petition may raise a
doubt as to majority status, the filing, in and of itself, should not overcome the strong
presumption in favor of the continuing majority status of the incumbent and should
not serve to strip it of the advantages and authority it could otherwise legitimately clai tn . 71
The Board concluded that. an employer in au existing collective-bargaining situation
could not observe strict neutrality." The Board recognized that an employer may have
difficulty in maintaining strict neutrality in the collective-bargaining situation because an
incumbent union, at the time of challenge by an outside union, is often in the process of
—and perhaps close (0 completing — negotiation of a contract." According to the Board,
if an employer continued to bargain employees could perceive a preference for the
incumbent union, whether or not the employer holds that preference." If an employer
withdrew from bargaining, however, particularly when agreement was imminent, it could
be interpreted by the employees as a repudiation of the incumbent and a preference for
the rival." Moreover, the Board reasoned, to prohibit negotiations until a ruling on the
results of a new election occurred might. work undue hardship on employers, unions, and
employees. 77 Further, the Board recognized that depending on the timing of the election,
waiting for a ruling on the results could require employees to work without a contract
unnecessarily, In addition, the Board reasoned that. such a rule allows an outside union to
interfere with an incumbent that. is in the process of, and perhaps close to completing,
negotiation of a contract that would be acceptable to a majority of the union. Thus, the
Board came to its ultimate conclusion that preservation of the status quo through an
employer's continued bargaining with an incumbent was the better way to approximate
employer neutrality. 78
In RCA Del Caribe, the Board also explained the specific effects of its new approach."
The new approach does not. insulate incumbent. unions from a legitimate outside dial-
lenge." As before, a timely filed petition will put an incumbent to the test of' demonstrat-
ing that it is still the majority choice for exclusive bargaining representation."' After the
Board's decision, however, although a valid petition has been filed, an incumbent will
retain its earned right. to demonstrate its effectiveness as a representative in the current
negotiating process." Nevertheless, the Board warned that if the challenging union
should prevail in an election following the execution of a contract with the incumbent
" Id. at 12-13, 110 L.R.R.N1. at 1371.









8" M. at 11, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1371.
8 ' Id.
82 Id.
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union, the contract with the incumbent would he considered null and void. The rival
union's successful challenge could not, therefore, be nullified on the basis of contractual
terms."
The facts in a companion case, Bruckner Nursing Home, differed from RCA Del Caribe
in certain fimdamental ways. In Bruckner Nursing Home, the Board focused its attention on
initial-organizing situations involving two or more rival labor organizations." The parties
involved in Bruckner Nursing Home were Local 144, Hotel Hospital, Nursing Home &
Allied Health Services Union, S.E.I.U., AFL-C10 (Local 144), Local 1135, Joint Board,
Nursing Home and Hospital Employees Division (Local 1115), and the employer, Abra-
ham Grossman d/b/a Bruckner Nursing Home." In the spring of 1984, Local 144 and
Local 1115 began organizational activities at the employer's nursing home facility." In
early September of 1974, Local 144 notified the employer that it possessed a majority of
signed authorization cards and a date was set for a card count.' Shortly thereafter, Local
1115 notified the employer that it was engaged in organizational activity with employees
and that the employer shoukl not extend recognition to any other labor organization."
On September 23, 1974, local 1115 filed charges against. the employer and Local 144
alleging that they had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(b)( I)(A) by interfering with the
employees' right to select a union of their choice." The card count was conducted on
September 27, 1974, the employer being informed t hereafter that. Local 144 represented
a majority of its employees." Local 144 subsequently requested collective bargaining. The
employer refused, pending the outcome of the unfair labor' practice charges filed by Local
1115. 9 ' On November 29, 1974 the unfair labor practice charges filed by Local 1115 were
dismissed by the Regional Director." 2 Negotiations between Local 144 and the employer
commenced shortly thereafter and culminated in the execution of a collective-bargaining
agreement on December 18, 1974. 93 Local 1115 then filed, on March 7, 1975, the charges
at issue in this proceeding, namely that the employer had violated section 8(a)(2) by
recognizing and negotiating with an uncertified union while another union possessed a
"colorable claim" to representation."
With respect to the foregoing facts, the Administrative Law Judge found that Local
1115 possessed a "colorable claim" to representation based on its continuous efforts to
obtain employee support during the all of 1974, and the fact that it had actually obtained
a few authorization cards." The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the employer
"by executing a collective-bargaining agreement . . . in the face of a real question
concerning representation which had not been settled by the special procedures of the
Act" had rendered unlawful assistance to Local 144 in violation of section 8(a)(2) of the
Act." In what. had become a standard remedy in this type of setting, the Administrative
" Id. at 12, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1371.
" 4 Bruckner Nursing Home, 202 N.L.R.B. at 4, 110	 at 1375.
" Id. at 2, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1374.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id., 1 10 at 1375.
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Law Judge ordered the employer to cease giving effect to the collective-bargaining
agreement with Local 144, and to withdraw and withhold recognition from Local 144
unless or until it was certified in a Board-conducted election." 7
In Bruckner, however, after reviewing its experience with Midwest Piping,' the Board
concluded that its task of reconciling the various interests of policy and law mandated a
rule which would give equal consideration to each of those interests in the light of
industrial reality." Accordingly, the Board voiced its intention no longer to find section
8(a)(2) violations in rival union, initial-organizing situations when an employer recognizes
a labor organization which represents an uncoerced, unassisted majority before a valid
petition for an election has been filed with the 13(iard. 1" The Board held that where no
petition has been filed, an employer is free to grant recognition to a labor organization
with an uncoerced majority, so long as it does not render assistance of the type which
would otherwise violate section 8(a)(2) of the Act."' The application of this rule to the
facts in the instant case, therefore, made it clear that since no petition had been filed by
either of the rival unions, the recognition granted to Local 144 was based properly on the
employer's determination of its uncoerced, unassisted majority st at us,'"
The Board explained that by making the filing of a valid petition the operative event.
for the imposition of strict. ern ployer neutrality in rival union, initial-organizing situations,
a clearly defined rule of conduct would be established, thereby furthering the goals of
both employee free choice and industrial stability.' 03 The Board explained that in situa-
tions where a rival organization could not command the support of at least thirty percent
of the unit, it would he unfair to allow that union to forestall an employer's recognition of
another organization which represented an uncoerced majority of employees and thereby
frustrate the establishment of a collective-bargaining relationship. 104 The Board further
explained that an employer, by virtue of these new guidelines, no longer would have to
guess whether a real question concerning representation had been raised, but would
instead be able to recognize a labor organization unless the employer had received notice
of a properly filed petition.'" The Board stressed that in a situation where a valid petition
has been filed, the need for resolution of the representation issue, prior to employer
recognition, is necessary to prevent undue influence or premature decisions by the
117 Id, at 3-4. 110 L.R.R.M. at 1375.
ld. at 4-9. 110 L.R.R.M. at 1375-76.
9° Id. at 9, 110 1...R.R.M. at 1376.
Id. at 9-10, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1376.
11 ' Id. at 11.13, 110 L.R.R.M. at n.13. The Board emphasized that an employer would still be
fOund liable under section 8(a)(2) for recognizing a labor organization which does actually have
majority employee support. Id. (citing International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO
[Bernhard Altmann Texas Corporation] v. N.L.R.B., 366 U.S. 731 (1961)). This Board stated that
this "longstanding principle applies in either a single or rival union organizational context and is
unaffected by the revised Midwest Piping doctrine announced in this case." Id.
"2 Id. at 14, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1378.
153 Id. at 10, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1377.
101
 Irl. at 10-11. 110 L.R.R.M. at 1377. The Board explicitly stated that it considered this 30%
figure to represent a definition of the term "substantial" in a representational context. The Board
explained that "experience had shown that ... when no labor organization had at least 30% support,
the chances of achieving majority support for union representation were too remote to justify an
election. We likewise regard the failure of a rival union to muster at least a 30% showing of interest to
he a reliable indication that an election held solely at that union's request would be unnecessary." Id.
at 11.14.
I"' Id. at 11, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1377.
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employer."'" The Board also emphasized that this new approach provides a satisfactory
answer to problems created by execution of dual authorization cards.'" The Board
explained that a validated petition supported by a thirty percent showing indicates
sufficient doubt in the reliability of any organization's apparent majority to require
resolution of the competing claims through the Board's election process." 8 Finally, the
Board concluded that the Supreme Court's recognition that Board-conducted elections
are not the sole means of ascertaining employee preferences justifies, if not mandates, an
end to the Board's absolute refusal to rely on cards in Midum:s1 Piping situations.'"
The importance of the re-examination of the Midwest Piping doctrine in Bruckner
Nursing Home, and the consequent redefinition of the Board's longstanding Midwest Piping
doctrine requiring an employer to maintain strict neutrality in the face of competing
initial union representational claims lies in two areas. First, it will severely restrict"° the
ability of a small minority — less than thirty percent of the employees — to force an
employer to withhold recognition of an organization that can clearly establish majority
support without the benefit of a Board-conducted election. Second, a de facto majority
union will be able to expand its energies as a representative, thereby avoiding a waste of
time and energy defending itself against a union that cannot even show enough support
to warrant a valid representation petition. These two effects should increase the stability
in the collective-bargaining process by recognizing the right of employees to organize
without the benefit of a Board-conducted election. No longer will the Board inject itself
into situations where it is unnecessary or counterproductive. The Board's decision in
Bruckner Nursing Home represents a recognition of the difficulties inherent"' in the
application of a standard that draws no precise lines as to when a claim is "colorable," or
"clearly unsupportable." 12 Under Bruckner Nursing Home, the Board now requires a
union to show support of at least thirty percent of the employees. The Board reasoned
that this will ensure that there will be strict employer neutrality only in those situations
which seriously require it.
The importance of RCA Del Caribe lies in the fact that no longer will the Board's
requirement for strict. employer neutrality in incumbent situations unnecessarily disrupt.
the stability of the collective-bargaining relationship in situations where no substantial
doubt of incumbent majority exists." 3 The Board emphasized in this decision, however,
that "as before, a timely filed petition will put an incumbent. to the test of demonstrating
that h still is the majority choice for exclusive bargaining representative. ”114 T he recogni-
tion of the special status of an incumbent union indicates a judgment. that, having once
1 " Id. at 11-12, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1377.
1 " Id. at 12, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1377. It is not unusual for employees confronted by solicitations
from rival unions to sign authorization cards for more than one union. Dual cards reflect the
competing organizational campaigns. They may indicate shifting employee sentiments or employee
desire to be represented by either of two rival unions. See id.
11)8 Id.
'" Id. at 13, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1377.
ll° See id. at 10-11, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1377.
'" In fact, this rejection results in an apparent return to the original application of the Midwest
Piping doctrine to rival union, initial-organizing situations. See Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom, Inc.,
74 N.L.R.B. 1443, 1445, 10 L.R.R.M. 1282, 1284 (1947) (duty of strict employer neutrality and the
necessity of a Board-conducted election were operative only when a representation petition had been
filed with the Board.)
12 See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
"3 RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. at 11, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1371.
lit Id.
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achieved the mantle of exclusive bargaining representative, a union ought not to be
deterred from its representative functions even though its majority status is under
challenge."'• The Board has accordingly developed the doctrine of presumption of
continuing majority status for the incumbent in order to give a majority representative
some reasonable degree of insulation and freedom to fulfill its mandate front employees
in its dealings with the employer.
A central criticism of the Board's redefinition of the Midwest Piping doctrine in RCA
Del Caribe was voiced in the dissents written by Chairman Van de Water and Member
Jenkins. The dissenting Members were concerned about the undue influence an em-
ployer might have by virtue of its decision to continue bargaining with the incumbent
union.'" The majority addressed this criticism by suggesting that a withdrawal from
bargaining might. in fact signal a repudiation of the incumbent and preference for the
rival.'" This predicament, the Board determined, was best resolved by preserving the
status quo through an employer's continued bargaining with an incumbent.'" In his
dissent., Member Jenkins explained that while he shared the majority's concern over the
Board's unsuccessful enforcement efforts in the courts, he believed that the Board could
resolve the difficulty through a fine tuning of rather than a major overhaul of Midwest
Piping."" Member Jenkins suggested that the major weakness of the Midwest Piping
analysis had been the Board's failure to define clearly what was required by way of
employee support to warrant finding that a real question concerning representation
exists."" He proposed, therefore, a minimum of a fifteen percent showing of employee
support 14 a rival union belOre strict. neutrality would be triggered by a Board elec-
tion."' Member Jenkins' solution would decrease the number of essentially frivolous
claims that have heretofore been able to hold the bargaining relationship. It does not,
however, recognize the unavoidable delays assticiated with elections. 122 It. also places
considerably less emphasis on the fact that an employer retains the right to withdraw front
negotiation if he believes in good faith that the incumbent no longer had majority
support.'" In such a situation, an employer would in fact be unlikely to continue
negotiating since any resulting contract could be declared null and void if the incumbent
later lost the election.
RCA Del Caribe represents the Board's recognition that its original applications of
Midwest Piping's strict neutrality rule to incumbent settings was the more appropriate
approach. RCA Del Caribe has also returned to the incumbent. union its earned right to
" 1 See id. at 11-12, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1371.
See d, at 17-18, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1372-73.
17 See id. at 10, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1371.
118 hi ,
"" a at 22, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1373-74.
21)
12 ' Id. at 23, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1373-74. Specifically. ,Member Jenkins proposed a 15% showing of
employee support. for a rival union as the requirement for holding a Board-conducted election.
' 22 Id. at till), I 10 1.„R.R.M. at n.19. Chairman Van de Water noted that in the Board's
Forty-Filth Annual Report the processing time for elections in fiscal year 1980 was approximately 38
days. This delay, he suggests, was not significant enough to warrant change in the system. The
Chairman railed to address the irossibility of this five week delay occurring just. as contract negotia-
tions were concluding. This delay could surely put a cloud over the contract negotiations. Depending
on the relationship between the employer and the incumbent union, this could be sufficient to trigger
further delays. indeed, an employer might be inclined to support an election delay if he was
disappointed in the bargaining position of the incumbent union, Id.
128 See id. at n.13.
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demonstrate its effectiveness as a representative at the bargaining table. An outside union
will now be required to view the incumbent as the previously elected majority that it is,
and not as a union artificially deprived of the attributes of its office. The RCA Del Caribe
decision does of course suffer from some of the same problems that earlier gave rise to
abandonment of this approach. The incumbent has an advantage in that it can do more
than promise action — it can actually act as representative. This advantage is balanced,
however, against the fact that it has been earned by a previous election, and the additional
expectations of useful action the employees may rightfully expect from their representa-
tive. The Board's decision in RCA Del Caribe represents a belief that stability in the
collective-bargaining process can best be achieved by minimizing the distractions for all
parties concerned. Thus, to ensure the swift and mutually beneficial outcome of the
bargaining process, the Board has determined that the incumbent should retain the
benefit of presumed majority as a way of approximating employer neutrality.
The decision in Bruckner Nursing Home, while important, is perhaps more a refine-
ment, than a redefinition of the Midwest Piping doctrine. Prior to the Bruckner Nursing
Home decision, courts were unwilling to enforce Board decisions in which the Board had
recognized a small minority of employees as a "substantial" interest, sufficient to warrant
an end of any bargaining.'" In this case, the Board held that, although an employer no
longer will automatically violate section 8(a)(2) by recognizing one of several rival unions
before an election petition has been filed, "an employer will still be found liable under
section 8(a)(2) for recognizing a labor organization which does not actually have majority
employee support." 125 A possible result of this new rule is that employers will follow the
safest course, which would be simply to refuse recognition, as clearly authorized under
Supreme Court decisions. 126 Thus, the Bruckner Nursing Home decision will most likely
only affect those situations in which the election of a union is so clearly assured that an
employer exposes himself to little or no risk of later Board sanctions by recognizing what
the employer knows to be a clear majority. The likelihood of employers recognizing a
union that does riot have a clear majority seems small since the risks of nullification of any
agreements arising out of bargaining 127 and possible liabilities under section 8(a)(2) for
recognizing a labor organization which did not actually have majority employee support.
would seem to be avoided best by a delay of the bargaining process until a clear majority
(Board-certified or otherwise) presents itself.'"
The Board's problems with the identification of a . "colorable claim" have been so
numerous that it seems this decision has been long overdue. The Board has long needed a
viable yardstick for identifying a "genuine issue" concerning representation. The only
possible problem with the Board's assignment of thirty percent as sufficient measure of
support to warrant "genuine issue" status to the rival representational claims is perhaps
the level of the percentage. Member Jenkins suggests that perhaps fifteen percent might
be more appropriate. 12 " Certainly the selection of any percentage is arbitrary in part, but
124 See cases cited supra at note 7.
1 " Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. at n.13, 110 L.R.R.M. at n.13 (citing International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL- C10 [Bernhardt-Altmann Texas Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 366
U.S. 731 (1961)).
"6 Id. (citing Lindell Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 419 U.S. '301 (1974) (au-
thorizing good faith refusal of recognition of union when employer believes it does not have majority
support)).
122 See RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. at 12, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1371.
128 Id .
'" RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. at 23, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1373 -74.
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according to the Board, experience has shown that thirty percent is an appropriate
number.'" The Bruckner Nursing Home decision represents the Board's recognition of the
need for some kind of line-drawing. It would seem that fifteen percent, especially in small
businesses would pose many of the same dangers as the ambiguous distinction previously
made.
The RCA Del Caribe and Bruckner Nursing Home decisions represent the Board's
recognition of the appeals courts' rejection of' some of the Board's applications of the
Midwest Piping doctrine*" The Board wisely has attempted to redefine its guidelines fOr
employers faced with rival unions' claims to prevent needless disruption of the bargaining
process by unions that. have no substantial claim of majority. The effect of these cases on
other Board decisions has already begun to he understood. As was perhaps presaged by
Bruckner Nursing Home and RCA Del Caribe, the NLRB has more recently overruled its
1972 Telautograph Corp .' 32 decision and held that an employer's neutrality in the face of a
union decertification petition can best be assured by maintaining the status quo.'" In
Dresser Industries the Board ruled that withdrawal by the employer from bargaining or
executing a contract may no longer be automatic upon the "mere" filing of a decertifica-
tion petition because that response does not give due weight to the incumbent union's
continuing presumption of majority status.'" This reasoning clearly tracks that found in
RCA Del Caribe and adheres to the concept of a rebuttable, residual presumption of
majority status in the incumbent union after the first year of certification."" Of course,
the Board's ruling does not erode "the principle that an employer may withdraw from
bargaining if, on the basis of objective evidence, it has a good faith doubt as to the union's
continued majority slat u.s." 37
RCA Del Caribe and Bruckner Nursing Home represent the Board's most recent attempt
to balance the protection of the employee's right to choose their representatives without
undue influence by their employer with the need for stability in the collective-bargaining
process. The cases also represent, at least in part, an implicit recognition of the role courts
have assumed in this area. The courts have failed to enforce Board decisions due
primarily to the lack of precision in the Board's decision-making process. The Board's
decisions in Bruckner Nursing Home and RCA Del Caribe should work to lessen the extent to
which courts decide whether the Board's decision can be enforced justifiably. The deci-
sions do make clear, however, that no longer will elected majority representatives be
stripped of their attributes in order to place a rival union on an equal footing with the
incumbent. The Board's decisions have set the stage for what it hopes will be a more stable
collective-bargaining process. Prior to this Survey year, stability in the collective-
bargaining process was, in the Board's opinion, best achieved through strict employer
neutrality. In the initial-organizing stage, rival union situation strict neutrality was de-
fined so as to require an employer to refrain from recognizing any of the competing
unions until after a Board-conducted election. Bruckner Nursing Home represent s a defini-
tion of strict neutrality that permits an employer to recognize a union that is not faced
' 30 Bruckner Nursing Henn, 262 N.L.R.B. at 11.14, 110 L.R.R.M. at 11.14.
See id. at 8-9, 1101-R.R.M. at 1.576. See also RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B at 12, 110 L.R.R.M.
at 1371.
"2 199 N.L.R.B. 892, 81 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1972).
"3
 Dresser industries, 269 N.L.R.B. No. 195, 111 L.R.R.M. 1436, 1438 (1982).
134 Id,
' 35
 Id. at 6, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1438.
136 See id. at 6-8, l 11 L.R.R.M. at 1437-38.
137 Id.
December 1983]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 97
with a challenging union of significance. In the past the "significance" standard was left.
largely undefined. Finally, the Board has seen fit to set the standard for defining "color-
able claims" at thirty percent. Strict neutrality in initial, rival union situations, after
Bruckner Nursing Home, will require an employer to refrain from negotiating only when
faced with rival unions that each have shown at least a thirty percent interest among
employees, or have filed a representation petition with the Board. In the incumbent
situation, the Board has decided to return to its original interpretation of "strict neu-
trality." Employers without additional information will henceforth be permitted to con-
tinue negotiations with an incumbent union. Together these two redefinitions will serve to
increase the stability of the collective-bargaining system. After many years of experimen-
tation with varying fOrmulas 16r employer strict neutrality, the Board has decided that
the risks involved do not outweigh the possible benefits to the employees' right to free and
effective representation through the collective-bargaining system.
3. *A Return to the Shopping Kart Standard for Campaign Misrepresentations:
Midland National Life Insurance Co.'
The responsibility of directing the elections in which employees determine whether
they shall he represented by a labor organization is delegated to the National Labor
Relations Board (the Board) under section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act.'- From
its inception, the Board has wrestled with the problem of what action it should take when
an employer or a union engages in misleading campaign tactics. 3 In General Shoe Corp., 4
the Board ruled that representation elections should take place under' "laboratory condi-
tions."' The Board then embarked on an effort ui regulate the content of both employer
and union campaign propaganda in a series of subsequent decisions."
In 1962, the Board decided Hollvz000d Ceramics Co.' In that case, the Board sought to
* By Michael K. Fee, Staff Member, BosToN Coiti:c• LAW REvirw.
1 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 110 L.R.R.M. 1489 (1982).
• 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
3 See, e.g., Maywood Hosiery Mills, 64 N.L.R.B. 146, 150, 17 L.R.R.M. 90, 91 (1995) and Corn
Products Refining Co., 511 N.L.R.B. 1441, 1442, 15 L.R.R.M. 104, 105 (1944) (holding the Board
cannot censor all intOrmation targeted at employees during elections, and that employees have the
ability to recognize propaganda and discount it). But see Fickett -Brown Mfg., 53 N.L.R.B. 106, 13
L.R.R.M. 98 (1943) (employer's statements interfered with employees' free choice). See generally,
Aldrich & Carlson, One. Step Forward and Two Steps Back: The Shopping Kart-General Knit Dance, 32
MERCER L. REv. 743, 744-745 (1981).
• 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1948).
• Id. at 127, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1341. The Board announced its laboratory conditions standard by
stating:
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which an
• experiment. may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible to deter-
mine the uninhibited desires of the employees. It is our duty to determine whether they
have been fulfilled. When in the rare, extreme case the standard drops too low ... the
requisite laboratory conditions are mit present and the experiment must be conducted
Over again.
Id .
See, e.g., United Aircraft Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 102, 31 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1953); The Gummed
Products Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092, 1093-1094.36 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1955) ("The ultimate consideration
is whether the challenged propaganda has lowered the standards of campaigning to the point where
it may he said that the uninhibited desires of the employees cannot be determined in an election.").
140 N.L.R.B. 221, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1962).
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preserve laboratory conditions for the exercise of the employees' free choice by holding
that the Board would set aside elections in which there had been a misrepresentation of a
material fact involving a substantial departure from the truth. 8 Under the Hollywood
Ceramics rule, the misrepresentation must have occurred at a time when the other party,
or parties to the election were prevented front making an effective reply, so that the
misrepresentation may reasonably have been expected to have had a significant impact on
the election." The Board applied the Hollywood Ceramics standard of review to election
propaganda for the following fifteen years. In 1977, however, the Board overruled
Hollywood Ceramics in Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc.'" The Shopping Kart majority
criticized the operation of the Hollywood Ceramics rule during the several years since its
announcement." The Shopping Kart Board claimed its earlier decision in Hollywood
Ceramics to review misleading election propaganda resulted in: the restriction of free
speech, inconsistent results before the Board and the courts, and increased litigation
which delayed the finalization of election results.' 2 Thus, in Shopping Karl, a majority of
the Board ruled that it would no longer probe the truth or falsity of campaign statements,
but instead, rely on the capability of employees, as mature individuals, to recognize
campaign propaganda.' 3 Less than twenty months later, a new Board majority overruled
Shopping Kart in General Knit of California, Inc." In General Knit, the Board reinstated the
Hollywood Ceramics standard after concluding that the rule announced in Shopping Karl
was "inconsistent with our responsibility to ensure fair elections.""
During the Survey year, another new majority of the National Labor Relations Board
further extended the trail of Board inconsistency regarding election propaganda. In
Midland National Life Insurance Co.,'" the Board announced it was overruling General Knit
and Hollywood Ceramics, and returning to the "sound rule" governing Board review of
campaign misrepresentations set forth in Shopping Kart." Consequently, at present, the
Board will not probe into the truth or falsity of campaign statements and will not set aside
elections because of misleading representations."
The dispute in Midland arose when the Board and the U.S. Cor•( of Appeals
8 Id. at 224, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1601.
9 Id., 51 L.R.R.M. at 1602. In determining whether a significant impact had occurred, the Board
stated it would consider whether die ittfiirmat iim was likely to have a de minimus effect on the election,
whether the party making the statement possessed substantial and intimate knowledge of the facts
which would increase its persuasive value, whether the employees had independent knowledge with
which to evaluate the information, and whether the statements were so extreme as to put the
employees on notice of their untruth. Id.
" 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 94 L.R.R.M 1705 (1977).
", Id. at 1312, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1706.
12 Id .
13 Id. at 1313, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707. In its decision to no l onger set aside elections because of
misleading statements, the Board nevertheless, reserved the right to set aside elections where
deceptive practices consist of improperly involving the Board and its processes, or where the use of
forged documents "render the voters unable to recognize propaganda for which it is.'' Id. at 1313, 94
L.R.R.M. at 1708. Furthermore, Chairman Murphy, in a concurring opinion which secured the
majority in Shopping Kart, stated her intention to continue setting aside elections "where a party
makes an egregious mistake of fact." Id. at 1314, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708 (Murphy, Chairman, con-
curring).
" 239 N.L.R.B. 619, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (1978).
" Id. at 620, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1688.
" 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 110 L.R.R.M 1489 (1982).
17 Id. at 129, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1490.
' 8 Id. at 133, 11() L.R.R.M. at 1494.
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ordered a second representation election after finding that the employer, Midland Na-
tional Life Insurance Co., had engaged in unfair labor practices and interfered with the
first election.'" The second election resulted in a tie vote but the union, Local 304A of the
Food & Commercial Workers, again filed objections to the election with the National
Labor Relations Board." The union's objections were based on the employer's actions on
the day before the second election. 21 On that afternoon, the employer distributed cam-
paign literature to the employees with their paychecks.'" One of the distributions was a six-
page document containing photographs of three local businesses and a textual descrip-
tion for each photo that contained misrepresentations about the conduct of Local 304A at
these other businesses," The document also contained a photocopy of the union's
financial report which it had filed with the Department of Labor in accordance with the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 24 The employer supplied an
inaccurate description of certain items listed on the disclosure document along with the
photocopy:24
 The union did not learn of the employer's distribution until the following
morning, three and one half hours before the employees voted."
'[he union filed objections to the employer's campaign literature with the Board
claiming that it contained substantial material misrepresentations." Upon consideration
of the union's objections, the hearing- officer concluded the document contained "numer-
ous misrepresentations of a substantial nature." 28 In addition, given the fact that the
union learned of the literature's existence only three and one half hours before the
election, and thus did not have time to respond effectively, the hearing officer ordered a
third election be held in accordance with the rule of Hollywood Ceramics, as adopted in
General Knit.'
' 9 244 N.L.R.B. 3, 102 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1979), enforced 621 F.2d 901, 104 L.R.R.M. 2293 (8th
Cir. 1980).
2" Id. at 127, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1489. The vote was 107 in favor of the Union and 107 against. the
Union with one void ballot and twenty challenged ballots. Id.
21 Id.. 110 L.R.R.M. at 1489.
22
23 Id., 110 1.. R.R.M. at 1489-90. One of the photographs in the employer's literature depicted a
deserted local plant. Id. at 128, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1490. The accompanying text stated that the union had
engaged in a strike at the plant, violence ensued, and "now all the workers are gone." Id. The
document then stated, "What did Local 304A do for them? Where is the Local 304A job security?" Id.
In actuality, the union and its members had not been on strike when the plant closed. Id. The
employees had in fact worked for one and one half years following the strike, before the plant was
closed down. Id.
" Id. Sec Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 431 (1976).
25 263 N.I.,.R.B. at 128-29, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1490. The photocopy was marked to emphasize
expenditures for union officers and employees. Id. Although the statement showed the union had
receipts of over $500,000, the line labeled disbursements "on behalf of individual members" on the
form showed nothing was spent. The text of the employer's document emphasized this disparity by
claiming "nothing was spent on behalf of individual Union members." Id. at 129, 110 L.R.R.M. at
1490. The employer failed to add, however, that the Department of Labor's instructions fin -
completing this particular forum state that the category labeled funds spent "on behalf of individual
members" should only reflect "other than normal operating expenses incurred by the Union." Id.
" Id. at 128, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1490.
2? Id. at 127, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1489.
2 " Id. The hearing officer concluded the document was designed to portray the Union as an
organization staffed by "highly paid individuals and employees who were ineffectual as bargaining
representatives, and that as a consequence, employees would stiffer with respect to job security and
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A majority of the full National Labor Relations Board decided to reverse the hearing
officer's ruling and certify the results of the election. 3 " At the outset of its opinion, the
three member majority explained the reversal was based on the decision to overrule
General Knit and Hollywood Geramics. 3 ' After "painstaking evaluation" and "careful consid-
eration," the majority announced the Board would return to the "sound rule" articulated
in shopping Karl Food Markel, Inc."
In its opinion, the three member majority began with a lengthy review of the history
of the Board's treatment of the campaign propaganda issue from the pre-General Shoe era
of the Wagner Act" to the present.'" Turning 10 a discussion of the Midland case, the
Board first established the fact that Congress has entrusted the Board with a wide degree
of discretion to establish procedures that ensure employees are provided a fair and free
choice of bargaining representatives. 35 The Board's exercise of discretion, according to
the majority, must be consistent with the concept of majority rule embodied in section 9(a)
of' dreNational Labor Relations Act." After weighing the concept 61' majority rule, along
with other critical factors," the majority explained the Board is free tn:promulgate a rule
governing the electoral process that constitutes a "justifiable and reasonable adjustment of
the democratic process."'" The majority stated a return to the Shopping Karl standard
alleviated many difficulties, including the Board's ability to ensure' certsiiu an'tf final
election results as well as the minimization of dilatory claims." Accordingly, the
majority characterized its holding in Midland as a 'justifiable and reasonable adjustment
of our electoral process."'
In support of its decision 10 return to the Shopping Kart rule governing- election
propaganda, the majority emphasized the uncertainty associated with the subjective
review of election propaganda under the Hollywood Ceramics standarc1, 41 In the majority's
view, application of the Hollywod Ceramics standard had resulted in "vague and inconsis-
tent rulings" that restricted free speech and increased litigation." In contrast, the ma-
3" Id. The members of the Board constituting the Midland majority were Members Zimmerman,
Hunter, and Chairman Van de Water. Id.
Id. at 129-130, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1490.
32 Id. at 129, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1490.
" Id.
34 N. at 129-31, 110 L.R.R.M, at 1490-1492. The majority traced the Board's treatment of what
it termed a "troublesome area." Id. at 129, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1490. After reviewing the Board's major
decisions regarding election propaganda, the majority concluded the Board's past practice concern-
ing its role in regulating campaign misrepresentation shows unquestionably that "reasonable, in-
formed individuals can differ., and indeed have differed ... in their views of the Board's proper role
in policing such misrepresentations." Id. at 130, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1492.
33 Id. at 131, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1492. The majority cited NJ„R.B. v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324,
19 L,R.R.M. 2128 (1946).
3" Id. Section 9(a) states in pertinent part:
"Representatives designed or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of
employees in a unit appropriate for such pun-poses shall constitute the exclusive representatives of all
the employees in such unit „ 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a) (1976),
263 N.L.R,R. at 131, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1492. The other factors which the majority gleaned
from N.L.R.B. v. Ai. Tower Co., supra note 35, included preserving the secrecy of the ballot,
insuring the certainty and finality of' election results, and minimizing unwarranted and dilatory'
claims by those opposed to the election results. N.
" Id. citing A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. at 332-333.




December 1983] 	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 101
}wily reasoned, the Shopping Karl standard "draws a clear line between what is and what is
not objectionable.'" The "clear line" which the majority saw in Shopping Karl is accom-
plished by not setting aside any election on the basis of the substance of a representation
made during the campaign, but rather, by focusing only on the "deceptive manner" in
which the representation was made.'" Thus, in accordance with this distinction, the
majority ruled that in the absence of forgery, through which no voter could recognize
campaign propaganda, the Board will not set aside an election that is challenged clue to
campaign misrepresentations. Instead, the Board will trust the employees involved in a
campaign 10 evaluate the substantive content of "mere propaganda."''
Unlike the "unwieldly and counterproductive" 4" Hollywood Ceramics standard, the
majority claimed its decision in Midland National to reject election challenges based on
alleged campaign misrepresentations will lead to "definite results that arc both predict-
able and speedy." 47 Furthermore, the majority also criticized the unwarranted "protec-
tionism" reflected by the Hollywood Ceramics standard." According to the Board majority,
the rule of Shopping Karl, in addition to providing a definitive and consistent treatment of
campaign misrepresentations, more appropriately respects the maturity of employees
and their ability to exercise a skeptical assessment of information by "recognizing cam-
paign propaganda hw what it's worth and discounting it." 4 "
At the close of the Midland opinion, the majority defended its decision to once again
change the existing rule concerning campaign misrepresentations. The members of the
majority expressed their understanding that their decision to return to the rule of
Shopping Karl would "cause concern.'" Nevertheless, the majority reaffirmed its "emphat-
ic belief" that the Shopping Kart standard is the "most appropriate accommodation of all
the interests here involved, and should be given a fair chance to succeed."'' After
balancing the benefits obtained through the reinstatement of Shopping Karl''' against the
possibility that some voters may be deceived by erroneous campaign propaganda, the
Id.. quoting General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (1977)
(Pencil°, Member, dissenting).
14 263 N.L.R.B. at 131, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1493.
.4ti Id.
" Id, at 132, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1493.	 „.
' Id. The majority claimed the definite and speedy results will occur under the new standard
because the "incentive lin - protracted litigation" is reduced, as is the potential for disagreement
between the Board and the courts. Id. Furthermore, the potential for delay is "almost nonexistent"
under the majority's new standard because "objections alleging false or inaccurate statements cats he
summarily rejected at the first stage of the Board's proceedings." Id.
48 1,1,
4" See ,supra note 13. See also Illinois Community Hospital, 224 N.L.R.B. 632, 638, 92
L.R.R.M. 1640, 1640 (1976). The Board majority also admitted, however, that the sophistication of
employees was recognized "to a certain extent" under Hollywood Ceramics. 263 N.L.R.B. at 132, 110
L.R.R.M. at 1493.
5" 263 N.L.R.B, at 132, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1493. The majority compared its Midland decision to
"General Knit's quick retreat from Shopping Kart in 1978." See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Mosey Mfg. Co., 595
F.2d 375, 100 1...R,R.M. 3134 (7th Cir. 1979) (Appeals court uncertain of which of the Board's "on
again, off again" standards to apply since the disposition of the election challenge spanned a period
covered by both Shopping Karl and General tinii.),
5 ' 263 N.L.R.B, at 132, 110 L.R,R.M. at 1493.
52 According to the majority the benefits include: definite, speedy, and predictable results; the
removal of impediments to free speech caused by the Hollywood Ceramics standard which would
overturn an election or cause "endless delay" because of an "inadvertent error"; and minimizing
disagreement between the Board and the courts, thereby promoting "uniformity in national labor
law". Id.
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majority concluded that the balance "unquestionably" favored the Shopping Karl stan-
dard," Exercising its "administrative flexibility,- therefore, and acknowledging frankly
that "the policy views of the Board have changed,'" the majority summarized t he Board's
holding. After Midland National Life Insurance Co., the National Labor Relations Board will
not investigate the truth or falsity of campaign statements, and will not set aside elect ions
because of misleading campaign representations," Only when forged documents arc
involved, preventing employees from recognizing propaganda for what it is, will the
Board intervene and set aside an election result." Because the allegations raised by the
union in Midland consisted solely of the employer's use of material misrepresentations,
the Board applied the Shopping Kart doctrine and dismissed the union's objections,
thereby certifying the election result. 57
Two members of the National Labor Relations Board strongly dissented in the
Midland case." The dissenters were dismayed that for the second time in five years, a
"bare majority" of the Board abandoned the "flexible and balanced Hollywood Ceramics
standard," and substituted an "ultra permissive standard that places a premium on the
well tinted use of deception, trickery, and fraud . " ' " The dissenters criticized the majority
for relinquishing the Board's obligation to ensure full freedom of choice for employees in
elections by regulating the use of fraud and deceit as campaign tools." The dissenters
claimed that the "illusory benefits" of speed and reduced litigation, sought by the ma-
jority's return to the Shopping Kart rule, should never take precedence over the preserva-
tion of 1 he integrity of the election process."
The dissenters also vigorously defended the Hollywood Ceramics rule from the ma-
jority's at tacks." 2 Contrary to the majority's view, the dissenters contended the Board did
not at tempt to scrutinize elections completely through the application of the Hollywood
Ceramics standard. 63 Rather, the Hollywood Ceramics standard, according to the dissenters,
functioned only to keep election propaganda within certain bounds." The dissenters also
Id,
" Id.
Id. at 139, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1494.
'" IrL The majority also stated it would continue to set aside elections when a Board document
has been altered so as to indicate an endorsement by the Nord of a party in the election. 14. at 133
n.25, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1494 n.25, The Board stated it would also continue to regulate campaign
conduct consisting of "threats, promises and the like," Id. at 133, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1494.
" Id. at 133, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1494.
Members Fainting and Jenkins dissented, Both Members had also dissented mgether in
Shopping liars. See 22S N.L.R.B. at 1315, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709.
'" 263 N.L.R.B. at 133, 110 L.R.R.N1. at 1494 (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
"" Id. at 134, 110 L.R.R.NI. at 1495 (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting.)
fi 1 Id.
" Id.
"" Id. The dissenters quoted language from Hollywood Ceramics itself in support of their position.
M. In that case the Board stated:
The Board has limited its intervention in cases of this type because an election by secret
ballot, conducted under Government auspices should not be lightly set aside, and
because we realize that additional elections upset the plant routine and prevent stable
labtw-ntanagement relations. We are also aware that absolute precision of statement
and complete honesty are not always attainable in a campaign, nor are they expecnNI by
employees. Election campaigns arc hotly contested and feelings frequently run high. At
such limes, a party may in its zeal overstate its own virtues and the vices of the other
wit hou t essentially impairing laboratory conditions.
140 N.1„R.B. at 223-24, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1601.
" 263 N.L.R.B. at 134, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1495 (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
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acknowledged the ability of employees to recognize some campaign misrepresentations
and discount them. 65 In the dissenters' view, the Board had accommodated this fact
through its flexible application of the Hollywood Ceramics doctrine, taking the facts of each
case into account before setting aside an election. 66
In place of the adaptable Hollywood Ceramics rule, however, the dissenters claimed the
Midland majority has created an irrebuttable presumption that employees can always
recognize misrepresentations, with the exception of forgery, and discount them."' The
dissenters concluded that. the majority's approach to the regulation of campaign propa-
ganda thus abandoned employees "utterly to the mercies of unscrupulous campaign-
ers. " ''" Consequently, in complete contrast to the majority's view, the dissenters chose to
apply the Hollywood Ceramics analysis to the facts of Midland. 6" They concluded that the
employer had engaged in substantial misrepresentations at the last minute in an attempt
to fraudulently influence the employees' free choice." By tolerating the employer's
conduct, the dissenters found that the majority had abandoned the Board's statutorily
imposed oversight responsibility. 71 The dissenters, therefore, concluded that the employ-
ees' right to a free, undistorted choice in a representation election is frustrated by the
Board's Midland opinion. 72 According to the Midland dissent, the majority's ruling pre-
served only the right to engage in lies, trickery, and fraud."
The Board's announcement. in Midland that it will no longer set aside elections
because of the use of deceptive propaganda anti misrepresentations during a campaign
appears to be an unfortunate development. The Midland holding seems inconsistent with
the Board's obligation to ensure a free and uninhibited choice for employees selecting a
bargaining representative. The Board majority apparently fails to appreciate the damage
inflicted upon the integrity of the Board's election process when even a small number of
employees are influenced by deceptive campaign propaganda. In addition, reinstitution
of the Shopping Kari rule eliminates any possible deterrent against the use of fraudulent
campaign tactics. The intention of the Midland majority, that is, to reduce unnecessary
litigation and devise a clear, consistent approach to the problem of deceptive campaign
propaganda, is commendable. By totally abandoning the review of fraudulent and decep-
tive electioneering, however, the Board appears to go too far and relinquishes too much
responsibility in its effort to achieve its desired objectives.
In its Midland opinion, the majority noted that a balancing of the benefits achieved by
the reinstatement of the Shopping Kart rule, against the "possibility that some voters may
be mislead by erroneous campaign propaganda' unquestionably favors the deregula-
tion of campaign propaganda achieved through the Shopping Kart rule. 7 ' As the dissent
more properly states, however, the achievement of benefits such as the reduction in the
66 id .
" 7 Id.
" 8 Id. The dissenters expressed particular concern over the "expert cadre of prolessional
opinion molders who devise campaigns For many of our representation elections." Id.
" Id. at 135, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1496 (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
74 Id. The dissent termed the employer's use of the Union's financial report an "elaborately
conceived fraud." Id. Midland's use of the form, according to the dissenters constituted "a Fraudu-
lent misrepresentation of the most serious and extreme nature." Id.
7 ' Id.
72 Id .
73 Id. at 135, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1494 (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
' See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
75 Id.
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amount of litigation before the Board should never take precedence over the Board's
duty to preserve the integrity of the election process.' Contrary to the majority's reason-
ing, the integrity of the Board's electoral process is threatened even by the prospect. that.
only "some" voters may be misled by deceptive campaign propaganda. As one empirical
study of representation elections has illustrated," while a majority of the employees
surveyed were not influenced by election propaganda when they ultimately cast their
vote, nineteen percent of the employees in the study were persuaded by propaganda."
Most importantly, however, in over one-quarter of the representation elections analyzed
in the study, the votes of the nineteen percent of the employees influenced by pro-
paganda determined the outcome of the election." In the Midland case, it was only
necessary for one employee to be deceived by the employer's literature in order to
maintain the deadlock that blocked a majority for the union." Accordingly, the outcome
of the Midland majority's balancing seems erroneous. The majority fails to recognize that
the deception of a seemingly insignificant. number of voters can nevertheless determine
the outcome of the entire election.
The most serious threat to the integrity of representation elections posed by the
Midland decision is the removal of a major deterrent to campaign misconcluct.. 8 ' Under
the Hollywood Ceramics standard, there was at least some point, albeit a vague one, at which
the Board would step into the emotional atmosphere of a representation election and
force campaign rhetoric back within certain bounds. 82
 After the Board's pronouncement.
in Midland that it will close its eyes to all campaign misrepresentations, with the exception
of forgery, both employers and unions are now free to launch a last minute propaganda
" 263 N.L.R.B. at 134, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1495 (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting). See
also General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. at 623, 99 L.R.R.M, at 1690.
" See Getman & Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying N,L.R.B. Regidation t f Campaign
Misrepresentations: An Empirical Evaluation, 28 STAN. L. Rev. 263 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Getman
& Goldberg, Campaign Misrepresentations]. See also Getman & Goldberg, Regulation of Cam-
paign Tactics: The Behairioral Assumptions on Which the Board Regulates, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1465 (1975)
thereinafter cited as Getman & Goldberg, Campaign Tactics].
" Getman & Goldberg, Campaign Misrepresentations, supra note 77 at 264. The authors of the
study examined 31 elections in an attempt to verify the assumptions under which the Board justifies
its regulation of representation elections. The authors found, through interviews conducted before
and after the representation elections, that the electioneering engaged in by the parties during the
campaign had absolutely no effect on 81 percent of the voters. Id. at 283. See also General Knit of
California, Inc., 239 N.I..R.B. at 621, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1689, and Shopping Kart Food Market, 228
N.L.R.B. at 1313, 94 L.R.R.M, at 1707.0n the basis of their findings, the authors recommended that
the Board overrule Hollywood Ceramics and refuse to set aside any election that is challenged because
of an alleged misrepresentation of fact or law. Getman & Goldberg, Campaign Misrepresentalions,supra
note 77 at 284.
7"
 Getman & Goldberg, Campaign Misrepre.srYttations, supra note 77 at 281. See also General Knit',
239 N.L.R.B. at 622, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1690.
80 See supra note 20.
8 ' See Truesdale, From General Shoe to General Knit: A Return to Hollywood Ceramics, 30 LAB. L.J.
67, 68 (1979) (Hollywood Ceramics has maintained the integrity of the Board's electoral process by
"establishing a boundary beyond which parties understand they cannot tread without significant risk
that success at the polls will be vitiated by properly filed post election objections."). See also, J. I. Case v.
N.L.R.B,, 55 F.2d 202, 205, 95 L.R.R.M. 2480, 2482 (8th Cir. 1977) ("If either side departs
substantially from the truth, that side must accept the consequences if the misrepresentation,
whether or not intended, could reasonably be expected to affect significantly the outcome of the
election.").
" See Aldrich & Carlson supra note 3 at 766 ("[t]he deterrence argument is perhaps the most
compelling argument raised by the General Knit majority.").
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blitz based on fraudulent or deceptive information without any fear of Board reprisal."
Cimsequently, by completely eliminating the possibility of Board intervention, the Mid-
land majority has removed the incentive for a campaigning party to temper the content of
their election propaganda before distribution." The Midland ruling, therefore, lifts the
restraints from unscrupulous individuals who seek to interfere with the employees' free
election through the use of deceitful campaign trickery."' Not even the Shopping Karl rule.
which the Midland majority sought to reinstate through its decision went. this far."
The Board's decision to completely withdraw from the regulation of serious cam-
paign misrepresentations is an unnecessary and extreme course of action. In place of the
radical abdication of its responsibility exemplified by the Board's Midland opinion, it is
possible for the Board to frame a workable standard of review governing campaign
misrepresentations and to abide by it. The Board continues to be bound by its self-
imposed duty to guarantee that representation elections occur under -laboratory condi-
tions." 7 The standard created by the Board in General Knit appears to be the most
reasonable and workable standard that has been developed for the regulation of serious
and damaging campaign misrepresentations."
The opinion of the Board majority in General Knit recognized each of the objections
to the Hollywood Ceramics doctrine raised by the Midlated majority." Accordingly, the
Board structured a standard in General Knit that would allow the waging of a vigorous
campaign by the parties, but also protect the right of employees to a free and uninhibited
choice in the election. The General Knit rule protects employers front campaigners who
distort election issues at the last minute through the use of substantial misrepresentations
83 An election where parties engage in election eve deceptions in the hope that the other party
will lack sufficient time to respond has been referred to by one commentator, a former Board
Member as "election by bombshell." See Truesdale,.mpra notes 81 and 70. See also Bak, The Regulation
of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. I.. Rev.
38, 92 (1964).
" See Miller, The Gelman, Goldberg, and Herman Questions, 28 STAN. L. Rev. 1163, 1170 (1976)
(Former N.1..R.B. Chairman Miller states: "Yet those of us who are directly invcrIved in counseling
people who arc facing campaigns know that. N.L.R.B. decisional law does have a deterrent effect. We
know it because our clients seek and billow our advice as to what may and may not be done during
these campaigns.").
" 263 N.L.R.B. at 134, 110 1...R.R.M, at 1495 (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
56 In Shopping Karl, then Chairman Murphy, who filed the determinative concurring opinion
form a majority, agreed with the basic principles set forth in Hollywood Ceramics. 228 N.L.R.B. at
1314, 94 L. R.R.M. at 1708 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring). Unlike the other two members of the
Shopping Karl majority who advocated the same pertnissive standard as that adopted by the Midland
majority, Chairman Murphy supported setting an election aside where a party has made an "egre-
gious mistake of fact." Id.
87 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See also Raskin, Deregulation of Union Campaigns':
Restoring the First Amendment Balance, 28 STAN. 1.„ REV. 1175, 1179 (AIL Raskin in an analysis of the
Getman & Goldberg study, supra notes 77-78, suggests a standard !Or the regulation of elections
under which no election would be set aside on the grounds that a party engaged in deceptive
campaign tactics unless the margin of defeat or victory is less than 20 percent.).
"" See General Knit, 239 N.L.R.B. at 620, 99 L.R.R.M., at 1689. See also Modine Manufacturing
Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 527, 530, 83 L.R.R.M. 1133, 1136 (1973) (the Board undertook an extensive
review of the operation of the Hollywood Ceramics rule and stated, "We do not wish to have unrealistic
standards, or insist upon such improbable purity of word or deed that will obstruct or delay our
administrative task of conducting elections in so high a number of cases that any hard fought
campaign will almost inevitably result in our elections being invalidated." Id. cited in General Knit of
California Inc., '239 N.L.R.B. at 623, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1591.
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of material facts, relevant to the campaign. The General Knit majority added a further
component to its standard that was not emphasized by the Board in Hollywood Ceramics.
Under General Knit, the campaigner engaging in the misrepresentations must be per-
ceived by the employees 01 possess "special knowledge" that would legitimize his or her
statements in the eyes of the employees." Framed in this way, the General Knit standard
can operate as a narrow rule, invoked by the Board to set aside only those elections in
which all the required elements are present. and in which the laboratory conditions of the
election have been seriously impaired."'
The Midland National Life Insurance Co, majority characterized its decision to deregu-
late campaign propaganda as the product of administrative decision making, based
largely on the experience gained through the constant process of trial and error."' 1t.
remains to he seen what experience the Board will gain from its resurrection of Shopping
Kart's restrained approach to the regulation of campaign propaganda. Perhaps Midland is
the first in a series of steps by the new Board membership to further deregulate represen-
tation elections. The Board may next seek to deregulate representation elections by
removing its restrictions on coercive or threatening speech by campaigners." One fact
that is evident from the Board's experience with the issue of regulating the content of
campaign propaganda was explicitly recognized by the Board majority in Midland. The
majority found that the cumulative experience of the Board shows that "reasonable minds
can, and indeed have differed over the most appropriate resolution of this issue..." Given
the fact that the Midland majority also admitted frankly that "the policy views of the Board
have changed,"' it is forseeahle that in the future, as reasonable minds continue to differ,
and the policy views of the Board continue to change along with its membership, the
problem of whether the Board should regulate the content of election propaganda will be
the subject of repeated Board review.
4. *A Less Restrictive View of Irregularly Marked Ballots: Kaufman's Bakery'
Under section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board (the Board) is authorized to administer a representation election to an'appropriate
unit of employees.' The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that through the Act. Congress
has entrusted the Board with a wide degree of discretion in establishing procedures and
safeguards necessary to ensure the fair and free choice of bargaining representatives by
employees. 3
 One of the issues that has plagued the Board over the years in its effort to
" 239 N.L.R.B. at 620, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1684-88. See also Truesdale, supra note 81 at 70.
" See, e.g., Mosey Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R,B,, 701 F.2d 610, 112 L.R.R.M 2822, 2830-2832 (7th Cir.
1983) (Swygert, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting) (an extensive listing of cases in which the Board
applied narrowly the General Knit misrepresentation doctrine).
92 263 N.L.R.B. at 132, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1493.
" See Truesdale, ,supra note 81 at 74 (quoting from Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., slip op. p. 5 (9th Cir., 1978) ("It is tempting to seize upon the (Getman & Goldberg) study
and go farther than the Board did in Shopping Kart, holding we will no longer sustain orders setting
aside elections, or set aside orders sustaining them in cases of threats as well as in cases of claimed
misrepresentations in election campaigns.")). See also Miller, note 84 supra at 1169-1170.
" 263 N.L.R.B. at 132, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1493.
" Id.
* By Michael K. Fee, Staff Member, BOSTON' COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
264 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 111 L.R.R.M. 1261 (1982).
29 U.S.C. § 159(c).
3 N.L.R.B. v. A.J. Tower Co„ 329 U.S. 324, 330,31, 19 L.R.R.M. 2128 (1946).
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safeguard representation elections is the problem of unclear or irregularly marked
ballots. The validity of such ballots may determine the outcome of close elections. The
Board has engaged in various attempts to address this issue, but the Board has had
difficulty framing a doctrine that may he consistently applied to ballots challenged
because, of the unconventional, perplexing. or indefinite manner in which they are
completed. 4
Parties involved in representation elections have generally challenged the validity of
two types of irregularly marked ballots before the National Labor Relations Board. On
the one hand, the validity of a ballot may be challenged when a voter has not followed the
ballot instructions and instead of indicating his preference in the appropriate box on the
front of the ballot, the voter places some type of written message on the reverse side.' On
the other hand, the validity of a ballot may he challenged when it has been marked on the
proper side, but the nature of the markings, or their location on the ballot, leads to
conflicting interpretations of the voter's intent." In San Joaquin Compress & Warehouse Co.,'
t he Board was confronted with a ballot of the latter type.' In that case, the Board ruled
that the manner in which the ballot was marked rendered the ballot an "enigma.""
Accordingly, due to the "irregular nature of the markings on the ballot," and because the
intent of the voter was unclear, the Board declared the ballot void .'°
See, e.g. Western Electric Co., Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. No. 144. 29 L.R.R.M. 1187 (1951) (Board
holds ballot which has no markings on the front where the choice should be indicated, but rather has
"AFL" clearly written across the back is void.). But see N.L.R.B, v. Manhattan Corp., 620 F.2d 53, 104
L.R.R.M. 2700 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 101 S. Ct. 3050, 107 L.R.R.M. 2632 (1981) (Appeals court
reversed the Board's decision to void a ballot with nothing written (in the front, only the word "no"
written on the hack. The court ordered that vote counted as a valid vote against the union.). See also
N.L.R.B. v. Titche-Goettinger Co., 433 F.2d 1045, 75 L.R.R.M. 2561 (5th Cir. 1970) (Board's
decision to void a ballot with only' the word "no" on its back is reversed.).
See, e.g. Missoula Textile Services, 261 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 110 L.R.R.M. 1179 (1982); Mallin
Bros. Co.. 261 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 110 L.R.R.M. 1200 (1982).
The Board articulated a rule governing the validity of ballots marked on the reverse side in
Columbus Nursing Home Inc„ 188 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 76 L.R.R.M. 1417 (1971). In that case, the
ballot in question contained bi.i.yes for each competing union in the election, as well as a box labeled
"neither." 76 L.R.R.M. at 1418. The voter left the designated boxes blank and instead wrote
"neither" and "X" on the back of the ballot. Id. The Board ruled the ballot was void because the
voter's total disregard for the instructions rendered any attempt to interpret his intent "speculative."
Id. Despite court of appeals decisions to the contrary, see, e.g. Hy-Land Convalescent Hospital v.
N.L.R.B., 110 L.R.R.M. 2220, 2223 n.5 (9th Cir. 1982), the Board continued to void ballots marked
on their hack until Columbus Nursing Home was overruled in 1982. See Hydro Conduit. Corp., 260
N.L.R.B. No. 178, 109 L.R.R.M. 1320, 1321 (1982) (The word "si" written on the back of a ballot for
a single union election by a Spanish speaking employee is an "unambiguous expression of voter
intent.") Id.
6 See, e.g. Wackenhut Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 666 F.2d 464, 109 L.R.R.M. 2499 (11th Cir. 1982)
(Instructions on the ballot asked "Do you want to be represented by the Union?" One union was
listed on the ballot and the instructions further asked for an "X" to be placed in either the box
marked "Yes" or the one marked "No." The employee wrote "No" in both boxes.). See also Mercy
College, 212 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 87 L.R.R.M. 1116 (1974) (A ballot contained a clear "X" in the "Yes"
box and a faint "X" "No" box that had been shaded over.).
251 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 105 L.R.R.M. 1007 (1980).
" 105 L.R.R.M. at 1008. The ballot was marked in pencil with what appeared to be a check mark
or an "X" and additional random markings in the "No" box. Id. There were no markings in the "Yes"
box. Id.
9 Id. The Board claimed it was unable to discern whether the additional marks in the "No" box
were an attempt to empahsize a no vote, or an attempt to obliterate the no vote and cast a "no choice"
vote. Id.
70
 Id. Member Jenkins dissented in San Joaquin Compress, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1008 (Jenkins,
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During the Survey year, in Kaufman's Bakery, Inc.," the National Labor Relations
Board decided to overrule San Joaquin Compress and sustain the validity of a ballot
irregularly marked in only one box." The Board announced that it would thereafter
consider a ballot with a "mark in only one box, despite some irregularity, as presumptively
a valid indication of the intent of the voter."" This result, according to the Board, is
consistent with the Board's long established policy of attempting to give effect 10 voter
intent whenever possible." Consequently, after Kau/loan's Bakery, a participant in a
representation elction may not challenge the validity of a ballot irregularly marked, but
nonetheless, marked in favor of one of the options presented on the ballot.
In Kaufman's- Bakery, the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board
had presided over a representation election in which the Kaufman's employees voted over -
whether to engage the International Longshoreman's Association (the Union) as their
collective bargaining agent.' A tally of the votes cast by twenty-six eligible voters revealed
nine votes in favor of the Union, nine votes against the Union, and six votes were
challenged.'" T. of the challenged ballots were marked in pencil with an "X" and
additional marks within the "Yes'' box." The "No - box was left unmarked by the voters,
and there were no other marks on the ballots.'" The Regional Director reviewed the
irregularly marked ballots in accordance with the Board's decision in San Joaquin Com-
press.'" The Regional Director ruled the ballots from the Kattfinan's Bakery election did
not contain the same type of marks that constituted an "inadequate manifestation of voter
intent" and lead to the voiding of the ballot challenged in San Joaquin Compress.'" Rather,
the Regional Director concluded the voters who marked the ballots challenged front
Kaufman's Bakery were attempting to emphasize their "Yes" votes with additional mark-
ings.""
Both the employer and the Union filed exceptions to the Regional Director's ruling
with the full five-member panel of the National Labor Relations Board." A four-member
majority of the Board announced that it agreed ivith the Regional Director's conclusion
that the ballots should be counted as valid "Yes" votes in favor of the Union, but the
Board disagreed with the Regional Director's analysis.' The majority reasoned that it was
Member, dissenting). He felt that the ballot had been marked "substantially in compliance with the
instructions given." Id. He conceded that the ballot was marked irregularly, but he felt the ballot
"indicated with a reasonable certainty the voter's intent." Id, He also chastised the majority
establishing a rule that "any irregularity in the making of a voter's choice presumptively makes his or
her intent unclear." Id.
" 264 N.L.R.B. No. 33, I I 1 L.R.R.M. 1261 (1982).
12
 Id. at 3, l l l L.R.R.M. at 1261. The majority stated it was adopting the position stated by
Member Jenkins in his dissent in San Joaquin Compress. id. at 2 iii, I 1 1 L.R.R.M. at 1261 n.1.
13 Id. at 3, 111  L.R.R.M. at 1261,
Id.
15 Id. at 1, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1261.
17 Id. at 2, IL I I„R,R.M. at 1261.
18 Id. The other ballots were challenged on voter eligibility grounds. In the Kaufman's Bukeri'
decision, the Board adopted the regional director's findings as to These challenged votes. Id. The
regional director sustained the challenge to the votes cast by two entployees and dismissed the tither
challenges ordering Mc two ballots to he opened and counted. Id .
1" For a discussion of Sari Joaquin Compress, see supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
2" 264 N.L.R.B. No. 33 at 2, I II L.R.R.M. at 1261.
2' Id.
' 2 Id. at 3, 111  L.R.R.M. at 1261.
23 Id. The Karyfman's Bakery majority consisted of Chairman Van de Water, Members Jenkins,
Zimmerman and Hunter. hl .
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the Board's "long standing and established policy to give effect to voter intent whenever
possible."" In accordance with that policy, the majority reasoned that when a ballot
contained an "X" almost entirely within the "Yes" or the "No" box, and when no
irregular markings appear outside the marked box, "there can be little doubt" that the
voter intended that his vote be counted for or against the particular union, 25 The majority
then explicitly overruled San Joaquin Compress to the extent that it was inconsistent with
their instant opinion.'"
At the close of the Kaufman's Bakery opinion, the Board majority elaborated on the
rationale behind its decision," The majority acknowledged that it was "of course, impos-
sible to determine with absolute certainty" what a voter is trying to say through stray
marks he may make on a ballot," In light of this fact, the majority then reviewed the San
Joaquin Compress decision in which the Board was faced with a challenge to a ballot
essentially similar to the ones at issue in Kaufman's Bakery."
In San Joaquin Compress, the Board had ruled that the voter who drew lines over his
original "X" mark might have been attempting to nullify that decision and lodge a "no
choice" vote.'" The Kaufman's Bakery majority, in contrast, viewed this scenario as unlikely
given the clear ballot instructions that state, "if you spoil this ballot, return it to the Board
Agent for a new one.'Fhe majority also reasoned that the practice of invalidating a
ballot whenever there is the "slightest variance from the normal manner of ballot mark-
ing" would cause the disenfranchisement of many voters whose ballots essentially indi-
cated their intent." Consequently, because the ballots at issue in Kaufman's Bakery were
completed substantially in compliance with the instructions, and because there was no
suggestion from the markings that the voters were attempting to identify themselves, the
Board majority concluded its opinion by restating its holding that the "irregularly marked
ballots indicate with reasonable certainty the employee's intent to vote" for the union."
Member Fanning dissented from the Board majority opinion in Kaufman's Bakery. 34
As the sole dissenter, Member Fanning claimed the ballots at issue in Kaufman's Bakery
"illustrate the impracticality" of the Board's decision to decipher the intent of voters
whose ballots 'fall short of a clear and unambiguous expression of intent," 3'' Member
Fanning restated a position he had advocated prior to Kaufman's Bakery in favor of a
formal Board rule that would automatically invalidate ballots not properly marked on
their face in accordance with the instructions." According to Member Fanning, the
ballots in Kaufman's Bakery may either represent an attempt by a voter to emphasize his
choice, or an attempt to obliterate his vote and cast a "no choice" vote." Member Fanning






See supra notes 8 Sc 9.
" 264 N.L.R.B. No. 33 at 3, Ill L.R.R.M. at 1261.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 3-4, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1261-1262.
" Id. at 4, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1262.
34 269 N.L.R.B. No. 33 at 5, III L.R.R.M. at 1262 (Fanning, Member, dissenting in part).
3,-, Id.
' Id. See also Hydro Conduit Corp., 260 N.L.R.B. No. 178, 109 L.R.R.M. 1320, 1321 (1982)
(Fanning, Member, concurring and dissenting).
" 264 N.L.R.B. No. 33 at 5-6, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1262 (Fanning, Member, dissenting in part).
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alter his original ballot. rather than obtaining a new one.' Therefore, under the reason-
ing of San Joaquin Compress, and because the Board's decision to adopt one of the two
possible interpretations of the ballot's meaning was based on an "unwarranted degree of
speculation," Member Fanning stated that he would declare the ballots challenged in
Kaufman's Baker): void."
The National Labor Relations Board's disposition of Kaufman's Bakery appears to be
the correct approach to the problem of irregularly marked ballots. While it is clearly
within the Board's discretion to do so, the Board has never adopted a policy such as that
advocated by Member Fanning,'" that would regard any ballot marked in an unorthodox
manner as void.'" Rather, the Board has chosen to count ballots whenever the intent of
the voter is clearly apparent." Under this policy, the Board has chosen to accept several
different types of irregularly marked ballots as valid expressions of voter intent.'" Given
the type of questionable ballots the Board has accepted in the past, the Board's decision to
invalidate ballots with unclear markings in a single box after San Joaquin Compress appears
irreconcilable with prior Board practice. Thus, in the absence of a rule invalidating all
irregularly marked ballots, the Board's decision to overrule San Joaquin Compress in
Kaufman's Bakery is consistent with the Board's practice of defining what type of ballot
markings are a satisfactory expression of voter intent."
In addition, the Board's decision in Kaufman's Bakery to widen the range of acceptable
ballot markings aligns the Board with  the view of irregularly marked ballots held by the
courts of appeals. Various circuit courts have reviewed Board decisions on ballot validity
in light of a statutory policy that "favors inclusion of ballots where intent can he deter-
mined."" In some instances these courts have reversed Board decisions to invalidate
ballots that are irregularly marked when the courts felt it was possible to discern the
proper intent of the voter." While at one time t he Board openly defied circuit court
m Id. See also note 31 supra and accompanying text.
" 264 N.L.R.B. No. 33 at 6, III L.R.R.M. at 1262 (Fanning, Member, dissenting in part).
4" See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
" See N.L.R.B. v. Whitinsville Spinning Ring Co., 199 F.2d 585, 588, 31 L.R.R.M, 2051, 2053
(1st Cir. 1952).
42 Id. See also N.L.R.B. v. Saulk Valley Mfg. Co., 486 F.2d 1127, 1133, 84 L.R.R.M. 2674, 2677
(9th Cir. 1973) ("It is well established however that in representative elections, the Board will count
all ballots where the voters' intent has been clearly manifested, even if the voter has not followed the
proper designation procedure, provided that mode of designation does not reveal the voter's
identity.").
• " See, e.g. Garod Radio Corp„ 32 N.L.R.B. 1010, 8 L.R.R.M. 240 (1941) (The letters "CIO"
written in the box under a local union's name is a valid vote for the union); Abtex Beverage Corp.,
237 N.L.R.B. No. 203, 99 L.R.R.M. 1107 (1978)
   (Ballot marked with an "X" in both the "Yes" and the
"No" boxes is a valid yes vote because the "No" box had sonic circular pen marks over it.); Daylight
Grocery Co. v. N.L.R.B., 678 F.2d 905, 110 L.R.R.M. 2915 (11th Cir. 1982) (The Board found a ballot
manifests "clear intent" where the "Yes" box had a check mark, and the "No" box had a check mark
and some evidence of an erasure); Belmont. Smelting Works, 115 NJ-R.13. 1481, 37 L.R.R.M. 1131
(1956) (A complete "X" in one box is a valid vote despite the presence of a diagonal line in the other
box).
44
" Daylight Grocery Co. v. N.L.R.B. supra note 43 at 2918 quoting N.L.R.B. v. Saulk Valley Mfg,
Co., 486 F.2d at 1135.
" See, e.g. N.L.R.B. v. Leonard Creations of California, 638 F.2d 1 l 1, 106 L.R.R.M. 2488, 2489
(9th Cir. 1981) (N.L.R.B. erred in holding a ballot invalid when the "No" box contained a complete
"X" and the "Yes" box contained three-quarters of a fully drawn "X", Given the presence of the
completed "X", the voter clearly intended to vote "no") and N.L.R.B. v. Connecticut Foundry Co„
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review of a policy invalidating certain types of irregularly marked ballots,;' the Board's
decision in Kaufman's Bakery will no clotibt he well received by courts that would prefer to
count a ballot "if there is a clear expression of preference, regardless of the irregularity of
the mark on the ballot.''
 Board's decision in Kaufman's Bakery marks the second time during the Survey
year that the Board has reversed its more restrictive views of irregularly marked ballots.
Earlier in the year, the had overruled its policy of invalidating ballots that are
marked on their reverse side in Hydra Cottditif Corp."" These decisions, when coupled with
the Board's Survey year decision to cease its practice of reviewing the content of represen-
tation election campaign propaganda t hat is allegedly misleading," seem to represent a
Board decision to limit its subjective review of representation elections. Like the "trouble-
some area" of campaign misrepresentations, the problem of irregularly marked ballots
has been subject to different views from different Board memberships,' Therefore, until
a Supreme Court statement on the proper treatment of irregularly marked ballots is
received, the currently permissive Beard position represented by Kaufman's Bakery, de-
spite its acceptance by some courts of appeals, may only be temporary.
B. *Majority Union Access In Public School Mailboxes: Perry Educational
Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association'
Since 1970 several federal and state courts have considered the constitutionality of
provisions in collective bargaining contracts that grant the incumbent bargaining rep-
resentative of public school teachers access to the interschool mail system, but deny such
access to minority unions.' While it has been argued that such exclusions abridge the first.
amendment free speech rights of minority unions, only the Seventh Circuit 3 found t hat
110 L.R.R.M. 3307, 3310-3311 (2d Cir. 1982) (The Board abused its discretion by invalidating a
ballot marked "No" in both the "No" and the "Yes" lxixes. Ballot clearly indicates the voter's intent to
vote against the union.). See also Mycalex Div. of Spaulding Fibre Co. v. N.L.R.B., 481 F.2d 1044, 83
L.R.R.M. 2650 (2d Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
47 See Columbus Nursing Home Inc„ 188 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 76 L.R.R.M. 1417, 1418 n.4 ("To
the extent that this finding is in conflict with the U.S. Court of Appeals the Fifth Circuit in
N.L.R.B. v. Thche-Goettinger Co., 433 F.2d 1045, 75 L.R.R.M. 2561, we respectfully disagree and
adhere to init. view until such. time as the U.S. Supreme Court has passed on the matter.'').
N.L.R.B. v. Wrape Forest Indus. Inc., 596 F.2d 817, 819. 101 L.R.R.M. 2001 (8th Cir. 1979)
(en bane),
4" 260 N.L.R.B. No. 178, 109 L.R.R.M. 1320 (1982). See also note 5 supra.
3" Midland National Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 110 L.R.R.M. 1189 (1982).
" Midland National, 263 N.L.R.B. at 132, 110 I,.R.R.M. at 1493.
* By Patric M. Verrone, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LASS' REVIEW.
1 03 S. Ct. 948 983).
2 See, e.g., Connecticut Stale Federation of Teachers v. Board of Ed, Members, 538 F.2d 471 (2d
Cir. 1976); Memphis American Federation of Teachers Local 2032 v. Board of Ed., 534 F.2cl 1199 (6th
Cir. 1976); Teachers Local 3724 v. North St. Francis County School District, 103 L.R.R.M. 2865 (F.D.
Mo. 1979); Haukedahl v. School District No. 108, No 75-C-3641 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 1976); Federation
of Delaware Teachers v. De La Warr Board of Ed., 335 F. Stipp. 385 (D. Del. 1971); Local 858,
American Federation of Teachers v. School District No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Colo. 1970);
Maryvale Educators Ass'n v. Newman, 70 A.D.2d 758, 410 N.Y.S.2d 876, appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d
605, 424 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (App. Dis. 1979); Geiger v. Duval County School Board, 357 So.2d 442 (Fla.
App. 1978); Clark Classroom Teachers Assoc. v. Clark County School District, 91 Nev. 143, 532 P.2d
1032 (1975) (per curiam).
Actually, the Seventh Circuit previously found the policy unconstitutional, in Teachers Local
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such provisions violated the first and fourteenth amendments in Perry Local Educator's
Assn. v. HoHt.' During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court, on writ of
certiorari, 5
 reversed the court of appeals decision in Perry, holding that a majority union's
exclusive access to an interschool mail system was not unconstitutional."
The Perry case involved an internal mail system which was operated by the Metropoli-
tan School District of Perry Township, Indiana. The system was designed to permit the
rapid transmission of personal and official business between and among the various
teachers and administrators in the school system, as well as to facilitate the delivery of
messages from certain private organizations which had been granted permission to use
the system.' Before 1977, both the petitioner, Perry Education Association (PEA), and the
respondent, Perry Local Educators' Association (PLEA), represented teachers in the
school district and had equal access to the mail system." In 1977, however, the Indiana
Education Employment Relations Board held an election and certified the winner, PEA,
as the exclusive representative of teachers in the Perry distriet. 9
 Following the election,
the school district negotiated a collective bargaining agreement with PEA which allowed
PEA "access to teachers' mailboxes,'" but stipulated that "these access rights shall not be
granted to any other 'school employee organization.' " 11
 The agreement added that other
school employee organizations were free to use any other means to communicate with
teachers in the district including bulletin boards, public address systems, personal meet-
ings and the United States mail." According to the agreement, however, the exclusive
access only existed while the bargaining agent remained the teachers' sole representa-
tive." Furthermore, the agreement provided that once the union's preferential access
status was challenged and a representational contest commenced, all unions must be
afforded equal access to all communication facilities, including the school mail system."
PLEA filed an action against PEA and the Perry Township School Board, contending
that PEA's preferential access to the mail system violated its right to freedom of speech
under the first amendment and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.) 5
 After the district court granted PEA's motion for summary judgment, PLEA
appealed)" The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's
holding," stating that "without an independent reason why equal access ... is undesir-
able, the special duties of [PEA] does not justify opening the system to [PEA] alone.""
399 v, Michigan City Area Schools, No. 72-5-94 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 24, 1973), but that case was vacated
on other grounds, 499 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1974).
652 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1981).
' 103 S. Ct. 948, 954 (1983). PEA sought Supreme Court review by way of an appeal, 103 S. Ct.
at 953, the Court actually dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, id. at 954, and regarded t he
petitioners' jurisdictional statement as a petition for a writ of certiorari. Id. Furthermore, the name of
the case was changed to Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educator's Assn., el al. Id. at 948.
6 Id. at 960.
Id. at 951-52.
8 Id. at 952.
" Id.
111 Id.
" Id. "School employee organization" is an Indiana term of art which applies to PLEA. Id.
12 Id .
Id. at 952-53.
" Id. at 953.
1 " Id. See, Perry Local Educators Assn. v. Hohlt, IP 79-189-C (S.D. Ind. 1980).
Id. See, Perry Local Educators Assn. v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1981).
IT
 103 S. Ct. at 953.
I" 652 F.2d at 1300.
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Accordingly, the court held that the school district violated the minority union's first
amendment rights by opening the system to PEA, but. denying its use to PLEA," PEA
then appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 2 "
The majority opinion in Perry, written by Justice White," began by explaining that
the interschool mailing system was public property and that the constitutional standards
by which limitations upon the access to public property must be evaluated differ depend-
ing on the "character of the property at issue." 22 The Court stated that public property
may fall into one of three 'categories, each requiring a different. constitutional analysis:
First, property which is specifically devoted to assembly and debate, like streets and parks,
where the state's ability to limit expressive activity is sharply circumscribed." Second,
property which the state has voluntarily opened up to public expression. According to the
Perry Court, all such expression must remain uncensored as long as the state chooses to
keep the property available to the public." Third. the Court referred to property which is
owned or controlled by the government, but not designated as a forum for public
communications. The Court stated that expression may be limited as long as the lim-
itations are "reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker's view."'" The Court found that the interschool mailing
system involved in Perry fell into the third category. 2" The Court stated the such property
is owned or controlled by the government, but was not a traditional public forum. 27
Having determined that the mailboxes were not a public forum, the Court explained
that the school district had the right to make distinctions in access based on the subject.
matter and speaker identity, provided such distinctions were "reasonable in light of the
purpose which the forum at issue serves."'" The Court fOund that. the difference bet ween
access provided PEA and PLEA was reasonable for three reasons: First, the Court
maintained that PEA needed the interschool mail facilities to perform effectively its
exclusive representational obligations. The Court recognized that PLEA had no such
obligations." Second, according to the Court, the exclusion of PLEA, as a rival union, was
a means of insuring "labor-peace within the schools:" 3 ° Finally, the Court recognized that
" Id. at 1290.
20 See supra note 5.




" Id. at 955.
24 Id .
2" Id.
2" N. The respondents argued first that because the district had opened the system to certain
private organizations, it had created a public forum to which PLEA must be admitted. Id. at 956. The
Court disagreed, thing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 n.10 (1976) (allowing civilian speakers at a
military base was not a public forum) and Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (opinion of
Blackmun, J.) (plurality holding city transit system rental of advertising space could be limited). The
Court added that even if a "limited" public forum had been created, the right of access would only
include organizations of a "similar character," and not PLEA. 103 S. Ct. at 956. The respondents
then alleged that because. PLEA once actually had access to the mailboxes, a public forum existed
forever. Id. The Court again rebuked them, pointing out that, since that time, PEA had become the
exclusive bargaining representative of the teachers and, as such, PLEA no longer had a legitimate
reason for using the system, as it had once. Id.
" 103 S. Ct. at 956.
28 Id. at 957.
2" Id. at 958.
30 Id. at 959.
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PLEA still had substantial alternative channels for union-teacher communications, includ-
ing bulletin boards, meeting facilities, and the United States mail." Accordingly, the
Court held that the differential access was reasonably consistent with the school district's
legitimate interest in "preserv[ingi the property for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated.•• 32
The Court next addressed PLEA's claim that the school district's plan violated the
equal protection clause. The Court began by stating that because no fundamental right of
PLEA's had been burdened, the school district's equal access policy need only rationally
further a legitimate state purpose." Because the mail system was not a public forum, the
Court concluded, such a legitimate state purpose existed in the furtherance of the
effective performance of the special responsibilities held by an exclusive bargaining
representative such as PEA." Again, because such responsibilities of PEA were not
shared by PLEA, the Court held that the distinctions in access were allowable, and did not
violate the equal protection clause. 35
Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in Perry and was joined by three other
justices." According to the dissent, PLEA's first amendment rights had been violated
without the advancement of any substantial state interest. 37 The dissent stated that the
exclusive access given to PEA by the school district was a form of "viewpoint. discrimina-
tion, -" which the Supreme Court had previously held as uncousth utional. 39 The dissent
began its analysis by disagreeing with the majority's identification of the major issues
involved. The relevant issue, according to the dissent, was not the character of the forum
and whether the plaintiffs had an absolute right of access, but instead, whether the
limitation discriminated on the basis of content, thereby impermissibly denying equal
access. In the dissent's view, once the government has allowed the discussion of certain
subject matter, it may not enforce limitations that discriminate among viewpoints within
that subject matter, whether the forum involved is public or non-public. 40
In support of its conclusion that viewpoint discrimination is unlawful, Justice Bren-
nan, writing for the dissent, then described two lines of cases in this area. In the dissent's
view, the first line demonstrated that the Court had consistently prohibited the govern-
ment from discriminating among viewpoints on particular issues falling within the realm
of protected speech:" The opinion stated that the second line showed that in certain
circumstances, the government may not interfere with the choice of subject matter and
3 ' Id. The Court also pointed out that under Indiana law, PLEA may have access to the
mailboxes while a representational election is in process. Id. at 953.
32 Id. at 958, citing United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civics Ass'n, 453 U.S.
114, 129-30 (1981).
a' 103 S. Ct. at 960.
" Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. The dissent was joined by Justices Marshall. Powell, and Stevens. Id.
37
 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
a' Id. at 961 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3" See supra note 34.
4" Id. at 963 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 961-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). These cases included Niemotko v. Maryland. 340 U.S.
268, 272 (1951) (denying Jehovah 'Witnesses access to park held unconstitutional); Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (suspension of students
wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War held unconstitutional); City of Madison Joint
School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (order to
disallow nonunion employees from speaking about collective bargaining held unconstitutional).
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must remain "content neutral."" The dissent then distinguished three cases relied upon
by the majority which allowed content-based exclusions in a non-public forum," Accord-
ing to Justice Bre7nnan, the forums in these cases, which included transit system advertis-
ing, a military base and a prison, were "unusual," and in addition to being non-public, the
prohibited speech was clearly "incompatible with the forum . "4 4 Furthermore, the dissent
added that none of these cases involved viewpoint discrimination."
Justice Brennan also rejected the majority's conclusion that the differential access in
Perry was based on the status of the unions and not on any intent to discriminate on the
basis of viewpoints. In the dissent's view, the intent to discriminate can be inferred from
the relevant effects of the limiting policy." Accordingly, the dissent. determined that
based on the record of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the effects of the
exclusive access policy would be for teachers to receive "self-laudatory descriptions of the
activities" of the petitioner and to be denied "the critical perspective offered by" the
respondents.' The dissent added that the only practical reason for PEA to seek such a
policy was to deny rival unions like PLEA access to channels of communications." Such a
purpose, the dissent maintained, amounted to censorship under the first amendment
which cannot be justified merely by PEA's special responsibilities as exclusive bargaining
representative.'" The dissent emit:hided, therefore, that the decision of the court of
appeals should be affirmed."
Perry is significant because it enables unions such as PEA, to enjoy an exclusive means
of communication with its members. The Court's holding clearly favors incumbent unions
because it maintains that exclusivity does not unconstitutionally hinder the free speech
rights of minority unions. This is so because the mailbox access system used in Perry was a
privilege, designed to be extended to one union, and not a right which would have to be
denied to all but one union. If, as was the case with all other organizations seeking to use
the mail system,'' the principal of the school — a government agent — chose the one
union to which this privilege could be extended, this could result in viewpoint discrimina-
tion. In Perry. however, the choice was not based on a union's viewpoint hut, as the
majority said, on the "status" of being the exclusive bargaining representative for the
teachers." Even if one could argue that this "status" was a manifestation of viewpoint, it is
a viewpoint that was preferred and chosen, not by the school district as an agent of the
" 103 S. Ct. at 932-33. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Consolidated Edison
Company v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980):
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972),
Id. at 963 (Brennan, J., dissenting). These cases included Lehman v. Shaker Heights, supra
note 26; . Greer v. Spock,,supra note 26 and Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119
(1977) (proscription of labor union organizational activities in a prison held constitutional).
44 103 S. Ct. at 963 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
4' Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 965 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting Perry Local Educator's Assn. v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d at 1296.
" 103 S. Ct. at 966 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). This is so, according to the dissent because, although the board
may have a legitimate interest in granting PEA access, there is no legitimate interest served in
denying PLEA access. Id. at 967 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Furthermore, there is absolutely no
evidence- that granting such access would jeopardize ''labor peace." Id. at 968 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
5° Id. at 969 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 963 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 960.
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state, but by the teachers, collectively acting as a non-state entity. Their decision then
forms the rational basis for the state action which allowed only one union access to the
interschool mail. In practical terms, as long as there is an unchallenged bargaining
representative, no other union has the privilege, but if several unions seek to be the
representative, all may invoke the privilege. As long as there is an alternative means of
communicating with teachers, open to all unions, such as the public mails, all channels of
communication are never shut oil completely and only certain_ channels, under special
circumstances, are limited.
The majority's opinion in Perry also encourages labor organization because access to
the interschool mail may be granted solely upon the "dual authorization" of the school
district and the unions. If access could be granted by the permission of the principal
alone, instead of by the mutual agreement of the school district and the unions," the
principals, as agents of management, could undercut the power of an incumbent union by
allowing access to other competing unions." Nevertheless, the dissent in Perry disagreed
with the majority's view that the "dual authorization" requirement was an adequate
safeguard for employees' collective bargaining rights. Specifically, the dissent feared that
by collaborating with the school district, the incumbent union could effectively "squeeze
nut" rival unions."
The dissent's fear of discriminatory collaboration is unpersuasive for a number of
reasons. The dissent's fear is grounded in the assumption that either no alternative access
to the teachers existed, or that it had been shut off by the collusive powers of the
incumbent union and the school district, or by a lack of manpower or money on the part
of the alternative unions to use the other forums for communication. At least under the
facts of Perry, the former possibility is simply not true. Furthermore, the latter possibility
implies the sort of conspiracy, ill-preparedness. or inconsequentiality which even access to
the internal mail system would no t be able to overcome. Presently, the district and the
union have structured a plan whereby the union in power has a privilege which supple-
ments the efficiency of its representational function. In addition, the plan permits alterna-
tive input and even allows extension of its privilege to those who seriously challenge its
representational stat us.
Finally, it should be pointed out that under the Perry Court's reasoning, other access
systems will withstand constitutional scrutiny provided that alternative means of access
are available. If such other forums are closed or limited, the system would be open to
suspicion. In addition, if the exclusive status of the union was to be ended, or if other
unions were indiscriminately, or at least unreasonably, allowed to use the system, a claim
of viewpoint discrimination could be valid. This would be so because sonic government
agent would be making the choice as to which "viewpoint" of the subject matter could he
heard, and which could not. Similarly, if any outside organization, such as right-to-work
councils, or other marginally related groups were permitted to use the system, the case
could conic up for re-examination.
In su mmary, the Supreme Court in Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educator's Assn.
' 3
 Id. at 952.
54 This is probably what the majority meant by "insuring labor peace." Id. at 959. Of course, the
dissent attacked this terminology with the lack of any evidence of union feuding during the clays of
shared access. Id. at 968 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This attack is misplaced because there must have
been sonic discord, or else PLEA would not have requested an election to select a single representa-
tive. Id. at 952.
55 Id. at 965-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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held that access to an interschool mail system by an exclusive bargaining representative
does not. violate the first or fourteenth amendments as long as the forum remains
non-public, alternative access remains open, and the union's representation remains
exclusive.
I.I. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Employer Unfair Labor Practices
1. *Employer Repudiation of Illegal Conduct by its Agents: Broyhill Co.'
When an employer's supervisors engage in unlawful conduct under the National
Labor Relations Act (the Act), the company may wish to repudiate that conduct in order
to insulate itself from charges of an unfair labor practice." To be effective, the company's
repudiation must disavow any connection with the unlawful activity of its supervisors,
thereby eliminating the need for a remedial order from the National Labor Relations
Board (the Board).' In Passavant Memorial Area Hospital,' the Board adopted a standard
for determining the adequacy of an employer's repudiation.' The Passavant standard
requires the repudiation to he "timely," "unambiguous," "specific in nature to the coercive
conduct," and "free from other proscribed illegal conduct."" In addition, the employer
must adequately inform its employees of its position by publishing the repudiation to the
employees and refraining from engaging in proscribed conduct after the notification.'
Finally, the repudiation must assure the employees that the employer will not interfere
with the exercise of the employees' rights under the Act in the future."
Although the Board is in agreement that Passavant is the correct test for determining
the effectiveness of an employer's repudiation," confusion exists over the proper applica-
tion of the standard to the facts of each case.'" In most instances, the problem arises
because of the presence of vague requirements in the test such as a "timely" and "unam-
biguous" repudiation and an "adequate publication" of it." The confusion caused by this
language has created practical difficulties for employers, because when a company learns
that one of its agents has committed an unlawful act, it needs to know with certainty
exactly what would constitute a repudiation which will effectively obviate the need for a
remedial order. 12
* By Steven C. Sunshine, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' Broyhill Co., 260 N.L.R.B. 1366, 109 1„R.R.M. 1314 (1982).
2
 See Passavant Memorial Area Hosp., 237 N.L.R.B. 138, 98 L.R.R.M. 1492 (1978).
3
 Broyhill Co., 260 N.L.R.B. 1366, 109 L.R.R.M. 1314 (1982).
237 N.L.R.B. 138, 98 L.R.R.M. 1492 (1978).




9 Materials Research Corp., 246 N.L.R.B. 398, 402, 102 L.R.R.M. 1561, 1565 (1979); Lucky
Stores Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 647, 650, 102 L.R.R.M. 1448, 1450 (1979); Laredo Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
241 N.L.R.B. 167, 177 it.12, 100 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1979), enforced N.L.R.B. v. Laredo Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 1338, 103 L.R.R.M. 2904 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S, 889, 105
L.R.R.M. 2658 (1980).
IS See Broyhill Co., 260 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1366-67, 109 L.R.R.M. 1314, 1315 (1982), where both
the majority and the two members in dissent applied Passavant. Each side reached different results
only through varying applications of the standard. See id.
See id.
12 See United Postal Service, 253 N.L.R.B. 1203, 106 L.R.R.M. 1063 (1981), where the employer
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During the Survey year, the issue of whether an employer had adequately repudiated
the unlawful conduct of its supervisors was before the Board in Broyhill Company."
Applying the Passavant standard, a majority of the Board found that the employer's
repudiation sufficiently disavowed the unlawful activity of its supervisors." Although t he
dissent also applied Passavant, it concluded that the employer had not effectively re-
pudiated the conduct of its agent.'
Broyhill arose after a company supervisor made a series of remarks to employees
within his department that - violated t he Act.'" Specifically, the remarks threatened plant
closure and job termination if a union were established within the company." Addition-
ally, the supervisor instructed an employee to keep him informed about any union
activity." There was no dispute between the parties that these statements violated section
8(a)(1) of the Act, which in the absence of an effective repudiation, would give rise to a
cause of action."
As a result of t he supervisor's statements, several employees filed a charge of unfair
labor practices with the Board and the Board initiated an investigation." The company
did not learn of its supervisor's conduct until five weeks after the supervisor made the
statements, when the Board's investigating agent first met with the company's )fficers. 2 '
The next day, the employer voluntarily posted a "Notice to All Employees" on its bulletin
board." The notice expressed the company's regret that the improper conduct may have
occurred and expressly disavowed the supervisor's statements that violated the Act. 23
addition, the notice stated that the company would not "in any other manner interfere
with or coerce its employees in the exercise of their rights to organize or engage in union
activities.' The investigating agent bniught the matter before an Administrative Law
Judge, who concluded that the notice effectively disavowed all unlawful conduct on the
part of the employer and its supervisors."
Applying the Passavant standard, the Board in Broyhill found that the company's
notice sufficiently repudiated the unlawful statements of its supervisor and obviated the
need for a remedial order." The Board ruled that the notice was timely, stating that it
had been posted immediately after' the employer learned of the supervisor's conduct."
published an ameliorative notice which nevertheless failed to repudiate the conduct of its agent
because the notice did not meet the standard set forth in Passavant. See also, Lake Development
Management Co., 259 N.L.R.B. 791, 109 L.R.R.M. 1027 (1981).
13 260 N.L.R.B. 1366, 109 L.R.R.M. 1314 (1982).
14 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. at 1315.
12 Id. at 1368, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1316.
" Id. at 1370, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1315.
' 7 Id.
IS Id. at 1367, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1315.
" Id. at 1366, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1315.
23 Id .
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1367, 109 L.R. R. M. at 1316. The notice to all employees noted that a charge of unfair
labor practices had been filed against the company and that an investigation was pending. Id. The
company stated that it made an investigation and "concluded that a supervisor of the company may
have acted in an improper manner." 1c1. The notice concluded with a description of the employees'
Section 7 rights in the traditional "we will nut" language often employed in the Board's notices. Id.
23 Id .
24 Id.
26 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. at 1315.
2 " Id. at 1366, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1315.
27 Id.
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The Board reasoned that the repudiation was timely, despite the five week delay between
the violation and the posting of the notice, because the company acted in good faith and
lacked actual knowledge of the infraction during that period." Moreover, the Board
recognized that its own remedial orders were never posted within five weeks of the
commission of an unfair labor practice and therefore the company's notice was certainly
timely."
After finding that the repudiation was timely, the Board concluded that the other
factors of the Passavant test were also satisfied. Accepting the Administrative Law judge's
conclusions, the Board decided that the posting of the notice on the company bulletin
hoard was adequate publication of the repudiation. The Board made this decision even
though it noted that only three out of live employees who testified at the hearing stated
that they had seen the notice." The Board also held that the notice was "sufficiently
specific" under the Passavant tests in spite of its failure to name the supervisor whose
comments were at issue or to mention the circumstances under which these unlawful
statements were made.'" Finally, the Board criticized the dissent's application of the
Passavant standard to the facts of Broyhill. According to the majority, the dissent's opinion
was "highly technical" and "mechanical."' Specifically, the Board noted that the result
reached by the dissent, carried to its logical end, would require the company to post a
second notice under the Board's order "disavowing the unlawful conduct in terms
virtually identical to those appearing in the notice (the Company) has already posted.""
• Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting in part, agreed that the correct standards
for determining the adequacy of the company's notice were set forth in Passavant." Their
approach differed, however, in the application of these standards to the facts of the
case." The dissent believed that the five week delay in posting the notice was untimely,
and that the mere 'misting of the notice on the bulletin board was inadequate. 36 Further-
more, the dissent found that the notice inadequately identified the illegal conduct."
Thus, the dissent concluded that the notice was ineffective as a repudiation."
Although the Board used the proper legal standard in Broyhill, it misapplied the facts
of the case to that standard. As the dissent correctly argued, the Board's decision was
erroneous for three major reasons. Namely, the notice was untimely, inadequately pub-
lished, and insufficiently specific. 39 First, the notice was not posted until five weeks after
the unlawful conduct occurred.'" In Passavant, a seven week delay was declared to be
"untimely."'" Another misapplication of the standard resulted from the Board's focus on
the good faith and lack of actual knowledge of the employer in Broyhill. 42 The employ-





32 Id. at 1366-67, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1315.
33 Id.






" Id. at 1366, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1315.
41 Passavant, 237 N.L.R.B. at 138-39, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1493.
42 Broyhill, 260 N.L.R.B. at 1366, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1314.
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lion was made the threatened employees were inhibited from engaging in protected
activities, regardless of the actual knowledge of the employer. The purposes of the Act
are fulfilled only by examining the mental state of the employees, not the employer.
Moreover, it must be recognized that the supervisor was the employer's agent. To require
the employer to have actual knowledge of his agent's unlawful conduct would discourage
employers from policing their agents to the detriment of employees. Consequently, the
Board's focus on the good faith of the employer is misplaced because this consideration
ignores the prejudicial effect of delay upon the exercise of the employees' protected
rights.
The second problem with the Board's decision in Broyhill is its finding that the
employer's notice was adequately published. The employer in Broyhill placed the notice of
repudiation on the company's bulletin board.'" From this fact, the majority concluded
that all em ployees "had an adequate opportunity to read the notice if they so chose. -44 As
the dissent pointed out, however, two out of the five employees who testified at the
hearing stated that they had not seen the notice." In addition, no evidence was presented
with regard to the likelihood that the rest of the employees had seen the notice." The
Board's opinion also does not consider where the bulletin hoard was located or for how
long the notice was posted," Consequently, the notice should not have been held to be
adequately posted in this proceeding. Because the need for a notice of repudiation arises
only when one of the employer's agents engages in unlawful conduct, the employer
should be required to prove that the notice of repudiation reached all its employees.
Requiring anything less denies employees the full protection offered by the Act when an
employer admits a violation.
Finally, the Board incorrectly concluded that the employer's notice was sufficiently
specific. The notice in Broyhill did not identify the supervisor who engaged in the
unlawful conduct." Furthermore, the n o tice did not admit any violation of the Act, but
instead only stated that a supervisor "may have acted in an improper manner." 44 If an
employer wishes to shield itself front charges of an unfair labor practice it shoukl have the
burden of identifying the guilty supervisor and specifying the exact. conduct it wishes to
repudiate. A repudiation must identify precisely the conduct involved if the message is to
he understood by all employees.
In summary, the Pas.saveilit standard should be strictly applied and the burden of
proof should be placed on the employer to satisfy that standard. If such an approach were
taken, employers would be alerted that they will he held to a strict standard and will
therefore make future repudiations more likely to he effective. After all, repudiation only
becomes an issue after both sides have agreed that an unfair labor practice has occurred.
To protect employees, the Board and the courts must require employers to convincingly
demonstrate that there is no longer a need for a remedial order. Any lesser standard
diminishes the effectiveness of the Act's prohibitions.
43 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. at 1315.
44 Id.
Id. at 1367, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1315.
4 " See id. at 1368, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1316.
47
 See id.
" Id. at 1367, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1316.
4''
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2. *Employer's Duty to Bargain — Subcontracting Work and
Partial Closing: Marriott Corp.'
ReaU together, sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act) 2
establish the obligation of an employer and the representative of its employees to bargain
over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, „ . "3 A unilateral
change with respect to any subject within this category violates the statutory duty to
bargain collectively and is subject to a National Labor Relations Board (Board) remedial
order. 4 Congress, however, intentionally left the phrase "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment" without more specific definition so that the Board could
more precisely define it in light of particular industrial practices.' Two such practices are
partial closings and sulXiontracting.
In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,' the United States Supreme Court
decided the issue of whether an employer's decision to close part of its business was
subject iO'cionpulsory'collective bargaining.' In First National Maintenance, the employer,
who provided maintenance services for commercial customers, structured its business so
that specific employees serviced particular customers." Unable to reach a contract agree-
ment with one of its customers, the employer discontinued its services to the customer and
discharged the employees servicing that account.' The First National Maintenance Court
held that. the employer's decision to discontinue its services and discharge its employees
' was not within the scope of "terms and conditions of employment," and therefore, was not
a subject of compulsory collective bargaining.'" Consequently, after First National Mainte-
nance, an employer's decision to close part of its business does not require mandatory
collective bargaining.
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB," the United States Supreme Court.
reached the contrary result regarding whether an employer's decision to lay-off its
employees and subcontract the work previously performed by them was a subject of
* By Michael P. Malloy, Staff Member, BOSTON CoLtyca: LAW REVIEW.
' 264 N.L.R.B No. 178, 111  -L.R.R.M. 1354 (1982).
_29	 § 158(a) (1976) provides in part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. . . ." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1 58(d) (1976) provides:	 .
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached
if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession . . . .
rs For text of relevant sections of the Act, see supra note 2. While the employer and the employees'
representative are required to bargain over these subjects, neither is legally obligated to yield. NLRB v.
Wooster Division of Borg- Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 ( 1958).
First National Maintenance Corp. v, NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674-75 (1 981).
• 
Id. at 675.
452 U.S. 666 (1981).
▪ Id. at 667.
• Id. at. 668.
" N. at 669-70. By terms of its contracts, the employer hired personnel separately for each
customer and did not transfer employees between locations. Id. at 668.
1 " Id. at 686.
379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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compulsory collective bargaining." The work subcontracted in Fibreboard consisted of
maintenance work at the employer's plant." The employer's action was motivated by a
desire to save labor costs," The Fibreboard Court held that the employer's decision to
subcontract the maintenance work was within the ambit of "terms and conditions of
employment," and therefore, was subject to mandatory. collective bargaining."
After First National Maintenance and Fibreboard, while an employer's decision to close
part of its business does not require collective bargaining, an employer's decision to
subcontract work previously performed by its employees does require collective bargain-
ing. The distinction between partial closings and subcontracting, however, is not always
readily apparent."'
During the Survey year, in Marriott Corporation," the Board addressed the question of
whether an employer's decision to discontinue one of its departments and hire out the
work previously done by the department was a mandatory subject of collective bargain-
ing." The Board stated that a critical factor in this determination was whether the
employer engaged in subcontracting or a partial closing." In order to make this distinc-
tion, the Board applied a four-pronged test that focused on whether the employer's action
concerned an 'aspect of the employer/employee relationship that is amenable to resolu-
tion through bargaining with the union," or whether it represented a substantial change
in operations or lay at the "'very core of entrepreneurial control.' " 2 " Applying this test 10
the Facts of Marriott Corp., the Board determined that the employer's decision was subject
to mandatory collective bargaining."
In Marriott Corp., the employer owned a commissary operation that prepared and
distributed food products to the employer's restaurants. 22
 The commissary was composed
of five departments, one of which prepared shrimp." Due to the escalating market price
of raw shrimp and problems concerning quality and portion control, the employer
entered an oral agreement with a company named Fishking to supply the commissary
with processed shrimp for distribution." A few months later, the employer laid off its 12
shrimp processing department employees and phased out its shrimp processing opera-
tion. 25
 Within the next few months, the employer sold some of its shrimp processing
equipment to Fishking for $30,000 and returned its leased machines to the lessor.'" The
employer retained ownership of the freezers and hydraulic system previously used in
shrimp processing as well as the plant area formerly used in this processing. 27
Addressing the employer's actions, the Administrative Law judge found that while
12 Id. at 204-05.
13 Id. at 206.
" Id. at 213-14.
15 Id. at 215.
1" See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEX .' ON LABOR LAW, 517 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GORMAN].
' 7
 f II t L.R.R.M. 1354 (1982).
Id. at 1354-55.
1" Id. at 1353-56.
2" Id. at 1356.
21 Id. at 1357.
22 Id. at 1354.
23 Id. at 1354-55.
24 Id. at t355.
25 Id.
2" Id. at 1357.
27 Id.
December 19831	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 123
the employer had violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act" by failing and refusing to bargain
with the union over the effects of discontinuing its shrimp operations, the employer's
actual decision to discontinue the operations was not a subject of mandatory collective
bargaining." The Administrative Law Judge based this determination on his finding that
the employer's action represented a "major shift in the direction of the company." 3 ° The
Board's General Counsel filed exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge's determina-
tion, asserting that the employer was obligated to bargain over its decision to discontinue
the operations anti hire out the work. 3 '
The National Labor Relations Board agreed with the Administrative Law judge's
finding concerning the employer's duty to bargain over the effects of' it s action. The Board
disagreed, however, with the Administrative Law judge's finding with respect. to the
employer's statutory duty to bargain over its decision." The Board noted that while the
Board and courts generally have held subcontracting to be within the scope of mandatory
collective bargaining, they generally have held partial closings to be outside the ambit of
this process." Nevertheless, the Board observed that the distinction between subcontract-
ing and partial closing is not. always readily apparent. 34 To clarify the distinction between
subcontracting and partial closing, the Board reasoned it was necessary to review the
particular facts of each case and decide whether the employer's action concerns an "aspect
of the employer/employee. relationship that is amenable to resolution through bargaining
with the union," or whether it represents either a substantial change in operations, or lies
at the "very core of entrepreneurial control."3 ' If the action fell within the former
category, the Board observed, it would be a suitable subject for mandatory collective
bargaining. 31t If, however, the employer's action fell within the latter category, the Board
stated, it would not be a suitable subject for compulsory collective bargaining."
Noting that the distinction between subcontracting and partial closing is not always
readily apparent, the Board examined four factors to draw this distinction: (1) the nature
of the employer's business before and after the action taken, (2) the extent of capital
expenditures, (3) the basis for the action, and (4) the ability of the union to engage in
meaningful barg&i-ning in view of the employer's situation and object ives. 38
 Reviewing the
facts of Marriott Corp. with respect to the first factor, the nature of the employer's business
before the action taken, the Board rejected the "narrow" characterization of the employ-
er's business as shrimp processing. 39
 Instead, the Board characterized the employer's
business as providing foodstuffs to its individual restaurants, 4 ° Considering the nat ore of
the employer's business both before and after the employer's action, the Board deter-
" For the text of § 8(a)(5) of the Act, see supra note 2.
29 Marriott Corp. 111 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1354-55 (1982).
30 Id. at 1356.
3 ' Id. at 1354.
32 Id.
" Id. at 1355.
34 Id, at 1356.
35 Id. (quoting General Motors Corporation, CMG Truck & Coach Division, 191 N.L.R.B. 951,
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mined that it. did not change. The Board reasoned that the business still provided
processed shrimp to its rest aurants. 4 '
With respect to the second factor, the extent of capital expenditures, the Board
found that while not de minimis, the expenditures were not sufficiently substantial to
remove the employer from the statutory duty to bargain collectively. 42 Turning to the
third factor, the basis for the employer's action, the Board found that such actions
occurred primarily because of concern over escalating costs as well as portion and quality
control:" With respect to the fourth factor, the ability of the union to engage in meaning-
ltd bargaining in view of the employer's situation and objectives, the Board noted that
since production costs include such factors as wages, fringe benefits and other employ-
►ent costs over which the union can exercise substantial control, production costs are
particularly suitable for resolution through collective bargaining," Finally, examining
quality and portion control, the Board found that while the potential union input would
not be as direct as it is in production costs, quality control is a common concern in
collective bargaining. 45 Consequently, the Board was unwilling to find that collective
bargaining would he of minimal value to the employer in achieving its objective of quality
and portion control:" In light of its examination of these four factors, the Board
concluded that the employer's action of closing its shrimp processing department and
contracting out the work to Fishking was suitable for collective bargaining, and therefore,
was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining."
Chairman Van de Water, joined by Member Hunter, issued a separate concurring
and dissenting opinion. While agreeing with the majority that the employer violated
section 8(a)(5) of t he Act' by refusing to bargain over t he effects of its decision,'" they
disagreed with the majority's holding that the employer's decision was a subject of manda-
tory collective bargaining.'" Believing that the "simple truth" of the case was that the
employer left the shrimp processing business, the dissenters disagreed with the majority's
characterization of the employer's business as providing foodstuffs to its individual
restaurants." Instead, the dissent viewed the employer's action as a partial closing. 52
Relying on what it discerned to be the United States Supreme Court's "plain holding" in
First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB 53
 — 
"that an employer's decision to close down a
part of its business for economic or other business reasons is outside the scope of the
mandatory bargaining obligation ... ,"— the dissent concluded that the employer's action
was not a subject of compulsory collective bargaining,' 4 The dissent. added that the
Id. at 1356.
42 Id. at 1356-57.





" For the text of the pertinent sections of the National Labor Relations Act, see supra note 2.
4" See 111 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1358
-59 (1982) (Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter
concurring in part and dissenting in part).




 453 U.S. 666 (1981).
"4 1 1 1 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1358
-59 (1982) (Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter concur-
ring in part and dissenting in pan).
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problem of quality and portion control can only be solved by the employer, and accord-
ingly, was not suitable for collective bargaining,"
The majority's analysis in Marriott Corp. successfully synthesizes the approaches to the
issue of subcontracting and partial closing that were enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in Fibreboard and First National Maintenance, The Fibreboard Court held
that an employer's decision to lay off its employees and subcontract out the work previ-
ously performed by them was a subject of' mandatory collective bargaining." The Court
based its holding in Fibreboard on several factors. First, the Court reasoned that the phrase
"conditions of employment" literally covered subcontracting." The Court stressed that
the phrase certainly covered the termination of employment that was caused by the
subcontracting." In addition, the Court noted that mandatory bargaining would effectu-
ate the Act's statutory objective by "bringing a problem of vital concern to labor and
management within the framework established by Congress as most conducive to indus-
trial peace.'" Second, the Court found that the employer's decision to "contract Out" did
not "aher the Company's basic operation.'" In reaching this finding, the Court reasoned
that the maintenance workers performed the same work in the same plant, and that no
capital investment was contemplated."' Third, the Court determined that the employer's
reason for "contracting out" — to reduce labor costs — was peculiarly suitable for
resolution through collective bargaining."' The Court emphasized that its holding was
restricted to the "contracting out" situation involved in Fibreboard, contracting that in-
volves replacement of bargaining unit employees with those of an independent contractor
to do the same work under similar employment conditions.'
Justice Stewart wrote a concurring opinion in Fibreboard which has proven to be more
influential than the majority's opinion." He stated that not all management decisions
potentially affecting job security are subjects of compulsory collective bargaining."' He
noted that some of these decisions may have only an indirect and uncertain impact on job
security." Finally, he stressed that regardless of the impact of the employer's decision on
employment, nothing in the Court's holding could be construed as imposing a duty to
bargain collectively regarding managerial decisions that "lie at the core of entrepreneurial
control.' justice Stewart reasoned that, regardless of' whether they resulted in the
termination of employment, management 'decisions concerning the commitment of
investment capital and the basic scope of the enterprise are not in themselves conditions
of employment. . . . "68
In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB," the Supreme Court held that an
55 Id. at 1359.
56 379 U.S. 203, 213-15 (1964).
sr
	 at 210.
" Id. at 210.
" Id. at 210-11.
"" Id. at 213.
" Id.
62 Id. at 213-14.
" Id. at 215
" Id. at 217. See CrORMAN, supra note 18 at 511.
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employer's decision to close part of its business was not subject to compulsory collective
bargaining." The Court reasoned that the employer's decision involved a change in the
scope and direction of the enterprise and was not "primarily about conditions of employ-
ment [even) though the effect of the decision may be necessary to terminate employ-
ment."" The Court indicated that both employees and management had an interest in
the decision: employees were interested in retaining their jobs while management. was
interested in "remaining free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent
essential for the running of a profitable business."'" Applying a balancing test to the facts
of First National Maintenance, the Court determined that the harm likely to be done to an
employer's discretion in deciding to close part of its business for economic reasons
outweighed the benefit that might be gained through the employees' participation in the
decision." The Court cautioned, however, that its holding was limited to the type of
situation in First National Maintenance, in which: (1) the employer had no intention to
replace the discharged employees or move the operation elsewhere, (2) the employer's
sole purpose was to reduce economic loss, and (3) the union had no control or authority
over the factors that caused the employer's economic loss. 74
While Fibreboard and First National Maintenance are the Supreme Court's leading
decisions on subcontracting and partial closing, neither decision presents as complex a
situation as that in Marriott Corp. In Marriott Corp., the employer closed its shrimp
processing department, discontinued processing shrimp, and subcontracted its shrimp
processing work out to Fishking." Despite the Board's characterization of the employer's
action as subcontracting," and the dissent's characterization of the action as a partial
closing," the employer's action actually presented a hybrid situation involving both
subcontracting and partial closing. Since the situation in Marriott Corp. was not limited to a
subcontracting problem as was Fibreboard, or to a partial closing problem as was First
National Maintenance, neither decision is directly on point. Nonetheless, in formulating a
test to apply to the hybrid situation in Marriott Corp., the Board drew upon anti har-
monized the principles articulated by the Supreme Court in Fibreboard and First National
Maintenance.
First, the Marriott Corp. majority determined that a major consideration in deciding
_whether an employer's action is a subject of mandatory collective bargaining is whether it
involves an "aspect of the employer/employee relationship that is amenable to resolution
through bargaining with the union," or whether it constitutes either a substantial change
in operation or lies at the "core of entrepreneurial control."'" This analytical framework
reflects principles espoused by the Supreme Court in both Fibreboard and First National
Maintenance. It reflects the Fibreboard Court's emphasis on whether the employer's action
was suitable for resolution through collective bargaining," or whether it altered the
7" Id. at. 667, 686.
71 Id. at 677 (quoting Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart J.,
concurring)).
" 452 U.S. at 677-79.
" Id. at 686.
" ld, at 687.	 lee dispute that led to the contract's termination and the discharge of the
employees servicing the contract was between the employer and a customer. Id.
" 111 L.R.R.N.I. 1354. 1355 (1982).
78 Id. at 1356.
77
 id. at 1358.
78 Id. at 1356.
" See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 213-14 (1964).
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company's basic operations." Further, it echoes Justice Stewart's concurring opinion's
emphasis on whether the employer's action altered the scope or direction of the enter-
prise or "lie§ at the core of entrepreneurial control.' 81
The analytical framework enunciated by the majority in Marriott Corp. also incorpo-
rates the First National Maintenance Court's concern for both the employer's freedom in
deciding whether to close part of its business for economic reasons and the benefits that
might be gained through collective bargaining." Under the Marriott Corp.'s analytical
framework, if the employer's action involves a substantial change in operations or lies at
the core of entrepreneurial control, then collective bargaining will not be required and
the employer will be allowed to operate freely." lf, however, the employer's actions
involve an aspect of the employer/employee relationship that is conducive to resolution
through bargaining with the union, then the benefits that might be derived through
collective bargaining take precedence and collective bargaining is required." The four
factors utilized by the Marriott Corp. Court to determine whether an employer's action is a
subject of compulsory collective bargaining also incorporate the analytical framework of
Fibreboard and First National Maintenance. These four factors are the nature of the employ-
er's business before and after the action, the extent of capital expenditures, the basis for
the employer's action, and the ability of I he union to engage in meaningful bargaining in
light of the employer's situation and objectives." The Supreme Court considered all four
of these factors in both Fibreboard" and First National Maintenance."
In sum, Marriott Corp.'s analytical framework successfully reconciles and incorporates
the approaches and principles articulated by the Supreme Court in the leading cases of
Fibreboard and First National Maintenance. Consequently, practitioners, courts and the
NLRB should avoid a literal definitional approach and utilize Marriott Corp.'s analytical
framework to determine whether a hybrid situation involving both partial closing and
subcontracting is a subject of mandatory collective bargaining.
3. *Employee's Right to Representation at Investigatory !Wet -views: F.I. du Pont
de Nemours and Co. v. N.L.R.B.' and Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph Co. v. N.L.R.B. 2
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) provides that employees may
engage in concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid and protection." Section 8(a)(1)
" See id. at 213.
"' Id. at 223.
' 2 See First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981).
33 Marriott Corp., 111 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1356 (1982).
84 Id,
8:'
" Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 213. 215 (1964). For a further
discussion of the Fibreboard Court's use of these four factors, see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying
text.
" See First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 667, 687-88. For a further
discussion of the First National Maintenance Corp. Court's use of these four factors, see supra notes
66-69 and accompanying text.
The First National Maintenance Corp. Court modified one or these factors indicating that the
extent of investment or withdrawal of capital was not crucial. 452 U.S. at 688. Marriott Corp,
incorporated this modification in its analytic framework. Ill L.R.R.M. at 1357, n.14.
* By John S. Brennan, S t aff' Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIF:W.
' 707 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983).
711 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1983).
3 Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) provides:
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of the Act. allows employees to assert. their section 7 rights by making it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
concerted activities.' In N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten the Supreme Court held that an
employer violated section 8(a)(1), and thus an employee's right. to engage in a protected
activity, when the employer denied an employee's request for union representation at an
investigatory interview which that employee reasonably believed would result in disci-
plinary action. 6 The Court agreed with the National Labor Relations Board (the Board)
that representation at an investigatory interview under such circumstances was protected
concerted activity under section 7. 7 The availability and quality of representation guaran-
teed by the Weingarten decision were the subject of two Ninth Circuit cases which were
decided during the Survey year. In E.I. du Pon/ de Nemours and Co. v. N.L.R.B. , 8 the Ninth
Circuit. held that employees in a nonorganized, nonunion firm are not automatically
entitled to the presence of a co-worker at an investigatory interview under the same
circumstances in which organized employees would be entitled to a union representative."
The quality of representation, when an employee is entitled to it, was addressed by the
Ninth Circuit. in Paeilic Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. N.L.R.B.'" In Pacific, the court held
that employees who are entitled to a representative are entitled to be informed or the
nature of the matter being investigated and allowed to consult with a union representative
before an investigatory interview which the employee reasonably believes will result in
discipline) '
This chapter will discuss the two Ninth Circuit decisions separately. First, the chapter
will address the issue of nonunion representation by outlining briefly those cases in which
the courts have considered the section 7 requirements of "concert edness" and "mutual aid
and protection." The chapter will then discuss /.•:./. du Pont, setting forth the court's
rationale, and conclude with an analysis of the rationale in light of Weingarten and
Employees shall have t he right to self-organization, to fOrm, join or assist labor organi-
zations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized by
section 158(a)(3) of this title.
Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1) provides: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights granted in section 157 of this title."
420 U.S. 25! (1975). In Weingarten, the employee worked at the employer's lunch counter at
one of the employer's retail stores, and was suspected of buying food for less than full price. Id. at
254. The employer summoned the employee to a meeting, at which the employee requested union
representation. hi. This request was denied. Id. The employee cleared herself of buying the food
below the stated price, but. in an emotional outburst admitted to taking free lunches. Id. at. 255.
Although this practice was allowed at the employee's previous store, it was not allowed at her present
location. Id. The employer used professional security personnel to interrogate the employee. Id. At
the close of the interview, the employer asserted that the employee owed money for lunches she took
for free, /d, When the union learned of the private meeting forced upon the employee, it began an
unfair labor practice proceeding. Id. The Board found that the management policy was not clear,
and that the employee owed nothing. hi. at 256.
6 Id. at 260-61.
7 Id.
" 707 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983).
9 Id. at 1080.
1 " 711 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1983).
" Id.
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previous decisions by the Board and courts. Second, the issue of consultation prior to the
investigatory interview will he discussed. The chapter will consider prior Board cases and
then contrast the Board's position with the Ninth Circuit's rationale in Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph.
I. E.I. Du PONT t'. N.L.R.B.
A single employee's request for representation at a disciplinary hearing is protected
by section 7 of the Act if it is a "concerted activity," and if it is taken for the "mutual aid" or
"protection" of the employees.''- The circuit courts, however, have not agreed which acts
by individual employees qualify for section 7 protection. For example, the Third Circuit
in Mushroom Transportation Co. v. N.L.R.B.," took the position that the actor must have
group activity in mind as the ultimate goal, and the individual activity must be in
preparation of or otherwise related to future group action, in order to qualify for section
7 protection." Although the ultimate fruition of group action is not required, the
Mushroom court. held that the action must be attempted with the purpose of effecting such
group action.'
The Mushroom decision was not favorably viewed by the Fifth Circuit in Anchortank,
Inc. v. N.L.R.B.'" In that case, the Fifth Circuit staled that the Weingarten emphasis on the
effect of representation on all employees in the workplace explained why the employee's
request for representation was concerted activity. 17 The Anchortank court was not con-
cerned with the purpose behind the employee's act.' 8 The court noted that Weingarten did
not require the employee's request to have group action as a purpose."' Thus, the
Anchortank court focused only on whether the individual employee's action was felt by a
group of employees.'"
The circuits have thus split over the section 7 requirements for protected activity.
The failure of previous decisions to distinguish between the separate elements of "con-
certed activity" and "mutual aid and protection" offered the Ninth Circuit an opportunity
to provide a clear standard when it considered the facts of E.!. du Pont.
The employee in E.1. du Pont was recovering from a workplace accident and was
docked in pay when he made an unauthorized visit to his doctor. 2 ' The employee refused
to sign his time card and was suspended. Thereafter, the employer requested the em-
ployee to sign a "Development Program" which listed conditions for his continued
employment_ The employee asked for copies of the conditions, but the employer refused
to comply with the request. The employee then stated that he would not sign the
document unless a co-employee was present as a witness. The employer terminated the
employee when he again refused to sign without a co-employee witness. 22
The employee filed charges against the employer with the Regional Director of the
N.I...R.B., alleging various unfair labor practices. The Administrative Law judge found
` 2 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
' 3 330 F.2d 683 (3rd Cir. 1964).
"4 330 F.2d at 685.
ill.
1" 618 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980).




21 707 F.2d at 1077.
22 Id.
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that the employer violated sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the Act, and his decision was affirmed
by the National Labor Relations Board. 23
 The employer appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The circuit court framed only one issue to be determined: "whether [the employee's]
request meets the 'concerted activities' requirement for protection under section 7." 2 ''
The court held that under the facts of the case, the request did not meet the require-
ment.'
The court noted at the beginning of its opinion that previous cases have failed to
distinguish between the requirement of concerted activity and the requirement of mutual
aid and protection.'" The court noted that it was possible for an employee's action to be
for the mutual aid and protection of other employees, and yet fail to be protected by
section 7 because the act kni was not concerted, but rather "the isolated conduct of a single
employee.'
The court looked to Weingarten for guidelines on section 7 requirements. 28
 The court
noted, however, that because Weingarten dealt with a union represented workplace, the
Supreme Court "assumed without discussion that a request invoking union assistance is
concerted activity."'" The Ninth Circuit noted that the Weingarten assumption was jus-
tified because "the union had been organized through concerted activity and stood as a
guarantee that concerted activity would follow the request for help." 3 " Thus, the court
stated that concertedness was "inherent in union activity." 31
The court. recognized that although an employee's request cannot. be assumed to be
concerted where there is no union, the Weingarten decision cannot be limited only to the
union setting." The court stated that the facts of a given case may indicate that certain
requests for representation in a nonunionized workplace may be protected, while other
requests may not. 33 The court held that the request of a single employee is not itself
concerted activity, but may be "transformed" into concerted action by "the backdrop of
other group activity or, possibly, indications of future activity." Such a "backdrop" may
"endow the request. [for co-worker representation] in a nonunion setting, with Weingarten
protection." 34 In this way, the court stated, an employee provides the court with a
"showing that the requesting employee acts as part of a group."" 5
In deciding the case against the employee, the Ninth Circuit noted that the employee
did not show a backdrop of group activity. 3" The court rejected the theory that the
employee's request was "incipient group activity."" The court noted that the employee
"had no clear plans for future activity." 36
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to the employee's intentions to protect only himself, and his willingness to waive the
request for the co-worker's presence if copies of the Development. Program were pro-
vided to him. 3 " Because the court found no backdrop of other group activity, it denied the
enforcement of the Boards order to reinstate the employee."
The Ninth Circuit opinion is in sharp contrast to the Board's position regarding
representation at disciplinary proceedings. In the Board's Materials Research Corp. 41
opinion, which was cited by the El. du Pont court as presenting the identical issue,' the
Board found concerted activity in the nature of the employee's request.'" The Board
noted that the activity of requesting and obtaining representation at a disciplinary inter-
view is concerted because the representative seeks to protect not only the individual's
rights, but also, in so doing, gives assurance to all other employees that they too can expect
such assistance if needed in the future."
The E.I. du Pont Court took issue with the Board's view of Weingarten's union setting.
The Board's Materials Research opinion states that the fact pattern of Weingarten happens
to place the representation issue in the context of a unionized plant.• Thus, the Board
stated that the union representation found in Weingarten did not indicate that the right in
Weingarten was in any way predicated upon the union's rights to exclusive representation
in matters of collective bargaining." Because the Board attached no significance to the
union setting, its fOcus remained on the nature of "Weingarten representation" which the
Board found to be concerted action for mutual' aid and protection of employees."
The Ninth Circuit was unwilling to allow the Board to expand section 7 rights
without a clear showing of concertedness." The E.I. do Pont court observed that con-
certed activity is a statutory requirement which must be present even if it produces
anomalous results. 4 " The E.I, du Pont court's distinction between concerted activity and
mutual aid and protection resulted in the failure of the Board's reasoning to convince the
court that both section 7 requirements are met by the mere request of an employee for
representation at an investigatory interview. The Board's contention that an employee's
request for a representative gives assurance to other employees that they too can expect
similar assistance in the future is correct, but the Ninth Circuit did not recognize the
3" Id.
4" Id. at 1080.
41 262 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 110 L.R.R.M. 1401 (July 20, 1982).
42
 Materials Research and a companion case involving the same appellant as the Ninth Circuit
case, du Pont de Nenours & Co., have been appealed to the Third Circuit. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. (Slaughter), 262 N.L.R.B. No. 123 ( July 20, 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82-3363 (3d Cir.
Aug. 4, 1982).
43 In Materials Research, the employer refused to allow a nonunion employee to have a co-worker
represent him at a meeting in which the employer issued a written warning to the employee. 262
N.L.R.B. No. 122, 110 L.R.R.M. 1401, 1402 (1982).
" Id. See also 420 U.S. at 260.
45 262 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1403.
46 Id.
47 Id., 110 L.R.R.M. at 1405-06.
48 707 F.2d at 1079.
49 Id. at 1078 n.2. The circuit court stated: Commentators have criticized the artificiality of a
construction of § 7 that results "its statutory protection for an activity engaged in by two employees
while the very same activity engaged in by one remains unprotected." Gorman & Finkins, The
Individual and the Requirement of 'Concert' Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. Rev. 286,
329 (1981). This artificiality, however, is one decided upon by Congress when it drafted § 7. It is not a
choice that can be undone by courts on policy reasons. /d.
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assurance as concerted activity." Rather, the assurance to other employees demonstrates
that the action is for mutual aid and - protection of employees. Yet the "mutual aid"
requirement alone does not bring the employee's request for representation within
section 7 protection, since the request itself must at least be associated with concerted
activit y. 5 '
The Ninth Circuit addressed the concerted activity requirement by referring to
Weingarten, which first recognized the right to representation where disciplinary action
might result. The court found no specific reference to concertedness, and thus deter-
mined that the Weingarten Court assumed concertedness because of the involvement of a
union. 52
 Absent a union setting, the Ninth Circuit. was unwilling to make any assumptions
concerning the concertedness of the action of a single employee. The court required a
specific showing that a single employee's request for representation is concerted action."
The Board, on the other hand, did not attach such significance to Weingarten's union
setting, and thus, did not require such a showing.
The E.I. du Pont court took issue with the Board's view of Weingarten's union setting.
because it clearly distinguishes between the nature of the activity (concerted or an act of a
single employee) and thepurpase of the activity (for the benefit of all or for the benefit of a
single employee). The E.I. du Pont decision makes it clear that the Act protects only those
activities taken by more than one employee for the benefit of more than one employee.
The requirement is consistent. with the 'Act's stated goal of fostering organizational activ-
ity,' as opposed to the individual actions of employees which may thwart collective
activity even if engaged in for an avowed purpose to benefit other employees. In this way,
the Act promotes (organization of workers, not the confusion which may result from single
employees acting independently in the name of all employees.
Unkortunately, however, the E.I. du Pont decision falls short of lending clarity to the
application of section 7 requirements. By allowing a "backdrop of group activity" to
"transform" a single act of an employee into a concerted act,' the court left the door open
fOr more litigation in this arcs. The court. lays down a firm requirement that there "be a
showing that. the requesting employee acts as part of a group.'' This requirement could
have been more straightforward: if the employee is not a member of a union or is not
joined in his request by at least one other employee, the requestis not protected. Instead,
through the metaphysics of a "backdrop" of group activity, which the court loosely defines
as a "history of group activity or possibly, indications of future group activity,' 7 the Board
will he invited to transform a single employee's act into a concerted act. As expressed by
the court, the standard frustrates the court's own effOrt to explain the requirements
needed for section 7 protection and to eliminate needless and costly litigation over the
representation issue, which now must be handled on a case by case basis.
A firm standard denying protection to the requests of single employees in the
nonunion setting would further another purpose of the Act. Employees, unable to obtain
the protection and security of representation on their- own, would be encouraged to
"" 707 F.2d at 1079.
" See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
" 707 F.2d at 1079.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
" See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
707 F.2d at 1079.
57 Id.
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organize and request such representation as a group. 58 The impetus to organize and
ultimately conduct employee affairs through the collective bargaining method is the
primary purpose of the Act. The protection of individual activity such as a single
employee's request for representation in a disciplinary meeting results in one less benefit
a union is able to offer as an advantage over nonorganization. Thus, the better policy
would be to encourage employees to organize by withholding section 7 protection from all
but those actions which are in fact concerted.
II. PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH V. N.L.R.B.
The Ninth Circuit was faced with a different aspect of the right to Weingarten
representation in Pacific Telephone and Telegraph v. N.L.R.B.'" lit Pacific, the issue was not
whether the employee's request for representation was protected, but whether the em-
ployee has a right. to a certain quality of representation once he has asserted rights
established in Weingarten. Specifically, the court decided whether an employee requesting
representation at. a disciplinary interview has a right to consult with the representative
prior to the disciplinary interview and whether the employee has a right to be inft.)rniecl of
the nature of the matter being investigated.
-
Iwo Board cases have previously discussed these issues. In Climax Molybdenum Co., 0
Division of Amax Co. hie.," the Board asserted that an employee has a right to consultation
prior to the investigatory interview. The Board noted that the "knowledgeable . ' represen-
tative required by the Supreme Court's Weingarten decision did not permit the employer
to put "blinders on the union representative by denying him the (pporitinity of learning
the facts" by means of denying a consultation prior to the interview." Although the
Climax decision was denied enforcement by the Tenth Circuit, on other grounds," 2 the
court agreed that the employee has a right to prior consultation." 3 The court held that
either the, employer must give the employee enough time to seek consultation on his own,
prior to the interview. or the employer must provide company tittle to do so." While
Climax recognized the right to prior consultation, it did not specify what information, if
any, was to be provided to the employee and his representative at the tittle of consultation.
This question was addressed by the Board in a subsequent. case.
in Southwestern Hell Telephone Co.,"" the Board held that information relevant to the
investigation must be provided to the employee." The Board's decision was not en forced
by the circuit court on other grounds," 7 but the court, considering other provisions of the
" Wall Street Journal, July 5, 1983, at 1, col. 5. The article contained the following reaction to the
E.I. du Pont decision:
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce praises the court's reversal, saying that it preserves
management's right to discuss problems individually with nonunion employees. But
one labor board lawyer says that if the NLRB had been upheld, unions might have been
the losers. He says, -The more employees have the right to do things without a union,
the less likely they are to seek one."
Id.
5" 711 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1983).
▪ 227 N.L.R.B. 1189, euf. den. 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978).
"' 227 N.L.R.B. at 1190.
52 Climax Molybdenum v. N.L.R.B., 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978).
' Id. at 365.
" Id.
• 
251 N.L.R.B. 612 (1981).
"" Id. at 614.
'' Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. N.L.R.B., 667 F.2d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 1982).
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Act, held that the union would have a right to the infOrmation if it was relevant to the
bargaining function." The court stated that providing the information was part of the
employer's duty to bargain under the Act."" These issues resurfaced in a different context
in Pacific.
In Pacific, two telephone installer/repairmen were called in from the held and
ordered to report to a customer service manager. Each employee asked why he was being
summoned, but the manager refused to give a reason and asked whether either employee
wanted union representation, Each responded that he wanted representation, and was
informed only that the meeting concerned "an incident. the previous week." 7" The chief
union steward then arrived and told the employees that he knew nothing of the reasons
for the interview. The steward was also told nothing except that there "was a problem.""
Each employee was interviewed separately by a security representative, and another
customer service manager.
The incident involved the installation of phone equipment. against company rules, by
one of the employees in the home of the other employee. After finding out. the nature of
the interview from the first employee interviewed, the steward requested that he be
allowed to consult with the other employee prior to his interview. The steward's request
was denied by the manager who claimed it would jeopardize the investigation. The
employees were later discharged for their infraction of the company rules.
The employees brought an unfair labor practice charge against the employe•." They
charged that the employer violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act by refusing to inform the
employees, or their union representative of the nature of the matter being investigated as
well as by refusing to allow them to consult with the union representative before their
interviews.'" The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that under Weingarten, the
employees had the right to insist on the presence of a union representative at interviews
which they reasonably believed would result in disciplinary action, and under the Board's
decision in Climax, they had the right to prior consultation with their union representa-
tive.'" The AL] further found that the employees had a right to be informed prior to the
interview of the nature of their alleged misconduct because such a right is inherent in the
right to prior consultation.Th The employer took exception to the ALls ruling and
appealed to the Board."'
The Board agreed with the ALJ's ruling, stating that. the employees had a section 7
right to CA instillation with their union representatives prior to the interviews. and that. the
employer was required to inform the employees of the nature of the matter to be
discussed at the interview.'"
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered both issues — whether an employee has the
right to a pre-interview conference and whether an employee has the right to be informed
of the subject matter of the interview and the nature of any charge of impropriety the
" Id. at 474 - 75 n.4.
Id.




" 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 110 L.R.R.NI. at 1414 (Hunter. M., dissenting).
75 Id.
71i
77 711 F.2d at 136.
F.2d at 136.
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employer may make. The court stated that the answer depends upon the nature of the
employee's right to act in concert. 78
The court held that the employee's right to representation at an investigatory inter-
view encompasses the right of a pre-interview consultation with the representative as well
as the right to be infbrmed of the nature of the interview.'" The court stated that these
rights are within the scope of the general Weingarten right of representation." The court
stated that unless relevant information was provided to the employee and an opportunity
to confer with the representative was granted, "the ability of the union representative
effectively to give the aid and protection sought by the employee would be seriously
diminished."'"
The court further held that although the representation at an investigatory interview
is a right which must be requested by the employee, and not offered by the employer,
"once representation has been afforded the representative may speak for the employee
he represents and either the union representative or the employee may make the request
for pre-interview conference."' The court provided no further discussion on the issue
and affirmed the Board's decision. Therefore, the Board's Pacific opinion will be exam-
ined and a critique offered on its decision to expand the Weingarten rights beyond the
mere grant of a representative at an itivestigatory interview.
The Board considered that the Weingarten right would be ineffective withrmt prior
consultation because the representative is "precluded from performing his envisioned
role as a knowledgeable' representative."" The Board also noted t hat the representative's
role in Weingarten was described as eliciting favorable facts and saving the employer
valuable production time by getting to the bottom of the incident." Moreover, the Board
noted, the Weingarten representative would be of special service when the employee is
inarticulate or inhibited, and thus unable to explain well the facts pertinent to the
inquiry." The Board explained that knowledge is a better basis than ignorance in
performing the representative role in labor-management relations.""
The Board made the argument that proper consultation would in turn be ineffective
unless the employee or union representative at least had enough information so that they
would be advised of the subject matter of the interview." Prior consultation, the Board
stated, is merely an "aspect of that function which enables the representative to fulfill his
role.' The Board found that requiring prior consultation and information regarding
the matter being investigated was consonant with the Weingarten concept. of representa-
tion at the interview. The Board supported its statement by noting that prior consultation
would assist the employer by enabling the employee to elicit favorable facts and would












88 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1412 n.8.
" Id., 110 L.R.R.M. at 1412.
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noted that the consultation would assist the employee who may be too fearful or inarticu-
late to relate accurately the incident being investigated."
The Board also addressed several counter arguments to their holding. First, the
Board stated, the requirement of prior consultation and information did not interfere
with legitimate employer prerogatives;"' the employer is still free to reject the collective
course and forego the interview."' Second, the Board asserted that the requirements
imposed would not transform the interview into an adversarial proceeding, as cautioned
by the Weingarten Court."3 The employer is free, the Board pointed out, to insist t hat he is
only interested in hearing the employee's account of the story." In further support for its
position, the Board observed that the prior consultation and notice requirements are
limited. According to the Board, the consultation is merely an opportunity for the
representative to become familiar with the employee's circumstances.' The-requirement
to provide information need only be a "general statement. as to the subject mailer of the
interview" which identifies the misconduct for which discipline may he imposed."
The Board found further support in Weingarten for the proposition that the re-
quirements imposed in Pacific merely recognized t he right. of employees to baud together
when their terms and condition of employment are threatened by employer prerogatives
in investigatory and disciplinary misconduct.."' Thus, the Board stated, the measures
imposed in Pacific would further balance the inequities which exist between an employer's
"investigatory machinery" and the "isolated employee."""
The dissenting member of the Board disagreed with the Pacific majority's interpreta-
tion of Weingarten's "knowledgeable" representative. The opinion acknowledged that
Weingarten requires a "knowledgeable" representative, but it disagreed with the majority
opinion which interpreted "knowledgeable" to mean one who is fluniliar with the specifics
of the employee's situation. Rather, dissenting Member Hunter asserted that "knowl-
edgeable" means only that the representative be familiar with management-employee
relations in general." The dissent was concerned that the majority's extension of Wein-
garten rights was a transformation of the proceedings into an adversary contest — a trans-
fOrmation forbidden by Weingarten.'" The dissent asserted that the Pacific decision would
encourage union representatives to act as counsel, rather' than as fact finders, which was
the role envisioned by FIceingarten . 1 " 1 The dissent also believed that the balance, sought to
be achieved by section 7 between employer and employee was upset by the Pacific majority
in favor of the employee. 10" The dissent took this position because it believed that there
are compelling policy reason's why an employer might need to prevent prior consultation
"" M.
91
" 2 Id. See also Glomac Plastics. Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1309. 1310 (1978).
262 N.L.R.B. No. 127, l 10 L.R.R.M. at l 412 - 13 ; see also Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 264.
" 4 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1412; ,set. aloe Southwestern Bell Telephonic Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 667 F.2d 470, 473 -74 (5th Cir.1982); Ina see N.I,.R.B. v. Texaco, 659 1:.2d 124, 126 (91.11 Cir.
1981) (no total bar on representative's participation is allowed).




"" Id., 110 L.R.R.M, at 1414 (Hunter, M., dissenting).
1 " Id., 1 10 L.R.R.M. at 1415 (Hunter, M., dissenting).
tilt Id .
102 id.
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and withhold information until the interview.'" These policy reasons included the need
to prevent. employees from coordinating stories, and the need for employers to conduct
investigatory interviews in the most efficient way possible."' The dissent noted that
withholding information until the interview may be the best way to discern the truth ()fan
incident, which the dissent asserted is in the best interests of both employer and employ-
ees."'" The dissent warned that the information requirement may lead to a "procedural
minefield" which will only impede the fact finding process envisioned by the Supreme
Court in Weingarten.'"
While section 7 is not completely elastic and is limited in its scope, 117 the Supreme
Court has allowed the Board to interpret the scope of section .7 rights liberally and thus
encourage the evolutionary development of those rights.'" Applying the Weingarten
recognition of the right to representation to a particular set of facts led the Board to
expand section 7 rights to include a right to prior consultation. A right to the opportunity
to meet with the union representative, if only briefly, in order to Limiliarize the represen-
tative with the employee and the facts which may be important to the interview is one
which seems reasonable, and within the power of the Board to recognize. The Pacific
opinion guards against a full blown adversarial proceeding by specifying the limitations
placed on the consultation and by noting that the information of the subject matter of the
interview is in no way similar to the "discovery" activity which precedes an adversarial
proceeding.'" It thus appears that the right to prior consultation is a permissive adapta-
tion of section 7 rights by the Board.'"
The need for information supplied by the employer prior to the interview is less
apparent, for two reasons. First, an employee who is summoned to an interview which he
reasonably believes will result in disciplinary action indicates that the employee already has
a good indication as to the subject matter of the interview. If not, it is difficult 10 imagine
how the employee's fear of discipline could be "reasonable" and why the employee should
have a right to a Weingarten representative. Furthermore, employers routinely give die
employee and the union a statement of the nature of the alleged misconduct to be
investigated.'" Thus, the requirement will only bear on those situations where the
employer has, presumably For good reasons, decided to withhold the information until
the interview so that it will be used most effectively to elicit the truth from the employee.
Second, the condition stated by the Board which requires a general statement as to
the subject matter of the interview does not provide a clear enough standard for either
.employee or employer. The employee may always object that the statement is too general;
the employer may always insist that the statement is specific enough. For example, the
statement in Pacific by the employer that the interview concerned an "incident last week"
could certainly have been specific enough. The employee was required only to recall the
events of the previous week, and determine which of them might subject him to disci-
pline. Since the incident involved was one for which the employee could be terminated, it
is difficult indeed to imagine that the employee was unable to determine the event in
103 id,
1 ° 4 Id., 110 L.R.R.M. at 1416 (Hunter, M., dissenting).
105 Id .
'" 6 Id.
17 See. American Shipbuilding Co. v. N.L.R.B., 380 U.S. 300, 310 (1965).
1 " Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266.
'°' 226 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1413.
"" See 420 U.S. at 266-68.
1 " 226 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1415 (Hunter, M., dissenting).
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question. Yet, because the Board failed to set forth exactly what type of information must
he given to the employee, more "procedural mines" may interfere with an efficient
investigation by the employer.
The Weingarten right was provided so that the imbalance of power between employer
and employee could be equalized in the interviewcontext," 2
 The goal of the interview is
fact finding. The role of the representative is to assist the employee so that the facts may
he put. in proper perspective in front of the employer 13
 Correctly exercised, the rights
granted in Weingarten should go a long way to prevent premature action by an employer
in discharging an employee, thus putting into motion the long and often burdensome
procedure of grievance-arbit ration. Proper exercise of the Weingarten right to represent a-
tion may discourage a protracted grievance procedure initiated by the union since the
employee was dismissed for just cause.
du Pont and Pacific represent possible extensions of section 7 rights in various
situations where an employee requests or receives representation at an investigatory
interview. When examined together, the cases raise further questions which may have to
be addressed by the Board in the future. For example, in the nonunion setting, is there a
right of prior consultation if the employee's request is "concerted activity?" If so, with
whom should the employee consult? Does the employer have the right to keep informa-
tion from a nonunion co-worker on the grounds of confidentiality? While the union
representative is easily identifiable and held to certain duties, it is difficult. to identify
which co-worker has the rights and responsibilities set forth in Pacific. After the interview,
the co-worker's status as representative has ended. Does he or she bear any responsibility
to other employees to keep information confidential: These questions point out the
difficulty involved in expansion of section 7 rights tinder Weingarten. Each extension of
the representation rights opens new possibilities for further demands that the right be
extended again to apply to a slightly different fact situation. Such expansion is particu-
larly vexing to employers whose interest. in the interview procedure is the quick and
efficient resolution of c he problem at. hand, The balance originally struck in Weingarten
between employers and employees may in fact be tipping in favor of the employees.
B. Union Unfair Labor Practices
I. *Hot Cargo Remedies: Shepard v. N.L.R.B.'
Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act.)'- prohibits and nullifies agree-
ments between labor organizations and employers whereby the employer agrees to cease
or refrain from transacting business with another person. 3
 Since section 8(a) defines these
" 2
 420 U.S. at 263.
13 Id. at 264.
* By Barbara Zicht Richmond. Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIE1A',
1 103 S, Ct, 665, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369 (1983).
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
3 Id. Section 8(e) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter
into any contract or agreement ... whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees
to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in
any of the products of any employer, or to cease doing business with any other person,
and any contract or agreement entered into ... containing such an agreement. shall be
to such extent tmenlincible [sic] and void. . .
Id.
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so-called "hot cargo" contracts as an unfair labor practice, the National Labor Relations
Board (Board) is authorized, under section 10(c) of the Act., 4 to issue cease and desist
orders'and to take affirmative action to remedy hot cargo contracts.'
During the Survey year, in Shepard v. National Labor Relations Board,' the Supreme
Court considered whether the Board was required to order a make-whole remedy —
reimbursement — for a violation of section 8(e) of the Act.' The Court held that the
Board had acted within its authority in deciding that, in this case, reimbursement would
not effectuate the remedial policies of the Act. 8 The Court based its decision, in part, on
its finding that the Act does not require the Board to order "complete relief" for every
unfair labor practice." The Court's holding is significant because it resolves a conflict.
between the Ninth Circuit)" and the District of Columbia Circuit."
In Shepard," respondent Building Material and Dump Truck Drivers, Teamsters
Local 36 (Union) and respondent contractors' associations and member contractors (Con-
tractors) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (Agreement) which prohibited
the Contractors from dealing with nonunion dump truck operators." Generally, the
Contractors in the San Diego area hired dump truck operators through brokers on a daily
basis.' 4 The Agreement, according to the court of appeals, had the effect of insuring that
the Contractors gave subcontracts only to signatory brokers who then referred hauling
jobs only to union truck operators."
Petitioner Larry Shepard owned and operated a dump truck in the San Diego area.' 6
Shepard had contracted with Terra Trucking Company, a broker who had signed the
Agreement." The Union informed Terra Trucking that, pursuant to the Agreement, it
could not deal with seven nonunion owner-operators, including Shepard.'" Terra Truck-
ing then informed these nonunion owner-operators that they either had to join the Union
or find a different broker." Shepard, against his will and "under protest," joined the
Union and paid the initiation fee and dues.'
4 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
5 Id. Section 10(c) provides in pertinent part:
If „ . the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has
engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board ... shall
issue ... an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor
practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with
or without hack pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act.
Id.
103 S. Ct. 665, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369 (1983).
Id. at 667, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2369.
8 Id. at 670, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2372.
Id.
1 " Joint Council of Teamsters v. N.L.R.B., 671 F.2d 305, 109 L.R.R.M. 2181 (9th Cir. 1981).
" Building Material and Dump Truck Drivers, Teamsters Local Union No. 36 v. N.L.R.B., 669
F.2d 759, 108 L.R.R.M. 3153 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
12 Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369 (1983).
13 Id. at 667, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2370.
" Id. at 667, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2369.
15 Building Material and Dump Truck Drivers, Teamsters Local Union No. 36 v. N.L.R.B., 669
F.2d 759, 762, 108 LR.R.M. 3153, 3154 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
15 Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 667, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2369 (1983).
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Claiming that the Agreement constituted a violation of section 8(e) of the Act,
Shepard and respondent California Dump Truck Owners Association (Association) filed
charges with the Board." The complaint was initially heard by an Administrative Law
Judge (Ala" The ALJ found that the individual dump truck owner-operators were
independent contractors and that, therefore, they could not be treated as employees of
the Contractors for purposes of the Agreement." In addition, the ALJ found that the
Agreement provisions in which the Union and Contractors agreed not to deal with
nonunion owner-operators violated section 8(e) of' the Act because these provisions had a
prohibited secondary purpose. 24 In conclusion, the ALI recommended that the Board
issue a cease and desist order, and require the Union and the Contractors to reimburse
those owner-operators who were compelled to join the Union for amounts paid to the
Union for clues, initiation fees and fringe benefit contributions.'
While affirming the findings of the ALJ and adopting his recommended order, the
" Id. at 667-68, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2370. Shepard's original complaint included a charge of a
violation of section 8(b)(4) of the Act. Id. at 668, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2370. Section 8(b)(4) prohibits
secondary boycotts and provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents — (4)(i) to
engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged
in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in
the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any
services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is —
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or
employer organization or to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by subsection
(e) of this section;
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer,
or to cease doing business with any other person. . . .
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976). Shepard, at the request of the Board's Regional Director, modified his
complaint and alleged only a violation of section 8(e). Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 668, 112
L.R.R.M. 2369, 2370 (1983). The Association — one of the respondent contractors' associations
which were parties to the Agreement with the Union — bled suit with Shepard because it wished to
contract with nonunion operators. Id. at 667-68, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2370. The Regional Director then
consolidated Shepard's and the Association's charges and filed a complaint against the Union and
Contractors alleging only a violation of section 8(e). Id.
22 Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 668, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2370 (1983). The AI_J decision
appears in full in the Board's later decision. Building Material and Dump Truck Drivers, Teamsters
Local Union No. 36. 249 N.L.R.B. 386, 387-95, 104 L.R.R.M. 1279 (1980).
23
 Building Material and Dump Truck Drivers, Teamsters Local Union No. 36, 249 N.L.R.B.
386, 391, 104 L.R.R.M. 1279, 1280 (1980).
" Id. at 391 - 94, 104 L.R.R.M. at 1280-82. The ALJ also found that the Agreement was not
protected by the section 8(e) proviso clause. Id, at 394, 104 L.R.R.M. at 1282. The proviso clause
excludes from the section 8(0 prohibition "agreement[s] between a labor organization and an
employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting ()I' work to be
done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other
work . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). The ALJ reasoned that since the battling done by the
owner-operators was to and from construction sites and not within the confines of a particular site, it
was clear that the proviso did not include the Agreement. Building Materials and Dump Truck
Drivers, Teamsters Local Union No. 36, 249 N.L.R.B. 386, 394, 104 L.R.R.M. 1279, 1282 (1980).
" Building Materials and Dump Truck Drivers, Teamsters Local Union No. 36, 249 N.L.R.B.
386, 395, 104 L.R.R.M. 1279, 1280 (1980) (the Union and the Contractors were jointly and severally
liable).
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Board omitted the ALys recommendation for reimbursement. 26 In a footnote to its
decision, the Board stated three reasons for not ordering reimbursement." First, the
Board found insufficient evidence that the alleged losses were "directly attributable to
actual coercion" by the Union. 28 Second, the Board believed an order for reimbursement
was "overbroad and inappropriate" for violations of section 8(e). 2 ' Finally, the Board
noted that independent contractors could pursue damage claims under section 303 of the
Act,"
After the Board had issued its order, the Union petitioned the court of appeals for
review and argued that the Board had erred in finding that the truck operators were
independent contractors." Sheparci and the Associations also petitioned for review,
arguing that the remedy ordered by the Board was inadequate." The court of appeals
affirmed the Board's order in its entirety."
In its review of the record, the court of appeals concluded that the Board was correct
in finding that the truck operators were independent contractors because they had not.
surrendered control over their operations to the brokers.'" When reviewing the Board's
remedy, the court noted its limited authority to change the Board's exercise of discre-
tion. 35 Because the Board's remedial powers are broad, discretionary ones, they are
subject to only limited review. 36 In addition, since the Board uses its own unique knowl-
edge and expertise in designing a remedy, the court noted that the remedy must be given
special respect by reviewing courts." The court set forth the Supreme Court standard
that a Board remedial order cannot be changed unless it is a "patent attempt to achieve
ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act ." 38 Since
20 Id. at 386, 104 L.R.R.M. at 1280. Pursuant to the Act, a three-member panel of the Board
reviewed the AL's decision because exceptions to that decision were filed by the parties. Id.
27 Id. at 386 n.2, 104 L.R.R.M at 1280 n.2.
28 Id. The full text of the Board's explanatory footnote is as follows:
The Board has on one occasion adopted without comment an Administrative Law
Judge's recommended Order containing such a remedy. Local 814, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Santini Brothers
Inc.), 208 NLRB 184, 201 (1974). In the present case, however, there is insufficient
evidence in the record with respect to alleged losses directly attributable to actual
coercion by Respondents. Furthermore, we find a reimbursement order, typically used
to "make whole" en/payees for violations of the Act, to be generally overbroad and
inappropriate in the context of 8(e) violations. We note that aggrieved owner-operators
engaged in business as independent contractors may pursue a damage claim under Sec.
303 of the Act. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the reimbursement of owner-
operators ordered by the Administrative Law judge would not effectuate the remedial
policies of the Act. See Local 60, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,




31 Building Material and Dump Truck Drivers, Teamsters Local Union No. 36 v. N.L.R.B., 669
F.2d 759, 762. 108 L.R.R.M. 3153, 3154 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Contractors intervened in support of
the Board's order. Id.
32 Id .





38 Id. (quoting Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. N.L.R.B., 319 U.S. 533, 540, 12 L.R.R.M. 739,
742 (1943)).
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the court found the Board's cease and desist order would be sufficient to deter future
wrongdoing under the Act, it held that the order could not be disturbed."
Following the court of' appeal's affirmation of the Board's decision, Shepard ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court" in order to resolve a conflict between the
District of Columbia Circuit's ruling in Shepard and a similar case in the Ninth Circuit,
Joint Council of TeamsMrs v. N.L.R.B." Upon facts similar to Shepard. the Council court
had remanded the case to the Board for either an order for reimbursement or an
explanation why reimbursement would not effectuate the policies of the Act. 12 Shepard
and the Association, relying upon the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Joint Council of
Teamsters, argued that when money is collected illegally, the Board should order a refund
unless a rational reason exists for not ordering reimbursement." In the instant case,
Shepard and the Association argued, reimbursenient should be required."
The Shepard Court, however, concluded that the Ninth Circuit viewed the Board's
discretion in fashioning a remedy too narrowly." The Supreme Court found that the
Board's decision that reimbursement would not effectuate the policies of the Act was
reasonable." Therefore, the Court held that the Board was not required to order
reimbursement.'"
In upholding the Board's refusal to order reimbursement, the Supreme Court
offered four basic reasons for its action. First, orders of the Board, the Court stated, will
be upheld if they are within the discretionary powers of the Board. In this case, the Court
found that the Board reasonably limited the use of reimbursement orders to cases in
which actual coercion has been found. Second, since the Board is empowered to order
remedial and not punitive relief, the Court decided the Board's decision was reasonable in
not ordering reimbursement. Third, in the Court's view, the Board appeared to have
followed the pattern of the Act in ordering reimbursement only in cases in which judicial
damages would be available. Finally, the Court ruled nothing in the Act requires the
Board to order complete relief for every unfair labor practice; the Board is authorized to
use its discretion in fashioning remedies.
In analyzing the discretion to be afforded the Board, the Shepard Court noted that.
Congress had authorized the Board to use its discretion in determining which remedies
would effectuate the policies of the Act." In addition, the Court stated, the Board's
remedies must be afforded special respect by courts because of the Board's knowledge
and expertise." In determining whether the Board's order was within its discretion, the
3" Id. at 767, 108 L.R.R.M at 3158.
▪ The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 102 S. Cr. 2232 (1982).
4 ' Joint Council of Teamsters v. N.L.R.B., 671 F.2d 305, 109 L.R.R.A.I. 2181 (9th Cir. 1981).
" Id. at 310-13, 109 L.R.R.M. at 2184-86.
13 Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 669, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2371 (1983) (quoting Joint
Council of Teamsters v. N.L.R.B., 671 F.2d 305, 310, 109 L.R.R.M. 2181, 2184 (9th Cir. 1981)).
*4 Id.
" Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 669, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2371 (1983).
4°




4 " Id. The Supreme Court had noted this mandate for special respect for Board remedies in
prior cases. N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32, 71 L.R.R.M. 2481, 2495 n.32




ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 143
Court examined the reasoning used by the Board to reach its decision. 5 °
In a previous case, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B.," the Shepard Court noted, the
Board had been given guidelines concerning the disclosure of the basis of its orders." In
Phelps Dodge Corp., the Court had reminded the Board that although it may use its
discretion to fashion remedies, it must also take responsibility in exercising its judgment
within its statutory powers." Since federal courts are charged with judicial review of
Board orders, the Phelps Dodge Corp. Court reasoned, the Board should be required to
disclose the basis of its order so as to avoid needless litigation and to provide for speedy
enforcement. of its orders." The Phelps Dodge Corp. Court concluded that the Board
should give a clear indication that it has exercised the discretion which was granted by
Congress."
In applying these principles to the facts in Shepard, the Court concluded that al-
though the explanation given by the Board for its order was contained in a brief
footnote," the explanation could reasonably be interpreted to mean that the Board had
decided to treat. cases in which actual coercion was found differently from cases in which
no actual coercion was found." Ordering reimbursement only when actual coercion is
found, the Court held, is within the Board's discretion." The Shepard Court acknowl-
edged that the scope of the Board's explanation was less than ideal, but concluded that it
was adequate to support the Board's order."
In ruling that the Board has power to order remedial and not punitive damages, the
Shepard Court affirmed the Board's reliance on Local 60, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America v. N.L.R.B." in choosing to limit its remedy in Shepard."' In
Carpenters Local 60, the Court had held that the Board's power was to grant remedial and
not punitive relief. 12 As a result, the Carpenters Local 60 Court had ruled, the Board could
not order a union to reimburse dues to workers who were required to join the union
under an illegal "closed shop" contract absent evidence that any employee was coerced
into becoming or remaining a union member." The Shepard Court. apparently presumed
that the Board had concluded that Carpenters Local 60 supported, by analogy, its decision
not to order reimbursement in Shepard." 4 The Shepard Court held that the Board's
decision, ordering reimbursement only in cases in which actual coercion is found, was
consistent with the Board's remedial power."
5° Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 669, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2371 (1983).
51 	313 U.S. 177, 8 L.R.R.M. 439 (1941).
52 Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 669, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2371 (1983).
52
 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 194, 8 L.R.R.M. 439, 446 (1941).
54 Id. at 197, 8 L.R.R.M. at 447.
" Id. at 197, 8 L.R.R.M. at 447-48.
56 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
" Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 669, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2371 (1983). The Court
assumed the Board meant actual coercion to include threats, strikes, picketing, and other egregious
situations which would constitute violations of section 8(b)(4). Id. See Local 20, Teamsters Union v.
Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 259, 56 L.R.R.M. 2225, 2227-28 (1964).
" Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 669, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2371 (1983).
59 Id.
6° 365 U.S. 651, 47 L.R.R.M. 2900 (1961).
°' Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 669, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2371 (1983).
62 Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. N.L.R.B., 365 U.S. 651,
655-56, 47 L.R.R.M. 2900, 2901-02 (1961).
" Id.
" Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 669, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2371 (1983).
65 Id.
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In addition to limiting its remedy appropriately, the Shepard Court determined, the
Board had acted reasonably in interpreting the Act to require reimbursement only in the
situations in which the Act provides for judicial damages." Section 303 of the Act," the
Shepard Court noted, provides judicial darmige remedies for illegal secondary act ivities." 8
The Shepard Court further noted that section 303 provides a remedy only if there is a
violation of section 8(b)(4), which requires proof of coercion." Congress is entitled,
according to the Shepard Court., to establish a remedy for some violations of federal law,
even if it does not provide a remedy for all violations."
Since the Board is an administrative agency, and not a court, the Shepard Court
reasoned, it does not have the power to order equitable relief." While a court might be
responsive to a plea for "complete relief," according to the Shepard Court, the Board does
not have the power to order compensatory damages for injuries resulting from illegal
conduct," Rather, the Shepard Court explained, the Board is authorized to fashion
remedies which will stop and prevent unfair labor practices." The Shepard Court lOund
that nothing in the Act required the Board to order complete relief for every unfair labor
practice." The Board, therefore, the Shepard Court concluded, had acted within its power
when it denied reimbursement because reimbursement would not effectuate the policies
of the Act."
Justice O'Connor wrote the only dissent, disagreeing with the majority on two legal
grounds as well as on factual grounds." While she agreed with the majority that the
Board had the authority to determine that reimbursement. in this case would tan effectu-
ate the policies of the Act, she did not believe that the Board had given an adequate
explanation for its order." Justice O'Connor argued that each of the Board's three
" Id. at 670, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2372.
67
 29 U.S.C, § 187 (1976). Section 303 provides in pertinent part:
(a)it shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only, in an industry or activity
affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in any activity or conduct
defined as an unfair labor practice in section [8(b)(4)].
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason [01] any violation of
subsection (a) of this sect ion t nay sue therefor in any district court of the United States
... without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any other court, and shall
recover the damages lay him sustained and the cost of the suit.
Id.
" Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 670, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2371-72 (1983).
" Id. The Court noted that Shepard and the Board agreed that section 303 only provides
remedies for violations of section 8(b)(4). Id. The dissent in Connell Construction also noted that
Congress had made the choice to provide section 303 remedies to situations in which there was
pressure to sign contracts in violation of section 8(e) and to limit violations of section 8(e) that did not
involve coercion to Board remedies. Connell Construction Co„ Inc. v. Plumbers and Stcamfitters
Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 647-50, 89 L.R.R.M. 2401, 2413-14 (1975) (Stewart, J., Douglas,
J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Shepard v, N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 670, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2372 (1983).
71 Id.
72 Id. The differences between courts and administrative agencies are discussed in Federal
Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 141-44 (1940).
73
 Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 670, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, .2372 (1981). See United
Automobile Workers v, Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 642-43, 42 L.R.R,M. 2142, 2145 (1958). -
74
 Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Gt.. 665, 670, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2372 (1983).
76 Id .
77
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reasons for its order was defective or insufficient to support its decision." Since she
viewed the explanations as inadequate, Justice O'Connor would have remanded the case
to the Board for its consideration of whether or not reimbursement would further the
Act's prohibition of hot cargo contracts."
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that each of the Board's justifications for its
order was faulty. Justice O'Connor. rejected the Board's first reason, that the evidence was
insufficient to prove the owner-operators' losses had been the direct result of coercion by
the Union and Contractors. Because the ALJ had found that Shepard and others had
joined the Union and had paid fees and dues under protest as a result of the Union's
enforcement of the hot cargo contract, justice O'Connor believed there was ample
evidence of losses directly attributable to coercion by the Union and the Contractors. 8 °
Next, Justice O'Connor rejected the Board's second reason, that reimbursement
orders are "overbroad and inappropriate" for violations of section 8(e). She acknowl-
edged that reimbursement would he an inappropriate remedy for an individual who
would have joined the Union even if it had not attempted to enforce the illegal provi-
sion." Nevertheless, she argued, in this case, reimbursement would not be "inappropri-
ate" because the ALJ had found that. Shepard had joined the Union only as a result of the
hot cargo contract and that he would not have joined otherwise."
Finally, justice O'Connor rejected the Board's third reason, that owner-operators
could pursue a section 303 damage award. A section 303 damage award, she argued, is
available for individuals harmed by a section 8(b)(4) violation, not a section 8(e) viola-
tion.'Since there was no finding of a section 8(b)(4) violation in this case, Justice
O'Connor argued that a section 303 remedy was not available to the petitioners."
Justice O'Connor acknowledged that the Court must affirm a Board order, even if
not completely clear, if its reasoning can be inferred reasonably.' Nevertheless, she
argued, an agency decision cannot be upheld unless the grounds of the decision were
within the agency's authority." This order should not be affirmed, Justice O'Connor
argued, because the Board's statements did not support the denial of reimbursement."
7" Id. The three reasons the Board had given are: that the losses were not shown to be the direct
result of actual coercion by the Union and Contractors; that an order for reimbursement is "over-
broad and inappropriate" for violations of section 8(e); and that a section 303 remedy may be
pursued by owner-operators who are independent contractors. Building Materials and Dump Truck
Drivers, Teamsters Local No. 36, 249 N.L.R.B. 386, 386 n.2, 104 L.R.R.M. 1279, 1280 n.2 (1980).
For the text of the Board's explanation, see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
" Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 670, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2372 (1983).
88 Id. at 672, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2374.
81 Id. at 673, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2374.
82 'Id. In support of her argument, justice O'Connor cited Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters and
Joiners of America v. N.L.R.B, in which the Court reversed the Board's order of reimbursement
because there was no evidence that union membership had been compelled by an unfair practice.
Local 60, United Bhd, of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. N.L.R.B., 365 U.S. 651, 655 -56, 47
L.R.R.M. 2900, 2901-02 (1961). She apparently concluded that if there was such evidence, then
reimbursement should be ordered. Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 673, 112 L.R.R.M, 2369,
2374 (1983).
" Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 673, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2374 (1983). See supra notes
65-69 and accompanying text.
" Id.
" Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 673, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2374 (1983) (citing Bowman
Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)).
" S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943).
87 Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 673, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2374 (1983).
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justice O'Connor did not believe, as did the majority, that the Board's order inferred
its decision to award reimbursement only for violations of section 8(6)(4)." She con-
cluded, therefore, that the case should be remanded to the Board for a decision as to
whether or not reimbursement would effectuate the policies of the Act. 8 "
The Shepard opinion is significant because it affirms the power of the Board and the
great weight to which Board orders are entitled. The Board's order in Shepard followed
precedent and the pattern of the Act. In its past decisions, the Board awarded reim-
bursement only in hot cargo cases in which it. found coercion, and therefore, a violation of
section 8(b)(4), as well as section 8(e)."° In Local 814, International Bhd. of Teamsters (Santini
Brothers) v. N.L.R.B.," the Board ordered reimbursement of independent owner-
operators who had joined the union because of the union's successful coercion of the
employer to enforce a hot cargo agreement."' The coercion found in Santini Brothers
included work stoppages which lasted until the employer agreed not to hire independent
owner-operators unless they joined the union." The Board found, in Santini Brothers, that
the union violated section 8(b)(4), as well as section 8(e), of the Act." Accordingly,
reimbursement was ordered."' Shepard is easily distinguished from Santini Brothers be-
cause in Shepard no violation of section 8(b)(4) was found." In Joint Council of Teamsters v.
N.L.R.B. ,H 7 a case involving facts similar to Shepard, the Board refused to order reim-
bursement because no actual coercion was found." Based upon its past decisions, the
Board was therefore absolutely correct in its refusal to order reimbursement in Shepard
because no actual coercion, and no violation of section 8(b)(4) was found.
Justice O'Connor seemed to believe the distinction between cases involving violations
of both sections 8(h)(4) and 8(e) and cases involving only a violation of section 8(e) is not
significant enough to justify ordering reimbursement only in the former cases." This
distinction, however, was properly acknowledged by the majority of the Shepard Court as
being consistent with the pattern of the Act.'"° As the Shepard Court explained, in section
303, the Act provides for judicial damages only when section 8(b)(4) has been violated."'
By ordering reimbursement Only in cases in which the Act permits damages, the majority
maintained, the Board acted reasonably in Shepard.'" Ignoring the Board's attempt for
consistency, justice O'Connor apparently felt that since the petitioners could not receive
" Id. at n.5.
" Id. at 673, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2374.
" E.g., Local 814, International Bhd. of 'Feamsters (Santini Bros.) v. N.L.R.B., 546 F.2d 989, 93
L.R.R.M. 2800 (D.C. Or. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818, 96 L.R.R.M. 2512 (1977); joint Council of
Teamsters v. N.L.R.B., 671 F.2d 305, 109 L.R.R.M. 2181 (9th Cir. 1981). See Newspaper and
Periodical Drivers and Helpers Union, Local No. 921 v. N.L.R.B., 509 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1974)
(reimbursement not ordered because no coercion found).
" 546 F.2d 989, 93 L.R.R.M. 2900 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818, 96 L.R.R.M. 2512
(1977).
' 2 Santini Bros., 208 N.L.R.B. 184, 201, 85 L.R.R.M. 1518, 1519 (1974).
" Id. at 189-201, 85 L.R.R.M. at 1521.
" 4
 Id. at 198-201, 85 L.R.R.M. at 1519.
" Id. at 201-02, 85 L.R.R.M. at 1519.
" See Shepard. v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 667-68, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2370 (1983).
97 671 F.2d 305, 109 L.R.R.M. 2181 (9th Cir. 1981).
" Id. at 310-11, 109 L.R.R.M. at 2184.
" Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 672-73, 112 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2374 (1983).
'°° Id. at 669-70, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2371-72.
"' 1d.
'" Id.
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damages under section 303, they should he able to obtain reimbursement.'"
In addition to following precedent and the pattern of the Act, the Shepard Court
properly acted within its limited authority to review Board orders. In a prior decision,
Phelps Dodge Corp.,'" the Court required the Board to disclose the basis of its order
because the Court believed an explanation by the Board was necessary to make limited
judicial review of Board orders cffective.' 05 The Board in Phelps Dodge Corp. had ordered
reinstatement of employees who had been refused employment solely because of their
union membership.'" Noting that Congress could not define all possible remedies to
effectuate the Act, the Phelps Dodge Corp. Court reasoned that the Board, due to its
expertise, must be given discretion to fashion remedies, subject to limited judicial re-
view.'" The Phelps Dodge Corp. Court concluded that it would not binder the Board's
exercise of discretion, but required the Board to give the Court a clear indication that it
has properly exercised the discretion authorized by Congress.'" In its consideration of
the Board's explanation for its order in Shepard, the majority of the Court reasonably
concluded that the Board had expressed its intent to limit. reimbursement orders to cases
involving actual coercion.'"" The majority further concluded that the Board had clearly
acted within its authorized discretion by limiting reimbursement remedies to those "espe-
cially egregious situations."'"
In a prior decision, Virginia Electric and Power Co. a. N.L.R.B.,'" the Court concluded
that the Board's order "should stand unless it can be shown that the order is a patent
attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies
oft he act."''' In its evaluation of the Board's order 'Or reimbursement in employees who
were coerced by their employer to join a specific union to retain their jobs, the Virginia
Electric and Power Co. Court found that the Board had concluded reimbursement was
proper because the employees had suffered a loss as a result of coercion. 13 Affirming the
Board's order, the Court stated that it could not find that reimbursement would not
effectuate the policies of the Act.'" Since the Board found that Shepard suffered no loss
clue to coercion, the Shepard Court appropriately concluded that reimbursement was not
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act, and that the Board's order did effectuate
those policies.
Acknowledging the Board's unique knowledge and expertise, the Court, in N.L.R.B.
v. Gissel Packing Company,'" stated that the Board's choice of remedy must "be given
special respect by reviewing courts."'" In fact, the Court has held, in N.L.R.B. v. Food
Store Employees Union, Local 347 ,'" that if the Board's order contains an inconsistency, the
"3 Id. at 673, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2374.
104 313 U.S. 177, 8 L.R.R.M. 439 (1941).
"5 Id. at 195-97, 8 L.R.R.M. at 447.
146 Id. at 181-85, 8 L.R.R.M. at 440-41.
"7 Id. at 192-94, 8 L.R.R.M. at 446.
"8 Id. at 196-97, 8 L.R.R.M. at 447-48.
" 9 Shepard v. N.L.R.B., 103 S. Ct. 665, 668-69, 112 L,R,R.M. 2369, 2371 (19839.
"" Id. at 669, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2371.
"' 319 U.S. 533, 12 L.R.R.M. 739 (1943).
"2 Id. at 540,12 L.R.R.M. at 742. See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v, N.L.R.B., 379 U.S.
203, 215-17, 57 L.R.R.M. 2609, 2614 (1964).
113 319 U.S. at 543-44, 12 L.R.R.M. at 744.
"4 Id.
" 5 395 U.S. 575, 71 L.R.R.M. 2481 (1969).
"" Id. at 612 n.32, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2495 n.32.
'' 417 U.S. 1, 86 L.R.R.M. 2209 (1974).
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Court must remand the case to the Board rather than substitute its own judgment.""
Since the majority in Shepard found no inconsistency in the Board's order, there was no
need to remand the case to the Board, as Justice O'Connor had suggested. On the
contrary, the Shepard Court acted properly in affirming the Board's order.
In Shepard v. N.L.R.B., the Supreme Court, has thus reaffirmed the great deference
to be given to Board opinions. The Board's discretion in fashioning remedies under the
Act, according to the Shepard Court, is subject only to limited judicial review because of
the Board's expertise in preventing and stopping unfair labor practices. Affirming the
Board's order, the Court acknowledged that the Board is empowered to limit its orders of
reimbursement to cases which involve actual coercion,
2. *Validity of Union Rule Restricting Resignation from Membership:
Machinists, Local 1327 Malmo Victor]'
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act' gives all employees the right not only
to engage in a wide variety of "concerted activities fin. the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection,' but also the right to refrain from any such activities,'
These rights arc expressly protected from union interference by section 8(b)(1)(A), which
makes it unlawful for a labor organization to "restrain or coerce ... employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7." 4
The restrictions on union interference set forth in section 8(h)( I )(A) and conse-
quently, the scope of the employees' section 7 rights, however, are not unlimited. An
express statutory proviso grants unions the "authority to prescribe its own rules with
respect to the acquisition or retention of membership." 5 Examining the legislative history
of section 8(b)(1), including this proviso, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co.," stated that a union rule which is internal in its scope and application
may he enforced against employees attempting to exercise their section 7 rights without
necessarily violating section 8(b)(1)(A). 7 The Allis-Chalmers Court defined an internal rule
"" Id. at 9, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2211-12.
* By Thomas K, Cox, Staff Member, BOSTON CoLLEGE: LAw REV! EW.
' 263 N.L.R.B, No. 141, 111 L.R.R.M. 1115 (1982).
29 U.S.C. **151-169 (1976).
a Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of theirown choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities . .
29 U.S.C. *157 (1976).
4
 Section 8(b)(1)(A) states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents 
—
(1) to restrain or coerce
(A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in sect ion 7:
Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a Usti: organization to
prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein .. .
29 U.S.C.	 158(b)( I)(A) (1976).
5
 See id,
" 388 U.S. 175, 65 L.R.R.M. 2449 (1967).
7 Id. at 195, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2457. In Allis-Chalmers, several union members were fined by the
union for crossing the picket line and returning to work during a lawful and properly-called strike
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as one which has been properly adopted by the union,' applies only to those employees
who "enjo[y] full union membership" and is enforceable in a way which does not affect
the members' employment status,'"
The analytical framework for evaluating union rules established in Allis-Chalmers was
clarified by the Supreme Court. in Scofield v. N.L.R.B." While the Scofield Court affirmed
the parameters of internality as defined in Allis-Chalmers," it set forth a second standard
— a second level of inquiry — for ascertaining the validity of union constitutional
provisions and by-laws. In addition to meeting the Anis-Chalmers criteria, the Court stated,
an internal union rule may be enforced only if it does not frustrate any overriding labor
policy inherent in the Act.'" Describing the method of analysis as a "dual approach," the
Scofield Court thus summarized that "[section] 8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a
properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Con-
gress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members
who are free to leave the union and escape the rule." 14 Under this method, a union rule
which forbids members from crossing a picket line during an authorized strike may be
enforced through the imposition of fines without violating section 8(b)(I)(A).' 5
In contrast to valid internal regulations, external union rules — those applied
outside of the union — are not enforceable against employees who choose to exercise
their section 7 right to refrain from concerted activities. Thus, the Supreme Court has
held that once the union-member relationship has been severed by the lawful resignation
of the member, the imposition of sanctions by the union against the former member for
engaging in conduct proscribed by the union is an unfair labor practice in violation of'
section 8(b)(1)(A). In both N.L.R.B. v. Granite State Joint Board, Textile. Workers Union of
America, Local 1029" and Booster Lodge No. 405, International Association of Machini,s1s
Aerospace Workers v. N.L.R,B.," the Supreme Court concluded that where neither the
union's constitution nor by-laws contained any restriction on the resignation of members,
the union could not lawfully fine employees who had resigned and returned to work
during an authorized strike." The Court based this rule on the premise that ''when there
against the defendant company, in violation of the union constitution and by-laws. Id. at 177, 65
L.R.R.M. at 2449. The Supreme Court held, contrary to the contention of the members, that the
fines did not restrain or coerceihe employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7 within
the meaning of section 8(b)(1)(A). M. at 195, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2457.
° Id. at 195, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2456-57.
9 Id. at 196. 65 L.R.R.M. at 2457.
'° Id. at 195, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2457.
" 394 U.S. 423, 70 L.R.R.M. 3105 (1969). InScrifield, the petitioners, union members employed
on a piecework basis, were fined and suspended by their union for violating a union rule relating to
production ceilings. Id. at 424-26, 70 1-12..R.M. at 3105-06. In defense to an action brought by the
union to collect the fines, the members argued that union enforcement of the ride was an effort
"restrain or coerce" them in violation of section 8(b)(1). N. at 426-27, 70 L.R.R.M. at 3106. The
Supreme Court. ruled that the pnxlitetion ceiling could be enforced by the union without contraven-
ing the Act. Id. at 436, 70 1.,.K.R.M. at 3110.
12 Id. at 428-29, 70 I..R.R.M. at 3107.
' 9 Id. at 429, 70	 at 3107.
14 Id. at 430, 70 L.R.R.M. at 3108,
Allis-Cludmers, 388 U.S. at 195. 65 L.R.R.M. at 2457.
15 409 U.S. 213, 81 L.R.R.M. '2853 (1972).
17 412 U.S. 84, 83 L.R.R.M. 2189 (1973). 	 •
Id. at 89-90, 83 L.R.R.M, at 2191-92: Grande Stare, 409 U.S. at 217-18, 8i L.R.R.M. at 2855.
The union in Booster Lodge sought to distinguish the result in Granite State on the ground that the
union's constitution contained a provision which expressly prohibited members from strikebreaking.
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is a lawful dissolution of a union-member relation, the union has no more control over the
former member than it has over the man on the street.'"
Since neither case presented the problem of construing an express union restriction
on a member's right to resign, the Court in both instances was careful to leave open the
important question of the extent to which the union may limit or curtail that right."
During the Survey year, in Machinists, Load 1327 [Dalmo Victor],'- ' the National Labor
Relations . Board (Board) confronted this issue. The Board considered the validity of a
union constitutional provision which restricted a member's right. to resign front the union
to nonstrike situations." Four of five Board members held that a union rule prohibit-
ing resignation from the organization during a strike or within 14 days preceding its
commencement was an unreasonable restriction on a member's section 7 right to resign. 2 "
Members Fanning and Zimmerman, however, writing the principal opinion, went on to
state that a union rule which places a 30-day limitation on the effective date of resignation
would be considered a reasonable limitation on this right to resign." In their concurring
opinion, Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter agreed that. the constitutional
provision was invalid but expressly denounced the 30-clay limitation proposed by Mem-
bers Fanning and Zimmerman." Dissenting Member Jenkins. arguing I hat the constitu-
tional provision was reasonable, did not expressly address the 30-day resignation limita-
tion issue." Dalmo Victor is significant in that it is the first Board decision to examine the
validity of a union rule which limits t he members' right to resign in order to subject theta
to the unifying influence of the union's internal rule-making authority.
In Dalmo Victor, the respondent union had adopted a constitutional provision stating
that resignation by a member during a strike or within 14 days of its commencement would
not relieve that member of' either Iris obligation to refrain from working, or his obligation
to observe the picket line." Several months after the commencement of an authorif,ed
412 U.S. at 88-89, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2191. The Booster Lodge Court, however, refused to impose this
obligation on nonmembers or to find an implied post-resignation commitment in the constitutional
provision. Id. at 89-90, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2192.
" Granite State, 409 U.S. 217, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2854-55.
29
 Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 88, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2191 (lw]e leave open the question of the extent
to which contractual restriction on a member's right to resign may be limited by the Act.“); Granite
Skirt., 409 U.S. at 217, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2855 ("We do not now decide to what extent the contractual
relationship between union and member may curtail the freedom to resign.").
2 ' 263 N.L.R.B. Nu. 141, II I L.R.R.M. 1115 (1982).
2 ' Id. at 3-4, I 1 1 L.R.R.M. at 1116.
23 Id. at 11, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1118; Id. at 15, III L.R.R.M. at 1119 (Van de Water, Chairman and
Hunter, Member, concurring).
" Id. at .12, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1118. Members Fanning and Zimmerman further noted that
"under extraordinary circumstances, a anion may need more than the 30 days found reasonable
herein to dispose of the administrative matters arising from the resignations." Id. at 12 n.21, III
L.R.R.M. at 1118 n.21.
zs Id. at 15, I 11 L.R.R.M. at 1119 (Van d e
 Water, Chairman and Hunter, Member, concurring).
26 Irl. at 40, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1126 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
" Machinists, Local 1327 [Dahno Victor], 231 N.L.R.B. 719, 96 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1977). The
constitutional provision provided as follows;
Improper Conduct of a Member ... Accepting employment in any capacity in an establish-
ment where a strike or lockout exists as recognized under this Constitution, without
permission. Resignation shall not relieve a member of his obligation to refrain front
accepting employment at the establishment fOr the duration of the strike or lockout
within 14 days preceding its commencement. Where observance of a primary picket
line is required, resignation shall not relieve a member of his obligation to observe the
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strike, three members submitted resignations to the union and returned to work." These
members challenged the lawfulness of the fines subsequently imposed."
In its original decision, the Board found that the constitutional provision was not a
restriction on a member's right to resign, but rather an unlawful restriction 00 the
post-resignation conduct of former members." Accordingly, the Board ruled that the
union had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) by fining the three resigning members.' On appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, the court denied
enforcement of the Board's order on the ground that the constitutional provision was a
restriction on a member's right to resign and not an unlawful attempt to control the
conduct of employees who are no longer members. 32 Concluding that the case "presents
the question reserved by the iSupremel Court in Granite Stale and Booster Lodge," the
circuit court remanded it to the Board for a determination of the provision's validity."
In the principal opinion of the Board, Members Fanning and Zimmerman ap-
proached the question as one requiring the balancing of two fundamental and inherently
conflicting labor law principles: The employee's section 7 right to refrain from collective
activity and the union's legitimate interest. in protecting itself and its members in collective
economic activity. 34 These Board members initially concluded that neither of these
interests is absolute.' They recognized that the section 7 right to refrain gives employees
the right to resign a right which is not. forever lost when an employee becomes a union
member.' Members Fanning and Zinunernian reasoned, however, that the right to
resign is not a right to instantaneously leave the union when its members have chosen to
exercise their right to strike." They asserted that the Supreme Court., in Allis-Chalmers,
had laid to rest the notion of an absolute right to refrain from union activity,' As such,
Members Fanning and Zimmerman cited the Allis-Chalmers case as support for the
proposition that a union has a legitimate and statutorily-based interest in maintaining its
status as a representative for the majority of its members, especially during a strike." This
interest, they concluded, supports the finding that 'certain limited restrictions may be
imposed on the right to resign from a union.'"
Having thus formulated a balancing of interests st andard for ascertaining the validity
of a union rule restricting the right to resign. Members Fanning and Zimmerman then
turned to the question of whether a union rule which distinguished, for resignation
purposes, between strike and nonstrike periods effected a reasonable balance of the
interests involved. Initially, they noted that in Scofield a. N,L.R.B.," the Supreme Court
primary picket line for its duration irate resignation occurs during the period that the
picket line is maintained or within 14 days preceding its establishment.
Id.
" Id. at 720, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1161.
2" id.
3" Id. at 720-21, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1161.
3 ' Id. at 720, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1161.
32 N.L.R.B. v. Machinists, Local 1327, 608 F.2d 1219, 1222, 102 L.R.R.M. 2583, 2585 (9th Cir.
1979).
33 Id.
:14 Machinists, Local 1327 [Dalmo Victor], 263 N.L.R.B. No. 141 at 5, I 	 L.R.R.M. at 1116-17.
" ld. at 6, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1117.
3" .1d, at 9, III L.R.R.M. at 1117.
37 Id. at 9, Ill L.R.R.M. at 1117-18.
3 ' Id. at 7, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1117.
39 hi .
411 id ,
394 U.S. 423, 70 L.R.R.M. 3105 (1969).
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asserted that members must be free to leave a union in order to escape membership
conditions that they consider onerous.'" In addition, these Board members cited to the
Granite State decision 43 in which the Court recognized that circumstances might arise that.
would compel a member to resign during a strike, notwithstanding- that fact that the
resigning member had earlier endorsed the strike. 44 Finding nothing in these and other
Court decisions to suggest that a member's right to resign should be limited to nonstrike
situations, the Board held that "a union rule which limits the right of a union member to
resign only to nonstrike periods constitutes an unreasonable restriction on a member's
section 7 right to resign," thereby violating section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.'"
Desiring, however, to establish a salutary rule which would provide guidance in
future situations," Members Fanning and Zimmerman then sought to fo rmulate a
proper balance which would accommodate both the union's interests and the member's
right to resign. In order For a union to be able to assess its strength during the course of a
strike and to protect those employees who have joined in the walkout, these members
asserted that. the union may require members who seek to resign immediately before or
during a strike to give reasonable notice of the effective date of their resignations. 47
Although recognizing that the definition of "reasonable" may vary front situation to
situation, they staled that a rule which restricts a union member's rights to resign for a
period no greater than 30 days following the tender of the resignation reflects a reason-
able balance between the union members' right no resign from the union, as well as the
union's interest in protecting its remaining members, and in disposing of administrative
matters arising-
 from the resignations.'
While Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter agreed I hal. the constitutional
provision is an invalid restriction on the member's right to resign, they sharply criticized
the 30-clay rule adopted by Members Farming and Zimmerman. Analyzing the quartet of
relevant Supreme Court cases, 4" they asserted that the proper standard of analysis is the
clear distinction between "internal" and "external" uniim actions." These cases, Chair-
man Van de Water and Member Hunter explained, established that while internal union
activities — those applying to full union members pursuant to a properly adopted rule
which serves a legitimate union goal — may be lawful under the Act, external actions —
those seeking to coerce nonmembers — expressly violate section 8(b)(1)." The 30-day
rule, Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter maintained, effectively allowed a
union to transform a prohibited external rule into a protected internal rule merely by
42 Datmo Victor, 263 N.L.R.B. No. 141 at 9-10, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1118, citing Scofield. 394 U.S. at
430, 70 L.R.R.M. at 3108.
4 ' Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Union of America, Local 1029. 409 U.S. 213, 81
L.R.R.M. 2853 (1972).
Dahno Victor, 263 N.L.R.B. at 10, 111 L.R.R.M. at H18, quoting Granite State, 409 U.S. at
217-18, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2855 ("Events occuring after the calling of a strike may have unsealing
effects, leading a member who voted to strike to change his mind.").
45 263 N.1- R.B. No. 141 at 11, 111 1...R.R.M. 1118.
41' H. at. 12, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1118.
47 Id. at II, I ll L.R.R.M. at 1118.
'" lit. at 12, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1118,
" hi. at 16, III L.R.R.M. at 1119 (Van de Water, Chairman and Hunter, Member, concurring)
(citing Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. 84, 83 L.R.R.M. 2187; Granite State, 409 U.S. 213, 81 1...R.R.M. 2853;
&yield, 394 U.S. 423, 70 L.R.R.M. 3105; Ai/is-Chalmers, 388 U.S. 175, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2449).
R" 263 N.L.R.B. No. 141 at 17-18, III L.R.R.M. at 1119-20 (Van de Water, Chairman and
Hunter, Member, concurring).
51 N. at 18, Ill L.R.R.M. at 1120.
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voting to do so." These members charged that by sanctioning his result, the majority had
improperly altered the internal/external distinction inherent in the Act.' 3
Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter further argued that the majority's
balancing standard is based on the flawed premise that the mere institutional interests of
the union can stand on equal footing with the express statutory rights of the employee."
Even assuming that t he employee's right and the union's interests are subject to balancing,
they asserted that the position of the employee who may he placed in financial jeopardy by
adhering to the strike should he given much greater consideration." Concluding, there-
fore, that the majority's 30-day rule contradicts Supreme Court precedent and ignores
the proper standard for evaluating the validity of union rules, the concurring opinion
adopted the view that any restriction on a member's right to resign violates section
8(b)(1)(A)."
Dissenting Member Jenkins asserted that the constitutional provision is valid accord-
ing to the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(A). 57 In accord with the
Scofield and Allis-Chalmers guidelines, he found that the provision was properly adopted,
reflected legitimate union interests, and was reasonably enforced." In addition, he
asserted that the provision did not impair any Congressionally-established labor law
policy reflected in the Act.'" Since the members "freely, knowingly, and expressly" agreed
to limit their right to resign in order to strengthen the effectiveness of a decision to strike,
he maintained that the constitutional provision merely permits the Union to enforce its
contract with the members." Member Jenkins thus would refuse to permit a member who
had voluntarily accepted the benefits and liabilities of union membership to breach his
contract by resigning during a strike and crossing the picket line."
The language of the three separate opinions reveals that the 30-day rule set forth in
the principal opinion of Members Fanning and Zimmerman reflects the current. posture
of a majority of the Board. Although Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter
expressly disavowed the 30-clay limitation on resignation, they repeatedly referred to the
rule as "die majority's,"" thereby implying that dissenting Member Jenkins endorses the
rule. This implication seems to be justified. Since Memberienkins would have found that
constitutional provision which limits the right to resign to non-strike periods valid, it is
reasonable to infer that he would also accept the less restrictive 30-day limit ation."a It
appears, therefore, that a majority of three members of t he Board would uphold a union
" 263 N.L.R.B. No. 141 at 29, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1123.
' 3 Id. at 28, II	 at 1122.
" 4 Id. at 25-26, 111  L.R.R.M. at 1122.
" Id. at 27, Ill L.R.R.M. at 1122.
56 Id. at 32, 111 I,,R.R.M. at 1123-24,
" Id at 33, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1123-24 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
s"
	
at 37-38, III L.R.R.M. at 1125.
59 Id. at 38-39, Ill L.R.R.M. at 1125.
6° Id. at 39, Ilk L.R.R.M. at 1125.
hi Id. at 39, Ill L.R.R.M. at 1126. Allowing a member to do so, Member Jenkins asserted, would
be to effectively allow him to "have his cake and eat it too." Id.
" Id. at 15, 17, 23, 25-32, I 1 I L.R.R.M. at 1119, 1121-23 (Van de Water, Chairman and
Hunter, Member, concurring).
63 Member Jenkins' statement that ". „ the constitutional provision here in issue does not
constitute a Hat prohibition on all resignations, but merely restricts their effect during ongoing,
lawful strikes ..." supports the conclusion that he would also uphold a less restrictive limitation, such
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constitutional provision which prevents a resignation from taking effect for no greater
than 30 days.
Ascertaining the validity of the Board's decision to strike down the union rule in
question, and of the principal opinion's 30-day rule requires an application of the
standards set forth in the relevant. Supreme Court decisions. As mentioned, the approach
espoused by the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers and Scofield describes a two-tiered level
of scrutiny for evaluating a union regulation in light of the limitations of section
8(b)(l)(A)." 4
 The initial determination is whether the subject matter of the union rule is
internal or external. If it is external — if the rule affects a union member's status as an
employee and not merely as a union member, or if it seeks to regulate employees who are
not members — the inquiry should terminate with a finding that the rule violates section
8(b)(I)(A)." 5
 If the scope of the rule is internal, a second level of analysis is required. At
this juncture, the rule must he analyzed in terms of the union interest involved and the
extent to which it infringes on any policies embedded in the Act."
Only dissenting Member Jenkins expressly discussed the threshold internal/external
question." An analysis of the principal and concurring opinions, however, reveals a•
consensus among all live Board members that union rules which restrict member resigna-
tions satisfy the initial requirement of internality. With respect to the principal opinion, it
seems clear that the proposed balancing test amounts to an examination of union interests
and the labor law policies of section 7 — in effect, an application of the second step of the
Scofield dual approach." Since this examination is mandated only after determining that
the rule is not patently external in scope, the principal opinion's discussion of the rule on
this level necessarily implies that the union action satisfies the internal/external• prong of
the Scofield test.
Similar reas oning may be applied to extract a similar conclusion from the language of
the concurring opinion. Although Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter accuse
the Board of seeking to redefine the internal/external dichtiturny by proposing a 30-day
rule," they stop short of claiming that the rule itself is actually external. A plausible
interpretation of their position is that while any union rule restricting resignations violates
section 8(b)(1)(A), it does so not because it is external. but rather because it violates
national labor policy by seeking to alter the internal/external distinction inherent in the
Act.'" As with the principal opinion, therefore, the fact that Chairman Van de Water and
Member Hunter have reached the second, "policy" tier of analysis set forth in Scofield,
implies that the rules arc at least internal in scope.
This apparently unanimous conclusion correctly applies the first prong of the analyt-
ical scheme established by the Scofield anti Allis-Chalmers decisions. Union regulations
which limit a member's right to resign from the union do not directly impair a member's
status as an employee, at least no more so than (lid the rules imposing fines against
" See supra notes 6-15 and accompanying text,
" See supra notes 16.19 and accompanying text.
w See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
" 263 N.L.R.B. No. 141 at 37, I II L.R.R.M. at 1125 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting). Member
Jenkins reasoned that "union rules and their enforcement are an internal matter .. ." Id.
" See sup?' notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
69
 263 N.L.R.B. No. 141 at 28, II 1 L.R.R.M. at 1122.
7" See id. ("[BJy allowing a union to compel an employee to remain a member subject to the
union's rules and authority for 30 days beyond an expressed desire to resign, the majority has
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strikebreaking members which were found valid in Allis-Chatiners. 7 ' Furthermore, such a
rule affects the conduct only of full union members." Although a union constitutional
provision restricting a member's right to resign compels employees to maintain the very
membership status required to satisfy the standard of internality, the rule does not (and
clearly cannot) apply to nonmembers. Indeed, rules limiting a member's right to resign
seem to fall directly within the context of the proviso to section 8(h)( I)(A) as rules which
pertain to the - retention of membership. -73 There would seen) to be little doubt that
union rules which restrict a member's right to resign and arc enforced through fines
comport with the basic Supreme Court. definition of internality. The validity of' a union
restriction on member resignation, therefore, turns on the legitimacy of the union
interest underlying the rule and the extent to which the rule violates any policy of the
Act . 14
The Allis-Chalmers decision clearly establishes that a union's desire to maintain its
.status as a bargaining representative, especially during a strike, is a legitimate union
interest. 75 To the extent that a rule which restricts resignations seeks to maintain union
solidarity in a strike situation, then, the rule reflects a recognized and well-accepted union
objective. The Allis-Chalmers Court, moreover. observed that a union, as a pseudo-
legislative body, is entitled to operate under a majority rule principle and thus may hind
those members who disagree with the collective union decision.'"
Yet while a union member may subject his individual rights to the authority of the
union, the Supreme Coma decisions in Granite State and Booster Lodge indicate that the
policy considerations of employee autonomy and the section 7 right to withdraw from the
collective bargaining entity are paramount. The Granite State Court noted that a member
may exercise his right to refrain from even those concerted union activities which he had
earlier endorsed, despite the union's desire to maintain its cohesiveness." The Court
implied that the interests of the individual employee — especially the equitable interests
that may arise during the course of a strike78 — take precedence over any contractual
obligations which might he inferred from the member's conduct. Thus, the right to resign
from the union and cross the picket line is non waived even though the resigning member
7 ' See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
72 Arguably, this conclusion is required by virtue of the Ninth Circuit's decision in the case that
the union rule was not an attempt to control the conduct of nonmembers. See supra note 32.
" See supra note 4,
" See Scofield, 394 U.S. at 431, 70 L.R.R.M. at 3108. ("The inquiry must therefore focus on the
legitimacy of the union interest indicated by the rule and the extent to which any' policy of the Act
may be violated by the [rule].").
" 388 U.S. at 181, 65 1..R.R.M. at 2451. In upholding the union's right to fine strikebreaking
members, the Court observed that a basic element of the federal labor policy embodied in the Act "is
the power in the chosen union to protect against erosion IA its status under that policy through
reasonable discipline of members who violate rules and regulations governing membership. That
power is particularly vital when the members engage in strikes." Id. (footnote omitted).
" Id. at 180, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2451.
" 409 U.S. at 217-18, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2855. ("[W]here . . . there are no restraints on the
resignation of members, we conclude that the vitality of § 7 requires that the member be free to
refrain in November from the actions he endorsed in May and that his § 7 rights are not lost by a
union's plea for solidarity or by its pressures for conformity and submission to its regime.") (footnote
omitted).
" See id. at '217, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2855 ("Events occurring after the calling of a strike may have
unsettling effects, leading a member who voted to strike to change his mind. The likely duration of
the strike may increase the specter of hardship to his family; the ease with which the employer
replaces the strikers may make the strike seem less provident.").
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ratified the strike and the strike breaking penalties and participated in the strike itself.'"
Incursions into the section 7 right to resign, therefore, cannot be so significant as to sap
the underlying spirit of the Section,
The Board's conclusion that a union rule prohibiting member resignations during
strike periods violates section 8(b)(I)(A) reflects a proper application of these principles.
Although the union provision does not prohibit all resignations, it obviously prevents a
union member from exercising his section 7 rights at the time when those rights arc of the
greatest value to the member, during a strike."" By thus depriving the section of touch of
its vitality, the rule violates the labor policy of employee autonomy, a policy recognized as
fundamentally important by the Booster Ledge Court." In addition, the rule ignores the
equitable concerns voiced in the Booster Ledge decision." Although the union constitution
in that case did not contain an express provision limiting a member's right to resign, the
presence or absence of such a provision would appear to be irrelevant with respect. to
these concerns. The likelihood that a strike will cause undue hardship on a striking
member is the same regardless of whether a union constitution purports to maintain an
employee's loyalty by securing his membership status. Presumably, the Court's recogni-
tion of and deference to this likelihood would remain constant as well.
The 30-day rule advanced in the principal opinion, however, reserves the employee's
section 7 rights while recognizing the interests of the union as a collective bargaining
entity, thereby adequately accommodating the competing interests set forth in the second
branch of the Scofield test. Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the policy
considerations of the Act as elevating the employees right to refrain above union interests,
a careful reading of the decisions reveals, contrary to the position adopted by the
concurring opinion, that the employee's section 7 rights are not necessarily absolute. In
Allis-Chalmers, the Court expressly rejected a "literal" reading of sections 7 and 8(b)( I )(A)
that would permit union members to violate collective union decisions with impunity."
Further support for this interpretation is found in the language of the Booster Lodge and
Granite State decisions, where the question left open by the Court was framed in terms of
the extent to which a union may limit the freedom to resign, not merely whether a union
may do so." The Court thus appears to have implied that while an employee's section 7
rights must he protected, this protection may be implemented in a way which does not
completely negate union interests. Under a 30-day rule, a member's ability to sever lies
with the union would depend not on external variables such as the duration of a strike —
variables over which he may have little control — but rather on his own volition. Although
the rule prevents a resignation front taking effect, immediately, it would not seem to place
any significant burdens on the resigning member or dissuade a member committed to
resigning. Thus, in accord with the Scofield Court's directive, the rule does not "invade or
The decisions in Booster Lodge and Granite State establish that a waiver of the right to resign
will not be inferred from implicit indicators such as a vote to strike, ratification of strikebreaking
penalties or participation in a strike. Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 80-90, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2191-92, citing
Granite State, 409 U.S. 2131, 81 L.R.R.M. 2853; see also supra note 18, discussing the Booster Lodge
Court's refusal to imply a restriction in a union constitution provision which did not expressly restrict
the right to resign.
8" See supra note 70.
Sec supra notes 17-10 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
" 388 U.S. at 178-80, 65 1...R.R.M. at 2950.
" See salmi note 19.
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frustrate" the important section 7 policies and the right to resign." The rule gives unions
a chance, however, to react to the pending depletion of its strike force, and allows them to
make careful decisions concerning the interests of the remaining loyal members in a way
which does not hamper the exercise of the disgruntled members' right to resign.
Regardless of whether the 30-clay rule is the binding position of the Board, the
decision in Dalin° Victor, if respected by the courts, should significantly impact on union-
member relations in two ways. Even assuming the validity of the 30-clay restriction, the
Board's holding clearly eliminates the ability of a union to pose any significant obstacles in
the way of voluntary member resignation. The union member who desires to cross an
authorized picket line and return to work but who wishes to avoid the fines authorized by
the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers may now do so by tendering his resignation and
waiting thirty days before going back to his job. By allowing members to escape the
influential effect of fines and similar sanctions in this manner, the Board's ruling substan-
tially limits a union's ability to prevent its members from abandoning it during a strike."
This result, in turn, may affect the basic structure of union strike discipline. If the
imposition or threat of fines has the effect not of securing the obedience of members, but.
rather of' inducing them to exercise their section 7 right to resign, the effectiveness of the
fine as a means of inducing and maintaining member loyalty will be greatly reduced. If
fines imposed against strikebreakers do have this "backfire" effect, and assuming that a
union has no desire to deplete its ranks through large scale resignations, the Board's
ruling may cause a shi 0 away from the use of fines toward alternative (and perhaps more
positively reinforcing) methods of implementing union decisions."'
With respect to the 30-day rule articulated in the principal opinion, a question
remains about the effect of the fiiotnote which recognized the possibility that extraordi-
nary circumstances may justify a restriction of longer than 30 days." If the 30-day rule
adopted by the Board is based purely on administrative considerations (i.e. clerical
matters pertaining to the recording of the resignation, dues payments. etc.), it is some-
what difficult to envision "extraordinary circumstances" that would require an extension
of the 30-clay limitation. Conversely, the Board may be indicating that factors outside of
the administrative context — for example, factors such as the timing of the resignation(s)
in relation to the current status of union-employer negotiations — could warrant excep-
tions to the 30-day rule. if this is the case, the concurring opinion's description of the
footnote as it "loophole tailor-made fur enterprising litigation' may prove correct. The
absence of articulated standards underlying the "salutary" 30-day limit makes it difficult
to define or predict the "extraordinary circumstances - to which Members Fanning and
Zimmerman refer." Further decisions will be required to determine whether the foot-
" 5 See Scofield, 394 U.S. 423, 429, 70 L.R.R.M. at 3107 r[1]€ the rule invades or frustrates an
overriding pilicy of the lalmir laws the rule may not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion, without
violating § 8(b)( ).").
86 See generally, Could, Some Limitations Upon Union Discipline Under the National Labor Relations
Act: Allis Chalmers, 1970 DuKE 1067, 1097 (1970).
"' See, e.g. id. at 1103 ("„ . ultimately the union must rely upon persuasiveness ofa more rational
nature than lines to implement their decisions since the fine merely induces exercise of the section 7
right to resign .
s" 263 N.L.R.B. No. 14l at 12 n.21, Ill L.R.R,M. at 1118 11.21.
263 N.L.R.B. at 15 11,23, 111 1..R.R.M. at 1[19 n.23 (Van de Water, Chairman, and Hunter,
Member, concurring).
" Given the Roar(l's emph;isis On accommodating administrative concerns, see supra note 4, one
plausible explan ation is that the 30-day period derives from the monthly payment schedule for dues,
a schedule utilized by man y unions. See Gould, supra note 86 at 1102-03.
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note reflects a willingness on the part of the Board to be more flexible with respect to the
"vitality'' of a member's section 7 rights.
Furthermore, the decision in Oak° Victor fails to clarify the scope of its own applica-
bility. The Board's 30-day rule validates union provisions which, to a limited extent,
rest rid a member's right to resign. Such provisions must be contrasted with those that
inhibit a mentber's post-resignation conduct — provisions which, by virtue of the holdings
in Granite State and Booster Lodge, are external and de facto invalid."' Unfortunately, while
these doctrines are easily articulated, the procedural history of the case highlights the fact
that a onion's constitutional provision which may legally limit a member's right to resign
(at least up to 30 clays) is not always easily distinguishable from one which illegally
proscribes post-resignation conduct. Reflective of the Board's disagreement with the
court Of appeals' description of the provision as a restriction on resignations, the principal
opinion accepted the court's finding as the law of the case only, otherwise treating the
provision as a restriction on post-resignation conduct.""- Neither the Board nor the Court,
however, set fOrth interpretive standards for ascertaining when a union has actually
placed a reasonable restriction on its members' rights to resign and not a condition on
post-resignation activities." 3 Unions seeking to take advantage of the Board's 30-day rule
will thus have to exercise great care in drafting their constitutional provisions in order to
guarantee their enforceability and to avoid violating the prohibitions expounded in
Booster Lodge and Granite State.
These shortcomings notwithstanding, the Board's decision in Damn Victor striking
down the union constitutional provision restricting a member's right to resign to
nonstrike periods properly applies the relevant Supreme Court interpretations of sections
7 and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Moreover. the 30-day rule established by Members Fanning
and Zimmerman —a rule which appears to be the current Board position on the issue —
accommodates union interests without significantly detracting from the section 7 policies
of employee autonomy.
3. *Secondary Boycotts and the Publicity Proviso: Delta Air Lines, Inc.'
Under Section 8(h)(4)(ii)(B) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 2
union may not threaten, coerce or restrain any person engaged in commerce to force that
person to cease doing business with any other person. 3 This provision outlaws secondary
"' See supra text accompanying notes I5 - 1 9.
92
 265 N.L.R.B. No. 141 at 3 n.4, 13 n.22, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1116 n.4, 1118 - 19 n.22.
• lit Local Lodge No. 1994, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
10.K. Tool Company, Inc.1, 215 N.L.R,B. 651, 653, 88 L.R.R.M. 1120, 1122 (1974), the Board
treated an identically worded union provision as a prohibition on postresignation strikebreaking.
The decision in O.K. Tool Company, Inc. formed much of the basis for the initial Board ruling in Dalmo
Victor, 231 ,N.L.R.B. 719, 720.21, 96 L.R.R.M. 1160, 1161-62. See supra notes 30-31 and accompany-
ing text.
* By Valerie Welch, Staff Member, Bos•oN Cont:oc LA• REviEw,
' 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153. III L.R.R.M. 1159 (1982).
• As amended by the Labor -Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-
Griffin Act) § 704(a), 73 Stat. 542-43, 29 U.S.C. (Stipp, 10, 1903)
	 158(h)(4).
3 The Act provides in part;
8(b) 11 shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization .. .
(4) ... (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where ... an object thereof is . .
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boycotts, which are exertions of pressure by a union against an employer with whom the
union has no labor dispute in order to force him to cease doing business with another
employer with whom the union does have a labor disputer' The statute protects neutral
employers from becoming enmeshed in labor disputes not of their own making and
beyond their power to resolve.'" A proviso to section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), however, exempts
certain kinds of publicity other than picketing from the statute's prohibition.' According
to this proviso, the prohibition does not reach any coercive non-picketing publicity which
truthfully informs the public that a secondary employer is distributing goods produced by
an employer with whom the union has a primary dispute, and which does not induce any
employees other than those of the primary employer to withhold their services.'
The proviso is generally recognized as an outgrowth of Senate concern for first
amendment considerations." National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) and
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting,
or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufac-
turer, or to cease doing business with any other person, .. .
29 U.S.C.	 158(b)(4).
A. Cox, D.C. BOK, R.A. GottmAN, LABOR LAW, 722 (Ninth ed. 1981). As an example of a
secondary boycott, these authors describe the following scenario:
[A] union may seek to organize the employees at Company P, or may seek to extract
economic concessions during a collective bargaining negotiation with Company P. An
inducement of P's employees to engage in a work stoppage would be treated as
'primary' concerted activity, and a request to Company S which buys the product of
Company P to refrain from doing so would he a 'primary' product boycott.... But if
the request to Company S is unsuccessful, and the union attempts to coerce in turn that
company to cease buying from ... Company P — and that coercion takes the form of
appealing to S's employees to engage in a work stoppage or to S's customers to boycott
S's product — the union's pressure becomes `secondary.'
5 Goetz, Secondary Boycotts and the LivIRA.. A Path Through the Swamp, 19 U. KAN. L. REV. 653, 653
(1971). Such activity is considered "secondary" because it is an indirect means of exerting pressure on
the party whose conduct the union really wants to influence, the employer with whom the union has
the dispute. Id.
" The publicity proviso to section 8(h)(4) states:
Provided further, that for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained
in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, fi)r the
purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor
organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the
labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as
long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by
any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse
to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods or not to perform any services, at the
establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution;„ . .
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the LMRA as codified at 29 U.S.C. 	 158(h)(4)(ii)(B).
7 Id. See also United Steel Workers of America and Pet, incorporated, 244 N.L.R.B. 96, 102
L.R.R.M. 1046 (1979), reversed on other grounds Pet, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 641 F.2d 545, 106 L.R.R.M. 2477
(8th Cir. 1981) where the Board found that the United Steel Workers did not violate section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by engaging in handbilling calling for a total consumer boycott of Pet in support of a
strike against one of its subsidiaries. The Board stated that consumer boycott publicity fell outside the
protection of the proviso only if it resulted in refusals by employees, other than the primary's, to
perform their services, or if the publicity was untruthful. Id. at 100, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1049.
8 In N.L.R.B. v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 55
L.R.R.M. 2961 (1964) the Supreme Court stated:
'The proviso indicates no more than that the Senate conferees' constitutional doubts led
Congress to authorize publicity other than picketing which persuades the customers of
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judicial decisions, moreover, have interpreted the protection of the publicity proviso
broadly." Accordingly, non-picketing publicity has lost the protection of the proviso only
where it is untruthful, fails to identify the nature of the primary dispute or induces
employees other than the primary employer's to withhold their services.' 0 The proviso
even protects publicity which advocates total consumer boycotts of the secondary em-
ployer."
During the Survey year, however, the NLRB construed the protection of the proviso
more narrowly. In Hospital and Service Employees Union, Service Employees International
Union, Los Angeles, Calif. and Delta Air Lines, Inc. (Delta Air Lines)'' the Board limited the
proviso's protection to coercive publicity aimed at the secondary employer which concerns
t he primary dispute.' 3 Delta Air Lines involved handbills and advertisements which truth-
fully identified the primary dispute, the parties, and their relationship, and did not
induce any secondary employees to withhold their services. The Board nevertheless
removed these handbills and advertisements from the proviso's protection because they
contained additional information, unrelated to the primary dispute, which pertained
solely to the secondary employer's business and was damaging to him." Without the
a secondary employer to stop all trading with him but not such publicity which has the
effect of cutting off his deliveries or inducing his employees to cease work.'
Id. at. 70-71, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2966. See also N.L.R.B. v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 55 L.R.R.M. 2957
(1964) where the Court. stated: "The proviso was the outgrowth of a profound Senate concern that
unions' freedom to appeal to the public for support of their case be adequately safeguarded." Id. at
55, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2960.
See N.L.R.B. v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1964) ("There is nothing in the legislative history
which suggests that the protection of the proviso was intended to be any narrower in coverage than
the prohibition to which it is an exception . .." Id. at 55. The Court in Servette, Inc. went on to
interpret the proviso broadly to find that products "produced by an employer" included products
distributed by a wholesaler with whom the primary dispute exists. Id.). United Steel Workers of
America and Pet, Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 96, 102 L.R.R.M. 1046 (1979), reversed on other grounds Pet, Inc.
v. N.L.R.B., 641 F.2d 545, 106 L.R.R.M. 2477 (8th Cir. 1981) (where the board was willing to allow
handbilling and other publicity which called for a total consumer boycott of a secondary employer);
Florida Gulf Coast Building Trades Council and The Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation, 252
N.L.R.B. 702, 105 L.R.R.M. 1273 (1980) enforced Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 662 F.2d
264, 108 L.R.R.M. 2729 (4th Cir. 1981) (where the Board utilized a broad reading of the proviso to
find that the union's failure to identify the primary employer specifically by name did not make the
publicity untruthful. Id. at 704 n.2, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1274 n.2.). In the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals' enforcing opinion. the Court stated moreover, that the proviso's language "is not to be read
literally but instead is to be broadly construed." 662 F.2d 264, 299, 108 L.R.R.M. 2729, 2732 (1981).
'" See supra note 4.
" See e.g., Florida Gulf Coast Building Trades Council and The Edward J. DeBartolo Corpora-
tion, 252 N.L.R.B. 702, 105 L.R.R.M. 1273 (1980) enforced Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. N.L.R.B.,
662 F.2d 264, 108 L.R.R.M. 2729 (4th Cir. 1981) (handbilling that called for total consumer boycott
of shopping mall upheld when primary dispute was with a construction company building a store for
only one of the tenants); International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 139 and Oak Construc-
tion, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 759, 93 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1976) (handbilling that called for total consumer
boycott of telephone company upheld when primary dispute was with a nonunion contractor who
constructed manholes and underground telephone conduits); Local 662, Radio and Telephone
Engineers and Middle South Broadcasting Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1698, 49 L.R.R.M. 1042 (1961)
(handbilling that called for non-patronization of firms that advertised on certain radio stations
upheld where primary dispute was with the radio stations).
" 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 111 L.R.R.M. 1159 (1982).
	 '
13 Id. at 8-9, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1161.
" Id. at 10, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1162.
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protection of the proviso, the NLRB ruled, the publicity constituted secondary boycott
activity prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).' 5
The dispute in Delta Air Lines originated when Delta Air Lines (Delta) legally termi-
nated its contract for janitorial services with National Cleaning Company (National) and
began contracting out janitorial work to Statewide, a non-union janitorial service.'"
National, a party to a collective bargaining agreement with the Hospital and Service
Employees Union (the union), then laid off five employees who had worked at Delta."
The union thereafter had a primary labor dispute with Statewide, the non-union com-
pany, but no primary dispute with Delta.'" As Delta had lawfully terminated its contract
with Nationwide, it was a neutral party.'" Thus, any pressure exerted by the union against
Delta was secondary to the primary dispute.'" In furtherance of the primary dispute,
however, the union distributed handbills at Delta's administrative offices in the Los
Angeles International Airport and in front of Delta's downtown Los Angeles ticket.
ofhce. 21
Four different handbills, referred to by the Board as Handbills A, B, C, and I), were
distributed at different times, and portions of them were published in union newspa-
pers.22 Handbill A contained an appeal to the public to boycott Delta because it did "not
provide AFL-CIO conditions of employment.' 23 On the reverse side the handbill listed
critical National Transportation Board (NTB) and Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) statis-
tics pertaining to Delta's accident and consumer complaint records.24 Handbill B included
the same NTB and CAB statistics concerning Delta's accident record. 25 Neither Handbill
A nor B referred to Statewide or the existence of a primary dispute.'" Handbills C and D
contained the same NTB and CAB information but also included introductory statements
on side one." Handbill C stated that Delta had caused union members to become
unemployed and had subcontracted with a non-union "maintenance company.'" 1-land-
bill D's introductory statement. was more specific. It identified Statewide by name and
explained that the NTB and CAB statistics were being brought to the public's attention in
furtherance of a primary labor dispute with Statewide.'"
Delta filed charges with the NLRB, alleging that the union had violated the secondary
boycott provisions of t he LM RA by distributing the handbills and publishing portions of
them in union newspapers, with the object of forcing Delta to cease doing business with
Id. at 11, 1 l l L.R.R.M. at 1162.





2 ' Id. at 3, 111  L.R.R.N1. at 1160.
22 id. at 3-5, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1160. Specifically, Handbill A was published in the September
editions of the Service Union Reporter (SUR) and the Service Union Reporter, Political Action Report,
(SURPAR) and Handbill C in the October edition of these two newspapers. In addition the union
published a block advertisement in the September edition of SUR and Mi.. October edition of
SURPAR. The Board treated the advertisements as extensions of the published handbills. id.
" Id. at 3, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1160.
24 Id.
25 Id .
2 " Id. at 7, II I L.R.R.M. at 1161.
27 Id. at 4, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1160.
28 Id.
22 Id.
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Statewide, the primary employer, 30 An administrative law judge, finding that the NTB
and CAB information was unrelated to any dispute with Delta and was misleading and
"highly coercive,"" ruled that the union's handbilling and advertising violated section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
In filing exceptions to these conclusions,32 the union made three arguments. First,
the union asserted t hat Handbills A, B, and C were not even at issue because t hey had
been voluntarily withdrawn from circulation." Second, the publicity proviso of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) protected Handbill D, the union claimed, because it contained only truthful
information and identified the primary dispute.' Finally, the union asserted that even if
the inclusion of t he NTB and CAB statistics placed Handbill D outside of the protection
of the publicity proviso, the handbill was nevertheless protected by the Free Speech clause
of the first amendment."
Finding that the handbills were used to coerce Delta to stop working with Statewide,
the Board held that all four handbills and the newspaper advertisements violated the
general prohibition of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) because they were used to coerce the second-
ary employer to stop doing business with Statewide." Moreover, the publicity proviso did
not protect the challenged literature because, in the Board's view, the handbills and
advertisements were not intended to advise the public truthfully about the nature of the
primary dispute. 37 Finally, the Board refused to find that the first amendment protected
the union publicity."
In determining that the union's publicity was unlawful, the Board first decided that
the handbilling and advertising fell within the prohibition of section 8(h)(4). 3 " The Board
pointed out that Section 8(b)(4) prohibited activity designed to coerce or restrain any
person from doing business with any other person." Since the union did not dispute that
the publicity was designed to bring economic pressure on Delta to force it to stop doing
business with Statewide,'" the Board ruled that the publicity clearly fell within the
proscription of section 8(b)(4)." Thus the major issue before the Board was whether the
publicity proviso saved the handbilling and advertising from violating section 8(b)(4). 43
Turning to the union's publicity proviso argument, the Board noted that the proviso
protects all publicity, other than picketing, which is designed "for the purpose of truth-
fully advising the public that a product or products are produced by an employer with
whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another
employer. -44
 The Board indicated that protected publicity can not "have an effect of
inducing any individuals employed by any person other than the primary employer" to
3° Id. at 2, 111  L.R.R.N1. at 1160.
3 ' Id. at 4, III L.R.R.M. at 1160.
32 All parties excepted to the Administrative Law Judge's factual findings. Id, at 2, I f 1 L.R.R.M.
at 1160.
33 Id. at 5, II I L.R.ICNI. at 1160.
34 Id.
Id., Ill L.R.R.M. at 1160-61.
Id. at 13-14, I 1 1 L.R.R.M. at 1163.
37 Id. at 8-9, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1161-62.
sm Id. at 13-14, 111 1.12,12.M. at 1163.
3" Id. at 5-6, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1161.
4" Id.
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withhold their services.' Since all parties stipulated that the union's conduct did not cause
any of Delta's employees to engage in a work stoppage, 46 the Board narrowed the issue to
whether ale handbills were for the purpose of truthfully informing the public within the
meaning of the proviso.'"
The Board stated that, at a minimum, the proviso requires that publicity advise the
public of the nature of the dispute and of t he secondary employer's relationship to the
dispute." Since Handbills A and B failed to mention Statewide or indicate that a primary
dispute existed with an employer other than Delta, the Board concluded that they were
not for the purpose of truthfully advising the public and therefore violated section
8(b)(4)." The Board recognized that Handbills C and D in contrast to Handbills A and B,
did identify the nature of the primary dispute.'" These handbills also included, however,
adverse statistical information about Delta's accident and consumer complaint record."
In the Board's view the NTB and CAB statistics constituted threats, restraint or coercion
for an unlawful purpose within the meaning of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 52 The publicity
proviso did not protect such coercive information which attacked a secondary employer
for reasons unrelated to its role in the primary dispute according to the Board." The
proviso requires, the Board reasoned, that all coercive publicity aimed at a secondary
employer must he related to the primary dispute in order to be "for the purpose of
truthfully advising the public." 54
In finding the literature unprotected under the publicity proviso, the Board em-
phasized two factors. First, the Board asserted that the express language of the "for the
purpose" clause of the proviso supported its interpretation." It noted that the proviso
stated that nothing in section 8(b)(4) shall be construed to prohibit "publicity, other than
picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public" of the nature of the primary
dispute.'" The Board read this language to mean that all coercive information contained
in secondary publicity had to be for the purpose of truthfully advising the public of the
primary dispute.' According to the Board's interpretation, the inclusion of any coercive
information unrelated to the primary dispute did not satisfy the express requirements of
the proviso and removed the publicity front its protection."
In addition to its analysis based on the wording of the provision, the Board asserted
that its "all or nothing- interpretation furthered the Congressional purpose in enacting
section 8(b)(4). 3 ° According to the Board, Congress enacted section 8(b)(4) to protect
neutral secondary employers from becoming involved in labor disputes not of their own
making.`'" If unions were allowed to publish coercive and unrelated information about the
45 Id ., quoting § 8(1- )0)(ii)(B) of the L.M.R.A.
46 Id .
47 Id .
48 Id. at 6-7, 111  L.R.R.M, at 1161.




5 ' Id. at 8, I I 1 L.R.R.M. at 116 I ,
53 Id. at 8-11, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1161-62.
54 Id. at 8, 111 L.R.R.M, at 1161.




59 Id. at 9, l 11 L.R.R.11. at 1161-62.
6° Id.
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secondary employer, according to the Board, secondary employers would be drawn into
labor disputes not their own," Thus, in the Board's view, the Congressional objective of
insulating secondary employers mandates that all coercive information regarding,second-
ary employers he related to the primary dispute." 2
 A contrary interpretation of the
proviso, the Board stated, would contradict the Congressional intent behind section
8(6)(4). 63
On the basis of its interpretation of the proviso of section 8(13)(4), the Board found
that the union had not included t he NTII and CAB statistical information for the purpose
of truthfully informing the public of the nature of the primary dispute."' In the Board's
view this information was misleading because it implied that the union had an indepen-
dent dispute with Delia over Delta's poor flying record." The adverse statistics had
nothing to do with the primary dispute with Statewide over janitorial services."" Inclusion
of the unrelated NTB and CAB information, the, Board determined, removed the
handbills from the protection of the publicity proviso. The distribution of the handbills
therefore, in the Board's view, violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)."
Having disposed of the union's arguments under the publicity proviso, the Board
considered. the union's alternative contention that the first amendment protected the
handbills and advertisements." The Board simply, asserted that as an administrative
agency it was compelled to presume the constitutionality of the statute it was charged with
administering." Thus, the Board presumed that its finding of an LM RA violation was
consistent with the constitution and the congressional intent to outlaw secondary
boycotts. m
In a.concurring and dissenting opinion, Member Zimmerman criticized the Board
for interpreting the proviso so narrowly:7 ' He asserted that once the union truthfully
identified the nature of the primary dispute, it was free to include in its publicity any
additional information aimed solely at the secondary employer." The only restrictions
recognized by Zimmerman were those expressly mentioned in the proviso, namely, that
the additional information also be truthful and not induce any employees, tither than the
primary employees, to withhold their services." Member Zimmerman suggested that his
broad reading of the proviso was consistent with the proviso's legislative history, prece-
. at 9- 10, I 1 1 L.R.R.M. at 1162.
62 Id .
" 3 Id.
" Id. at 10, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1162.
65 Id.
nfi
" Id. at I I, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1162. The Board also found that the publication of Handbills A and
C in the union newspapers were violative of § 8(3)(4)(ii)(13) for the same reasons that the distribution
of the Handbills was violative of the section. Id, at 12, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1162.
68 Id. at 13-14, 111 1..R,R.M. at 1163.
"" Id.
7" Id.
71 The majority holds that of/ apprarently coercive information in handbills, or in
other nonpicketing publicity, aimed at a secondary employer must relate to the primary
dispute in order for such publicity to be privileged under the proviso. In so doing, it
misconstrues the language of the proviso, misreads its legislative history. misapplies
Board precedent, and mistakenly ignores serious constitutional issues.
Id. at 33, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1168.
72 Id. at 34, I 1 1 L.R.R.M. at 1168.
73
 Id. at 37, Ill L.R.R.M. at 1169,
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dent, the language of the proviso and first amendment considerations underlying the
proviso's enactment."
According to Member Zimmerman, the sparse legislative history, coupled with perti-
nent Board and Supreme Court precedent, indicates that the proviso's underlying pur-
pose is to safeguard labor unions' first amendment rights." The Board's narrow interpre-
tation, in Zimmerman's view, restricted union speech in violation of the first amend-
ment." He acknowledged that picketing as a mixture of speech and conduct could he
restricted without raising a first amendment problem." The first amendment prohibited
content-based restriction on speech." He contended t hat sensitivity to these first amend:
meat concerns inspired Congress to exclude publicity other than picketing from 8(h)(4)'s
prohibition," According to Zimmerman, Congress recognized that it could not prohibit
non-picketing publicity without infringing a union's freedom of expressions" lie also
cited precedent that indicated that the proviso resulted front Congressional awareness of
first amendment. guarantees." Thus, in Member Zimmerman's view, the Board's narrow
interpretation of the proviso violated the constitutional guarantee of free speech which
Congress and the judiciary had sought to protect." The proviso's underlying concern for
" Id. at 34, 111  L.R,R.M. at f 168.
Id. at 35-39, I l l L.R.R.M. at 1168-69. To support his theory that the proviso was added in
response to first amendment considerations, Zimmerman examined in depth two remarks made by
then Senator John F. Kennedy. Senator Kennedy chaired the conti2rence between the Senate and
House to resolve the differences between their two versions of the hill. hi. at 35, 111 L.R.R.M. at
1168. The first statement was made in response to the House passed revisions of section 8(h)(4) which.
contained no publicity proviso. Senator Kennedy is quoted as saying: "One of the apparent purposes
of the amendment is to prevent unions from appealing to the general public as consumers for
assistance in a.labor dispute. `Phis is a basic infringement upon freedom of expression. The portions
of the House bill which have this effect are unacceptable." 105 CoNc. REC. 15222 (daily ed.)
reprinted in I I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF
1959,1708, as quoted in Deha Air Lines, 263 N.L.R.B. No. 253 at 35, 1 I l L.R.R.11.1. at 1168 (Member
Zimmerrrian concurring and dissenting).
The second statement quoted by Member Zimmerman was made by Senator Kennedy when the
compromise bill, which contained the publicity proviso as added by the Senate, was adopted. Senator
Kennedy ,stated:
[Wle wei-e able to persuade [the House] to agree that the union shall be free to conduct
infOrmational activity short of picketing. In other words, the union can hand out
handbills at the shop, can place advertisements in newspapers, can make announce-
ments over the radio, and can carry on all publicity short of having ambulatory
picketing in front of a secondary site.
105 Coml. Rix:. 16414 (daily ed. September 3, 1959), reprinted in II LEGisLATIvE 1-hsToRY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE Act' of 1959, 1432, as quoted in Delta Air Lines, at
36, 1 1 1 L.R.R.M. at 1168 (Member Zimmerman concurring and dissenting).
Among the Supreme Court precedents cited by Zimmerman was the watershed case of N.L.R.B.
v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen, Local 760, and Tree Fruit Labor Relations
Committee, Inc., 377 U.S. 58 (1964). He also quoted N.L.R.B. v. Serveue, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1964):
"The proviso was I he outgrowth of a proftaind Senate concern that the uniints'I'reedom to appeal to
the public for support of their case be adequately safeguarded .. .." Id. at 55, Della Air Lines, at 40, 111
L.R.R.M. at 1169.
7 ' Id . at 35-37, Ill L.R.R.M. at 1168-69.
77 Id. at 4l, 11 l 1...R.R.M. at 1170, quoting Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in N.L.R.B. v.
Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980).
7" Id.
7" Id. at 40, I 1 1 L.R.R.M. at 1169,
81 ' Id. at 37-38, I 1 1 L.R.R.M. at 1168-69.
sr
" Id. at 39, 11.1 L.R.R.M. at 1169.
166	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	
[Vol. 25:73
free speech, according to Member Zimmerman, mandated a broad reading of the pro-
vtsi c 53
Turning to the language of the statute; Member Zimmerman maintained that it.
requires no more than that the information presented identify the relationship between
he primary and secondary employers." Absent legislative intent to the contrary, Zim-
merman could find no basis in the proviso language for a limitation on additional truthful
information to buttress an appeal for a consumer boycott of a secondary employer. 85
Moreover, according to Member Zimmerman, the Board and the courts previously
had held that such an appeal could call for a boycott of the secondary employers entire
business and not merely for a limited boycott of the product or services involved in the
primary dispute."" He reasoned, therefore, that if the proviso protects a boycott which
extended beyond the primary dispute, it must also protect publicity that included infor-
mation which extended beyond the primary dispute."
Given the ambiguity of the proviso's language, Member Zimmerman felt the Board
was compelled to interpret the proviso in a way that most reflected constitutional
considerations." He implied that the Board violated this mandate of statutory construc-
tion by interpreting the proviso so narrowly that a union's constitutional right of free
speech was impinged." Taken together, the legislative history, the language of the
proviso and the constitutional considerations impelled Member Zimmerman to reject the
majority's restrictive interpretation of the proviso and embrace instead the interpretation
that publicity, to be protected, need only be truthful and not induce any non-primary
employees to withhold services.""
83 "[I]lappeals to consumers take the form of 'publicity other than picketing,' the proviso comes
into play and any resultant deterrence of customers of the secondary employer will be tolerated
because of the preference afforded freedom of speech." Id, at 41, I 1 1 L.R.R.M. at 1170.
84 Id. at 37, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1168-69.
" Id.
" Id. at 40, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1170 thing, inter alia, United Steel Workers of America and Pet,
Incorporated, 244 N.L.R.B. 96, 102 L.R.R.M. 1046 (1979), reversed on other grounds Pet, Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 641 F.2d 545, 106 L.R.R.M. 2477 (8th Cir. 1981); International Brotherhotx1 of Electrical
Workers and Middle South Broadcasting Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1698, 49 L.R.R.M. 1042 (1961); Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers Local 139 and Oak Construction, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 759, 93
L.R.R.M. 1385 (1976); American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, San Francisco Local,
and National Association of Broadcast. Employees and Technicians, Local 55 and Great Western
Broadcasting Corporation, d/b/a KXTV, 150 N.L.R.B. 467, 58 L.R.R.M. 1019 (1964).
87 Id. at 42, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1170. Zimmerman also pointed out that the Board had also read
broadly the proviso's requirement that the information be truthful. He noted that in Florida Gulf
Coast Building Trade Council and Edward J. DeBartolo, 252 N.L.R.B. 702, 105 L.R.R.M. 1273
(1980), enforced Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 662 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981) and
Central Indiana Building and Construction Council and K-Mart Corporation, 257 N.L.R.B. 86, 107
L.R.R.M. 1963 (1981), the Board found that a union's faiurc to identify the primary employer
specifically by name in its handbill did not render the handbill untruthful./d. at 43-45, 111  L.R.R.M.
ai 1170-71.
" Id. at 47-48, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1171.
" Id.
Id. at 48, 11 l L.R.R.M. at 1172. In applying his reasoning to the instant case, Member
Zimmerman found that Handbills A and B were not protected by the proviso because they did not
even meet the minimum requirement of identifying the primary dispute. Thus he joined the
majority in finding that they violated section 8(6)(4). Handbills C and D, however, did sufficiently
identify the primary dispute in his view. Moreover, according to his broad interpretation of the
proviso, the inclusion of the additional NLRB and CAB statistics pertaining to Delta's accident and
consumer report record did not remove Handbills C and D from the proviso's protection. Therefore,
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In a separate opinion, Member Jenkins also concurred in part and dissented in
part. 9 ' Jenkins concurred with the Board in all but its treatment of the publication of
Handbills A and C in union newspapers." According to Jenkins, section 8(b)(4) prohibits
conduct which has a reasonably foreseeable consequence of forcing a neutral business
into a labor dispute not of its own making." 3 In his opinion, the publication of information
in a union newspaper of limited circulation was not such conduct." Rather, In his view,
the Foreseeable impact of such intra-union communication on a neutral business was
trivia1. 95 For that reason, Member Jenkins contended that the challenged newspaper
publications were not coercive within the meaning of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)." Member
Jenkins also felt that a restriction on a union's use of its own newspapers raised attendant
first amendment problems."' Absent legislative intent to the contrary, Jenkins asserted
that such a restriction was inappropriate,"
The significance of Delia Air Lines lies in its imposition of a limitation on the informa-
tion that a union may use in handbills or other nonpicketing publicity pertaining to a
secondary employer."" This limitation seems inconsistent with both the first amendment.
guarantee of free speech and prior judicial and administrative decisions which interpret
the proviso broadly. Although the Board's decision may be consistent with the spirit of
section 8(b)(4) that secondary employers should be insulated from labor disputes not of
their own making,'" it seems inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of freedom of
expression. The proviso was apparently added in response to congressional concerns that
a prohibition of all union publicity would abridge first amendment rights."' The perti-
nent legislative history, moreover, does not indicate any lesser concern for first amend-
ment protection of publicity related only to a secondary employer than for publicity
related to a primary dispute."' The Board, however, found a distinction between the two
in the language of the proviso. It interpreted the "for the purpose of truthfully advising
the public" phrase as limiting the publicity to only that infOrmation which was intended to
inform the public of the secondary employer's relation to the primary dispute. 113 Read in
context, the phrase could give rise to such an interpretation.'" Alternatively, the phrase
could be interpreted as meaning that the publicity need only disclose the nature of the
primary dispute. That disclosure could' he viewed as publicity for the purpose of truth-
fully advising the public of the primary dispute. The inclusion of additional truthful
information would, therefore, have no effect on t he publicity's acceptability. The legisla-
Member Zimmerman dissented with the majority to the extent it found Handbills C and D violative
of section 8(b)(4). Id. As to the publication of Handbills A and C in the union newspaper, Zimmer-
man agreed with the majority that Handbill A's publication was a violation of section 8(b)(4) but in his
view, Handbill C's was not. Iii. at 49-50 n.76, 111  L.R.R.M. at 1172 n.76,
91 Id. at 17-32, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1163-67.
92 Id. at 27-32, 111  L.R.R.M. at 1166-67.
93 Id. at 29-30, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1167.
" Id. at 30, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1167.
95 Id.
96 Id .
97 Id. at 31, f I 1 L.R.R.M. at 1167.
99 Id.
99 See supra text accompanying note 13.
'°° See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
'°' See supra note 75.
102 Id.
103 See supra text accompanying notes 44 -54.
I " See supra note 6.
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rive history, moreover, indicates no Congressional intent to differentiate between public-
ity relating only to the primary dispute and any other publicity."' Absent express
language to the contrary, it seems that Congress recognized that all truthful publicity
deserves first amendment protection.
As Member Zimmerman cautioned, whenever a statute is ambiguous, it should be
construed to accord with constitutional guarantees.""' The Board's narrow interpretation
limits a union's constitutional right to print and distribute truthful information about a
secondary employer. Given the absence of legislative history supporting such a narrow
view, and the ambiguity of the proviso's language, the Board should not have interpreted
the statute so narrowly as to raise this potential first amendment problem.
Furthermore, precedent exists which suggests that the proviso should be interpreted
as broadly as is consistent with Congress' purpose in enacting section 8(b)(4). 10 ' Neither
the Board nor the courts have interpreted the section or the proviso to mean that a
secondary employer should be completely insulated from a primary labor dispute. The
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable. Packers, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 108 for
example, held that picketing at. a secondary site did not violate section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) if it
"followed the product."'" In other words, the Court refused to protect secondary
employers from on-site picketing which was used to persuade customers to cease buying
only the products of the struck primary employer.'" Furthermore, non-picketing public-
ity has been upheld by the courts and t he Board even t hough it contained an appeal for a
total consumer boycott of the secondary, and not just a boycott of the primary's product
distributed by the secondary."' The courts and the Board should have realized subjecting
the secondary employer to limited picketing and publicity calling for a total consumer
boycott would enmesh that secondary employer in the primary dispute."~ It appears,
however, that neither the courts nor the Board have recognized that Congress' intent in
enacting section 8(h)(4) was to insulate completely the secondary employer from involve-
ment in the primary dispute. Hence, the Board's limitation in Delta Air Lines of protected
publicity to information pertaining solely to the primary dispute cannot be justified on the
basis of Congressional intent to insulate secondary employers.
Given the concomitant constitutional concerns, the ambiguity of the proviso's lan-
guage and the lack of legislative history indicating a narrow interpretation, the Board's
interpretation of the proviso seems unsupportable. If followed in future Board and court
decisions, however, the inclusion in a handbill or other non-picketing publicity of any
information which does not pertain to the primary dispute will remove that publicity from
the protection of the proviso and reduce it to coercive activity in violation of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B)•
See supra note 75.
1011
 263 N.L.R.B. No. 153 at 47, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1171.
E" See supra note 9.
"8
 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
109 Id. at 72.
110 Id.
11 See .supra note IL
112
 "The publicity proviso clearly envisions that secondary employers may become enmeshed in
labor disputes as a result of their relationship with a primary employer, provided chat such entan-
glement neither induces the secondary's employees to halt work nor interrupts deliveries to it." 263
N.L.R.B. at 40, 111 L.R.R.M. at 1169 (Member Zimmerman dissenting in part).
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III. CONCERTED ACTIVITY
A. *Concerted Activity Under Section 7: Comet Fast Freight, Inc.'
The National Labor Relations Act' was enacted to equalize the bargaining positions
between employers and employees and to facilitate peaceful resolution of work-related
grievances. 3 Section 7 of' ; he Act grants an employee the right "to engage in ... concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . "4
An employer who coerces, restrains or interferes with an employee's exercise of his
section 7 rights engages in an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.' Consequently, an employee discharged for exercising his protected rights may
challenge his discharge and seek reinstatement. 6
Although an employee is protected by the Act when he engages in a concerted
activity, the definition and scope of the term "concerted activities" has plagued the
National Labor Relations Board and the courts for many years.' The problem of defining
the parameters of this term is particularly acute when an employee takes unilateral action
which may benefit his fellow employees. 5
There have been two general approaches to defining the term "concerted activities,"
a restrictive approach and a constructive approach. 9 Examples of the restrictive approach
are found in the National Labor Relations Board v. Northern Metal Co." and Mushroom
Transportation Co. v. National Labor Relations Board" decisions. In these cases, the United
* By Carole Cattaneo Gori, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 262 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 110 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1982).
2 29 U.S.C. ** 151-68 (1976 and Stipp. V 1981).
• See generally 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
• 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
• 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
• Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Machinery, Inc, 247 N.L.R.B. 333, 351, 103 L.R.R.M. 1222, 1223
(1980); Thermofill, Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 1056, 1059, 102 L.R.R.M. 1271, 1271 (1979); Steere Dairy,
Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1353, 99 L.R.R.M. 1434, 1434 (1978); Self Cycle & Marine Distributor Co.,
237 N.L.R.B. 75, 96-97, 98 L.R.R.M. 1517, 1518 (1978); Air Surrey Corporation, 229 N.L.R.B. 1064,
1072-73, 95 L.R.R.M. 1212, 1213 (1977); McLean Trucking Company, 216 N.L.R.B. 925, 925, 88
L.R.R.M. 1649, 1649 (1975).
• National Labor Relations Board v. Northern Metal Company, 440 F.2d 881, 884-85, 76
L.R.R.M. 2958, 2960-61 (3d Cir. 1971). The court of appeals in Northern Metal reviewed the two
interpretations afforded to this term before adopting the most restrictive reading of the statute. Id.
For recent Board decisions construing this provision, see Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Machinery, 247
N.L.R.B. 333, 345-51, 103 L.R.R.M. 1222, 1222 (1980); Ontario Knife Company, 247 N.L.R.B. 1288,
1288-89, 103 L.R.R.M. 1309, 1309-10 (1980); Datapoint Corp., 246 N.L.R.B. 234, 235, 102 L.R.R.M.
1464, 1465-66 (1979); Steere Dairy, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1351-53, 99 1..R.R.M. 1434, 1434
(1978). See also infra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
8 id.
9 National Labor Relations Board v. Northern Metal Company, 440 F.2(1 881, 884-85, 76
L.R.R.M. 2958, 2960-61 (3d Cir. 1971). For a comprehensive discussion of these two approaches, see
generally Comment, Constructive Concerted Activity and Individual Rights: The Northern Metal-Interboro
Split, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 152 (1972). See also, Note, Representation During Hiatus Period; A richoriank, Inc.
v. NLRB, 23 B.C. L. REv. 114, 114-15 (1981).
10 440 F.2d 881, 76 L.R.R.M. 2958 (3d Cir. 197 1). In Northern Metal, a probationary employee
sought to enforce a provision of a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 882-83, 76 L.R.R.M. at
2959-60. Adopting the restrictive interpretation of section 7, the court held that the employee did
not engage in protected activity because none of the employee's co-workers shared his concern, Id. at
886-87, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2959-60.
" 330 F.2d 683, 56 L.R.R.M. 2034 (3d Cir. 1964). In Mushroom, an employee was discharged for
threatening to report his employer 6or 1.C.C. violations. id . at 684, 56 L.R.R.M. at 2035. The court
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States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit indicated that to demonstrate that there was
concerted activity in a particular instance, an employee must show that he was in fact
acting with other employees to guarantee a collective right.' 2 Accordingly, other employ-
ees must share the employee's concern, and the grievance must, if remedied, benefit the
collective workforce." This approach, therefore, requires that the employee's actions
have both the purpose and effect of aiding a collective interest in order to be pi -fleeted
activity under the Act."
Under the constructive approach, an employee need not show that he was actually
acting with other employees." This approach requires only that the effects of the
employee's action would benefit his co-workers, for there to be concerted activity." The
leading case espousing the constructive approach is National Labor Relations Board 71.
Interboro Contractors, Inc . 17 in that case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit stated that an employee's attempt to enforce the provisions of a collective bargain-
ing agreement may be deemed concerted activities within the meaning of the Act, even if
such action were unilateral and without the support of other employees."
During the Survey year, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) reconsidered
the definition and, hence, the scope of the term "concerted activities" under section 7 of
the Act. In Comet Fast Freight, Inc. , 19 the NLRB, in a two-to-one decision, held that an
employee's refusal to drive an unsafe truck did not constitute concerted activity because
his co-workers did not share his concern about the safety of the truck, 2 " In a vigorous
dissent,2 ' Member Jenkins attacked the majority's reliance on a restrictive construction of
section 7."
In Comet Fast Freight, Inc., Richard Chandler challenged his discharge from employ-
ment following his refusal to drive a truck which he considered unsafe for operation."
Chandler had worked for the respondent company for approximately two weeks." His
responsibilities included driving the respondent's trucks." Chandler was assigned to
Truck No. 10 during the major portion of his employment." Other employees had
driven Truck No. 10 on occasion." On May 7, 1982, Chandler came close to having an
held that the employee did not engage in protected activities, reasoning that none of the employee's
co-workers were planning to join with the employee in protest. Id. at 684-85, 56 L.R.R.M. at 2035-36.
12 National Labor Relations Board v. Northern Metal Company, 440 F.2d at 884, 76 L.R.R.M. at
2961 (quoting Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 283, 286 (7th Cir. 1967)); Mushroom
Transportation Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 330 F.2d at 685, 56 L.R.R.M. at
2035-36.
13 Id .
" Note, Representation During Hiatus Period, supra note 9. at 115.
Comment, Constructive Concerted Activity, supra note 9, at 158-59.
16 Id.
" 388 F.2d 495, 67 L.R.R.M. 2083 (2d Cir. 1967).
Id. at 499.500, 67 L.R.R.M, at 2087. The court stated: "Furthermore, while interest on the
part of fellow employees would indicate a concerted purpose, activities involving attempts to enforce
the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement may be deemed to be for concerted purposes
even in the absence of such interest by fellow employees." Id. at 500, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2087.
" Comet Fast Freight, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 110 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1982).
20 110 L.R.R.M. at 1321.
2' See infra notes 23-42 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
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accident because the turn signals in the truck were not operating." He immediately
reported this defect to the company's manager and recommended that the truck receive
repairs. 29 The company refused to make the repairs and terminated Chandler's employ-
ment when he refused to drive the truck in its state of disrepair. 3 °
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Chandler possessed a reasonable
belief as to the truck's condition, and that his refusal to drive Truck No. 10 involved
concerted activity protected by section 7 of the Act. 31 Accordingly, the Administrative
Law Judge held that Chandler's employer had interfered with the exercise of his section 7
rights and that the discharge was in violation of section 8(a)(1)." In reaching this
conclusion, the Administrative Law Judge rioted that Chandler's complaint centered
around a safety problem which was of concern to all of his co-workers. 33 The Administra-
tive Law Judge-recognized that although Chandler was concerned only for his own safety
in refusing to drive the truck, 34 his action, nevertheless, could be considered concerted
activity."
In reversing the Administrative Law Judge's decision , 3" a majority of the Board
stated that the fact. that Chandler's concern for safety did not involve co-workers, by itself,
would not defeat his claim. 37 The majority stated, however, that since none of Chandler's
co-workers objected to driving the truck, the truck's condition was not a common con-
cern." Accordingly, the majority concluded that Chandler did not engage in protected
concerted activity," In reaching this conclusion, the majority distinguished five cases 40
cited by the Administrative L.aw Judge, noting that in those cases other employees shared
the concerns of the discharged employee." Emphasizing the fact that only Chandler
believed that the truck was unsafe and that none of the respondent's other employees
objected to driving the truck, the majority stated that its conclusion was supported by
prior case law."
In a vigorous dissent,'" Member Jenkins argued that the Board's decision in Comet
Fast Freight, Inc. reversed many years of Board precedent." Member Jenkins noted that









39 Id. While the Board accepted the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact, it rejected his
conclusions of law. Id.
37 Id.
" Id. The Administrative Law Judge reported that "Richard Chandler stated in his pretrial
affidavit that 'I was looking out for myself, not the other drivers. The other drivers didn't mind
driving the red truck like I did.' " 110 L.R.R.M. at 1321 n.7.
39 1 10 L.R.R.M. at 1321.
" 110 L.R.R.M. at 1321 n.3. The Board distinguished Datapoint Corporation, 246 N.L.R.B.
234, 102 L.R.R.M. 1464 (1979), Therrnofill, Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 1056, 102 L.R.R.M. 1271 (1979), Pink
Moody, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 39, 98 L.R.R.M. 3463 (1978), Air Surrey Corporation, 229 N.L.R.B. 3064,
95 L.R.R.M. 1212 (1977) and Carbet Corporation, 191 N.L.R.B. 892 ; 77 L.R.R.M. 1722 (1971). 110
L.R.R.M. at 1321 n.3.
" 110 L.R.R.M. at 1321 n.3.
42 Id. at 1322-23 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
" Id. at 1323-25 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
44 Id. at 1323 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
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equipment is unsafe may refuse to operate the equipment. 45 Such a refusal, the dissent.
continued, had been upheld by the Board because of the Board's interest in the safety of
all company employees." The dissent then stated that the Board had in the past protected
an employee's right to refuse to operate unsafe equipment without proof that others were
injured by the equipment or that others had taken action regarding the problem. 47
After noting that the Board previously had found that factual circumstances similar
to those in Comet Fast Freight, Inc. indeed constituted concerted activity protected by the
Act,48 the dissent. outlined the policy considerations underlying these decision S. 49 Member
Jenkins stated that Congress has declared that safe and healthful employment conditions
are in the public interest." In order to further the intent of other legislation, the Board
must recognize these objectives in administering the National Labor Relations Act."
Thus, the dissent concluded, the majority's failure to recognize concerted activity in this
case "can only lead to injustice in the market place, and confusion as to present. and future
Board law.""
To understand the divergent views of the Board in Comet Fast Freight, Inc. concerning
the nature of Chandler's activities, it is necessary to review prior decisions involving an
employee's request for section 7 protection. Specifically, consideration of prior case law
relating to unilateral action by an employee with regard to safety conditions of the
workplace may aid in determining whether the majority or the dissent in Comet Fast
Freight, Inc. followed precedent..
Contrary to the restrictive approach followed in Comet Fast Freight, Inc., the Board
previously had applied the constructive approach in determining when concerted activity
has occurred. For example, in Alleluia Cushion Co.,53 the Board used the constructive
approach when it held that an employee's efforts to report his employer's violations of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act constituted concerted activity even though none of
the employee's co-workers expressed a similar interest in these safety hazards." Jack
Henley, a janitor at Alleluia Cushion Co., discovered various unsafe conditions at the
company's plant. 55 Henley reported these conditions to managements" When nothing
' Id. ( Jenkins, Member, dissenting) (citing Alleluia Cushion Co., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 91
L.R.R.M. 1131 (1975); Self Cycle & Marine Distributor, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 75, 98 L.R.R.M. 1517
(1978); Ontario Knife Company, 247 N.L.R.B. 1288, 103 L.R.R.M. 1309 (1980); Steere Dairy, Inc.,
237 N.L.R.B. 1350, 99 L.R.R.M. 1434 (1978); Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Machinery, Inc., 247
N.L.R.B. 333, 103 L.R.R.M. 1222 (1980); Consolidated Freightways, 253 N.L.R.B. 988, 106
L.R.R.M. 1076 (1981); Bay-Wood Industries, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 403, 104 L.R.R.M. 1228 (1980);
John Sexton & Co., A Division of Beatrice Food Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 80, 88 L.R.R.M. 1502 (1975),
enforced, 596 F.2d 717).
46 110 L.R.R.M. at 1323.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1323 n.13.
* 9 Id. at 1323 -24.
5 ' Id. at 1323-24 (quoting Alleluia Cushion, 221 N.L.R.B. at 1000, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1132).
' 1 110 L.R.R.M. at 1323-24,
5 ' Id. at 1324.
53 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 91 L.R.R.M 1131 (1975).
54
 Id. at 1000-01, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1133.
" Id. at 999, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1132. Henley "began complaining about safety conditions, includ-
ing the lack of instruction regarding chemicals used in production, the absence of protective guards
on machines, his inability to communicate safety instructions to the majority of employees who were
Spanish-speaking, and the absence of first aid stations, eyewash stations, and an overall safety
program." Id.
56 Id.
December 1983]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 173
was done to remedy these problems, Henley notified the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). 57 After an OSHA official inspected the plant, the company
terminated Henley's employment."
In holding that Henley's actions constituted concerted activity, the Board stated that
while Henley acted alone in his protest, the absence of any outward support by Henley's
co-workers did not establish that the other employees lacked his concern." The Board
stated that assurance of safe working conditions is a matter of great concern for all
employees." The Board explained:
. . . [s]ince minimum safe and healthful employment conditions for the
protection and well-being of employees have been legislatively declared to be
in the overall public interest, the consent and concert of action emanates from
the mere assertion of such statutory rights. Accordingly, where an employee
speaks up and seeks to enforce statutory provisions relating to occupational
safety designed for the benefit of all employees, in the absence of any evi-
dence that fellow employees disavow such representation, we will find implied
consent thereto and deem such activity to be concerted."'
The Board then concluded that because the effect of Henley's actions encompassed the
well-being of his co-workers, his activities constituted concerted activities." Thus, the
Alleluia Cushion Board indicated that implied consent was adequate to establish "concerted
activity" within the meaning of the Act.
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia employed
the constructive approach in Banyard v. NLRB." In this decision, the court. reversed the
Board's discretionary dismissal of an employee's petition for review concerning his dis-
charge after refusing to drive an overloaded truck." The petitioner, Banyard, had
worked for the McLean Trucking Company and its predecessor for twenty-two years."
Banyard was dispatched to drive a truck which he believed to be overloaded in violation of
Ohio law." Banyard refused to drive the truck and was fired the next day. 67 Noting that
in section 141 of the Labor Management Relations Act, Congress declared that employ-
ers, employees or labor unions do not possess "any right in their relation with each other
to engage in acts or practices which jeopardize the public health, safety or in terest," 6 8 the
court remanded the case to the Board to determine the propriety of Banyard's dis-
charge." On remand, the Board held that Banyard's activities constituted concerted
activities, and therefore, ordered the company to reinstate him as an employee."
Although Alleluia Cushion' and Banyard" arguably are distinguishable from Comet
57 Id.
48 Id.
59 Id. at 1000-01, 91 LR.R.M. at 3133.
60 Id. at 1001, 91 L.R.R.M. at 3133.
" Id.
62 Id. at 1000-03, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1133.
63 505 F.2d 342, 87 L.R.R.M. 2001 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
64 Id. at 349, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2001-06.
65 Id. at 344, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2001-02.
66 Id. at 343-44, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2001-02.
" Id. at 344, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2002.
" Id. at 347, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2004 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976)).
69
 Banyard v. National Labor Relations Board, 505 F.2d at 347, 349, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2004, 2006.
70 216 N.L.R.B. 925, 88 L.R.R.M. 1649 (1975).
71 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 91 L.R.R.M. 1131 (1975). See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
72 505 F.2d 342, 87 L.R.R.M. 2001 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying
text.
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Fast Freight, Inc. in that, in the former two cases, the employees' discharges resulted from
their attempts to enforce federal and state legislation,'" other Board opinions indicate
that this distinction may not mandate the Comet Fast Freight, Inc. result. For example, in Air
Surrey Corporation,' the Board stated that the finding of concerted activity upon a
showing only of benefit to the workplace should extend to situat kilts where the employee's
concerns do not find their roots in other legislative enactinents. 7 '' Accordingly, under the
Air Surrey Corporation rationale, an employee's effort to insure safe working conditions
could qualify as concerted activity, even absent a showing shat other workers shared his
concern. 76
In Air Surrey Corporation , 77 Patton, an employee of Air Surrey, received a paycheck
which was dishonored due to insufficient funds.'" Other employees experienced the same
problem with their paychecks. 79 After Patton made an inquiry at the company's bank as to
the company's bank balance, he was discharged from employment." The Board ordered
Air Surrey to reinstate Patton." In reaching this conclusion, the Board stated thatAlleluia
Cushion did not stand 14 the proposition that. concerted activity is defined more liberally
when an employee is seeking to enfOrce statutory policies titan whets he is making some
other complaint. 82
 Rather, the Board concluded that an individual's actions are concerted
when they relate to employment conditions which are of mutual concern to all employ-
ees.
Another decision in which the Board has applied the constructive approach is
Thermofill, Inc." In Thennofill, Inc., the Board ordered reinstatement of Thomas Singer,
who was discharged for complaining about safety conditions within the respondent's
plant."' Singer walked off his job after discovering that the machine which he operated
was cluttered by scrap boxes." The Board stated that the scrap boxes' proximity to the
machine caused an unsafe working condition." Noting that Singer's reason for not
" Allelulia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 999, 91 L.R.R.M. 1131, 1132 (1975) (Occupational
Safety and Health Act); Banyard v. National Labor Relations Board, 505 F.2d 342, 343, 87 L.R.R.M.
2001, 2003-04 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Ohio state law).
74 229 N.L.R.B. 1064, 95 L.R.R.M. 1212 (1977).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 229 N.L.R.B. 1064, 95 L.R.R.M. 1212 (1977).
78 Id., 95 L.R.R.M. at 1212.
" Id. at 1066. 95 L.R.R.M. at 1212.
8° Id. at 1067, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1212.
81 Id. at 1073, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1212-13.
82 Id. at 1064, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1212.
83 Id. Responding to the dissent's narrow reading of Alleluia Cushion, the Board stated:
By interpreting Alleluia Cushion in the restrictive manner expressed in his dissent, our
colleague indicates that he misperceives the import of that decision. In our judgment,
that decision rests not only on the statutorily expressed concern of the Federal and state
governments with respect to safety conditions and a corresponding acconum)dation of
the principles embodied within that legislation with the principles of our own Act, but
also on the premise that an individuals actions may be considered to be concerted in
nature if they relate to conditions of employment that are matters of mutual concern to
all the affected employees.
Id.
" 244 N.L.R.B. 1056 (1979).
" Id. at 1057.
" Id.
67
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finishing his work shift resulted from these conditions, the Board stated that Singer's
protest "was therefore a protest about conditions of employment which were of concern
to all employees subjected to those conditions."' The Board held that Singer engaged in
protected activity even absent a showing that other employees joined him in his protests"
Thus, even though Singer's complaint centered around an unsafe working condition
unrelated to any violation of federal or state law, the Board held that Singer was deemed
to be acting in concert.
The decisions concerning the scope of section 7, there Fore, have not resolved the
issue of whether unilateral actions by an employee are protected under the Act." Al-
though several Board decisions prior to Comet Fast Freight, Inc. indicate that the Board was
favoring the constructive approach in defining the scope of section 7, circuit court cases
employing the restrictive approach"' continued to reject the constructive approach. The
debate over the scope of section 7 emerged again in the majority and dissenting opinions
in Comet Fast Freight, Inc."
In light of prior Board decisions concerning the scope of section 7, the dissent's
criticisms of the majority's analysis are well lOunded, In Alleluia Cushion, 9a Banyard," Air
Surrey's and Thermofdl the Board adopted the constructive approach in defining section
7 activities. The majority's analysis in Comet Fast Freight, Inc. marks a retraction of this
expansive view of protected activity. In Comet Fast Freight, Inc., the majority stated that the
absence of concern by Chandler's co-workers over the truck's safety demonstrated that
Chandler was not engaged in concerted activity. 97 Moreover, the Board noted that
Chandler's co-workers did not share a "common cause" with him in his effort to protest
against the unsafe vehicle." The Board's language reflects an insistence upon both
concerted purpose and effect to fulfill the concerted activity requirement." Thus, the
majority's opinion adopts the restrictive approach advocated by the Third Circuit.'"
Conversely, the dissent in Comet Fast Freight, Inc. analyzed Chandler's petition under-
the constructive approach to defining concerted activity.'°' The dissent's interpretation of
66 Id. at 1058-59. The Board adopted the Administrative Law Judge's findings.
99 Id. at 1059. In Thermufill, the Board adopted the Administrative Law Judge's conclusions. Id.
at 1056. The Administrative Law Judge found the following:
The stacking of heavy boxes close to work stations to a formidable height in an unstable
manner affected the efficiency and safety of all employees who worked in the extruder
building. Singer's protest was therefore a protest about the conditions of employment
which were of concern to all employees subjected to those conditions. It was accordingly
protected concerted activity even absent a showing that other employees joined in his
walkout where, as here, there is no evidence that fellow employees disavowed the
substance of his complaint.
Id. at 1058.59.
See supra notes 54-90 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 23-53 and accompanying text.
93 See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
94 See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
95 See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
96 See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
" Comet Fast Freight, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 110 L.R.R.M. 1321, 1321 (1982).
99 110 L.R.R.M. at 1321.
See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
1 " 0 Id.
'"' Comet Fast Freight, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 110 L.R.R.M. 1321, 1323-25 (1982) (Jenkins,
dissenting).
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concerted activity under section 7 did not require a showing of concerted purpose or of
common concern." In this view, where the effect of an employee's conduct benefits the
entire workforce — in this case, a complaint about defective equipment — the require-
ments of section 7 are met.'" No showing of common concern by fellow workers is
necessary.'" The restrictive approach adopted by the Board in Comet limits the protection
afforded to an employee under section 7 of the Act. Prior to Comet Fast Freight, Inc., the
Board deemed an employee to be acting in concert so long as the effects of his actions
would benefit his co-workers.'" By insisting upon concerted purpose as well as concerted
effect for section 7 protection, the Board in Cornet Fast Freight, Inc., is imposing a heavy
burden of proof upon the employee who acts unilaterally in response to unsafe working
conditions. Under the Comet Fast Freight, Inc. analysis, an employee must make an affirma-
tive showing that he was acting with other employees to guarantee section 7 protection.'°"
This type of requirement could have a chilling effect upon an employee's exercise of his
section 7 rights. Without the support of other employees, a worker who complains about
unsafe conditions at his workplace may risk losing his job.
Given the Board's narrow reading of section 7 in this case, employees may, in the
future, be required to show both concerted purpose and effect. to be granted section 7
protections. Cornet Fast Freight, Inc. indicates that concerted activity may be found only
where other employees join the petitioner in acknowledging a safety problem. Further-
more, although an employee may be motivated by selfish concerns, some showing of
desire to aid the entire workforce may by required. Finally, the effect of the employee's
activities must inure to the benefit of all workers. Although Comet Fast Freight, Inc.,
standing alone, may not mark a reversal of Board policy, the legal practitioner should be
aware that the Board may apply more stringent standards in its future interpretations of
section 7 of the Act.
After the close of the Survey year and while this issue was in the process of being printed, the
Board amplified its Comet Fast Freight, Inc. reasoning and expressly repudiated the principles
adopted in Alleluia Cushion, Co. and its progeny. Meyers Industries, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73
(January 6, 1984).
IV. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
A. *Contributions. to Taft-Hartley Trusts: Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449'
Although the Labor Management-Relations Act' generally prohibits an employer
from making payments to any representative of his employees,' an exception is made in
order to allow the employer to contribute to certain employee benefit trust funds, known
as Taft-Hartley trusts.* The basis for payments into these trust funds must he laid out in a
I' 110 L.R.R.M. at 1323-24 (Jenkins, dissenting).
'"' Id. ( Jenkins, dissenting).
1 " Id. ( Jenkins, dissenting).
15 See supra notes 54-90 and accompanying text.
l" Comet Fast Freight, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 110 L.R.R.M. 1321, 1321-22 (1982).
* By Anne Ackenhusen. Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 265 N.L.R.B. No. 199, 112 L.R.R.M. 1220 (1982).
2 29 U.S.C. §,§ 141-197 (1976).
3 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1976). These trusts are known as Taft-Hartley trusts because they are set
up under the auspices of the Taft-Hartley Act, which is another name for the Labor Management
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detailed written agreement between he union and the employer.' While the trust funds
themselves are provided for under the main bargaining contracts, their precise details arc
often contained in a separate document, known as a stipulation.'
During the Survey year, the National Labor Relations Board (Board), in Truck Drivers
Local Union 449, 7 held that stipulation reached pursuant in a provision in a collective-
bargaining agreement must be consistent. with the bargaining agreement, and cannot be
altered unilaterally by the union and the trustees of the pension fund.' The Board also
held that the trustees, in urging the adoption of the unilaterally-altered stipulation, acted
as agents of the union.' The Board concluded that the union, and the trustees acting as its
agent., violated section 8(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)," which
prohibits a labor union from refusing to bargain collectively with an employer, when they
sought to force an employer to make contributions into a pension fund not required by
the collective-bargaining agreement,' '
In Truck Drivers, Universal Liquor Corporation and Erie Liquor Company, Inc. bad
jointly negotiated collective-bargaining contracts with a warehousemen's union for 1976-
1979. 12 The agreements provided that "seasonal, casual or part-time employees shall not.
be entitled to any fringe benefits."' 3 Article XVI of the agreements required employers to
make contributions in specified amounts to the New York Teamsters Council Pension and
Retirement Fund, which is a Taft-Hartley trust." According to the agreement, the
employers were to contribute on behalf of "any and all of its employees covered by this
Agreement."'" The bargaining agreements stated that the parties agreed to execute
simultaneously stipulations submitted to them by the pension fund trustees.' These
stipulations set forth the terms of pension fund participation." Under the collective-
Relations Act. See id. Such trust funds may pay only for "medical or hospital care, pensions on
retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational
activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance,
disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance." 29 U.S.C..§ 186(c)(5)(A) (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1976).
"	 Track Drivers Local Union No. 449, 265 N.L.R.B. No. 199, 112 L.R.R.M. 1220, 1221
(1982).
7 265 N.L.R.B. No. 199, 112 L.R.R.M. 1220 (1982).
8 Id. at 1225.
" Id. at 1225-27.
IS Id. at 1224. The N.L.R.A. is found at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976), with section 8(b)(3) of the
N.L.R.A. being 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3),
" 112 L.R.R.M. at 1221. The labor organization must be the representative of the employees
for section 8(h)(3) of the N.L.R.A. to apply. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1976).
12 112 L.R.R.M. at 1221. Although the union and each employer entered into separate con-
tracts, the contract provisions relevant to this case are identical. Id. Two other employers who were
not involved in the instant suit participated in the joint negotiations as well. Id.
13 Id. "Seasonal" employees are those who work during seasons where the employer has
temporarily increased business. Id. "Casual or part-time" employees are those who work to cover for
absenteeism, vacations, illnesses, and when there is an unbalanced work load during part of the week.
Id.
Specific exceptions were made, however, to the general provision preventing seasonal, casual, or
part-time employees from receiving benefits. Id. at 1225. For example, one provision of the agree-
ment required welfare fund contributions to be made on behalf of "all casual employees," and






	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 25:73
bargaining contracts, the pension fund trustees reserved the right to refuse contributions
from employers who failed to execute such a stipulation."
Both of the employers and the union signed their respective 1976-79 collective-
bargaining agreements without incident.'" Pursuant to Article XVI of these agreements,.
the union, Universal and Erie each subsequently executed stipulations, or pension fund
participation agreements. 2 ° The stipulations stated that the employer agreed "to contrib-
ute for any and all of his regular full-time and any and all other employees covered by this
Agreement" to the pension fund. 2 ' Each stipulation also contained a clause certifying that
the terms of the stipulation were identical to those in the collective-bargaining agree-
ment."
During the 1976-79 term of the collective-bargaining agreement, Universal and Erie
made contributions to the pension fund on behalf of only full-time employees." In 1978,
however, the trustees of the pension fund" brought suit against Erie, alleging that Erie
was not paying its obligated contributions to the fund. 25 In particular, the trustees
contended that Erie was required under the stipulation to make contributions on behalf
of all employees, not simply employees." Following an answer by Erie denying
any such obligation, the trustees ceased to pursue the litigation."
During 1979, Universal and Erie jointly negotiated successor collective-bargaining
agreements with the union." The provisions of the 1976-79 contract were incorporated
verbatim into the new agreement, including the provision which stated that the parties
would simultaneously execute stipulations submitted by trustees of the pension fund."
Despite the earlier suit by the trustees, the only discussion about pensions which took
place during the negotiations concerned the amounts of contributions to be made to the
fund, and the effective dates of contribution.3° The union's chief negotiator neither
submitted new stipulations to the employers, nor indicated that any other modifications in
the existing stipulations would be forthcoming. 3 '
Following the signing of the collective-bargaining agreements, Erie and Universal
continued to contribute to the pension fund for their full-time employees. 32 The union




21 Id, The stipulations also provided that pension fund coverage could be extended to union
employees who were not members of the bargaining unit, as well as to nonunion employees. Id.
22 Id. at 1222.
23 Id. Universal occasionally made pension fund contributions for a casual employee due to
clerical error. Id.
24 Id. at 1222. The board of trustees which administers the fund is composed of four members
selected by the participating employers, and four selected by the participating local unions. Id. at
1221. The Labor Management Relations Act requires equal representation of employees and em-
ployers in fund administration. 29 U.S.C. § 1186(c)(5)(B) (1976).
25 112 L.R.R.M. at 1222.
25 Id.
2'7 Id .
28 Id . at 1222.
28 Id,
38 Id.
31 Id. No one representing the pension fund trustees was present during the negotiations, nor
were the trustees consulted regarding the negotiations. Id.
32 Id.
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accordance with the bargaining agreements. 33 The new stipulations provided that the
employers would contribute to the pension fund on behalf of all employees doing the
same work as bargaining unit employees, without regard to their status as full-time,
part-time, casual or seasonal." The new stipulations stated that no agreement between
the employer and union could alter this rule, and that in the event that there was an
agreement between the employer and union inconsistent with the terms, of the stipula-
tion, such inconsistent provisions would be void."
Erie and Universal refused to sign the stipulations, maintaining that they were not
required to make pension fund contributions on behalf of seasonal, casual or part-time
employees." The pension fund trustees then joined in the union's demands, contending
that the employers were liable for these pension fund payments." The trustees subse-
quently refused, in accordance with the collective-bargaining agreement, to accept con-
tributions to the fund made by the employers."
Eric and Universal then brought suit against the union alleging the union had
committed an unfair labor practice by unilaterally attempting to modify the provisions of
the collective-bargaining agreements through its agents, the trustees. 39 The administra-
tive law judge recommended dismissal of the complaint,'"
Based on his interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement as a whole," and
the circumstances surrounding the 1979 contract negotiation , 42 the judge found that the
pension plan covered seasonal, casual and part-time employees. 43 Furthermore, the judge
held that even if the agreement did not encompass such employees, the pension fund
33 Id. at 1223.
' Id. Contributions were to be made for employees doing the same work as bargaining unit





33 Id. at 1223. Universal subsequently obtained a temporary restraining order from the Federal
District Court for the Western District of New York which enjoined the fund from refusing to accept
contributions. Id.
39 Id. at 1220-21.
" Id. at 1223.
41 Id. The administrative law judge believed that Article IV of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment which provided that "seasonal, casual or part-time employees shall not be entitled to any fringe
benefits under this Agreement, or contributions with respect thereto" had to be interpreted in the
light of those contract provisions which dealt specifically with fringe benefits. Id. The judge com-
pared the vacation and holiday provisions of the contract, which specifically stated when coverage
was intended only for full-time employees, with the pension fund provisions. Id. Because the contract
language dealing with the pension fund required contributions on behalf of "any and all employees,"
the judge found that this provision gave definition to the general reference to "fringe benefits." Id.
Hence, in his opinion, all unit employees, including casual employees, were covered. Id. at 1223-24.
" Id. at 1224. The administrative law judge believed that Erie was on notice of the trustees'
position concerning pension fund coverage, because of a prior lawsuit between the two where
pension fund contributions were at issue. Id. at 1224 & n.12. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying
text. He found this notice imputable to Universal because Universal's attorney was familiar with the
suit. 112 L.R.R.M. at 1224 n.12. The administrative law judge believed that this previous action
militated against finding that there was an established practice for pension fund contributions. Id. He
thus concluded that by agreeing to reexecute stipulations submitted by the pension fund trustees,
both employers "invit[ed]" the trustees to submit stipulations clarifying their position regarding
contributions for casual employees. Id. at 1224.
43 112 L.R.R.M. at 1223.
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trustees had not been acting as agents of the union. 44 He cited NLRB v. Amax Coal Co."
for the proposition that the union-designated trustees were not necessarily acting on
behalf of the union when operating in their capacity as trustees on behalf of the pension
fund beneficiaries." In Amax the Supreme Court held that employer-designated trustees
of a Taft-Hartley trust are not representatives of the employer for purposes of collective
bargaining.' Accordingly, the judge concluded that the union had not committed any
unfair labor practices." The employers appealed this decision to the National Labor
Relations Board." On appeal, the Board disagreed with both the administrative law
judge's interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreements, and his findings concern-
ing the actions of both the union and the trustees. 5 ° The Board, in concluding that. the
union and the trustees acting as its agent, violated section 8 (b)(3) of the NLRA, inter-
preted the collective-bargaining agreements as providing fur pension fund contributions
on behalf of only full-time employees." In addition, the Board found that the parties'
agreements to execute stipulations were not an invitation to the trustees to amend the
stipulations. 52 The court determined, therefore, that both the union and the fund trust-
ees had attempted to modify the collective-bargaining agreements."
In reaching its decision, the Board examined the 1976-79 stipulations, which stated
that the employers would contribute to the pension fund on behalf of "any and all .. .
regular full-time and any anti all other employees covered by this Agreement." 54 The
K)ard decided that the word "Agreement" referred to the stipulations themselves, and
not to the collective-bargaining agreements. 55 As the stipulations also covered non-
bargaining unit employees and non-union employees, the Board held that the disputed
phrase referred to these full-time employees only, and not to part-time or casuaLemploy-
ees.'" The Board further stated that the stipulations correctly certified that the terms of
the stipulations were identical to those of the collective-bargaining agreements."
In support of its conclusion that the employers had agreed to contribute on behalf of
only the full-time employees, the Board also reviewed the general provision of the
collective-bargaining contracts which stated Isieasonal, casual, or part-time employees
shall not be entitled to any fringe benefits ... or contributions with respect thereto." 58 The
" Id. at 1224.
" 453 U.S. 322 (1981).
" 112 L.R.R.M. at 1224.
47 Id. (citing NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322 (1981)).
48
 112 L.R.R.M. at 1224. The judge did not believe the union was doing anything other than
fulfilling its duties as the employees' representative when it mailed several requests to the employers
asking them to sign new stipulations, and thus modify the collective-bargaining agreements. M.
For the actual text of the administrative judge's opinion,see Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449,
265 N.L.R.B. No. 199, app.
4 ' 112 L.R.R.M. at 1224.
So Id.
Id. at 1224-25.
52 Id. at 1225.
" 3 Id. at 1226.
Id. at 1225.
as Id. in support of this interpretation, the Board referred to S.M. Flickinger Co., Inc. v. Phillip
Ross, Industrial Commr's, Nos. PR -20 -79 and PR-21-79 (Indus. Bd, of Appeals, N.Y. State Dep.'t .
Labor, May 15, 1980), where the Industrial Board of Appeals of the New York State Department of
Labor reached the same conclusion when interpreting an identical stipulation. 112 L.R.R.M. at 1225.
5"
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Board noted that the parties had created exceptions to this provision very deliberately
where such exceptions were intended, as other sections of the agreements used specific
language when including casual employees in their coverage. 59 The Board pointed out
that there was no such specific exception applying the pension provision to seasonal,
casual, or part-time employees."
Finally, the Board believed that the employers' practice of making pension fund
contributions only on behalf of full-time employees during the term of the 1976-79
collective-bargaining agreements supported the employers' position that the 1979-82
agreements did not obligate them to make contributions for seasonal, casual, or part-time
employees."' The . Board found that the incorporation of all the relevant language of the
1976-79 contract into the 1979-82 contracts without discussion indicated the parties'
belief that the agreements' language was "sufficiently precise," and that the parties
intended pension fund contributions to be made only on behalf of full-time employees."
Having established that the collective-bargaining agreements did not provide for the
disputed pension fund payments, the Board considered the authority of the trustees to
introduce new stipulations." The Board noted that the trustees' authority must be
exercised within the bounds of the collective-bargaining agreements." According to the
Board, the parties contemplated that the stipulations submitted to them would be consis-
tent with the collective-bargaining agreements." Accordingly, the Board rejected the
administrative law judge's holding that the parties had "invited" the trustees to amend the
stipulations when they consented to execute stipulations submitted by the trustees." The
Board reasoned that if the parties had intended to extend pension fund coverage to
seasonal, casual, and part-time employees, they would have stated this intention."?
Given the trustees' lack of authority to go beyond the collective-bargaining unit, the
Board found that the union and the pension fund trustees had tried to modify or alter the
1979-82 collective-bargaining agreements through their attempts to impose their in-
terpretations of the agreements upon the employers." The Board emphasized three
factors in support of this finding: the actions of the trustees in mailing letters to the
" Id. For examples of the exceptions used in other sections of the agreement, see supra note 13.
"" 112 L.R.R.M. at 1225.
" 1 /d. The text of the Board's decision erroneously states that the employers' practice during the
term of the 1976-79 collective-bargaining agreements supported their position regarding the 1976-
79 agreements. See id.
"2 Id. The Board stated that because the union negotiator, who was in a position to know
different stipulations would soon be submitted by the pension fund, did not mention the modified
stipulations during the 1979-82 contract negotiations, the employers were led to believe any "succes-
sor" stipulations would he consistent with the terms of the collective-bargaining agreements. Id.
63 ht. _at 1225-26.
"I Id. at 1226.
' 5 Id.
88 Id. at 1225. The Board relied on its decision in Warehousemen's Union Local 334, 253
N.L.R.B. 1090, 106 L.R.R.M. 1201 (1981), enforcement denied, 670 F.2d 855, 109 L.R.R.M. 3226 (9th
Cir. 1982). 112 L.R.R.M. at 1225. In Warehousemen's Union, the Board held that the trtistees could
not establish a vision care plan for employees when the employers had refused to agree to such a plan
during contract negotiations with the union. Id. (citing Warehousemen's Union Local 334, 253
N.L.R. B. 1090, 106 L.R.R.M. 1201 (1982)). The Board stated that, although the employers agreed to
be bound by the decision of the trustees, the discretionary authority of the trustees extended only to
decisions related to benefit plans specifically agreed upon. 112 L.R.R.M. at 1226 (citing Warehouse-
men's Union Local 334, 253 N.L.R.B. 1090, 1091, 106 L.R.R.M. 1201, 1202 (1982)).
" 7 112 L.R.R.M. at 1226.
w4
182	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 25:73
employers urging them to execute the modified stipulations; their subsequent threats to
terminate the employers' participation in the fund if they did not remit pension fund
contributions for their seasonal, casual, and part-time employees; and, their ultimate
enforcement of this threat.," The Board decided that the union acted together with the
pension fund trustees in attempting to alter the collective-bargaining agreements because
of the actions of the union's business agent.'" The Board noted that this union agent had
sent Eric a letter containing the new pension Fund stipulation and requesting that Erie
execute the stipulation.'" The agent subsequently sent additional letters to both employ-
ers asking them to sign the stipulations." Moreover, the Board recognized that the union
agent did not protest when the trustees threatened to, and later did terminate pension
benefits to all of the employees they represented."
Having determined that both the trustees and the union had attempted to modify the
collective-bargaining agreement., the Board next concluded that the trustees of the pen-
sion fund had acted as agents of the union." In support of this conclusion, the Board
noted that it previously had found that trustees of a Taft-Hartley trust may be agents of
the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement." In particular, the Board noted that in
Local 80, Sheet Metal Workers International Association," trustees were held to have acted as
agents of a union when they refused to accept contributions from an employer acting
pursuant, as in the instant case, to authority granted by collective-bargaining agree-
ments." According to the Board, when the trustees here refused to accept pension fund
39 Id.





" Id. See, e.g., Warehousemen's Local 334. 253 N.L.R.B. 1090, 106 L.R.R.M. 1201 (1981),
eiyinrement denied, 670 F.2d 855, 109 L.R.R.M. 3226 (9th Cir. 1982) (union's trustees were acting on
behalf of the union when they attempted to institute a vision care plan which had been rejected by
employers as part of collective - bargaining agreement); Jacobs Transfer, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1231, 95
L.R.R.M. 1589 (1977) (trustees were agents of both union and employer for purposes of accepting
contributions that were made in compliance with backpay awards); L & M Carpet Contractors, Inc.,
218 N.L.R.B. 802, 89 L.R.R.M. 1733 (1975) (union trustee who requested audit of employer's records
was agent of union); Local 80, Sheet Metal Workers Intl Assoc., 161 N.L.R.B. 229, 63 L.R.R.M. 1261
(1966) (trustees were agents of union when they refused to accept employer contributions under
collective -bargaining agreement).
" 161 N.L.R.B. 229, 63 L.R.R.M. 1261 (1966).
77 112 L.R.R.M. at 1226. In Sheet Metal Workers the union had insisted that a collective-
bargaining contract must include provisions for an industry promotion fund before it would execute
the contract. Id. at 1226 n.18 (citing Local 80, Sheet Metal Workers Intl Assoc., supra note 76).
The employer signed the contract, but indicated that it agreed to the promotion fund under
protest. 112 L.R.R.M. at 1226 n.12 (citing Local 80, Sheet Metal Workers Intl Assoc., supra note 76).
The employer then attempted to make contributions to other employee benefit funds established
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, but not to the industry promotion Fund. 112
L.R.R. M. at 1226 n.12 citing Local 80, Sheet Metal Workers Intl Assoc., supra note 76). The trust
funds would not accept the contributions based upon a provision in the agreement which prohibited
them from accepting any payments which were less than the amount due under all the funds
established by the contract. 112 L.R.R.M. at 1226 n.12 (citing Local 80, Sheet Metal Workers Intl
Assoc., supra note 75). The Board found that the trustees, by acting- pursuant to the specific
contractual mandate, were agents of both the union and !lie employer. 112 L.R.R.M. at 1226 (citing
Local 80, Sheet Metal Workers Intl Assoc„ supra note 76). It concluded that the union, by its agents
the t rustees, violated section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA itu refusing to accept any payments by the employer
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contributions from the employers because they would not execute the stipulations, they
were using the authority vested in them by the collective-bargaining agreements on behalf
of the union. 78 Specifically, the Board noted that the union fully backed the trustees'
erroneous interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreements and was willing to
sacrifice the pension benefits of all employees."
The Board also rejected the administrative law judge's use of NLRB v. Amax Coal Co.
as support for his finding that the trustees were not acting as agents of the union."" The
Board noted that in A max, the Supreme Court specifically stated that trustees "can neither
require employer contributions not required by the original collectively bargained con-
tract, nor compromise the claims of the union or the employer with regard to the latter's
contributions."' The Board concluded, therefore, that the Amax decision did not pre-
clude, and in fact was consistent with, a finding that the trustees were acting as agents of
the union. 82
The Board then explained that, in addition to being supported by precedent, its
finding that both the union and the trustees had violated section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA was
necessary in order to protect the integrity of the collective-bargaining process." To allow
unilateral changes to be made in the terms of collective-bargaining agreements, stated the
Board, would undermine the whole bargaining process, raking away the certainty of
contract terms.'"
The Truck Drivers decision is significant because it emphasizes that benefit fund
trustees must exercise their authority within the bounds of the collective-bargaining
agreement." Employers cannot be bound to any trust provisions beyond these limits. The
Board's decision clearly indicates that it will not allow unilateral changes to be made in
collective-bargaining contracts. Trustees who attempt to make such alterations may be
found to be representatives of the party trying to make the change."
The Board's decision in Truck Drivers is supported by prior Board holdings and
relevant Supreme Court case law. The National Labor Relations Board has firmly estab-
lished that the trustees of a Taft-Hartley trust are the agents of both parties to the
collective-bargaining agreement. 87 Moreover, the Supreme Court's dicta in NLRB v. Amax
Coal Co., as well as its holding in UMW Health & Retirement Fund v. Robinson" support the
Board's finding that the trustees of a Taft-Hartley trust cannot unilaterally alter the terms
of a trust which have been established by a collective-bargaining agreement. 89
In Amax, the Supreme Court stated that the trustees of an employee benefit fund can
to the benefit funds until the employer agreed to contribute to the promotion fund. 112 L.R.R.M. at
1226 (citing Local 80, Sheet Metal Workers lnt'l Assoc., supra note 76).
78 112 L.R.R.M. at 1226.
79 Id .
" Id. at 1227. For a discussion of the administrative law judge's reliance on A max, see supra notes
45- 47 and accompanying text.
" 112 L.R.R.M. at 1227 (emphasis added by the Board) (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453
U.S. at 336).
82 112 L.R.R.M. at 1227.
83 id .
84 Id. The Board cited its decision in Warehousemen's Union. Local 334, 253 N.L.R.B. 1090,
1091-92, 106 L.R.R.M. 1201, 1203 (1981) for this proposition. 112 L.R.R.M. at 1227.
" See 112 L.R.R.M. at 1227.
86 See supra notes 8.10 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
" 455 U.S. 562 (1982).
" Id. at 573-74; NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. at 336.
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neither require employer contributions not provided for in the collective-bargaining
agreement, nor modify the union's or employer's claims regarding employer contribu-
tions.u" This language was set forth after the Court decided that trustees are not represen-
tatives of the party which appointed them for the purposes of collective bargaining or the
adjustment of grievances."' The administrative law judge in the instant case went beyond
the bounds of Amax when he held that, because the individual trustees were not automat-
ically representatives of their appointing parties, the whole board of trustees, including,
both employer- and union-appointed trustees, could riot be found to be acting on behalf
of one party or the other. 12 The Amax decision made no such broad statement.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in UMW Health & Retirement Fund v. Robinson
also supports the Board's declaration that unilateral alteration of trust terms established
by a collective-bargaining contract is prohibited. In Robinson, the Supreme Court held that
the trustees of a Taft-Hartley trust must enforce the terms of the trust as set forth in the
collective-bargaining agreement unless alteration is required in order to comply with
federal law." Because no such federal law was at issue in the Truck Drivers case, it is clear
that the terms of the collective-bargaining agreements, and the stipulations referenced
within those contracts, must govern the pension trust.
The Truck Drivers decision has established that trustees of a Taft-Hartley trust cannot
unilaterally alter the terms of the trust as set forth in the collective-bargaining agreement,
just as a party to the agreement cannot undertake such a unilateral modification." The
Board's holding represents a rational policy decision because, as was pointed out by the
Board in Truck Drivers, to allow unilateral change in an agreement negotiated between two
parties is to destroy the certainty of the document." 5
V. ANTITRUST
A. *Union Standing in Antitrust Actions: Associated General Contractors v. California
State Council of Carpenters'
Under section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust. Act, lalny person who shall be injured in
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefore . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 2 Private antitrust enforcement under section 4
is significant, not only' as a means for those who are damaged by antitrust violations to
recoup losses, but also as a deterrent to would be violators.' The broad language of
" 9
 453 U.S. at 336.
" Id. at 334.
" See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the administrative law judge's
reasoning.
" 5
 455 U.S. at 573-74.
If' such a unilateral modification is made by the union, it violates section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA,
29 U.S.C. § 158(6)(3) (1976), white if it is made by the employer, it violates section 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a}(5) (1976).
95 See 112 L.R.R.M. at 1227. See also Warehousemen's Union Local 334. 253 N.L.R.B. 1090,
1091, 109 L.R.R.M. 1201, 1203 (1981), enforcement denied, 670 F.2d 855, 109 L.R.R.M. 3226 (9th Cir.
1982).
* By Patric M. Verrone, Staff Member, BosroN COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983), 112 L.R.R.M. 2753.
2 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. V 1981).
3 Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 50 U.S.L.W. 4723, 4724 (1982).
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section 4, in particular. the term "any person" has led, however, to interpretive difficulties
for the courts. Therefore, a threshold question in antitrust litigation is whether the party
claiming damages is a "person" injured within the meaning of the antitrust laws.'
During the Survey year, in Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council
of Carpenters,`' the United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and held that, based on the allegations contained in its complaint, the plaintiff
union was not a person injured by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws within the
meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act.' Drawing on the specific allegations of the
complaint, the Court reasoned that the harms suffered by the Union, even if intentional
and provable, were too indirect to support a section 4 action.' Furthermore, the specula-
tive nature of the relationship between the defendant's actions and the harm to the
Union, and the existence of other more direct victims of the.alleged illegal actions which
could lead to duplicative awards of complex apportionment, led the Court to conclude
that the Union did not have a cognizable claim under the antitrust laws.'
The Union's complaint, filed as a class action suit on behalf of numerous affiliated
unions and councils, 9 alleged that the defendants conspired to "weaken, destroy and
restrain" both the trade of certain contractors, and "free exercise of the business,ac-
tivities" of the Union." The complaint contended that the defendants, a multi-member
trade association composed of construction contractors,:"coerced" landowners and gen-
eral contractors who were not members of the local unions, thereby causing unionized
subcontractors to lose business and, accordingly, to weaken the bargaining relationship
between the union and signatory employers." The Union claimed that these acts violated
the Claton Act' and sought $25,000,000 in damages.' 3
The complaint was dismissed by the district court in 1975' 4 because it alleged only "a
rather vague, general conspiracy" that was not a matter of antitrust law but rather a
typical labor dispute that should have been resolved by the National Labor Relations
Board." The court of appeals reversed the decision more than five years later," holding
that the plaintiffs had standing to recover damages for injuries due to the defendant's
conduct, by alleging an "industry-wide boycott against all subcontractors with whom the
Unions had signed agreements...."" The Ninth Circuit believed that the allegations
satisfied the requirement that the defendants' activities created a viable antitrust violation
with foreseeable injuries specifically intended to harm the plaintiffs.' 8
4
 For a complete discussion of standing in antitrust litigation, see Berber and Bernstein, An
Analytical Framework for, Antitrust Standing, 86 YAU, L.J. 809 (1977); and Sherman, Antitrust Standing
from Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.T.U. L. Rev. 374 (1976).
103 S. Ct. 897 (1983), 112 L.R.R.M. 2753 (1983).
6 Id. at 908-09, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2760.
Id, at 911, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2762.
8 Id., 112 L.R.R.M. at 2762.
103 S. Ct. at 899, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2753.
" Id. at 901, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2754.
" 103 S. Ct. 900, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2753-54.
12 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. V 1981).
13 103 S. Ct. at 901, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2754.
H California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated General Contractors of California, Inc.,
404 F. Stipp. 1067, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
u Id. at 1069.
" California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated General Contractors of California, Inc.,
648 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1980).
' 7 . Id. at 537.
18 Id. at 537-38.
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The Supreme Court, in reversing the Ninth Circuit ruling, noted that although the
alleged coercion of third parties by the defendants may have been unlawful, it did not.
necessarily follow that the Union had standing under the Clayton Act to sue for damages
resulting from this unlawful coercion.'" Justice Stevens, speaking for a majority of the
Court, refused to take for granted the literal meaning of the Clayton Act provision
regarding "injured persons," preferring instead to examine the legislative history behind
the Act." This examination made it "perfectly clear that [Congress] expected the courts
to ... draw on common law traditions" to determine the Act's scope." The Court then
proceeded to trace these common law traditions through a series of cases 22
 which showed
a clear tendency on the part of courts to limit who may recover antitrust damages, and to
specifically eliminate anyone only "tangentially affected" by the antitrust violation. 23 In
accordance with these traditions, the Court stated, it was required to evaluate three
factors: the plaintiff's harm, the defendant's alleged wrongdoing, and the relationship
between them.'
In examining these three factors, the Court noted that every possible injury which
could be traced to a particular wrongdoing was not automatically entitled to a judicial
remedy. 25 Nor, stated the Court, was the intent of the alleged wrongdoer determinative.'"
Instead, the Court focused its inquiry on the nature of the plaintiff union's injury to
determine if the injury was within the area of harm that the antitrust laws were meant to
deter:27
Addressing the nature of the harm to the plaintiff, the Court first noted that the
plaintiff was not harmed by the alleged restraint of trade either as a consumer or as a
et on petit or." In fact, noted the Court, it was not even clear that the restraint of trade
itself was necessarily harmful to unions." In this regard, the Court determined that in
theoretical terms, uninhibited competition among contractors can actually help unions, 3 "
and that in practical terms, the alleged wrongdoings in this case were only indirectly
linked to that plaintiff's injuries which the Court added, "may have been produced by
independent factors."' Furthermore, the Court pointed out that damages alleged by the
Union were at least one step removed from the injuries allegedly sustained by the
unionized firms who were themselves the proper parties to assert an antitrust claim." The
'" 103 S. Ct. at 902, 112 L.R.R.M, at 2755.
2 " Id. at 904, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2756.
" Id. at 905, 112 L.R,R.M. at 2758, quoting National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1978).
22 Loch v. Eastern Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3c1 Cir. 1910); Southern Pacific Co, v. Darnell-
Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918): Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Illinois
Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977): and Blue Shield of Virginia, inc. v. McCready, 50 U.S.L.W.
4723 (1982).
" 103 S. Ct. at 907, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2759.
24
 14., 112 L.R.R.M. at 2759.
"Id. at 908, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2759.
2" Id.
27
 Id., 112 L.R.R.M. at 2760.
m Id. at 909, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2760.
29 Id.
" Id., 112 L.R.R.M. at 2760. The Court maintained that the greater the freedom which
contractors have to subcontract with whomever they please, the higher the profits that can be passed
on to the worker, either directly through his earnings, or indirectly through improved working
conditions. Id.
31
 103 S. Ct. at. 911, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2762.
32 Id. at 913, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2763.
December 1983]
	
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 187
existence of these parties, noted the Court, supported the denial of standing to the more
remote parties.33 Finally, the Court determined that the Union's damage claims were
either highly speculative in the alleged form," or remediable under other laws. 3 '
The Court concluded its analysis by noting the practical difficulties inherent in
maintaining the plaintiff's suit." Given the strong interest in minimizing the complexity
of antitrust litigation, the Court pointed to severe problems in this case in identifying and
apportioning damages among subcontractors, the workforce, unions, and union mem-
bers. 37 Particularly concerned about the potential for double recoveries multiplied over
treble-damage liabilities, the Court dismissed the Union's complaint. 39
Justice Marshall, the only member of the Court who refused to join the majority
opinion, filed a dissents" which criticized the Court's failure to consider the value of the
defendant's intent. Citing Bigelow v. RKO Pictures," Justice Marshall noted that antitrust
violations are essentially "tortious acts" and, in this case, where the tort was "intentional,"
the directness of the harm should not be a factor since intentional tortfeasors are liable
even for the unforseen consequences of their conduct." Therefore, Justice Marshall
maintained, dismissal of the complaint was not warranted merely on the basis of un-
specific, indirect, or speculative damage allegations." Justice Marshall also contended
that there was no risk of double recovery since the union sought recoveries from injuries
that were distinguishable for the injuries of other parties." Using the example of union
dues, Justice Marshall noted that it. was a matter of simple subtraction to separate distinct
recoveries and that difficulties in ascertaining damage claims should not bar recovery."
Justice Marshall concluded by emphasizing that the Court's concern for the weakness of
the plaintiff's case based solely' on.its pleading should not have required dismissal of the
case.' 5
Associated General Contractors was decided on the sufficiency of the complaint and,
therefore, it is possible that a more carefully' drafted complaint in a similar situation might
allow for standing. Although the Court examined a number of factors, all of which
weighed against the plaintiff's standing in this case, the Court failed to indicate which, if
any, of the factors were ultimately dispositive. Thus, a future plaintiff runs the risk, on
the basis of this opinion, of failing the standing test if he does not satisfy any of these
factors. Nevertheless, the Court does make several statements which could be used in
determining what standards would be dispositive for similar claims in the future and,
thus, could help future practitioners in designing more successful allegations and com-
plaints.
The most standard-oriented statement made by the Court is the three-prong test
33 Id., 112 L.R.R.M. at 2763.
34 Id. at 911, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2762.
" Id. The Court found the damage claim highly speculative "[plartly because it is indirect, and
partly because the alleged effects on the Union may have been produced by' independent factors." Id.
3" 103 S. Ct. 911-12, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2762-63.
37 Id. at 912, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2763.
" Id.
39 103 S. Ct. 913, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2763 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946).
4 ' 103 S. Ct. at 914, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2761 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42 103 S. Ct. at 916, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2766 (Marshall J., dissenting).
" 103 S. Ct. at 915-16, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2765 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
45 103 S. Ct. at 916, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2766 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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designed to determine if a party qualifies as a "person" under section 4. 46 This test,
according in justice Stevens, requires the Court to evaluate: a) the plaintiff's harm; b) the
defendant's alleged wrongdoing; and c) the relationship between them."' The Court,
however, never specifically referred to this test again in the opinion, and as such never
clearly enunciated how it should he applied. Nonetheless, it would appear from the
Court's opinion that while no single prong of the test is dispositive of the plaintiff's claim,
the first and third prongs are the most important for the establishment of standing,
especially when, as in this case, all three factors "weigh heavily against judicial enforce-
ment of the plaintiff's claim."'"
The first factor, the plaintiff's harm, stands at a threshold position in the evaluation
of standing. The enabling act itself specifically requires that the plaintiff be "a person who
shall he injured,"" but injury alone is insufficient because "the court must make a further
determination whether the plaintiff is a proper party to bring a private antitrust action."''"
The injury alleged should, therefore, be one that the antitrust laws are designed to deter,
and to deter for that particular plaintiff. s' In this regard, the Court struggled with the
fact that the plaintiff in this case was a labor union and not a consu Mer or a competitor in
the restrained market:" Although it did not specifically say that a consumer or a com-
petitor would definitely have had standing on similar facts, the Court did say that labor
unions with the type of injuries alleged here are not necessarily part of the class the
antitrust statutes are designed to protect. 53 Furthermore, the injury alleged must flow
directly from the defendant's wrongdoing; the injury cannot be, as the Court claimed it
was here, "highly speculative."" The injury alleged must be specific, direct, and judicially
manageable. 55 The Court was acutely aware of the remedial problems posed by complex
antitrust litigation. 56 As such, the easier the damages arc to apportion, the lesser the risks
of double recovery, and the clearer the proof that these awards might not be granted
pursuant to some other law, the more likely a court should be to entertain the action." if'
only because section 4 claims include treble damages, the Court indicates that future
claims should allege specific, identifiable, and distributable antitrust damages.
Being primarily preoccupied with the other two factors, the Court dealt only briefly
with factor two — the alleged wrongdoing of the defendant. 58 The Court considered this
factor on its own only in terms of the defendant's motive which, the complaint in the case
46 103 S. Ct. at 907, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2759.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 913, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2763.
4" 15 U.S.C.	 15 (Supp. V 1981).
56 103 S. Ct. at 913 n.31, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2759 n.31.
5 ' Id., 112 L.R.R.M. at 2759 n.31, citing Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 50 U.S.L.W. 4723
(1982) (consumer of psychotherapuetic services injured by conspiracy 10 restrain market for such
services allowed to recover treble damages).
32 103 S. Ct. at 909, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2761.
" Id. at 910, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2761.
ld. at 911, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2762.
" Id., 112 L.R.R.M. at 2762.
" Id. at 911-12, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2762.
" Id.. 112 L.R.R.M. at 2762.
" The Court's decision to limit its discussion of intent was ironic in light of the Court's previous
admonition that "summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation
where motive and intent play leading roles...." Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 368
U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
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alleged, was an improper one. 59 In this regard, the Court stated that, while intent may
support the plaintiff's overall claim, it is "not a panacea that will enable any complaint to
withstand a motion to dismiss."" Justice Marshall's dissent sharply criticized this aspect of
the opinion, contending that a formative allegation of intent, based on tort law damage
theory, automatically extends recovery to include even the most remotely damaged
parties." According to Marshall, once intent has been alleged, any party who has been
injured must be allowed to maintain an antitrust suit. Justice Marshall's interpretation,
however, would open up a floodgate of litigation, permitting anyone, despite the absolute
remoteness of their claim, to show that an intentional antitrust violation had a causal link
to their injury. Such an argument, however, is inconsistent with relevant precedent" as
well as the Court's previous interpretation of Congressional intent which the Court has
assumed did not permit individuals who are only "tangentially affected by an antitrust
violation" to maintain a treble damages action." This interpretation also tends to make
the deterrence clement of treble damage claims overly harsh should duplicative recovery
occur." Also, it would potentially limit recovery in cases where intent is either very
difficult to prove or non-existent." 5 Since antitrust recovery is designed to protect those
whom violations actually effect, an "intent" requirement is not very helpful." Thus, the
alleging party is left uncertain of the value of making allegations pertaining to the "intent"
behind the wrongdoings of the defendant,
The final factor, the relationship between the plaintiff's harm and the defendant's
wrongdoing, appears to be the most crucial to the Court because it involves two elements
of the fact pattern which seem essential to the Court's dismissal of the complaint. The first
clement is the actual lack of directness between the defendant's wrongdoing and the
plaintiff's harm."' The Court believed that, in this case, the "chain of causation" con-
tained "several somewhat vaguely defined links.""" The vagueness of these links, the
Court maintained, diluted the Union's complaint to an extent that provoked the Court to
state, "the alleged effects on the union may have been produced by independent fac-
tors."" The second element of the injury/wrongdoing relationship which led to the
dismissal was that. there existed a class of persons who stood directly between the parties in
the causal chain," The fact that a group of nonunionized contractors were the direct
targets of the defendant's activities caused the Court not only to question why these
"victims" were not parties and whether they had been injured, but also to express doubt as
to whether there was actually any injury at all." Troubled by the prospect of double
recoveries in antitrust claims presented by a broadening of the term "persons," the Court
maintained that, based on the "private attorney general" motivations behind the enact-
ment of section 4, only those claims for which the plaintiff has proven that he is the most
" 103 S. Ct. at 907, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2759.
"" Id., 112 I..R.R.M. at 2760.
" 103 S. Ct. al 913, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2763 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62 Described in the opinion at 103 S. Ct. at 907, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2757, and discussed, infra notes
22-23 and accompanying text.
63 glue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 50 U.S.L.W. 4723, 4726 (1982).
" 103 S. Ct. at 907, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2759.
'5 Sherman, supra note 5, at 388-89.
66 Id.
67 103 S. Ct. at 906, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2758.
68 Id.
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viable "private attorney general" to press such a claim, may be entertained." If any factor
is to be held dispositive in future claims based on Associated General Contractors, it is this
one: for a plaintiff to be allowed to bring a massive antitrust suit it must be clear, first, that
there are no other parties who would have a superior suit, or perhaps, who should be
joined to this suit; and second, that this plaintiff is the one whose specific damages the
defendant should be made liable to pay in treble.
In summary, Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters held
that the unions in question failed to state a claim, and that they did not have standing to
sue because of the indirectness of their injury, the speculative and complex nature of their
damages, the existence of less remote parties who might have superior claims, and the
availability of alternative remedies. This case also demonstrates the concern which the
Supreme Court has for the problem of balancing "private antitrust enforcement and
redress for injury" against "treble damages 'overkill' and a litigational avalanche."'" As
such, the case holds a valuable lesson for future union antitrust complainants; in order to
persuade the Court to allow its case, the union must design allegations which demonstrate
that its action will result in effective enforcement and redress and not cause injudicious
and unnecessary overkill.
72 Id., 112 L.R.R.M. at 2758.
" Sherman, supra note 5, at 405.
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A. *Burdens of Production and Proof in Individual Disparate Treatment Litigation:
Miller v. WFL1 Radio incorporated'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 7964 2 (Title VII) proscribes employers' intentional
discrimination against an employee because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.' The Supreme Court of the United States has held that an employee who charges
an employer with individual disparate treatment in violation of Title VII must establish a
prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. 4 According to the Supreme Court,
an employee can establish a prima facie case of individual disparate treatment by proving
that (I) he belongs to a racial minority; (2) he applied and was qualified for a position for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) he was rejected despite his qualifications;
and (4) after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants!' When the Court articulated these elements of a prima facie case, it
reserved the discretion to modify them somewhat, depending on the factual context of a
given cases
Once the plaintiff employee has established a prima facie case by a preponderance of
the evidence, according to the Court, there is a presumption that the employer has
.unlawfully discriminated against the individual employee.' Although t he Court has rec-
ognized that at all times, the burden of persuasion in an individual disparate treatment.
suit remains with the plaintiff, the Court has stated that if the trier of fact believes the
plaintiff's evidence, and the employer makes no response to that evidence, the trial court
must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case. 8
The Supreme Court has stated that in order to rebut this presumption, the defen-
dant employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection. 9 According to the Court, the defendant must produce admissible evidence
which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that there was no intentional,
unlawful discrimination in order to rebut the presumption created by the established
* By Christopher R. Vaccaro, Staff Member, BOSTON COLI.F.GE LAW REVIEW.
' 687 F.2d 136 (6th Or. 1982).
• 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
3 Id. This statute states in pertinent part: "Unlawful Employment Practices (a) It shall be
unlawful employment practice for an employer — (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . .."
4 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973i; Texas Department of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981).
5 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Id. at n.13.
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981).
• Id. at 254.
9 Id. at 254-55.
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prima facie case.'" Since the Court has stated that the defendant must produce evidence
which is admissible in court, his burden of production will not be met by mere statements
in the pleadings or in his attorney's closing argument."
Finally, assuming that the defendant has met his burden of production and there-
fore, rebutted the presumption created by the plaintiff's prima facie case, the Court has
held that the plaintiff must be permitted to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that the reasons proffered by the defendant were not his true reasons, but
instead, were mere pretexts for discrimination." According to the Court, the plaintiff can
do this in either of two ways: (I) directly, by persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer, or (2) indirectly, by demonstrating that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." In applying this paradigm,
however, it was unclear whether a court could infer a legitimate reason for an employer's
preference from evidence produced at trial where that reason was different from that
raised by the employer as a rebuttal to the plaintiff's prima facie case.
During the Survey year, the United Stales Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
decided Miller v. WEL! Radio Incorporated." In that case, the Sixth Circuit applied the
paradigm for determining the presence of unlawful employment discrimination that had
been developed by the Supreme Court.' 5
 The Sixth Circuit held that a trial court properly
may infer a legitimate reason for an employer's preference, even though that reason was
not clearly and fully developed by the employer, so long as the plaintiff has a full and fair
opportunity to disprove that reason." This holding is significant because it enables a trial
court, in cases where the defendants' proffered reasons for its allegedly discriminatory
behavior have been disproved, to find a legitimate reason not clearly developed by the
employer based on the trial record." •
In Miller, a female employee brought a Title VII suit against her employer, a radio
station, for alleged sex-based discrimination." The plaintiff, Norma Miller, had been the
station's most successful seller of the station's available advertising time slots. Miller was so
successful that she had been promoted to sales manager.'" Some time after Miller's
promotion, the station rehired Johnny Eagle as a sales person. Eagle was a former
employee and long-time friend of one of the station's owners. 2 " Mr. Eagle's success as a
salesperson for WFLI was questionable. 21
1 ° Id. at 255.
" Id, at n.9.
" 1d. at 256.
" Id. Note that in disparate impact cases — that is. cases where a facially neutral practice results
in discrimination — plaintiffs must use a different paradigm to prevail in a Title VII action. To
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, the plaintiff most show that a facially
neutral employment practice has a significantly discriminatory impact. Connecticut v, Teal, 457 U.S.
440,446 (1982). If that showing is made, the employer must then demonstrate that each requirement
has a manifest relationship to the employment in question, in order to avoid a finding of discrimina-
tion, Id. at 446-47. The plaintiff nevertheless prevails if he shows that the employer was using the
practice as a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 447. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
" 687 F.2d 136 (6th Cir. 1982).
" M. at 138.
'" hi, at 138-39.
See id.
'" Id. at 137-38.
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In 1978, the station decided to reduce its number of saleable advertising slots and
informed Miller that she would have to begin splitting her advertising accounts with
Eagle." She refused to do so and was discharged. The station filed a separation notice
with the Tennessee Department of Employment Security indicating that Miller had been
discharged because her position had been deleted." After Miller's termination, Eagle
assumed most of her former duties and was given the title "National Sales Manager.""
Miller filed a Title VII action in federal district court against the station alleging
sex-based discrimination." The station answered that she was terminated because she was
inefficient, disloyal and tempermental." A United States Magistrate, hearing the case
without a jury, determined that Miller successfully had established a prima facie case of
sex-based discrimination and that the station's proferred reasons for her discharge were
specious and pretextual. 27 The Magistrate, however, held that Miller had failed to satisfy
her burden of proving unlawful discrimination, concluding that the discharge of Miller
was based on a simple preference for the services of Eagle, although this reason was not
clearly advanced by the station." Apparently, the Magistrate inferred this legitimate
business preference from the testimony of two of the station's owners at the trial."
In deciding Miller, the Sixth Circuit began with the burden of proof analysis devel-
oped by the Supreme Court. in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine. 30 Under
this analysis, a plaintiff alleging unlawful discrimination initially must establish a prima
facie case of discrimination." The Miller court noted that if the plaintiff succeeds in
establishing a prima facie case, the defendant assumes the burden of producing, as distinct
from proving, a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. 32 Finally, if the
defendant produces evidence of legitimate purpose, the Miller court explained, the
plaintiff must carry her burden of proof that she was in fact a victim of sex discrimination. 33
The court noted that the plaintiff may sustain this burden by showing by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the defendant's proffered reasons arc not legitimate, but rather
pretexts which mask discriminatory conduct. 34 According to the court, the plaintiff may
show pretext in either one of two ways: (1) directly, by affirmative evidence of discrimina-
tion, or (2) indirectly, by demonstrating that the employer's proffered explanation lacks
credence." The Miller court also stated that the trier of fact resolves the question of
whether the plaintiff has satisfied her burden of proving discrimination by a preponder-






27 Id. at 138.
2' Id.
" See id.
" Id. (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).




" Id. (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
36 687 F.2d at 138.
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Having thus set forth the allocations of burdens in individual disparate treatment
litigation under Title VII, the Miller court stated that the Magistrate had departed from
this norm by inferring a legitimate business reason for Miller's discharge other than those
specifically advanced by the defendant." Stating that if the station had discharged Miller
because of a simple preference for Eagle it should have argued so from the beginning, the
Miller court nevertheless refused to reverse judgment for Miller as a matter of law." The
court reasoned that to do so, would be "too mechanical an application of the Burdine
paradigm."39
In support of its refusal to reverse the lower court's holding, the court explained that
the trial testimony of two of the station's owners revealed a "strong suggestion" that they
were determined to rehire Johnny Eagle.'" Because of this testimony, according to the
court, it would be unfair to hold that the "simple business preference" argument had
never been raised at all, although the station did not develop or pursue it." The Miller
court suggested, however, that it would have reversed the Magistrate's decision had there
been no support in the record that Miller's discharge was based on a non-discriminatory
preference for Eagle's services. 42
The Miller court observed that the station had neither pleaded nor emphasized that
Miller's discharge was based on a preference for Eagle." The court further rioted that the
Magistrate apparently had inferred this defense from recorded testimony." In light of
these observations, the court of appeals concluded that Miller had not had a full and fair
opportunity to respond to this proffered defense." The Miller court, therefore, held that
the case had to be remanded for reconsicleration. 4" The court. explained that the remand
was required to allow Miller to present evidence showing the station's argument that it.
honestly preferred Eagle's services was also a pretext for discrimination." Finally, the
court stated that its opinion did not compel the Magistrate to reach a different. holding
upon rehearing." Accordingly, the Miller court vacated and remanded the case for
further consideration. 4 "
A single dissenting judge would have reversed the decision of the Magistrate and
remanded for a determination of the hack pay owed to Miller.'" The dissent stated that
since Miller had established the prima facie case of discrimination, and had shown the
station's proffered explanation to be pretext, she was entitled to judgment in her favor."
37 Id.
39 Id.





 Id. at 138.
44
 Id.
4!" Id. at 139.
46 Id. According to the court, a remand would allow the factual issue, whether Miller was the
victim .





5° Id. at 139-40 (Churchill, DJ., dissenting).
Id. at 140.
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The dissent argued that Burdine requires that a plaintiff have a full and fair opportunity
to respond to legitimate business reasons proffered by the defendant and that the reason
proffered by the Magistrate, therefore, need not be addressed by the plaintiff." Appar-
ently, the dissent would have reversed because the defendant radio station in Miller had
failed to present its argument that it simply preferred Eagle's services in its pleadings or
explicitly in its argument at trial." This conclusion implies that the dissent deemed it
improper for the Magistrate to infer the defense merely from the trial testimony."
According to the majority in Miller, the dissent's analysis of the Magistrate's decision
is too mechanical an application of the Burdine paradigm." Under the circumstances of
Miller, this is perhaps correct. In Miller, the true state of affairs appeared to be that the
owners of the station were looking for an opportunity to rehire an old friend, Johnny
Eagle." Eagle's rehiring, however, required that Miller be discharged. The station,
unaware that a preference for Eagle based on friendship was a legally sufficient defense
to the charge of sex discrimination, instead attempted to rely on pretexts that Miller was
uncooperative and temperamental to respond to her prima facie case." 'The Magistrate,
upon hearing the testimony of the station's owners, inferred that the decision to rehire
Eagle was the true reason for Miller's discharge." Consequently, the Magistrate decided
that the preference was not unlawfully discriminatory and held for the station." In so
deciding, the Magistrate refused to hold the station liable for its mistaken evaluation of
what constituted a defense to a Title VII action. The Magistrate's decision, therefore,
although not based on a mechanical application of the Burdine paradigm, is defensible
insofar as it looked beyond the station's pleadings and legal argument to determine the
actual facts and reasons which were really involved, and ultimately concluding that the
underlying reasons were legally defensible." The Magistrate's decision, however, was
contrary to Burdine since it did not allow Miller a full and fair opportunity to address this
argument."'
The Sixth Circuit's holding in Miller is significant for two reasons. First, the holding
upheld the trial court's inference of defenses, from testimony, that were not explicitly
articulated in the defendant's pleadings or argument."' The allowance of such inferences
by the trial court, however, is qualified by the requirement that a full and fair opportunity
be allowed for the plaintiff to address them." Moreover, there apparently must be a basis
for such inferences in the trial record." The Miller holding, therefore, suggests that
where the plaintiff neglects to make an obvious defense in his answer to a charge of
52 Id. at 139.
53 See id. at 139-40.
54 See id.
55
 Id. at 139.
" See id. at 137.
57 See id. at 137-38.
" See id. at 138-39.
59 See id.
" See id.
61 Id. at 138 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258).
" 687 F.2d at 139.
63 Id.
" See id.
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violating Title VII, the trial judge may come to his rescue and raise the defense himself, if
the trial record supports it.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Miller court's holding implicitly endorses
a defense that an employee's discharge was based on a non-discriminatory preference for
the services of another." The Miller court's endorsement of a defense phrased in such
general terms may make it more difficult for future Title VII plaintiffs to sustain their
burdens of proof. Unless the courts require that the defendant employer specifically state
a non-discriminatory basis of such preference, it probably will be more difficult in future
litigation for a plaintiff to show pretext. In responding to allegations of unlawful dis-
crimination, a Title VII defendant may plead that he denied employment to the plaintiff
merely because the employer had a non-discriminatory preference for someone else.
Assuming, however, that the court's endorsement of this defense affects both plaintiff
and defendant equally in Title VII cases, it nevertheless will demand a more subjective
evaluation by the factfinder and hence likely will render the outcome of such litigation less
predictable. This is so because where a defendant pleads that his employment decision
was based on a simple non-discriminatory preference, and the plaintiff in turn claims this
defense to be a pretext, the trial judge must. decide which side will prevail. This decision
often will not be aided by direct evidence; therefore, the trial judge will have to base his
decision on which of the parties appears more believable.
B. *Consent Decree in EEOC Action Cuts Off Charging Parties' Right-to-Sue:
Adams v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co.'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2 protects employees of and applicants for
employment from discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 3
The 1972 amendments to section 706(0(1) of Title VIP grant the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforcement powers which had been absent from the
65 See id. at 138-39.
* By Kristina Hansen Wardwell, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
697 F.2d 582, 30 FEP Cases 1228 (4th Cir. 1983) (per curiatn; en bane).
2 Pub. L. 88 -352, 78 Stat.. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a - 19754,
2000a-200011-6 (1976)).
See, e.g., General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 323, 22 PEP Cases 1196 (1980).
4 Pub. L. 92-261, §§ 2-8, 10, 11, 13, 86 Stat. 103-113 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§:§ 2000e- I to 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9, 2000e-13 to 2000e-17 ( 1976). Section 706(0( I) of Title VII,
as amended, reads in pertinent part:
(0(0 If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission . . . , the
Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement
acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any
respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in
the charge.... The person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a
civil action brought by the Commission. . . . If a charge filed with the Commission
pursuant. to subsection (h) of this section is dismissed by the Commission, or if within
one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge ... , the Commission has
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original statutory scheme." Specifically, the amendments authorize the EEOC to bring a
civil action against a party who has been charged by an employee or applicant for
employment with an unlawful employment practice if the EEOC is unable to secure a
conciliation agreement from the alleged Title VII offender which is acceptable to the
EEOC." As amended, the statute accords the parties claiming the existence of a Title VII
violation the express right to intervene in a suit commenced by the EEOC. 7 In addition,
the present section requires the EEOC to notify the aggrieved parties of their individual
right to sue if the EEOC dismisses the charge, or has not entered into a conciliation
agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party."
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit., in
Adams v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Go.," held that the entering of a consent decree in a civil
action brought by the EEOC under section 706(f)(1) extinguished the right of the
charging parties to bring an individual action based on the sarne claim unless the parties
had intervened in the EEOC action prior to the entry of the consent decree.'" Central to
the Adams holding was the court's finding that a consent decree is a judgment on the
merits, which under the doctrine of res judicata requires the dismissal of any subsequent
suit brought by the charging parties." The Fourth Circuit holding is in agreement with
the decisions reached by the two other appeals courts which have considered the effect of
an adjudication on the merits in an EEOC action on a later action brought by a charging
party.' 2 The court's decision in Adams, however, is contrary to the EEOC's position that a
not filed a civil action under this section ..., or the Commission has not entered into a
conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission „
shall so notify the person aggrieved within ninety days after the giving of such notice a
civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the
person claiming to be aggrieved. . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
5 '[he Senate Report on the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 noted that the
"failure to grant the EEOC meaningful enforcement powers has proven a major flaw in the
operation of Title VII." S. REP. No. 415, 924 Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971).
Prior to 1972, the only civil actions authorized (other than private lawsuits) were actions by the
Attorney General upon suspicion of a pattern or practice of discrimination. See General Telephone
Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 327, 22 FEP Cases 1196, 1199 - 1200 (1980).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 5(f)(1) (1976); see supra note 4 for relevant text of the provision. An
individual, of course, retains his private right of action. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 45 (1974).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
" Id. The statute grants the aggrieved party ninety clays from the date of such notice to bring a
civil action. Id.
9 697 F.2d 582, 30 PEP Cases 1228 (4th Cir, 1983) (per curiam; en bane).
1 ° Id. at 583. 30 FEP Cases at 1229.
" Id.
Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389, 1389, 22 FE? Cases 773, 773 (5th Cir. 1980)
(Private Title VII action barred when same claim was at issue in earlier action brought by the EEOC
and was set aside for failure to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act); McClain v. Wagner
Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119, 14 FEY Cases 817, 819 (8th Or. 1977) (Once EEOC files an action
under § 706(f)(1), an individual may not institute an independent action, but rather has the right 10
intervene); see also United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 870 n,62,
FEP Cases 167, 202 n.62 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944, 12 FEP Cases 1090 (1976)
(Charging party has "an unconditional right to intervene in order to protect his or her own interests
in a § 706 suit brought by the Commission, which [suit] otherwise cuts off the private party's right to
sue under Title VII."). Compare Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hospital, 614 F.2d 520, 526-27, 22
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consent decree does not bind the charging parties who reject the terms of the settlement
contained in the decree,"
The underlying controversy in Adams commenced in 1976 when the EEOC brought
an action against Procter & Gamble in response to employment discrimination charges
filed by over two dozen employees." During the ensuing three year discovery period
none of the charging parties exercised their statutory right to intervene." Negotiations
between the EEOC and Procter & Gamble eventually resulted in a consent decree,"
Following the entry of the consent decree, the EEOC issued right-to-sue letters to the
charging parties who had rejected the awards under the decree." When sixteen of the
charging parties instituted individual actions in federal district court against Procter &
Gamble pursuant to their right-to-sue notices, the court granted the company's motion to
dismiss the individual actions.'s
According to the district court, the EEOC's filing of a suit. and the subsequent entry of
a consent decree extinguished the right of the charging parties to initiate their own Title
VII actions.'' In so holding, the court relied upon the clear language of section
706(1)(1). 2° In other words, the court found that "consent decree" and "conciliation or
settlement agreement" were not interchangeable terms. The district court set forth what
in its opinion was the "fundamental" distinction between the two." A consent decree, the
district court stated, was an agreement between the EEOC and the party charged with the
Title VII violation following the institution of a civil suit by the EEOC." A conciliation
agreement, in contrast, was a settlement agreement reached by the employer and the
EFOC prior to the initiation of a suit. 22 The district court emphasized that the charging
parties have no right to take part in the negotiations leading up to a conciliation or
FEP Cases 554 (5th Cir..1980) (Court held that procedural dismissal of EEOC action did not operate
as res judicata where EEOC could have, but did not, file a subsequent suit.. Court acknowledged that
a charging party who did not intervene in an EEOC action cannot initiate a lawsuit on the same claim
merely because the party is not satisfied with the outcome of the EEOC suit.).
" 678 12.2d 1190, 1192, 28 FEP Cases 1463. 1464 (4th Cir. 1982). The EEOC asserted that the
charging parties were only potential witnesses in its agency action and were not bound by the terms
of a settlement decree that they refused to accept. Id.
A consent decree has been defined as an laJgreement 	 deletklant to cease activities asserted as
illegal by government.... Upon approval of such agreement by the coon the government's action
against the defendant is dropped." 41.C. BLACK, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 370 (5th ed. West 1979).
'' 697 F.2d 582. 583, 30 EEP Cases 1228, 1229 (411, Cir. 1983).
15 678 F.2d 1190, 1190, 28 FEP Cases 1463, 1463 (4th Cir. 1982).
'" 697 F.2cl 582, 583, 30 FEP Cases 1228, 1229 (4th Cir. 1983). Pursuant to the terms of the
consent decree, Procter & Gamble agreed inter alia to compensatory awards for the employees who
had instituted the action. 678 F.2d 1190, 1192, 28 FEP Cases 1463, 1464 (4th Cir. 1982).
" 697 F.2d 582, 583, 30 FEP Cases 1228, 1229 (4th Cir. 1983). A "right - to-sue- letter is a notice
the EEOC is authorized to issue to charging parties when the EEOC dismisses the charges, fails to file
a suit within 180 days of the filing of the charges, or has entered into a conciliation agreement to
which the person aggrieved is a party. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)( I) (1976). A properly issued right - to-
sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the institution of'a private cause of action under Title VII.
See Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 621 F.2d 117, 120, 24 EEP Cases 1077, 1078 (5tIt Cir. 1980):
fliduchenko v. Minneapolis Medical and Diagnostic Center, 1.,t cl„ 467 E. Supp. 103, 107, 19 FEP
Cases 460, 462 (D. Minn. 1970).
m 30 EEL' Cases 1225, 1228 (D. Md. 1981).
" Id. at 1226.
2 ' Id. See note 4 suprtt for the text of § 706(0(1).
" 30 FEP Cases 1225, 1228 (I). Md. 1981).
22 Id.
23 Id.
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settlement agreement, whereas they have an unqualified right to intervene in an EEOC
suit which may eventually culminate in a consent decree." The court observed that. its
ruling did not limit the right of allegedly injured employees to seek relief, reasoning that
the reservation of the charging parties' statutory right to intervene once the EEOC files a
suit adequately safeguarded the individuals' interests. 25 In addition, the court noted that
its holding would have the beneficial effect of preventing duplicative proceedings. 26
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit, in a two-to-one panel decision, vacated and remanded
the district court's dismissal of the individual actions." Specifically, the panel court held
that the charging parties' private rights of action were not terminated by the EEOC's
institution of a section 706 action or the entry of a consent decree. 28 Accordingly, the
court found that the EEOC had issued the right-to-sue letters properly 2t1 The panel court.
identified a number of factors in support of its decision. It observed that the legislative
history indicated no congressional intent to cut. off private rights of action following the
filing of an EEOC action." More particularly, the court found no basis in the legislative
history to conclude that Congress intended only unacceptable pre-suit settlements, and
not unacceptable consent decrees, to keep private rights of action alive. 31 In addition, an
examination of other remedial statutes in which the automatic termination of a private
right to sue was expressly revoked suggested, in the panel's opinion, that Congress had no
such intention in the section 706(0(1) context." The panel couri also found that Congress
intended to provide for parallel and possibly overlapping remedies under Title VII. 33
Furthermore, the panel court opined that a conciliation agreement, as that term was
defined in section 706(f)(1), meant any form of negotiated settlement and included
consent decrees. 34 Moreover, not being a party to the agreement simply meant not
agreeing to its terms, rather than not being eligible for its benefits.' This reasoning was
based upon the panel's interpretation of dicta in General Telephone. Co. v. LEGG.'" In that
case, the Supreme Court held that the EEOC may seek classwicle relief under section
706(0(1) without class action certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 37 In support of
its position, the panel court cited General Telephone dicta which provided that "blinder
section 706(0(1), the aggrieved person may bring Ins own action .. lithe agency has ...
reached a conciliation or settlement agreement with the employer that the [charging]
party finds unsatisfactory." 38
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1226.
26 Id. ("The statutory right to intervene serves the 4111a1 purpose of protecting the interests of the
private parties and preventing duplicative proceedings:).




3° Id. at 1193-94, 28 FEP Cases at 1465-66. The court's examination of legislative history is a
lengthy analysis which relies to a great extent on a comparison of the disjunctive wit It the conjunctive.
" Id. at 1194, 28 FEP Cases at 1466.
32
 Id., 28 FEP Cases at 1465 - 66.
33 Id., 28 FEP Cases at 1466. The court noted Supreme Court language which Found in Title
VII "a general intent [by Congress] to accord parallel or overlapping remedies against discrimina-
tion." Id. (citing Alexander v. Gardner- Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974)).
" 678 F.2d 1190, 1194, 28 FEP Cases 1464, 1466 (41h Cir. 1982).
" Id.
as 446 U.S. 318, 22 FEP Cases 1196 (1980).
" Id. at 323-24, 22 FEP Cases at 1198 - 99.
38 678 F.2d 1190, 1194, 28 FEP Cases 1464, 1466 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing General Telephone Co.
v. EEOC,•446 U.S. 318, 326, 22 FEP Cases 1196, 1199 (1980)).
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In a dissenting opinion, Senior Circuit Judge Haynsworth stated that the district.
court correctly dismissed the individual suits," According to Judge Haynsworth, charg-
ing parties who fail to intervene in an EEOC action should be barred from filing any
subsequent individual action once a consent decree is issued.'" Despite conferring preclu-
sive effect on a consent decree, Judge Haynsworth noted an implicit exception if the
EEOC action is terminated on a technical basis which would not have such a preclusive
effect:" Agreeing with the reasoning of the district court, Judge Haynsworth distin-
guished a conciliation agreement from a consent decree because of the different positions
held by intervening parties in the two instances.'" The dissent stated that although a
charging party has no right to participate in the negotiation of a conciliation agreement, it
does have an opportunity to participate in the events leading up to the entry of a consent
decree through the absolute statutory right of intervention provided by section
706(0(0,43 In addition, the dissent noted the lack of incentive an employer will have to
settle disputes with the EEOC, if' a charging party may reject the terms of' such settle-
ments:" Finally, Judge Haynsworth dismissed the majority's use of General Telephone as
inapposite to the instant case because in that case the employer sought a holding that any
judgment would have a preclusive effect on all individual claims, including the claims of
persons who were not charging parties:" The panel dissent concluded that the General
Telephone dicta cited by the majority referred only to members of the class who filed no
charges."
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals entered an order granting rehearing en bane.."
It then rejected the panel decision and affirmed the judgment of the district court."
Adopting Judge Haynsworth's reasoning, the en bane Fourth Circuit held that the
conclusion of an EEOC action by consent decree precluded any subsequent. suits on the
same claim by charging parties who had not intervened in the EEOC action." The court
found that a consent decree clearly was a judgment on the merits." Furthermore, in the
Fourths Circuit's opinion, a charging party's unqualified right to intervene rendered the
statutory scheme "fair and reasonable."'' Finally, the Fourth Circuit noted that. if a
charging party does not intervene "it is no unfair to conclude that he placed the conduct
of the litigation entirely upon the EEOC and expressed a conclusive willingness to be
bound by the outcome."" The Fourth Circuit. did, however, note that this rule should not
" 678 F.24.1 1190, 1196, 28 FEP Cases 1463, 1467 (4th Cir. 1982) (Haynsworth, j., dissenting).
4" Id. (Haynsworth, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Haynsworth, J., dissenting).
" Id., 28 FEP Cases at 1467-68 (Haynsworth, j., dissenting).
' 3 Id., 28 FEP Cases at 1468 (Haynsworth, J., dissenting).
44 Id. (Haynsworth, j., dissenting).
" /d. (Haynsworth, J., dissenting).
' hl. (Haynsworth, J., dissenting).
697 F.2d 582, 30 FEP Cases 1228 (4th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). The en bane Fourth Circuit
voted 5 for rehearing en bane, 4 against, with one disqualification. Id. at 584, 30 HP Cases at 1230
(Widener, j., concurring).
" Id, at 583-84, 30 FEP Cases at 1229-30. judge Widener agreed with the majority's per curiam
decision on the merits, but wrote a separate concurrence on procedural grounds. Id. at 584, 30 FEP
Cases at 1230. He noted a possible procedural difficulty with the court's authority far the rehearing.
Id.
" Id. at 583, 30 FEP Cases at 1230.
5" Id., 30 FEP Cases at 1229.
5 ' Id. The consent decree awarded benefits which were available to the charging parties. Id.
52
 Id.
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apply where the EEOC's action was concluded on technical grounds without a judgment
on the merits. 53
The Fourth Circuit also agreed with Judge Haynsworth's conclusion that the panel's
reliance on the General Telephone dicta was misplaced." According to the en bane majority,
General Telephone related to the effect of a judgment on persons who were not charging
parties and had no right of intervention." Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that. General
Telephone was "inapplicable to the preclusive effect of a judgment upon charging parties
who had not exercised their right of intervention.” 5 "
Finally, the en Banc Fourth Circuit acknowledged concerns that a charging party may
not recognize any reason to intervene until it is too late." Nevertheless, the opinion
emphasized that its decision rested on the plain meaning of section 706(1)(1)." Further-
more, the court admonished those who invoke the machinery of section 706(f)(1) to take a
continuing interest or participation in the proceedings.'"
Three members dissented from the en bane Fourth Circuit's decision, relying on the
reasoning of the panel court's majority opinion."" Emphasizing the "real-life situation"
involving Title VII suits, the dissent noted that there was nothing in either the statutory
framework or the record of the case at bar that revealed any obligation of either the
EEOC or the employer to keep the charging parties apprised of the progress of their
case." The dissent observed that the imminence or entry of a consent decree might he
unknown to the charging parties until it was too late."' Furthermore, the dissent coun-
tered the plain-meaning reasoning of the majority, staling that section 706(f)(1) is
sufficiently ambiguous to require judicial interpretation," Finally, the dissent cited Gen-
eral Telephone dicta which indicated that a court may require an individual who wishes to
claim under a judgment obtained by the EEOC to relinquish his right to bring a separate
private action." The dissent stated that. this language in General Telephone only made sense
if EEOC-obtained judgments were not binding on employees."
The en bane majority rendered an opinion that is consistent with existing precedent
on the preclusive effect of an adjudication on the merits in an EEOC action. 66 The
significance of the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Adams lies in the court's decision to confer
preclusive effect upon a consent decree entered in a civil action brought by the EEOC
against an alleged Title VII offender. Adams, if followed by other courts, assures defen-
dants that the terms of a consent decree will he binding on all charging parties, rather
" Id., 30 FEP Cases at 1230. Accord, TruviIlion, supra note 12, at 526.
" 697 F.2d at 583-84, 30 FEP Cases at 1229-30. See ,51111ta notes 30-34 and accompanying text,






" Id. (Phillips, .1., dissenting). See .supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
6 ' 697 F.2d at 585, 30 FEP Cases at 1231 (4th Cir. 1983) (Phillips, J., dissenting).
62 Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Phillips,	 dissenting). Presumably, the ambiguity to which the court refers is whether
conciliation agreement, as used in § 706(f)(1), means only a "conciliation" agreement or any form of
negotiated settlement including a consent decree. .
64 Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting); see supra notes 27 - 29 and accompanying text.
" 697 F.2d at 586, 30 FEP Cases at 1231-32 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
" See supra note 12.
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than serving as a possible floor for future negotiations with attorneys for individual
claimants. 67
The Fourth Circuits majority en bane opinion, in contrast to the dissent and panel
opinions, correctly recognizes the distinction between consent decrees and conciliation
agreements, as well as the policy against duplicative court proceedings. The unqualified
statutory right of intervention affords charging panics the opportunity to participate in
the negotiations leading lip to a consent decree. Such an opportunity, the district court
explained, is conspicuously absent from the process of reaching a conciliation agree-
ment." Furthermore, a close look at the reasoning of t he dissent and the majority panel
opinion" reveals several significant weaknesses. First, while resting their conclusion of
legislative intent on the lack of express statutory language concerning the preclusive
effect of a consent decree,'" the dissent ignores that portion of the history which points to
the clear intent of Congress to avoid duplication of proceedings." Instead, the dissenting
position looks to General Telephone where the Supreme Court declined to require class
certification of the EEOC. 72 According• to the dissent, the Supreme Court in General
Telephone accepted the threat of a multiplicity of suits by not binding all persons similarly
situated." The dissent fails, however, to note the fundamental difference between the
parties in General Telephone and those in the case before it. In General Telephone, the parties
who would have been bound by a class action had not initiated a charge, whereas in Adams
the charging parties possessed, but did not exercise, the statutory right to intervene.
Moreover, in its selective use of the General Telephone dicta, the dissent neglects the
Supreme Court's statement in that opinion that "unlike the Rule 23 class representative,
the EEOC is authorized to proceed in a unified action and to obtain the most satisfactory
overall relief even though competing interests arc involved and particular groups may
appear to be disadvantaged. The individual victim is given his right to intervene for this very
reason,'
Finally, the dissent fails to appreciate the limited purpose of an EEOC civil suit and
resulting consent decree will serve if it is not binding on all the involved parties. Defen-
dants' motivation to reach a settlement with the EEOC would be drastically reduced if the
dissents position were adopted. It should also be recognized that if the consent decree is
not binding on the charging parties, it is unlikely that the defendant would be bound by
such an order.
While the en bane majority is supported by the better, if somewhat formalistic, legal
reasoning and federal policy aimed at avoiding multiple suits, the dissent's view does have
the hacking of strong equitable arguments. The dissent is justifiably concerned that the
statute obligates. neither the EEOC nor the employer to apprise the charging parties of
67
 This certainty is lacking in the Eighth Circuit where the court of appeals suggested that a
consent decree will not hind a charging party if he was never informed of the filing of the EEOC civil
action. McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1120-22, 14 FEP Cases 817, 820-21 (8th Cir.
1977).
" See supra note 13.
" 697 F.2d 585, 585.86, 30 FEP Cases 1228, 1230
-32 (4th Cir. 1983) (Phillips, J., dissenting).
The dissent's reasoning is articulated in its greatest detail in the superceded majority panel opinion.
678 F.2d 1190, 1191 - 96, 28 FEP Cases 1463, 1463-67 (4th Cir. 1982).
to 678 F.2d 1190, 1194, 28 FEP Cases 1463, 1465:66 (4th Cir. 1982).
71 See 30 FEP Cases 1225, 1226 (D. Md. 1981).
" 678 F.2d 1190, 1194, 28 FEP Cases 1463, 1465 - 66 (4th Cir. 1982).
" lei. at 1194-95, 28 FEP Cases at 1466.
74
 446 U.S. 318, 331, 22 FEP Cases 1196, 1201 (1980) (emphasis supplied).
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the progress of negotiations." Indeed, the EEOC does not consider itself under any
obligation and it does not routinely keep all charging parties even generally informed of
the course of its conciliation-settlement negotiations.'" Moreover, there was no evidence
in the Adams case that the charging parties were ever sufficiently advised of the progress
of the proceedings so that they might make an informed decision as to whether to
intervene."
The inadequacies of the statutory scheme arc further highlighted by other appellate
cases arising under section 706(f)(1). In McClain v. Wagner Electric corp., 78 the charging
party claimed he was informed of neither the filing of the EEOC civil action nor the entry
of the consent decree. 79 While holding that a charging party's statutory right of interven-
tion is his sole legal recourse once the EEOC has filed a civil action," the Eighth Circuit
opined that Congress could not have intended "to create a situation in which an individual
employee without fault or lack of diligence on his own part might find himself unable to
file his own suit or to intervene in a suit filed by the Commission."'" In Junes v. Bell
Helicopter Co.," a seven-year delay between the time the charging party filed his claim with
the EEOC and the time the EEOC commenced a civil action against the defendant
resulted in a dismissal of the EEOC's suit on the merits." This dismissal was held to be a
bar to any subsequent suit by the individual charging parties." As in both McClain and
Adams, the record in ./ones did not indicate whether the EEOC had informed Jones of the
progress of his complaint until the suit was filed seven years later." While ruling against
the plaintiff intones, the Fifth Circuit was quick to point out the grave shortcomings of the
syste m . 8 "
Strong equitable considerations, coupled with an alleged ambiguity in the statutory
language of section 706(f)(1), led the dissent in Adams to advance a position which is most
appealing, but is not supported by the weight of legal or policy reasoning. The amend-
ments to section 706(1)(1) have been in operation for just over a decade. Experience,
demonstrated by Adams, McClain and Jones, reveals serious inadequacies in the statute's
operation.
The dissent in Adams advanced a position which may be the most equitable in
grievous cases. It is, however, a task for the legislature, not the judiciary, to respond to the
" 697 1'.2d 582, 585. 30 FEP Cases 1228, 1231 (4th. Cir. 1983) (Phillips, J., dissenting).
76 Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting).
550 F.2d 1115, 14 FEP Cases 817 (8th Cir. 1977).
79 Id. at 1119, 14 FEP Cases at 819.
8° Id.
8 ' Id. at 1121, 14 FEY Cases at 821. Ultimately, the charging patty lost his right to intervene on a
procedural issue. Id.
82 614 F.2d 1389, 22 FEP Cases 773 (5th Cir. 1983).
83 Id. at 1390, 22 FEP Cases at 774.
A9 Id.
"
86 Id.•at 1391, 22 FEY Cases at 774-75. The Fifth Circuit, while ruling against the plaintiff,
stated:
We cannot forebear from pointing out the ineptitude, sloth and indifference with
which the E.E.O.C. processed Jones complaint. The Commission was designed to
protect substantive rights, not shield discrimination in a bureaucratic milieu.... Jones
himself was not without fault, for he showed a singular lack of interest in pressing his
claim, but he did not deserve to be penalized by the F..E.O.C.'s failure to provide decent
governmental process.
Id.
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lessons of the last ten years. Clearly, Congress should establish a statutory framework
through which charging parties arc kept informed of EEOC negotiations and any pend-
ing disposition of the suit. Such a system would ensure a fair process for the charging
parties, while at the same time assuring all parties of the binding nature of a consent
decree entered into by the EFOC. 87
C. *Burden of Proof for Denial of Damages in Title VII Cases: Patterson v. Greenwood
School District 50'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2 prohibits employers from discriminating
against an employee because of the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.' I f a court finds that a person has been intentionally discriminated against., the
court may enjoin the employer front engaging in the unlawful practice and order
appropriate affirmative action.' The affirmative action may include reinstatement or
hiring of the employee with or without back pay'.'' A court cannot order relief if an
individual was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for
any reason other than the prohibited discrimination."
In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green,' and later in Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine , 8
 the Supreme Court set forth the allocation of the burden of proof for
proving discrimination in a Title VII case.' The Court emphasized in Burdine that,
" The alternative to this proposal, although nor advocated herein, is to amend the statute to
provide that the adjudication of an EEOC suit on the merits does not bar a charging party from filing
his own suit on the same claim.
* By Anne Ackenhusen, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
696 F.2d 293, 30 FEP Cas. 825 (4th Cir. 1982).
2
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e -2000e- 17 (1976).
3 Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act or 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
' Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), states in
pertinent part:
If the coon. finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay . . . , or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate....
Id.
ld.
• Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-5(g) (1976), concludes with:
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a
member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an
employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused
admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was
suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this Title.
Id.
411 U.S. 792, 5 FEP Cas. 963 (1973).
8
 450 U.S. 248, 25 FEP Cas. 113 (1981).
• Id. at 252-56, 25 FEP Cas. at 115-16: McDonnell Douglas Corp, v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802-04, 5
FEP Cas. at 969. The plaintiff must first prove by a preponderance of the evidence a prima fade case
of discrimination against the defendant-employer. Id. at 802, 5 FEP Cas. at 969. The burden of
production then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination created by the
plaintiff's prima facie case by producing evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its
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although the burden of production may shift to the defendant during the course of a case
alleging discrimination, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant-employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains with the
plaintiff at all times,"
While distributing the burden of proving discrimination, the Supreme Court has not
specifically addressed the standard and burden of proof required after discrimination has
been shown in order for a Title VII plaintiff to he awarded relief. During the Survey year
in Patterson v. Greenwood School District 50," the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with
the latter issue in the context of a claim for back pay and a promotion under Title VII.' 2
The Fourth Circuit found that once a plaintiff establishes that she has been discriminated
against, the defendant-employer bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the plaintiff would not have been promoted even in the absence of dis-
crimination. 0 If the employer does not meet this burden of proof, the plaintiff will
prevail in obtaining the injunctive relief sought."
In the Patterson case, Mrs. Patterson was one of four persons interviewed for the
position of assistant principal at an intermediate school in Greenwood School District.'
Three of the candidates for the position were female.'" The sole male of the four
interviewees was unanimously recommended for the position by the interviewer, and his
selection was confirmed subsequently by the School District Board of Trustees." Mrs.
Patterson brought a Title VII action against the school, alleging she had been discrimi-
nated against upon the basis of sex." The magistrate who heard the case upheld the
plaintiff's claim." In finding sex discrimination, the magistrate took into consideration
the individual interviewees' education 2° and teaching experience,' as well as the all-male
composition of the selection panel and the fact that the panel was looking for an applicant.
who fit a male stereotype." The magistrate also noted that, although the usual procedure
was to consult an applicant's immediate supervisor regarding the applicant's qualifica-
tions, the person who supervised both the plaintiff and the male candidate was never
consulted." That supervisor who was a principal at the school where both candidates
actions. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 25 FEP Gas. at 115. If the
defendant carries this burden, the plaintiff then has an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were
a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 256, 25 FEP Gas. at 115.
10 450 U.S. at 253, 25 FEY Cas. at 115.
" 696 F.2d 293, 30 FEP Cas. 825 (4th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 295, 30 HP Cas. at 826.
Id. at 295, 30 FEP Gas. at 826.
' 4 Id.





20 Id. The magistrate pointed out that although the job vacancy announcement was limited to
persons with a Masters Degree in Administration and Supervision, the male who was selected for the
job did not have such a degree when he was hired. Id. The other three candidates held the requisite
advanced degree. Id. at 294-95, 30 FEP Gas. at 826.
21 Id. at 294, 30 FEP Gas. at 825. The magistrate relied on the fact that the male applicant
ultimately hired had significantly less teaching experience than the other candidates for the position.
Id.
22 Id. at 294, 30 FEP Cas. at 825-26.
23 Id. at 294, 30 FEP Cas. at 825.
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taught.," later testified that Mrs. Patterson was a more qualified administrator than the
male who was hired."
The district court adopted the magistrate's conclusion that there had been sex
discrimination." The court awarded Mrs. Patterson both back pay and a promotion to the
next available administrative position."
Upon appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the school district argued that the plaintiff was
not entitled to relief because, even absent sex discrimination in selecting the male assistant
prineipa1, 2 " the other two female candidates who were interviewed for the position would
have been appointed before Mrs. Patterson. 25 Three of the interviewers stated that they
had rated the plaintiff the lowest of the three women interviewed for the joh. 3 ° A fourth
interviewer testified that he would have picked another female candidate over Mrs.
Patterson. 3 ' Although the plaintiff apparently had a good record of performing adminis-
trative duties, based on the interviewers' assessment of Mrs. Pattersons answers to
questions and upon the characteristics she exhibited during the interview, they believed
the other women would interact better with parents, teachers and students as an assistant
principal. 32 The court indicated that the record demonstrated that the other two females
interviewed were equally qualified, if not more qualified, for the position than Mrs.
Patterson. 33 Each of the female candidates held a Masters Degree in Education, and had
extensive teaching experience."
The court declared that once the judiciary finds a plaintiff has been discriminated
against in violation of Title VII, it has broad remedial powers to grant injunctive relief
and to order appropriate affirmative action." It noted, however, that a further investiga-
tion must be made if retroactive. promotion and back pay are sought. 3" The court relied
on both the language of Title VII and case law for this proposition," According to the
court, section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act" makes it clear that back pay and promotion
" Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist. 50, No. 78-665-3, Master's Report Findings of Fact No.
12 (D.S.C. Aug. 18, 1981).
22 696 F.2d at 294, 30 FEP Cas. at 825.
2" Id.
27 Id .
28 Id. The school district continued to deny that it was improperly motivated. Id. It did not,
however, appeal the ntling finding it guilty of sex discrimination. Id.
28 Id .
3" Id. at 294, 30 FEP Cas. at 826. Five persons conducted the interviews. Patterson v. Greenwood
School Dist. 50, No. 78-665-3, Master's Report Findings of Fact No. 5 (D.S.C. Aug. 18, 1981).
696 F.2d at 294, 30 FEP Cas. at 826.
32 Id. The negative characteristics cited by the interviewers included "nervousness," '`a high-
pitched," and an "overdomineering personality." Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 294-95, 30 FEP Cas. at 826. Mrs. Patterson had taught for seventeen years, but had no
previous experience as an assistant principal. Id. Another female candidate had nine years of
teaching experience and was appointed to a different administrative position shortly after the
interview. Id. at 295, 30 FEP Cas. at 826. The third female applicant had nine years of experience,
which included serving as a school principal, and was working as a principal for an elementary school
at the time of the appellate court's decision. Id.
" Id. The court cited EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 200, 25 FEP Cas. 774 (4th Cir.
1981) for this proposition. 696 F.2d at 295, 30 FEP Cas. at 826.
" 696 F.2d at 295, 30 FEP Cas. at 826.
37 Id .
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). For the relevant language of this section, see supra note 5.
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are available only where an employee would have received the promotion had she not
been the victim of discrimination. 39 The court stated that other court decisions further
clarify this point, demonstrating that the reason back pay is granted is to put the plaintiff
in the position she would have enjoyed but for the discrimination." The implication is
that if there is no damage resulting from the discrimination, no remedy need be awarded.
According to the court, once a plaintiff has established that she was discriminated
against, the burden of proof which determines whether relief will be granted to the
plaintiff shifts to the defendant." The. court held that the plaintiff must prevail unless the
defendant proves by "clear and convincing evidence" that the plaintiff would not have
been promoted absent discrimination."
Neither the magistrate nor the district court judge had made any findings of fact
regarding whether Mrs. Patterson would have been hired for the position of assistant.
principal if there had been no discrimination.' The court of appeals, however, pro-
ceeded to decide this factual issue. 44 Although the usual rule requires an appellate court
to remand when a factual issue which was unresolved below is material to the outcome of
the case;45
 the court stated that an exception can be made where the record permits only
one resolution of the question." The court found the facts in Patterson fell within this
exception." The appellate court thus held that the evidence contained in the record was
clear and convincing, showing that Mrs. Patterson would not have been selected as the
assistant principal absent discrimination." In the appeals court's opinion, any other
resolution by the district court would be clearly erroneous. 4 ° Consequently, the appellate
court did not remand for further proceedings." The court concluded that Mrs. Patterson
had not suffered any damage as a result of her sex-based discrimination, and hence was
not entitled to a remedy.',' Thus, the court reversed the portion of the district court's
judgment which awarded the plaintiff a promotion and back pay. 32
" 696 F.2d at 295, 30 FEP Cas. at 826.
" Id. The court cited Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-23, 10 FEP Cas. 1181
(1975); Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 104, 14 FEP Gas. 490 (4th Cir. 1979); and, Day v.
Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085, 12 FEP Cas. 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 696 F.2d at 295, 30 FEP Cas. at
826.
" 696 F.2d at 295, 30 FEP Cas. at 826. The court referred to Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083,
1085, 12 FEP Gas. 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 696 F.2d at 295, 30 FEP Cas. at 826.
42 696 F.2d at 295, 30 FEP Gas. at 826. The cases the court cited were Marotta v. Usery, 629 F.2d
615, 618, 24 FEP Cas. 17 (9th Cir. 1980); Davis v. Bd. of School Cornin'rs, 600 F.2d 470, 474, 22 FEP
Cas. 1579 (5th Cir. 1979); Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085, 12 FEP Cas, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
696 F.2d at 295, 30 FEP Cas. at 826.
43 696 F.2d at 295, 30 FEP Cas. at 826.
4" Id. at 295-96, 30 FEP Cas. at 827.
45 Id. at 295, 30 FEP Cas. at 826. The court cited Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 28
FEP Cas. 1073 (1982) for this proposition. 696 F.2d at 295, 30 FEP Cas. at 826.
46 696 F.2d at 295, 30 FEP Cas. at 827. The court referred to Avery v. Homewood City Bd, of
Educ., 674 F.2d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1982). 696 F.2d at 295, 30 PEP Cas. at 827.
47 696 F.2d at 295, 30 FEP Cas. at 827.
48 Id. at 296, 30 FEPCas. at 827. In reaching the conclusion that Mrs. Patterson would not have
been promoted even absent discrimination, the court considered the testimony of the four interview-
ers who said they would have selected another female applicant ahead of the plaintiff, as well as the
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Patterson v. Greenwood School District is noteworthy because it formulates and resolves
two issues which are presented when determining whether to deny a remedy to a Title
VII plaintiff after discrimination has been established. Prior to this decision, the Fourth
Circuit had never addressed these issues. The first issue involves the allocation of the
burden of proving that a remedy should or should not be available and the second
involves the standard of proof. Of relevance to both these issues is the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in favor of an award of back pay once discrimination has been estab:
fished." In Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody" the Court stated that " ... given a finding
of unlawful discrimination, back pay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied
generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination
throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past
discrimination. -55 The dual purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act which are noted
in Albemarle appear to operate in favor of presuming a promotional remedy once dis-
crimination has been established."
Given the presumptions for the award of back pay and promotion, it is not surprising
that all of the courts which have ruled on the issue have held that the burden of proving a
plaintiff would not have been promoted or hired in the absence of discrimination is upon
the defendant-employer, once an individual has demonstrated that there was discrimina-
tion." The courts have reasoned that because the difficulty in determining what would
have happened absent the discrimination is attributable to the employer's unlawful action,
it is only fair that any resulting uncertainty be resolved against the employer." To put the
' 3 See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text,
" 422 U.S. 405, 10 FEP Cas. 1181 (1975).
55 Id. at 421, 10 FE? Cas. at 1189.
55
 The Fifth Circuit has declared that the presumptive entitlement to relief applies to both back
pay and individual injunctive relief. Davis v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 600 F.2d 470, 474, 22 FE? Cas.
1579, 1581 (5th Cir. 1979); McCormick v. Attala County Bd. of Educ., 541 F.2d 1094, 1095, 18 FEP
Cas. 1759, 1759 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085, 12 FEP Cas. 1131,
1133 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
57 See,e.g., Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist. 50, 696 F.2d at 295, 30 FEP Cas. at 826; Marotta
v. Usery, 629 F.2d 615, 618, 24 FEP Cas, 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1980); Davis v. Bd. of School Cornm'rs, 600
F.2d 470, 475, 22 FEP Cas. 1579, 1581 (5th Cir. 1979); Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 924-25, 14
FEP Cas. 1348, 1352 (3d Cir. 1977); Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085, 12 FE? Cas. 1131, 1132
(D,C. Cir. 1976); McCormick v. Attala County Bd. of Educ., 541 F.2d 1094, 1095, 18 FEP Cas. 1759,
1759-60 (5th Cir. 1976); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836, 840, 4 FEP Gas. 1219, 1222 (5th Cir. 1972).
The Fifth Circuit has generally stated that once discrimination has been found against a class of
employees, the class is presumptively entitled to back pay. Mims v. Wilson, 514 F.2d 106, 110, 10 FEP
Cas. 1359, 1362 (5th Cir. 1975); Johnson N'. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Go., 491 F.2d 1364, 1379,7 FEY
Cas. 627, 638 (5th Cir. 1974). This circuit places the initial burden on the individual employee to
bring himself within the class and to demonstrate the harmful effect of the discrimination on him
individually, Mims v. Wilson, 514 F.2d 106, 110, 10 FEP Cas. 1359, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1975); Johnson
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1379-80, 7 FE? Cas. 627, 638 (5th Cir. 1974). These
courts hold the burden of proof then shifts to the employer to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the employee would not have been hired or promoted. Mims v. Wilson, 514 F.2d 106,
110, 10 FEP Cas. 1359, 1363 (5th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d
1364, 1380, 7 FEP Gas. 627, 638 (5th Cir. 1974). ,
" League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Salinas Fire Dep't, 654 F.2d 557, 559, 27
FEY Gas. 408, 410 (11th Cir. 1981); Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1086, 12 FEP Cas. 1131, 1133
(D.C. Cir. 1976). This allocation of the burden of proof also comports with the principle that a party
should have the burden of proving facts particularly within its own knowledge. Id. at 1086 n.5, 12
FEP Cas. at 1133 n.5.
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burden on the plaintiff would ignore the presumption in favor of recovery and require
the plaintiff to relitigate the liability issue."
The imposition of this burden on the defendant by the appellate courts must,
however, be reconciled with the Supreme Court's decision in Texas Department of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine."" In Burdine, the Supreme Court declared that the plaintiff retains
the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against him. 61 Burdine, however, speaks only to the initial establishment of
discrimination.' Once the plaintiff has proved intentional discrimination, Burdine is,
apparently, no longer applicable since it does not address the question of damages which
was at issue in Patterson ."3
Although the appellate courts agree that the defendant has the burden of proving
that a remedy should not lie, they differ with respect to the degree of certainty with which
the defendant must meet his burden of proof." The Fourth Circuit in Patterson, along
with the majority of courts, requires that the defendant employer establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the plaintiff would not have been promoted absent discrimina-
tion." The Third Circuit, however, favors a preponderance of the evidence standard for
denial of a plaintiff's remedy." The difference between these standards is relative: the
"clear and convincing evidence" test places a greater burden upon the defendant than
does the "preponderance of the evidence.' test. 67
The courts using the "clear and convincing evidence" standard for rebutting the
presumption of relief in Title VII cases do not state the justification for the application of
this particular standard." The early precedent relied upon by courts for the "clear and
5" See Kamberow v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 603 F.2d 598, 602, 20 FEP Cas. 602, 605 (7th
Cir. 1979).
6° See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
61 Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 25 FEP Cas. 113.
62 Id. at 252-56, 25 FEP Cas. 115-16,
" 3 See Walker v: Ford Motor Co.. 684 F.2d 1355, 1362-63 n.9, 29 FEP Cas. 1259, 1264 n.9 (11th
Cir. 1982); League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Salinas Fire Dep .t., 654 F.2d 557, 559,
27 FEP Cat. 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1981).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to implicitly hold that the Burdine standard is
inapplicable to the issue of damages, as well, See Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist. 50, 696 F.2d
293, 30 FEP Cas. 825. In Patterson, the circuit court did not refute the district court's holding that the
plaintiff's only burden of proof is that which is spelled out in Burdine. Id. See Patterson v. Greenwood
School Dist. 50, No. 78-665-3, Order (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 1981), The district court stated that, thus, the
plaintiff does not have the burden of establishing she would have been selected for the position if
discrimination had not occurred. Id.
" See infra tunes 64-65 and accompanying text.
65 See, e.g. , Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist., 696 F.2d at 295, 30 FEP Cas. at 826; Marotta v.
Usery, 629 F.2d 615, 618, 24 FEP Cas. 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1980); Davis v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 600
F.2d 470, 474, 22 FEN Cas. 1579, 1581 (5th Cir. 1979); Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085, 12 FEP
Cat, 1131, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
66 See Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 924-25, 14 FEY Cas. 1348, 1352 (3d Cir. 1977).
si McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CAU•. L. Raw. 242, 251 (1944). A showing of a
preponderance of the evidence is generally considered to mean that the evidence presented by the
burdened party in support of its contention is of greater weight than that produced by the opposi-
tion. Id. at 247.
68 See cases cited supra note 64. For instance, in Patterson the Fourth Circuit cited three cases
from three different circuits in support of its holding that the defendant must produce clear and
convincing evidence that the plaintiff would not have been promoted absent discrimination. Patter-
son v. Greenwood School Dist. 50, 696 F.2d at 295, 30 FEP Cas. at 826. In neither the Patterson case
nor the cases cited within Patterson, was the choice of the "clear and convincing evidence" standard
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convincing" language involved the dismissal of black teachers as their forces were reduced
because of the desegregation of the schools." In such cases, courts stated that the school
boards had to justify dismissal of black teachers by "clear and convincing evidence." 70
The courts' rationalization of their selection of the "clear and convincing evidence"
standard as the requisite burden of proof for an employer to avoid a grant of Title VII
relief is questionable, if it is based solely upon the desegregation cases. It is possible that
this standard was imposed in the desegregation decisions merely because the courts of the
1960's were tiring of the school boards' failure to desegregate.
The goals of the Civil Rights Act itself offer more persuasive support fir the use of
the "clear and convincing" standard for burden of proof. Title VII of the Act' was
designed "to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal remedial proce-
dures, discrimination in employment."' Maximum deterrence of employment discrimi-
nation is achieved if an employer is able to avoid an award of back pay and promotion
only upon offering the most persuasive evidence that the employee would not have been
promoted absent discrimination. Otherwise, it is more probable that an employee demon-
strating discrimination will be unable to obtain a meaningful remedy for discrimination,
The more lenient "preponderance of the evidence" standard utilized by the Third
Circuit. is supported by an alternate rationale." Although the selection of this standard of
proof was not explained by the Third Circuit in its Title VII relief case," the "preponder-
ance of the evidence" standard has been used by the Supreme Court in a teacher dismissal
case of constitutional dimensions." In Mount Healthy City School District v. Doyle," the
plaintiff teacher sued for reinstatement with back pay because of an allegedly wrongful
discharge from his employment.'" The teacher had carried his burden of showing that
the exercise of his first amendment rights was a "substantial factor" in his employer's
decision not to rehire him." The Court required that the defendant-employer show by a
discussed. See id.; Marotta v. Usery, 629 F.2(1 615, 618, 24 FEP Cas. 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1980); Davis v.
Bd. of School Comm'rs, 600 F.2d 470, 474, 22 FEP Cas. 1579, 1581 (5th Cir. 1979); Day v. Mathews,
530 F.2d 1083, 1085, 12 FEP Gas. 1131, 1132.33 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
" Hill v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 390 F.2d 583, 584 (6th Cir. 1968); Rolfe v. County Bd.
of Ethic., 391 F.2d 77, 79, 9 FEP Cas. 1111, 1112 (6th Cir. 1968); Wall v. Stanley County Bd. of
Ethic., 378 F.2d 275, 276-77, 9 FEP Cas. 1095, 1095-96 (4th Cir. 1967); Chambers v. Hendersonville
City Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189, 190, 1 FEP Cas. 488, 488-89 (4th Cir. 1966); Smith v. Bd. of Educ.,
365 17.2d 770, 774-75, 9 FEP Gas. 1081, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 1966); Williams v. Kimbrough, 295 F.
Stipp. 578, 585-86 (W.D. La.), aff'd, 415 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1969).
71 Wall v. Stanley County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275, 278, 9 FEP Gas. 1095, 1097 (4t h Cir. 1967);
Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Ethic., 364 F.2d 189, 193, 1 FEY Cas. 488, 490 (4th Cir.
1906); Williams v. Kimbrough, 295 F. Stipp. 578, 585 (W.D. La.), qlf , 415 F.2d 874 (5111 Cir. 1969).
The other cases cited supra note 68 did not use the "dear and convincing evidence" language, despite
the fact that they were used in later cases to support a requirement of this degree of proof. See Hill v.
Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 390 F.2d 583.584 (6th Cir. 1968); Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391
F2d 77, 79, 9 FEP Cas. 111 I, 1112 (6th Cir. 1968); Smith v. Bd, of Educ., 365 F.2d 770, 9 FEP Cas.
1081 (8th Cir. 1966).
7 ' H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. Coot: CONG. & An. NEws 2391,
2401.
" See Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 924-25, 14 FEP Cat. 1348, 1352 (3d Cir. 1977).
73 Id .
" Mount Healthy II City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
" 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
7" Id. at 276.
77 Id . at 287.
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preponderance of the evidence that it would have deckled not to rehire the teacher even
absent the protected conduct."
In Mount Healthy, the Supreme Court used the lower "preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard, 7" rather than the more stringent "clear and convincing evidence" test, If
the Supreme Court is willing to use the more lenient "preponderance of the evidence" test
when awarding damages in an area as protected as are first amendment rights, a similar
standard is arguably appropriate in the Title VII field.
With the Patterson decision, the Fourth Circuit joins the other appellate courts ruling
on the issue of the burden of proof in Title VII damages cases." These courts believe that
once the plaintiff has proved discrimination, the burden of proof is on the defendant-
employer to show that the plaintiff would not have been hired or promoted even absent
discrimination.' The Fourth Circuit agrees with the majority of circuits in holding that
the defendant must prove its case for denying relief by "clear evidence."" The Third
Circuit stands alone in utilizing the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. 83
II. SEX DISCRIMINATION
A. *Employer's Liability for Sexual Harassment: Henson v. City of Dundee'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of sex, race, color, religion, and national origin. The statute seeks to establish the
equality of all employees of an organization with respect to the "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment."3 Title VII claims based upon sexual harassment have been
accorded different treatment in the courts, than have those based upon racial, religious,
or: ethnic harassment.' Although courts have always accepted that a right of action exists
under Title V11 for these latter type claims, the courts initially declined to find a similar
right of action for sexual harassment.' In 1977, however, in Barnes v. Costle," the
7"
79 Id .
80 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
si Id.
" See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
* By Richard M. Graf, Staff Member, BosToN Coi,LEot: law REvww.
1 682 F.2d. 897, 29 FEP Cas. 787 (11th Cir. 1982).
' Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
3 Section 703(a) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Employer practices, It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —
( I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
Id. at § 2000e-2(a).
4 See Significant Development, New EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Employer
Liability for Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 61 B.U.L. REV. 535, 546 & n.54 (198 1 ) .
5 See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568
F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600
F.2d 211 (9th C:ir. 1979); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975),vacated without
reported decision, - 562 F.2(155 (9th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Train, 13 FEP Cas. 123 (D.D.C. 1974),rey'd sub
nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 15 FEY Cas. 345 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
561 F.2c1 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
1 9
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groundbreaking case in this area, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit ruled that sexual harassment by supervisory personnel, when coupled with an
adverse employment consequence,' is actionable under Title V11. 8 The court further held
that employers could be held vicariously liable for the. actions of their supervisory
personnel if' they knew of the harassment and failed to take appropriate action." The
Barnes holding was extended in 1979, in Miller v, Bank of America.'" In Miller, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit became the first court to impose vicarious liability on an
employer for a supervisor's sexual harassment which resulted in a discharge where the
employer had no knowledge of the harassment." The court ruled that the language of
section 701(h) of Title VII, which defines an employer as including any agent of such a
person,"" makes an employer liable as a principal fir any Title VII violation resulting in
a discharge which was committed by a supervisor in the course of his or her employ-
ment."
This line of cases was extended in 1980, in Brown v. City of Guthrie," when an
employer was held liable under Title VII for a supervisor-created discriminatory work
environment which resulted from sexual harassment and that caused a constructive
discharge.' The court, applying the then recent Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) guidelines on sexual harassment which prohibit. the creation "of an
intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment,"" ruled that the harassment had
created an "impermissible condition of employnniiii.'" Though the court noted that the
standard for gauging an employer's liability for sexual harassment by his agents was
unsettled, the court determined that the city was liable "even under the more stringent"
actual knowledge test of employer liability."
This line was further extended by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. in 1981, in Bundy v, Jackson.'`' In Bundy, a female plaintiff had initially filed suit in
federal district court claiming that she had been denied promotions because of her sex
and her refusal to submit to sexual advances,'" Though the district court held that her
allegations regarding the sexual advances were fully proved, it nevertheless failed to find
Plaintiff Barnes had alleged that she was fired lx.eause she refused her superior's sexual
advances. Barnes v. Train, 13 FEP Cas. 123, 124 (D.D.C. 1974).
8
 561 F.2d at 990, 995.
9 Id . Liter the same year, a similar conclusion was reached by the Third Circuit in Tompkins v.
Public Set -v. Eke. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048
-49 (3d Cir. 1977). The Barnes court qualified its
holding somewhat, however, noting in dicta that an employer amid be relieved of liability upon a
showing that the supervisor violated established company policy without the company's knowledge
and that the employer took appropriate action after learning of the harassment. Barnes v. Costle,
561 F.2d at 993.
1 " 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 213.
j2
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
13 600 F.2d at 213.
14
 22 FEP Cas. 1627 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
'' Id . at 1632-33.
" Id. at 1631 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980)).
' 7
 ld. at 1632.
18 Id, at 1633. The court noted that even if actual knowledge were necessary to hold an
employer liable, Brown's employer had actual knowledge of the harassment because Brown had
complained to the highest officer in the defendant-police department and he had disregarded her
complaint. Id.
'" 641 F2d 934, 24 FEP Gas. 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
'" Bundy v. Jackson, l9 FEP Gas. 828, 829 (D.D.C,. 1979).
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any adverse employment consequences. 21 Instead, the court ruled that she had been
denied promotions because of her work performance and not her sex. 22 Accordingly, the
district court entered judgment for the defendant, concluding that sexual harassment.
which does not lead to the denial of tangible job benefits does not constitute a claim under
Title VII." The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, ruling
that an employee need not be fired or forced to resign to be able to obtain the protection
of Title VII in cases of sexual harassment.'" Rather, the court held that sexual harassment
itself constitutes a violation of the statute. 25 Based upon the district court's findings that
the harassment was considered "standard operating procedure .. a normal condition of
employment in the office, -26 and that the department director and other top officials had
notice of' the harassment and took no action to stop it," 7 the circuit court held the
employer liable for the harassment."
This line of cases was consolidated and clarified during the Survey year. in Henson v.
City of Dundee. 2 " In Henson, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
question of what should be the extent of an employer's liability for cases of sexual
harassment and established a two-tier standard. It ruled that an employer is strictly liable
for sexual harassment by supervisors that causes tangible job detriment to the subordinate
employee,'" Where the employee seeks to hold the employer responsible for sexual
harassment that creates an offensive work environment but does not result in tangible job
detriment, however, the court ruled that the employee must show that the employer knew
or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt corrective action. 3 '
In Henson, the plaintiff, Barbara Henson, was a dispatcher in the Dundee police
department. 32 She had been hired by the department, along with one other female and
four males, in January, 1975 under the federal Comprehensive Employment Training
Act (CETA)." She alleged that during the two years she had worked for the department
she and her female co-worker had been subjected to sexual harassment by the chief of the
police department., John Sellgren. 34 According to her complaint, this harassment caused
her to resign under duress in January, 1977. 3 ' In May, 1977, Henson filed a complaint
2 ' Id. at 832 (Conclusion of Law No. 2).
22 Id. (Conclusion of Law No. 3).
23 Id. (Conclusions of Law Nos. 5 & 6).
" 641 F.2d at 943, 24 FEP Cas. at 1160.
" Id.
26 19 FEP Cas. at 931 (Finding of Fact No. 38),
27 A co-worker and several supervisors had subjected plaintiff to a series of sexual advances. 641
F.2d at 939-40, 24 FEP Cas. at 1156-57. When plaintiff complained to her supervisors' superior, he
responded that "any man in his right mind would want to rape you," and invited her to his apartment
for a hasn't. Id. at 940, 24 PEP Cas. at 1157. After subsequently being denied a promotion, she
consulted with her second and third-line supervisors, the department director, and the company's
EEO Officers. Id, at 941, 24 PEP Cas. at 1158. All of these men, however, took no corrective action,
did not investigate her complaint, and frustrated her efforts to complain. Id. On these facts,
employer liability could be to cases where the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment and still took no corrective action. Id.
" Id. at 943, 24 PEP Gas. at 1159.
23 682 F.2d 897, 29 PEP Cas. 787 (11th Cir. 1982).
31' Id. at 910, 29 PEP Cas. at 798.
2 ' Id. at 905, 29 PEP Cas. at 794.
32 Id. at 899, 29 FEP Cas. at 788.
33 Id., 29 FEP Cas, at 788-89.
34
 Id,, 29 HP Las. at 789.
as Id.
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against the city with the EFOC alleging sexual harassment." The EEOC issued her a right
to sue letter on January 31, 1978 and she commenced her suit in the district court in
March, 1978. 37
During trial in the district court, plaintiff alleged she had been subjected to three
types of sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. First, she charged that Sellgren had
created a hostile and offensive working environment for her and other women in the
police station.'" Second, she claimed that her resignation constituted a constructive
discharge based on sex. 39 Finally, she alleged that Sellgren had prevented her from
attending the local police academy because of her refusal to engage in sexual relations
with him.'"
During the opening arguments, the district judge expressed his reservation about the
viability of a Title VII claim based upon the types of sexual harassment alleged by
Henson." Following the close of plaintiff's case, the court granted defendant's motion for
involuntary dismissal of the action, pursuant to rule 41(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." From the judge's bench comments and his memorandum accompanying the
dismissal order, the circuit court. discerned three bases for the dismissa1. 43 First, the
district court determined that Henson's claim that she suffered a hostile and demeaning
working environment did not, standing alone, make out a claim under Title VI1. 44
Second, although the district court agreed that her claim that she had been forced to
resign because of' a sexually demeaning work environment was a cognizable claim for
constructive discharge under Title VII. the court did not accept her testimony that she
had resigned because of the work environment,' Rather, the court found that Henson
as Id.
" Id. Because the city had not contended that the complaint was the subject of an untimely
charge to the F,E0C, any objections to the timeliness of the charge were waived. Id. at n.1, 29 FEE
Cas. at n. I (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132 (1982)).
" Id. at 899, 29 FEP Cas. at 789. Plaintiff and her former female co-worker, Dicks, testified that
Sellgren subjected them to numerous harangues of demeaning sexual inquiries and vulgarities
during plaintiff's term of employment. Id. Additionally, plaintiff testified that Sellgren repeatedly
requested that she have sexual relations with him. Id. The court did not permit plaintiff to introduce
evidence that Sellgren had also made advances to Dicks, Id. Plaintiff further testified that she had
complained of Sellgren's conduct in 1976 to the city manager, but that the manager had taken no
action to restrain Sellgren. Id.
39 Specifically, plaintiff charged that on January 18. 1977, Sellgren suspended her for two days
on the pretext that she had brought food into the dispatch room in violation of department policy. Id.
According to plaintiff, this policy had not been previously enforced. Id. at 899-900. 29 FEP Gas. at
789. Plaintiff testified that she regarded the suspension asa warning that she would be fired if she did
not accede to Sellgren's sexual advances. Id. at 900, 29 FEP Cas. at 789.
4"
 Id. Both Henson and Dicks testified that during the period in question, two of the male
dispatchers were sent to the academy. Id. This testimony was corroborated by other witnesses and the
dispatcher's employment records. Id. Henson testified that Sellgren had made it clear to her that he
would help her gain the approval of the city manager to attend the academy if she would agree to
have a relationship with him. Id. The city manager testified that Henson was qualified to attend the
academy and that she would have permitted Henson to attend if Sellgren had informed her of
Henson's interest. Id.
41 Id. at 900 & n.2, 29 FEP Cas. at 789-90 & n.2.
42 Id. at 900 & n.3, 29 FEN Cas. at 790 & n.3.
43 Id. at 900, 29 FEP Cas. at 790.
44 Id. Although Sellgren subjected the two women to vulgar language and almost daily inquiry
into their sexual habits and proclivities, the district court concluded that there was no Title VII
violation unless the conduct inflicted some tangible job detriment. Id. at 900-01, 29 FEP Cas. at 790.
43 Id. at 901, 29 FEP Cas. at 790.
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had resigned because a Dundee police officer with whom she was having an affair had
been forced to resign in January 1977 and had subsequently moved elsewhere, with
Henson following. 46 Lastly, the district court recognized that Henson's claim that she had
been prevented from attending the police academy because of her refusal to have sexual
relations with Sellgren stated a claim under Title VI1. 47 The judge ruled, however, that
such a claim had not been proven in the case before him. The district judge discounted
her testimony that Sellgren had demanded sex as a precondition for attendance at the
academy, stating that her testimony "was not believed by me, as the Trial Judge."' The
court. also made a specific finding that none of the male CETA dispatchers had been sent
to the police academy.'" Consequently, the court ruled that Henson had not been denied
an available promotion because of her refusal to submit to Sellgren's alleged sexual
advances as she had alleged."
Appealing to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Henson challenged the
district court's determination that her work environment allegations did not state a claim
under Title VII for sexual harassment." She also challenged the district court's holdings
on her constructive discharge and police academy claims. 52 The circuit court reversed in
part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case with instructions to the district court."
On appeal, Henson contended that a plaintiff states a valid Title VII claim by alleging
that sexual harassment perpetrated or permitted by an employer has created a hostile or
oliensive work environment regardless of whether the plaintiff has suffered tangible job
detriment from working in the environment.'" The appellate court agreed with this
contention, reversed the district court's order and remanded hir a new trial on the
claim." Noting that courts have held that an employer violates Title VII by creating or
condoning a working environment that significantly and adversely affects an employee
because of his or her race or ethnicity, - regardless of any other tangible job detriment,"
the court determined that it is similarly a violation of Title VII to create a hostile
environment through sexual harassment even if no further job detriment exists." The
court stated that a "pattern of sexual harassment inflicted upon an employee because of
her sex is a pattern of behavior that inflicts disparate treatment upon a member of one sex
with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. There is no requirement
that an employee . . . prove in addition . . tangible job detriment,'"
46 Id. The city's records indicated that Henson began an affair in 1976 with Robert Owens, a
policeman with the Dundee police department. Id. at 908, 29 FEP Cas. at 796. Owens, who was
married at the time, came under official pressure and was forced to resign on January 12, 1977,
because of the affair with Henson. Id., 29 FE]) Cas. at 796-97. Owens subsequently found employ-
ment with the Davenport police department. On January 28, 1977 Henson tendered a letter of
resignation to the town manager in which she stated that she had "sincerely enjoyed" working on the
Dundee force but that due to "work conditions and . job security," she would seek work elsewhere. Id.,
29 FE? Cas. at 797. Subsequently, Henson was employed by the Davenport police department. Id.
17 M. at 901, 29 FEP Cas. at 790.
45 Id.




53 Id. at 913, 29 FEP Cas. at 801.
54
 Id. at 901, 29 FEP Cas. at 790.
5' Id.
56 Id. at 901	 0.4, 29 FE? Cas. at 791 Re n.4.
57 Id. at 902, 29 PIP Cas. at 791.
58 Id. The court cited to Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-46 (D. C. Cir. 1981) as supporting
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The court noted, however, that not every instance of sexual harassment. gives rise to
an actionable claim under Title Vii for a hostile work environment. 5" Rather, the court
determined that plaintiffs must allege and prove five separate elements in order to
establish such a claim." These elements include: (1) The employee belongs to a protected
group. This is satisfied by a stipulation that the employee is a man or woman." (2) The
employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment. To define sexual harassment, the
court quoted the EEOC regulations which define sexual harassment as including" 'sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature.'""2 In order for the conduct to be unwelcome, according to the court, the
employee must not have solicited or incited it, and the employee must regard the conduct
as undesirable or offensive." (3) The harassment complained of must have been based
upon sex. Because the essence of a disparate treatment claim under Title VII is that an
employee is singled out for adverse treatment on the basis of a prohibited criterion," the
court stated that t he plaintiff must show that but for her sex, she would not have been the
object of harassment." (4) The harassment complained of must have affected a "term,
condition or privilege" of employment. The court. determined that for sexual harassment
to state a claim under Title VII, the harassment must be sufficiently pervasive so as to
alter the conditions of employment and create a hostile work environment." The court
noted, though, that 1 he mere utterance of epithets will not suffice to state a claim."
The fifth element of a sexual harassment claim, according to the court, is respondent
superior. The court held that a plaintiff when seeking to hold her employer liable for the
hostile environment created by a supervisor," or a co-worker, must show that the
employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take corrective
action," The court ruled that an employee can either demonstrate that the employer
knew of the harassment by proving that she complained to higher management., or can
its conclusion. Id. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text. See also 1980-1981 Annual Survey of
Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 82, 279-89 (1982); Significant
Development, supra note 3, at 555-57. The court also cited, with approval, to the recent EEOC
guidelines on sexual harassment, 29 C.F.R. 1604.11 (1982). 682 F.2d at 903 & n.7, 29 FEP Cas. at
792 & n.7.
" 682 F.24 at 903, 29 HP Cas. at 792.
''" Id, at 903-05, 29 FEP Gas. at 792-94.
" /4. at 903, 29 FEP Cas. at 792.
" Id. (quoting 29 G.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1981)),
'a Id., 29 FEP Cas. at 793 (citing Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,577 (1978);
United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 43 I U.S. 324, '335 n.15 (1977); Lee v. Gonecult
County Bd. of Educ., 634 F.2d 959, 961-62 & 11.3 (5th Cir. 1981)).
" 5
 14. at 904, 29 FEP Gas. at 793. The court noted that in the typical case in which a male
supervisor makes overtures to a female subordinate, it will he obvious that male workers were not
treated similarly. Id . The court also rioted, however, that in cases where the overtures were made to
workers of both sexes, or where the conduct complained of was equally offensive to workers of both
sexes, the only remedies available would be slate law remedies. Title VI1 provides no remedy for
such a situation. Id.
"6 Id., 29 FEP Cas. at 793-94.
" Id., 29 FEP Gas. at 794. The court stated that "twThether sexual harassment at the workplace
is sufficiently severe and persistent to affect seriously the psychological well being of employees is a
question to be determined with regard to the totality of the circumstances.
- M.
" The court assumed fin• purposes of the discussion that Sellgrcn was Henson's supervisor and
not her employer. Id. at 905 u.9, 29 FEP Cas. at 794 n.9. 11', on remand, Sellgren was found to be her
employer, then the city Wi Ai Id be liable without the tiperation of respondeat superior. Id.
"" Icl. at 905, 29 FEP Gas. at 794.
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raise an inference of knowledge or constructive knowledge on the part of the employer by
showing that the harassment was pervasive.'"
The court determined that Henson had made a prima facie showing of all the
elements necessary to establish a Title VII violation." Accordingly, the court remanded
to the district court for a new trial to allow Henson to prove her clainns." 2 Because Henson
did not seek reinstatement as a dispatcher, the court. rioted that it was unlikely that she
would be able to obtain an injunction to prevent police department practices which no
longer affect her." She would, however, be entitled to nominal damages if she prevailed
in the new trial, and thereby become eligible for an award of attorney's fees."'
The court turned next to Henson's constructive discharge claim, affirming the
district court's dismissal of the claim. 75 Henson alleged that she had resigned from her job
because of Sellgren's sexual harassment, and charged that her resignation amounted to a
constructive discharge in violation of Title V11. 76 The city, for its part, asserted that she
had resigned because the officer with whom she had been having an affair had been
forced to resign from the police department," The district court found for the city on this
issue.'" The circuit court noted that the evidence before the district. court was such that it
could reasonably support two entirely different versions of the events leading to Henson ' s
resignation.'" Determining, however, that the ruling of the district judge was not clearly
erroneous, the circuit court affirmed his dismissal of the constructive discharge count."
Lastly, the court addressed Henson's claim that Sellgren had prevented her front
attending the police academy because of her refusal to have sexual relations with hint. As
noted previously, the district court had not believed Henson's testimony on this issue."'
Specifically, the trial judge found that Sellgren had never sexually propositioned the
other female dispatcher and that no male dispatcher had ever attended the academy." 2
The judge did not permit. Henson to introduce evidence corroborating her testimony that
Sellgren had made sexual advances to the other female dispatcher, however."' Addition-
70 Id .
" Id. The court noted that an employee, in disparate treatinent cases may generally establish a
prima facie case by means of a lesser evidentiary showing than would be needed to prevail on t he
merits. Id. at IL I I, 29 FEY Gas. at n.11. Establishing a prima facie case in disparate treatment
igm kat shifts the burden of production to the employer. Id. This serves to "'progressively sharpen
the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination' '' in cases where prohibited
criteria and legitimate job-related criteria blend in the employment decision. Id. (quoting Texas Dep't
Of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248. 253-54 n.8 (108 I)).
Cases of sexual harassment, however, do not present elusive questions of intent. Thus, the court
determined that a specific prima facie showing was unnecessary. Id. Rather, the court ruled that
district courts should employ normal principles of pleading and proof allocation while remaining
flexible in light of cases of superior knowledge on the pan of one party or the other. Id.
72 Id. at 905, 29 FEP Cas. at 794.
" Id.
7.1 Id. at 905.06 & 11.12, 29 FEN Gas. at 794-95 & n.12.
7 " Id. at 007-08, 29 FEN Cas. at 796-97.
71 ' id. at 899-900, 29 FEP Cas. at 789.
77 Id. Lt 908, 29 FEN Gas. at 796.
" hi.
7 " Id. at 907-08 & nn.16-17, 29 FEN Gas. at 796-97 & 1111.16-17.
9 " Id. at 907-08, 29 FEN Cas. at 796-97. For a discussion of why the court chose the "clearly
erroneous" standard of review see id. at 906-07, 20 FEN Cas. at 795-96.
"' Id. at 901, 29 FEP Cas. at 790. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
92 Id. at 911, 29 FEP Cas. at 800.
" Id.
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ally, Henson's testimony that male dispatchers had attended the academy was corrobo-
rated by several other witnesses. Moreover, the employment records of two male dis-
patchers clearly indicated that they had been sent. to the police academy during the period
in question." Consequently, the circuit court ruled that both of these factual findings
were clearly erroneous and remanded for a new trial on the claim."'"
The circuit court began its analysis of the count. by stating the general principle that.
"[a]n employer may not require sexual consideration from an employee as a quid pro quo
for job bencfits."" The court set out five elements which an employee must prove in
order to establish a violation of Title VII on grounds of sexual harassment of this kind.
The first three elements of a quid pro quo claim are identical to the first three elements of a
hostile work environment claim: namely, that the employee belongs to a protected group;
that the employee was subject to sexual harassment; and that the harassment was based
upon sex." Although not identical, the fourth element of a quid pro quo claim is similar to
the fourth element of a hostile work environment claim. The one distinction is that in the
latter type of claim, the harassment must affect a "term, condition, or privilege" of
employment," whereas in the former, the court held that the complainant's reaction to
the harassment must have affected tangible aspects of her compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment." According to the court, the acceptance or rejection
of the harassment must have been either an express or implied condition to the receipt of
a tangible job benefit or the cause of a tangible job detriment for the harassment to create
a cause of action under Title VII."'
With respect to the fifth element, however, resporrdeat superior, the court ruled that a
substantially different standard applies to quid pro quo sexual harassment claims than to
claims based on a hostile work environment. In a work environment claim, according to
the court, the employee must prove that the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take prompt corrective action."' In a quid pro quo case, however,
the court ruled that an employer is strictly liable fc.ir sexual discrimination by supervisors
that causes tangible job detriment." 2 The court recognized that it was requiring different
treatment of employers in the two types of harassment cases, but determined that the
differing treatment was justified by differences in the effect of the authority of the
supervisor in the two types of cases." 3
The court noted its assumption that the work environment can be rendered hostile or
offensive in equal degrees through the acts of supervisor's, co-workers, or outsiders,' The
capacity of any person to create a hostile working environment, according to the court, is
" Id. & n.24, 29 FEP Cas. at 800 & n.24.
" 5 Id. at 911-13, 29 FEP Cas. at 800-01.
" 682 F.2d at 908, 29 PEP Gas. at 797. See id. at n.18, 29 PEP Cas. at n.18.
" Id. at 909, 29 PEP Cas. at 797. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
682 F.2d at 904, 29 FEP Cas. at 793-94. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
682 F.2d at 909, 29 FEP Gas. at 797.
"" Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(I) & (2) (1981)).
"' Id. at 905, 29 FEP Gas, at 794. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
" 2 682 F.2d at 910, 29 FEP Cas. at 798. See Bundy v. jackson, 64t P.M 934, 943, 29 FEP Gas.
1155, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979). (I/ 29
C.F.R. 1604.11(c) (1982) (no exception to employer liability for conduct of agent or supervisor). But
see Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1049, 1048 -49 (3d Cir. 1977) (actual or
construciive knowledge and failure to take corrective action required before employer liable under
Title VII for sexual harassment resulting in tangible job detriment).
682 F.2d at 910, 29 FEP Cas. at 799.
" Id.
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not necessarily enhanced by any authority, actual or apparent, which the employer has
conferred upon that person." Rather, the court noted, because a supervisor who insults
-or harasses an employee generally does so for his own reasons and through his own
means, he acts outside of the scope of his authority."" Consequently, the court ruled that
"[h]is conduct cannot automatically be imputed to t he employer any more so than can the
conduct of an ordinary employee." 57 In a quid pro quo case, however, the court. stated that a
supervisor relies upon his apparent or actual authority to extort sexual favors from an
underling. According to the court, this extortion is t he essence of the quid pro quo claim."
Consequently, because the supervisor in that case is using his "actual or apparent author-
ity to 'hire, fire, discipline or promote' for a prohibited purpose, the court held that his
conduct can fairly be imputed to the source of the authority."
In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, )edge Clark took exception
to the court's establishment of the two-tier standard.'" The judge noted that. the majority
had placed a "knew or should have known" restriction on an employer's liability for a
hostile environment created by a supervisor or co-worker.' °I The judge agreed with the
majority's restriction so far as it applied to actions of co-workers, but dissented to the
extent. that the majority applied the restriction to the actions of supervisors.'" Citing to
the EEOC sexual harassment regulations, the judge noted that these regulations make a
clear distinction between a hostile environment created by a supervisor and one created
by a co-worker and provide for strict. liability in the former situation.'" The judge stated
that he would hold "that a woman in the workplace should he able to obtain relief against
an employer when her supervisor creates a hostile working environment without having
to prove that the employer knew about it." 104 Among the responsibilities which an
employer delegates to its supervisors, the judge noted, is the duty to create a pleasant
working environment,'" According to the judge, if the supervisor uses his position to
create a hostile and offensive work environment through sexual harassment., the em-
ployer should he liable.LO" The judge based his conclusion on his belief that a supervisor,
by virtue of his position, is in a better position to create an offensive environment than are
other employees, because women employees are not likely to complain about a supervisor
for fear of retribution.' 07 judge Clark disagreed with the majority's belief' that the ability
of any person "to create a hostile or offensive environment is not necessarily enhanced or
diminished by the degree of authority which the employer confers upon that individual,"
and he dissented on that ground.'"
95 Id .
9t;
" Id .Bui see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1982) (employer strictly liable for harassment by supervisor
or agent).
98 682 F.2d at 910, 29 FEP Cas. at 799.
Id. (quoting Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (91:11 Cir. 1979)). The court set out
in a footnote the elements of a prima facie case in the quid pro quo situation for the benefit of the
district court on remand. See id. at 911 n.22.
'"" Id, at 913-14, 29 FEP Cas. at 801-02 (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1 ' Id. at 913, 29 FEP Cas, at 801 (citing Majority Opinion at 905).
'"' Id. at 913-14, 29 FEP Cas. at 801-02.
113




' 07 Id. at 913-14, 29 FEP Cas. at 802.
" Id. (quoting Majority Opinion at 910).
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The majority m Henson was generally correct. in its disposition of the case. It correctly
determined that claims based upon sexual harassment that creates a hostile working
environment are actionable under Title VII without further job detriment, as is the case
for claims based upon racial or ethnic harassment. It correctly overturned the district
court's ruling on Henson's police academy claim, as t he lower court's ruling was clearly in
error on the issue. And, though the appellate ciittrt might. have been a little more
circumspect in its affirmance of the trial judge's ruling on 1-lenson's constructive dis-
charge claim, in light of his apparent bias to her claims, the affirmance was not incorrect,
because the evidence was such that it could support Iwo differing conclusions, and the
district court's ruling was not clearly in error.
On the issue of an employer's liability for sexual harassment, however, Judge Clark's
position appears to be the better one. The reasons given by the majority do not seem to
justify the different treatment accorded employer's liability in the work environment and
the quid pro quo cases. The majority's suggestion that a person's capacity to create an
offensive working environment. is not enhanced by the actual or apparent authority given
him by the employer is unpersuasive. Logically, it would seem that a supervisor is in a
better position than a co-worker to retaliate against the harassed employee if that em-
ployee complains of the harassment. It is this potential retaliation which seems to cause
most harassed persons to refrain from complaint. Assuming, then, that the employer
would take corrective action if t he harassed employee were to complain, it would seem to
be fair to hold the employer liable in situations where the employee is hesitant to complain
because of the potential retaliatory power given a supervisor by the employer. This is
essentially the argument advanced by Judge Clark in his dissenting opinion. In this
regard, judge Clark's opinion offers a better conclusion than that of the majority.
In summary, the decision in Henson is a logical continuation on the path of Title VII
sex discrimination litigation. As in Miller, the court imposed vicarious liability for sexual
harassment. by a supervisor that resulted in tangible job detriment regardless of whether
the employer knew of the harassment.'" As in Bundy, the court recognized that. Title VI I
is violated when a supervisor creates a discriminatory work environment regardless of
whether the harassed employee resigned or suffered tangible job detriment."" All that is
needed now is the combination that judge Clark would have made: namely, holding an
employer vicariously liable when a supervisor creates a d iscriminatory  work environment.
regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of t he harassment. If this
standard is adopted in the future, the judiciary will finally signal that it is ready to treat
sexual harassment as no less serious an offense than other forms of harassment. This
recognition of the seriousness of sexual harassment would affirm one of the goals put.
forth by Congress when it et meted Title VII: the establishment of the sexual equality of all
employees wit h respect. to the "terms, conditions or privileges of employment."
B. *Tide IX's Coverage Extends to Employment: North Haven Board of Education v. Bell'
Title 1X of the Education Amendments of 972' prohibit, with a few limited excep-
tions, sex discrimination in arty education program or activity receiving federal financial
1 " Id. at 910, 29 FEP Cas. at 798. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
"° 682 F.2d at 901, 29 Hi' Cas. at 790. See supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
* By Richard NI. Graf, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE: LAw
' 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
2
 Education Amendments of 1972 §§ 901-07, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1976),
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assistance. Section 901(a), the substantive section of the sun me, provides, in relevant part,
that "no persOn" shall, on the basis of sex, "be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."' In 1975,
  the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare, pursuant to its statutory authority,' issued
regulations to enforce the Title's proscriptions.' The Department, interpreting "person"
as contained in section 901(a) to include employees as well as students, included in these
regulations a series entitled "Subpart E," which prohibit sex discrimination in the em-
ployment practices of covered education programs."
The validity of these employment regulations has been challenged in several courts,
by a number of schools and universities, as exceeding the authority granted to the
Department by Title IX.T As a rule, the schools have alleged that Title IX was not meant
3 Education Amendments of 1972 § 901(a) 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976). Nine statutory exemp-
tions to § 901(a) coverage follow. Among the specific exemptions included are ones for religious
schools, military schools, social fraternities, father-son and mother-daughter activities, and beauty
pageant scholarships. See §§ 901(a)(1)-(9).
4 Education Amendments of 1972 § 902, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976), which provides in relevant
part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or
contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to
effectuate the provisions of section 1681 with respect to such program or activity by
issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent
with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in
connection with which the action is taken. No such rule, regulation or order shall
become effective unless and until approved by the President. Compliance with any
requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be affected (1) by the termination of
or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any
recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity
for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination or
refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other
recipient as to whom such a finding has been made, and shall he limited in its effect to
the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so
found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided, however, that no such
action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the appro-
priate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has
determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. . . .
Id. (emphasis in the original).
5 34 C.F.R. § 106 (1982). The regulations initially appeared at 34 C.F.R. § 86 (1975), but were
recodified in connection with the establishment of the Department of Education. HEW's functions
under Title IX were transferred in 1979 to the newly created Department of Education by § 301
(a)(3) of the Department of Education Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3441(a)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
Because the majority of the regulations were originally issued by HEW, but were enforced in most of
the cases considered by both HEW and the Department of Education, hereinafter the generic term
"Department" will be used to refer to both agencies unless greater specificity is warranted.
6 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.51-.61 (1982). The general introductory section provides:
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of', or be subjected to discrimination in employment, or recruitment, consider-
ation, or selection therefor, whether full-time or part-time, under any education pro-
gram or activity operated by a recipient which receives or benefits from Federal
financial assistance.
Id. § 106.51(a)(1).
See Dougherty Cty. School System v. Harris, 622 F2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated sub Horn. Bell
v. Dougherty Cty. School System, 102 S. Ct. 2264 (1982); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler,
621 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), riff 'd and remanded sub nom, North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S.
512 (1982); Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980), vacated sub Horn. United States Dept.
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to reach the employment practices of educational institutions. Four courts of appeals and
several district courts have agreed with this assertion, holding that Tide IX's protection
does not extend to the employees of covered institutions, and that the Depart ment
exceeded its statutory grant of authority in promulgating the Subpart E regulations." Two
courts of appeals, however, upheld the Department's position, determining that Congress
did intend that Title IX cover the employment activities of regulated educational pro-
grams. 9 On February 23, 1981, in order to resolve the conflict among the circuits, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari" to review the decision of the Second Circuit in one of
these latter cases, North Haven Board of Education v. Hufstedler," in which the circuit court
held that Title IX authorized the Department to promulgate the Subpart F regulations. 12
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court, in North Haven Board of Education v.
Bell,' 3 affirmed the Second Circuit's decision, concluding that employment discrimination
does come within the ambit of Title IX. Following a review of the statutory language, the
legislative history, and t he relevant post-enactment history, the Supreme Court concluded
that Congress did intend that Title IX reach the employment practices of covered
programs.' 4
 The Court, however, remanded the case to the district court for a determina-
tion of whether the programs in question were receiving "federal financial assistance" for
purposes of the Slat LII e.' 5
The petitioners in North Haven were two Connecticut public school boards, the North
Haven Board of Education and the Trumbull Board of Education. Each school board had
brought suit in federal district court challenging the Department's authority to issue the
Subpart E regulation.'" In their suits, which were joined on appeal, both petitioners
asserted that Congress did not intend Title IX to reach employment practices."
The litigation in the North Haven case arose in January 1978 when Elaine Dove, a
tenured teacher its the North Haven school system, filed a complaint with the Depart meet
alleging that the school board had violated Title 1X by refusing to rehire her after a one
year maternity leave," The Department processed the complaint, claiming authority by
virtue of its Subpart E regulations, and initiated an investigation into the school hoard's
of Educ. v. Seattle Univ., 102 S. 0. 2264 (1982); Romeo County Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Isleboro School Comm, v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cell
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
Four courts of appeals had so held. See Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980),
vacated sub nom. United States Dept. of Educ. v. Seattle Univ., 102 S. Ct. 2264 (1982); Romeo County
Schools v. HEW, (i00 F.2c1 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. of Si.
Louis v. Califano, 497 F.2c1 119 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islehoro School Comm. v.
Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
See Dougherty Cty. School System v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated sub MM. Bell
v. Dougherty Cty. School System, 102 S. Ct. 2269 (1982); North Haven Rd. of Educ. v. Hufstecller,
621 F.2d 773 (2c1 Cir. 1980), all 'd and remanded sub nom. Ntmli Haven Rd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S.
512 (1982).
l° 450 U.S. 909 (1981).
" 629 F.24 773 (2d Cir. 1980).
12 Id. at 786.
' 3 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
14
 Id. at 520-35.
Id. at 539-40.
16
 Id. at 517.
'T Id. at 517-19.
' 8
 Id. at 517.
December 1983]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 223
employment practices.' " As part of its investigation, the Department requested from the
school board certain information concerning its policies on hiring, seniority, leaves of
absence, and tenure.'" The school hoard refused to comply with the information request,
arguing that the Department. lacked authority under Title IX to regulate employment:2 '
After the Department notified the board that it was considering administrative
enforcement proceedings because of the board's refusal to cooperate, the school hoard
filed suit in federal district court pursuant to section 903 of Title IX22 seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the Subpart E regulations were beyond the scope of the Department's
statutory authority, and an injunction forbidding the Department. from initiating funding
termination proceedings." The district court, agreeing with the school board that Title
IX was not intended to reach employment practices, ruled that the regulations were
invalid and enjoined the Department from initiating termination proceedings,"
The litigation in the Trumbull case arose in ()ember 1977, when Linda Potz., a former
guidance counselor in the Trumbull school system, filed a complaint with the Department
against the Trumbull Board of Education, 25 alleging that the school board had discrimi-
nated against her with respect. to job assignments, working conditions, and contract
renewal.'" After all in vestigation, with which the school board cooperated, the Depart-
ment determined that the board had violated Title I X, 27 and directed the board to take
corrective action, including the reinstatement of Pori, with hack pay." The school board
then filed suit in district court, contending that the regulations were invalid and seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief identical to that granted in the North Haven case." Once
again the district court agreed that the Department had exceeded its statutory grant of
authority, and granted the relief sought by the board. 3 "




22 Education Amendments of 1972 § 903, 20 U.S.C. 4 1683 (1976) provides:
Any department or agency action taken pursuant to section 1682 of this title shall
be subject to such judicial review as may otherwise be provided by law for similar action
taken by such department or agency on other grounds. In the case of action, not
otherwise subject to judicial review, terminating or refusing to grant or to continue
financial assistance upon a finding of failure to comply with any requirement imposed
pursuant to section 1682 of this title, any person aggrieved (including any State or
political subdivision thereof and any agency of either) may obtain judicial review of
such action in accordance with chapter 7 of title 5, and such action shall not be deemed
committed to unreviewable agency discretion within the meaning of section 701 of that
t itle.
Id.
23 455 U.S. at 518,
2-1
	The decision of the district court is unoHicially reported at 19 FEI' Gas. 1505 (I). Conn.
1979).
23 North Haven, 456 U.S. at 518.
2 6 ,rd .
21 Id. The investigation revealed that the school board had required Potz to perform secretarial
tasks not required of her male counterparts; had demeaned her in the eyes of her co-workers and
counsellees; had required her to falsify a Title IX compliance report concerning her job duties and
work load; and had fired her solely because of her sex. Brief for Respondent Linda Potz at 2, North
Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
" North Haven. 456 U.S. at 518.
" Id.
" Id. at 518-19,
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for the Second Circuit reversed.' Finding the language of section 901 unclear and
inconclusive, the appellate court examined the available legislative history, and concluded
that Title IX was indeed intended to prohibit employment discrimination." The court
also determined that the Subpart E regulations were consistent with section 902, the
enforcement section of Tide IX. 33
 That section provides that compliance with the statute's
proscriptions may be enforced by the termination of "federal financial assistance"" to any
"recipient'°
 found in violation of the statute, but limits the effect of the termination to
"the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so
found." 3" Ruling that the "pinpoint termination provision -
 of section 902 applied only to
fund terminations per se, the court determined that the provision did not limit the
Department's authority to issue regulations prohibiting sex discrimination in educational
employment."
Thus, the Department could issue the regulations which private plaintiffs would be
able to use as a basis for private enforcement action,'" even if the Depart mem would be
unable to terminate the funding to the institution because the program in question did
not receive federal funding. Furthermore, the court ruled that if on investigation the
Department determined that there were funds which would be subject to termination
going to a school, the Depart mem would not be required, prior to the termination, to
specify which specific programs receiving financial assistance were covered by the regula-
tions." Because the Department had not exercised its termination authority with respect
to the two school boards. however, the court declined to decide whether or not the
North Haven Bd. of Ethic. v. hfufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1980).
32 Id. at 785.
See .sun/»'a note 4.
3 ' 34 C.F.R. § 06.2(g)(1982) defines federal financial assistance, in pertinent part, as:
(1) A grant or loan of Federal financial assistance, including funds made available
for:
(i) The acquisition, construction, renovation, restoration, or repair of a build-
ing or facility or any portion thereof; and
(ii) Scholarships, loans, grants, wages or other funds extended to any entity for
payment to 10' on behalf of students admitted to that emity, or extended directly to
such students for payment to that entity.
(3) Provision of the services of Federal personnel.
(5) Any other contract, agreement, or arrangement which has as one of its pur-
poses the provision of assistance to any education program or activity, except a contract
of insurance ∎ Ir guaranty.
Id.
35
 34 C.F.R. 106.2(h) (1982) defines a recipient
[A]ny State or political subdivision thereof', or ally instrumentality of a State or
political subdivision thereof, any public or private agency, institution, or organization,
or 1./I her entity, 14 any person, to whom Federal financial assistance is extended directly
or through another recipient and which operates an education program or activity
which receives or benefits from such assistance, including any subunit, successor,
assignee, or transferee thereof.
Id.
36 § 902. See supra note 4.
37 629 F.2d at 785.
" The Supreme Court has previously ruled that there is all implied private right of action
under Title IX. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
39
 629 F.2d. at 785.
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Department could do so in these cases." Rather, it remanded the cases to the district
court for determination of whether the school boards had violated the regulations, and, if
so, what remedies were appropriate.'" After their petition for a rehearing en bane was
denied," the school boards petitioned the Sup-erne Court for certiorari, which the Court
granted.'"
In its opinion, the Supreme Court. upheld the validity of the regulations with respect
to employment. The Court agreed with the Second Circuit and the Department that Title
IX prohibits sex discrimination against both students and employees." The Court
reached this conclusion after an examination 4 if the relevent statutory language, legisla-
tive history, and post-enactment history.'" The Court disagreed. however, with the
appellate court's interpretation of the program-specific limitation of Title IX. Whereas
the lower court had ruled that the program-specific limitation affected only the termina-
tion provisions of section 902 and did not affect the authority of the Department to
promulgate regulations," the Supreme Court ruled that the authority of the Department
to both issue and enforce Title IX regulations was limited by the program-specific
language." "Certainly it makes little sense to interpret the statute . . . to authorize an
agency to promulgate rules that it cannot enforce."" Though the regulations may be
worded broadly and need not he directed at specific programs, the Court ruled, they can
be applied validly only to programs that receive federal financial itssistance. 4 "
The Supreme Court began its analysis with an examination of the statutory language.
The Court noted that section 90 I (a)'s broad directive that "no person" may be discrimi-
nated against on the basis of sex appears, on its face, to include employees as well as
students." The Court stated: "There is no doubt that 'if we are to give [Title lx] the
scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language.' ..51
Because the statute neither expressly nor impliedly excludes employees from its reach,
the Court reasoned, it should he interpreted as covering these "persons" absent consid-
erations to the contrary." The Court noted that Congress could have restricted the scope
of the statute, if it had so desired, by substituting "student" or "beneficiary" for "person"
in section 90 I (a).' The Court noted that the petitioners had argued that because the nine
statutory exemptions" were directed only at students they indicated that section 901(a)
similarly applies only to students," The Court dismissed this argument, however, noting
that not all of the exemptions concern students: two of them exempt an entire class of
45 Id.
in Id.
42 Brief for Petitioners North Haven Board of Education and Trumbull Board of Education at
10, North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
43 450 U.S. 909 (1981).
44 456 U.S. at 530.
45 Id. at 520-35.
4" 629 F.2d at 785-86.
47 456 U.S. at 538. "We conclude, then, that att agency's authority under Tide IX to both
promulgate regulations and to terminate funds is subject to the program -specific !imitation of §§ 901
and 902." Id.
48 Id. at 537.
-19 Id. at n.27.
" Id. at 520.
5 ' Id. at 521 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 ( 1 960)).
52 Id .
53 Id.
54 See supra note 3.
" 456 U.S. at 521.
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instil utions." Moreover, the Court stated that the absence of an exemption for employ-
ment among the specific statutory exemptions lent support to the conclusion that Con-
gress intended employees to fall within the ambit of the statute."
As the statute does not expressly include or exclude employment practices from its
scope, however, the Court next sought evidence of Congress's intent in the Act's legisla-
tive history. The Court quoted from the introductory remarks of Senator Bayh to his
Amendment No. 874 of the Education Amendments of 1972, sections of which became
Title 1X." Senator Bayh stated: "Amendment No. 874 is broad, but basically it closes
loopholes in existing legislation relating to general education programs and employment
resulting from these programs. . .. The amendment would cover such crucial aspects as
„faculty employment, with limited exceptions.' Because the amendment also contained
provisions extending Title VII and the Equal Pay Act," however, the petitioners pointed
to differences in the heading of the amendment, and noted that only the heading relating
to these extensions contained a reference to employment, and suggested that the differ-
ence was significant as an indication of intent." The Court dismissed this argument,
however, stating that the choice of wording in the headings was insufficient to negate the
general intent of the amendment, as related by Senator Bayh. 1 i 2
The Court then turned to the legislative history in the House, but declared that it was
even more sparse than that of the Senate." The Court explained that H.R. 7248," the
House version of Tide IX, contained a general prohibition against sex discrimination
similar to that found in section 901 as enacted.'''' But, as the Court noted, one section of
the House bill, section 1004, provided that nothing in the hill authorized action by any
department against any employment practice, unless the primary purpose of the federal
funding involved was to provide employment." The debate in the House did not address
this limitation." When the House and Senate versions of the statute were submitted to the
Conference Committee, the Court noted, the limitation was deleted." The Conference
reports contained no detailed explanation of the deletion, but merely noted that: "The
House Recedes,"" The Court stated that the deletion, as an express and conscious choice,
" Id. (citing H 901(a)(3) & (4)).
37 Id. at 521-22.
Ser supra note 2.
5" 456 U.S. at 524 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972)) (emphasis added by Court).
"" Id. at 525.
" Id.
" 2 Id. at 525-26 & nn.15-16. The Court noted that while the remarks of one legislator normally
are not controlling, Senator Bayh's remarks, as those of the sponsor of the legislation, are the only
authoritative guide to the statute's construction. Id. at 526-27. This is because the statute was
introduced as floor amendment during discussion on the Education Amendments of 1972 and was
passed by voice vote almost immediately thereafter. 118 CoNc. REC. 5803-15 (1972). As a result of
this method of introduction and passage, there were no bill or committee reports which discussed the
statute's provisions, nor was there any significant discussion among the members of Congress about
the statute prior to its enactment. 456 U.S. at 527. Consequently, according to the Court, Senator
Bayh's statements provide the only authoritative indications of Congress' intent in enacting Title IX.
Id.
"3 456 U.S. at 527.
" H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CoNo. REC. 39,248 (1971),
" 5 456 U.S. at 527.
" Id.
"' Id. (citing 117 CONG. REe. 39,248-63 (1971)).
"" Id. at 527-28.
" Id. at 528 (quoting S. Coxi. REP. No. 92-798. p. 221 (1972); H.R. CA)NF. REF'. No. 92-1085, p.
221 (1972)). The Senate report is reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. News 2608, 2671-72.
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indicated that "Congress intended that 901 prohibit gender discrimination in employ-
ment."'"
In so concluding, the Court rejected the petitioner's contention that section 1004 had
been deleted to avoid an inconsistency. According to the Court, because the bill which
became Title IX included provisions relating to the Equal Pay Act, 71 which did cover
employment, petitioners had argued that section 1004 had to be deleted in order to avoid
conflict with that portion of the bill. 72 This conflict would have arisen because the
limitation contained in section 1004, limiting enforcement action to programs whose
primary purpose was to create jobs, would have precluded full enforcement of the
amendments to the Equal Pay Act which were contained in the same bill as Title IX. The
Court noted, however, that the Conference Committee could easily have avoided the
inconsistency by altering the wording of section 1004 to make it clear that the section's
limitation only applied to section 901 or could have stated in the Report that the deletion
was necessitated to avoid the apparent inconsistency, if such had been their intention in
making the deletion.'" Rather, the statement that "Whe House recedes" according to the
Court, suggests that the Senate version, which was intended to encompass employment,
prevailed for substantive reasons. 74
The Court also rejected the petitioners argument that a specific exclusion for em-
ployment, such as was contained in section 1004, was unnecessary to limit the scope of
Title IX. 75 Noting that Title IX was consciously patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 76 which prohibits discrimination based on race or national origin in any
program receiving federal financial assistance, the petitioners asserted that the addition
of a similar limitation in Title VI was not viewed by Congress as altering the scope of that
statute." Rather, the petitioners asserted, Congress had agreed before the limitation was
added that Title VI did not cover employment and merely added the specific limitation
section to make explicit that intent.'" Consequently, a similar intent should be ascribed to
Title 1X: it was, they asserted, not intended to reach employment.'" The Court, however,
dismissed this argument stating: "This focus on the history of Title VI . is misplaced. It
is Congress' intention in 1972, not in 1964, that is of significance in interpreting Title
IX." 5 " If Congress had intended, in 1972, to enact a statute that duplicated Title VI's
scope, the Court reasoned, they would have enacted an identical statute." Because they
did not do so, however, and, according to the Court, because differences between the two
7" 456 U.S. at 528.
71 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
72 456 U.S. at 528 & n.18.
73 Id. at 528-29.
74 Id. at 529 (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1974); Schweg-
mann Bros. v. Calvert Drillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 391-92 (1952)).
73 Id.
7' Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601,42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Stipp. 1V 1980). Sri' Cannon v. Univ. of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979).
77 456 U.S. at 529.
73
 Id. See Brief, S1410(2 note 42, at 36-7.
7" Id.
8" 456 U.S. at 529. -The meaning and applicability of Title VI are useful guides in construing
Title 1X, therefore, only to the extent that the language and history of Title IX do not suggest a
contrary interpretation." Id,
8 ' Id. at 530.
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statutes must be given their due, the Court concluded that Title IX had been intended to
reach employment . 82
Concluding, then, that the legislative history of the statute supported its reading of
the statutory language, the Court turned to an examination of the postenact mem history
of the statute," The Court first took notice of Senator Bavh's summary of the statute
which he had had inserted into the Congressional Record following passage of Title IX."
The Court quoted a portion of that description which stated, in part: "Title VI . . .
specifically excludes employment from coverage . . . There is 7iO similar exemption for employ-
ment in [Tide IX].""'
Next, the Court noted that Congress had been given an opportunity to examine the
Department's proposed regulations and to disapprove them if they found them inconsis-
tent with its intent." Although a number of resolutions of disapproval were introduced,
none were passed," Moreover, during hearing on the resolutions, the Conn noted, a
majority id the witnesses testified that employees were intended to he protected by the
statute." Although the Court noted that Congress' failure to disapprove the regulations
clues not necessarily demonstrate that. Congress considered the regulation with its intent,
the Court -
 reasoned that die fact that Congress was aware of the dispute and took no
action lent weight to the argument that coverage of employment was intended . 8" Fur-
thermore, according to the Court, because Congress has amended Title IN when it has
disagreed with  the Depart merit's interpretation of the statute" but took no action regard-
ing the employment regulations, Congress's inaction in this instance was a particularly
significant guide to its intent." Where an agency's construction of a statute has been fully
brought to the attention of Congress and Congress has not sought to alter that construc-
tion, though it has altered the statute in other respects, then presumably, the Court
reasoned, the agency has correctly discerned the legislative intent." 2
 The Court con-
cluded, then, that these postenactment developments lent further credence to its earlier
statutory interpretation."'
Finally, the Court addressed the "program-specific - limitation of section 902." The
Supreme Court disagreed with the circuit court's determination that the limitation of
section 902 only limited the Department's authority to terminate hincling and not to
promulgate regulations. " '' The Court stated that it made little sense to allow an agency to
H2 Id .
" Id, at 530-31.
""11 at 531.
" 5 hi. (quoting 118 Cosa:. Rm. 24,684 n.1 (1972)) (first emphasis in original; second emphasis
added by Court.).
8"
	This review period was mandated by § 431 (d)(1) of the General Education Provisions Act,
20 U.S.C. § 1231(d)(1) (1976), See 456 U.S. at 531.
" 456 U.S. at 532-33 & nn, 22-24.
"8 id.
""	 at 533-34.
"" hi. at 534 & n.25.
"' Id. at 534.
" 2 Id . at 535 (quoting United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (1979), quoting Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940)).
93 hi .
" See supra notes 4, 45-49 and accompanying text.
"" 456 U.S. at 535-36. But see Id. at n.27 (agreeing with possible narrow interpretation of the
Scrotal Circuit's ruling).
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issue regulations which it could not enforce."" The Court ruled that the Subpart
regulations were consistent with the program-specific limitation because they contained a
provision limiting their application only to programs or activities receiving federal finan-
cial assistance.' The Court declined, however, to undertake to define "program" for
purposes of the statute, because the record did not indicate whether the petitioners
actually engaged in discrimination nor had either school protested the Department's
action on grounds that the alleged discrimination did not affect a federally funded
program."' Rather, the Court left the definition to the district court on remand."
Justice Powell, joined by Chief, justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, dissented. In his
dissent, Justice Powell asserted his belief that the majority's interpretation was neither
consistent with the statutory' language nor supported by the legislative history. 11 " Ile
argued that the majority had undertaken a tortured reading of the statutory language. 11"
A natural reading, he stated, would limit the statute's scope to students and to teachers
who directly participate in federally funded programs."' justice Powell also stated that
legislative history should only he consulted when the statutory language itself is ambigu-
ous, and then only if the history is clear and unambiguous.'" Because he found the
statute's language clear when given a "natural reading," and because he found the
legislative history "neither clear nor unequivocal," justice Powell concluded that the
majority had incorrectly' interpreted Congress' intent regarding the coverage of em ploy-
ment." 4
The North Haven Court's decision that Congress intended Title I X's protection to
reach employees was a correct one. The majority recognized that Congress intended that
the statute have a broad reach. The statute was enacted to prevent federal funds from
being used to support any form of discrimination in education. When Congress used the
word "person" it was attempting 10 effectuate that goal. If Congress had desired to limit
the statute's scope to only students and employees receiving federal grants it could
have used language to that end. But, far from limiting the scope of the statute, Congress
specifically deleted language that would have precluded the statute's coverage of employ-
ees.'" Consequently, the Court was correct in inferring that Congress did intend that
Title IX reach the employment practices of covered programs. This interpretation is
further supported by a reading of the relevant postenaciment history of the statute.
Though Congress was given several opportunities either to amend the statute to prevent
the coverage of employment, or to enact resolutions disapproving of the Department's
interpretation of the statute, it declined to do so. Congress bad, however, amended the
statute several other times when the Department's interpretation had conflicted with its
own. Consequently, the conclusion is inescapable that Congress did intend Title 1X to
reach employment and that the Department correctly interpreted the intent of Congress
when it promulgated the regulations.
Thus, as a result of North Haven, employees of educational institutions are n ow
"' Id. at 537.
" 7 Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (1980)).
"" Id. at 530-40.
110
100 Id. at 541 (Powell, J., dissenting).
101 Id, at 541-42.
1 02 Id. at 11.3.
103 Id. at 544.
104
 Id. at 550.
1 '' See supra note 3, 66-82 and accompanying text.
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protected by Title IX. This protection apparently extends tint only to teachers and
counselors, but to all other employees as well, including secretaries, janitors, and other
support personnel. 11 °'
A question which remains unanswered, however, is exactly what constitutes an
"education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" for purposes of
Title IX, and, consequently, to what extent are employees protected. This question is
most important in the university and college context, for the Department has taken die
position that the entire university or college is the Title IX program funded for purposes
of general student. aid such as National Direct. Student. Loans and Guaranteed Student.
Loans which are granted to students but ultimately are received by the school."' This
question presumably will be decided this term, because the Court has recently granted
certiorari to hear another Title IX case which addresses this issue, albeit in a non-
employment sit nal ion.'"
III. HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION
A. *Discrimination Against the Handicapped — Reevaluating the. Scope of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Le Strange v. Consolidated Rail Corp.' and Jones v.
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority'
An express purpose of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was to "promote and expand
employment opportunities in the public and private sectors for handicapped individ-
uals."' In furtherance of this goal, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits dis-
crimination against the handicapped in "any program or activity receiving Federal finan-
cial assistance. " 5
 This broad mandate of equal treatment for the handicapped by recip-
ients of federal funds has been construed to encompass discrimination in access to and
provision of services by educational," health,' and mass transit facilities." it has also been
"' See 456 U.S. at 541-42 (Powell, J., dissenting).
07 See 106.2(g)(1)(ii), printed supra note 34.
100 See Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1811
(1983).
* By Tamara S. Wolfson, Staff Member, BosToN COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 687 F.2cl 767 (3rd Cir. 1982), 29 FEP Cases 1150, cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1982).
2
 681 F.2d 1376 (11th Cir. 1982), 29 HI' Cases 729.
3 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. ** 701-96, (1976).
4 29 U.S.C. § 701(8) (1976) (repealed 1978). The eleven statements of purpose in the 1973 Act
were replaced by the 1978 Amendements to the Rehabilitation Act with one statement providing
Mat: "The purpose of this chapter is to develop and implement, training, services, and the guarantee
of equal opportunity, comprehensive and coordinated programs of vocational rehabilitation and
independent living." 29 U.S.C. 701 (Supp. 11 1978).
5 Section 504 of t he Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides in relevant part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual .
	 shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by
the United States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C.
	
794 (Supp. 11 1978).
• See e.g., Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (N.D. Cal. 1979);
Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 637 (D.S.C. 1977).
• NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 919. 923 (D. Del. 1977), rev'd on
other grounds sub 110711. NAACP v. Medical Center, inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1259 (3rd Cir. 1979).
• See e.g., Leary v. Crapsey, 566 17.2c1 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Fecfn v.
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established that section 504 prohibits federal grantees from engaging in employment
practices which discriminate against the handicapped. 9
The right of handicapped individuals to he free from discriminatory employment
practices in federally funded programs has also been held to be enforceable by a private
right of action." The Rehabilitation Act as originally enacted, did not, however, expressly
provide for an enforcement mechanism to guarantee compliance with section 504 by
federal grantees." In 1978, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act to correct this
omission by adding section 505(a)(2)" which incorporated the enforcement provisions set
forth in Title ,VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
The primary enforcement mechanism of Title. VI, 14 which prohibits racial discrimi-
nation in federally funded programs," is found in section 602." That provision au-
thorizes federal agencies and departments to issue regulations to enforce the prohibition
against racial discrimination, and to terminate federal funding in the event of non-
compliatice." Section 604 1s  Title VI, however, significantly limits the enforcement
powers of federal departments and agencies under section 602 by providing that federal
departments and agencies arc not authorized to take any action "with respect to any
employment practice of any employer ... except where a primary objective of the Federal
financial assistance is to provide employment."'" Thus, only those federal grantees who
receive federal funds intended to provide for employment will he subject to Title VI's
prohibition against racial discrimination, as enforced by section 602.
Andre, 558 F.2d. 413, 415-16 (8th Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth. 548 F.2d 1277,
1284-87 (7th Cir. 1977).
c' See, e.g., Hart. v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Whitaker v. Board of
Higher Education, 461 F. Supp. 99, 106 - 08 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791,
796-98 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
" :Heiner v. State of Mo., 673 F.2d 969, 973 (8th Cir. 1982); Pres.:hi v. United States Postal
Service, 662 F.2d 292, 302 (5th Cir. 1981); NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1258 (3d
Cir. 1979); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Kamprneier v. Nyquist,
553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1284-87 (7th Cir.
1977). The Supreme Court has expressly reserved judgement on whether section 504 implies a
private right of action. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 404 n.5 (1979).
" See, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 -94 (1976).
12 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978),
13 Id. Section 505(a)(2) states in pertinent part: "The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth
in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or
failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such." Id.
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1976).
15
 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("No person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or he subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.")
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976).
" Id. Section 602 of Title VI provides in pertinent part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial
assistance to any program or activity . is authorized and ;lirected to effectuate the
provisions of section 2000d of this title with respect to such program or activity by
issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general . Compliance with any
requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of
or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity ... or (2) by
any other means authorized by law. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976).
19 Id.
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Prior to the Survey year, in Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc.,' the Fourth
Circuit held that by incorporating the "remedies, procedures, and rights," from section
602 of Title VI into the Rehabilitation Act, Congress also intended to incorporate the
limitations of section 604 into the Rehabilitation Act. 2 ' Accordingly, the Trageser court
concluded that a plaintiff who failed to establish that the primary purpose of federal
financial assistance to the grantee defendant was to provide employment, lacked standing
tinder section 504 to maintain an action challenging employment practices which dis-
criminated against him on the basis of handicap. 22 The Trageser analysis has subsequently
been adopted by the Eighth" and Second" Circuits.
During the Survey year, three additional circuits addressed the issue of the scope of
section 504's prohibition against employment practices which discriminate against the
handicapped. In Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hospital, 23
 the Ninth Circuit adopted the
Trageser holding and denied relief under the Rehabilitation Act to a victim of diabetes
mellitus and blindness in one eye, who alleged that he was refused employment on the
basis of' his disability, because the primary purpose of federal funding to state hospitals was
not to provide employment," In contrast, the Third Circuit in Le Strange v. Consolidated
Rail Corp.," and the Eleventh Circuit in Jones v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Author-
ily, 28
 held that by incorporating the rights and remedies of Title VI into the Rehabilitation
Act, the 1978 Amendments did not also incorporate the limitations of section 604 of Title
V1, Roth courts found that handicapped individuals could establish a cause of action
under section 504 for employment discrimination without establishing that the federal
assistance received by the defendant grantee was targeted towards providing employment
opportunities." Consequently, the Jones and Le Strange holdings represent a significant
departure from the approach, first announced in Trageser, which restricts the substantive
scope of section 504's prohibition of discriminatory employment practices against the
handicapped. As a result, the Jones and Le Strange holdings have prompted a review of the
issue by the United States Supreme Court and a resolution is expected during a coming
Survey year."
In Trageser, the Fourth Circuit based its restrictive reading of the scope of section 504
primarily on the similarities between that section and Title V1. 3 ' The court began its
analysis by observing that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is modeled after section
601 of Title VI. 32
 Roth of these provisions, through nearly identical language, prohibit
discrimination by recipients of federal funds, with section 504's prohibition applying to
discrimination on the basis of handicap, while Title VI applies to discrimination on the
" 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979).
21




	v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, 620 F.2d 672, 674-75 (8th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980).
24
 United States v. Cabrini Medical Center, 639 F.2d 908, 910-11 (2d Cir. 1981).
' 677 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1982).
211 Id. at 1271-72. Trageser has also been adopted by one district court during the Survey year.
Ward v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 550 F. Stipp. 1310, 1311.12 (D. Ma. 1982).
" 687 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983).
25 681 F.2c1 1376 (11th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed 51 U.S.L.W. 3535 (Jan. 18, 1983).
2 ' Id. at 1382; Le Strange 687 F.2d at 776.
" Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Le Strange, cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983).
31 590 F.2d at 88-89.
32 Id. at 88.
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basis of race, color, or national origin. 33 The Trageser court further stated that Title VI's
broad mandate against discrimination is limited by section 604 which restricts enforce-
ment of Title VI by federal departments and agencies with respect to discriminatory
employment practices to those instances in which providing employment is the primary
purpose of the federal funding, or in which employment discrimination would necessarily
entail discrimination against the intended beneficiaries of the federal aid." The court also
observed that the language of section 604's limitation only refers to enforcement by
federal departments and agencies, but nonetheless concluded that. section 604 also re-
stricts private actions hniught under Title VI, 35
After examining the statutory structure of Title VI, the court then turned to the
effect of the 1978 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act. 36 The court. observed that the
1978 Amendments simultaneously accorded the remedies, procedures, and rights of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. of 1964" to federal employees, 38 while providing employees of
private employers receiving federal aid with the rights, remedies, and procedures of Title
VI. 33 In the court's view, Congress could have provided both federal employees and
employees of federal grantees with similar remedies. 4 " This differential treatment, the
court reasoned, "could not have been inadvertent. -41 The court therefore concluded that
the scope of section 504 was restricted by the employment discrimination limitation of
section 604 of Title VI. 42
The Eighth Circuit in Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District:" and the Second
Circuit in Wilted Stales v. Cabrini Medical Center," relied on substantially similar reasoning
as the Fourth Circuit did in Trageser in holding that individual action under section 504 is
limited bpsection 604 of Title VI. 45 The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Scanlon v. Atascadero
State HospitaLt° citing Trageser, Cared, and Cabrini Medical Cente, and without engaging in
any further analysis, similarly held that section 505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act incor-
" hi. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 794 quoted in part supra at note 5 with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d quoted in
part supra note 15.
590 F.2d at 88 - 89.
" Id. at 89.
36 Id.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Title Vii of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer of 15 or more persons "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
38 The 1978 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act added section 505(a)( l), codified at 29
U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1), provides in pertinent part:
The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 . including the application of sections 706(f) through 706(k) ... shall be
available with respect to any complaint under section 501 of this Act, to any employee
or applicant for employment aggrieved by the final disposition of such complaint, or by
the failure to take final action on such complaint.
Id. Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap by the
Federal Government. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1976).
" Section 505(a)(2), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2).
" 590 F.2d at 89.
41 Id.
42 Id.
" 620 f.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1981), 22 FEP Cases 1107.
44 639 F.2d 908 (2nd Cir. 1981), 24 FEP Cases 1688.
45 See id. at 910-11; 620 F.2d at 674-75.
46 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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porated the restrictions of section 604 of Title VI." Thus, prior to Jones and Le Strange,
the circuit courts that had construed sections 504 and 505(a)(2) unanimously held that
section 505(a)(2) incorporated the limitations of Title VI as well as the rights and
remedies of that title into the Rehabilitation Act, and consequently, these courts held that
section 504 could provide no relief for handicapped individuals who were victims of
employment discrimination by federal grantees unless the purpose of such funding was to
provide for employment." Against this background of consistent precedent, the plaintiffs
in Jones and Le Strange, two physically handicapped individuals seeking relief from
discriminatory employment practices, were able to argue successfully that the Eleventh
and Third circuits resp'ectively, should reject Trageser as the correct construction of the
Rehabilitation Act. ()I' 1973.
In Le Strange, the plaintiff, Thomas Le Strange, had been employed as an engineer by
the Erie Lackawana Railroad.'" In 1971, his left hand and a portion of his left arm were
amputated.'" Le Strange was subsequently denied re-employment with the Railroad." In
1973, the defendant, Consolidated Rail Corp., a recipient of federal loans, became the
successor in interest to Erie Lackawana, and similarly denied re-employment to Le
Strange." Le Strange ultimately brought suit for injunctive relief and monetary damages,
relying inter alia, on section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act." The United States District
Court for the 111iddle District of Pennsylvania, citing Trageser and Carmi, held that in order
to have standing under section 504 to challenge an employment practice, Le Strange must
establish that: "1) providing employment is a primary objective of the federal aid received
by the defendant, or 2) discrimination in employment necessarily causes discrimination
against primary beneficiaries of the federal aid, -54 Le Strange was unable to satisfy either
of these tests.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit avoided the
standing question by framing the issue presented for review as whether section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. prevents employment discrimination against the handicapped by recip-
ients of federal funds." The court then noted that the same issue was recently decided by
the Supreme Court within the context of Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972" in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell.o" The court reasoned that North Haven
dictated the approach to be followed in Le Strange's appeal."
The Le Strange court observed that section 901(a) of Title IX, prohibiting discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex by educational institutions receiving federal funds, like section
" 677 F.2d at 1272.
" Id.: United States v. Cabrini Medical Center, 639 F. 2d at 911; Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis
Sewer District, 620 F.2d at 674-75; Trageser-
 v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc. 590 F.2d at 89.
49
 501 F. Stipp. 964, 965 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
"
" Id. at 966.
52 Id.
" Id. Le Strange also relied on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The district court {build that Le Strange failed to state a cause of action under the
equal protection clause because he failed to establish the requisite state action. Id. at 966-67. The
court similarly dismissed the § 1983 claim holding that Le Strange had not demonstrated that the
railroad was acting "under color of state law, - Id. at 967.
" Id. at 968.
" 687 F.2d at 769,
56 20 U.S.C, § 1681 el ,seq. (1976).
57 102 S. Ct. 1912 (1982).
" 687 F.2d 769.
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504 of the Rehabilitation Act, is modeled after section 601 of Title V
	 In addressing the
issue of whether Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded educational
programs, the Supreme Court had first looked to the expansive language of section 901,"
and concluded that because it ''neither expressly nor impliedly excludes employers from
its reach, we should interpret the provision as covering and protecting these 'persons'
unless other considerations counsel to the contrary."tit The North Haven Court had then
focused on the legislative history of section 901 to determine whether Congress intended
to limit the broad language of section 90 I ." 2
 Finding no such intent, the Court concluded
that section 901 encompasses sex discrimination by federally funded educational pro-
grams."
Following the Supreme Court's approach in North Haven, the Third Circuit began its
deliberation in Le Strange by focusing on the language of sections 504 and 505(a)(2) of the
Rehabilitation Act." Noting that the language of section 504 is virtually identical to that
of section 901(a) of Title 1X, 65 the court adopted the conclusion of the North Haven
decision that section 504 "neither expressly nor impliedly excludes employees from its
reach."""
The court next observed that the Rehabilitation Act, unlike Title IX, contains section
505(a)(2) which extends the rights and remedies of Title VI to the Rehabilitation Act."
The Le Strange court thus addressed the analysis of the Trageser court which had found
that section 505(a)(2) incorporated the limitations as well the remedies of Title VI."'
The court rejected the Trageser conclusion on two grounds. First, the court noted that the
language of section 604 of Title VI only limits agency action and not private remedies
under Title VI." The court stated that Title VI was not the primary mechanism for
individual pursuit of equal employment opportunities." Rather, individuals seeking
relief from employment practices which discriminate on the basis of race, may invoke
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 7 ' Furthermore, Tide VI I established the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission as the primary federal agency for the enforce-
ment of Title VI 1. 72 Thus, in the Le Strange court's view Congress sought to limit agency
action under Title VI with respect to employment discrimination to prevent various
federal agencies from promulgating conflicting sets of rules and regulations with respect
to employment discrimination, however, no such rationale existed for limiting private
66 Id. at 769-70. Section 901(a) of Title IX provides in part that: "No person ... shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance...." 20
U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). Compare section 901 of Title IX with section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
quoted in part supra at note 5 and section 601 of Title VI quoted in part .supra at note 15.
6° 120 S. Ct. at 1917.
61 Id.
62 hi.
" lei. at 1926.
6 ' 687 F.2d 769-70.
65 Id .
66 Id. at 770.
67 Id.
66 Id. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
69 687 F.2d at 770.
70 Id.
" Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) quoted supra at note 37.
72 687 F.2d at 770. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
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action under Tide VI. 73
 The court concluded, therefore, that section 604, as its language
provides, only limits agency action and not private action under Title VI."
The Le Strange court also rejected the significance which the Trageser court. attached
to the fact that the 1978 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act extended various provi-
sions of Title VII to federal employees but not to employees of federal grantees."
According to the Le Strange emir'. this differential treatment could best be explained by
the necessity to bypass the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in cases of
handicap discrimination by federal grantees since that agency did not have the expertise
to answer t he fundamental question of what is a federally funded program.' The court,
therefore, concluded that the statutory scheme employed in the Rehabilitation Act, as well
as the language of section 504. evidenced no intent to limit the scope of section 504's
protection to handicapped individuals from employment discrimination by federal
grantees."
Following the approach of the Supreme Court in North Haven , 7 '1 the Third Circuit
next turned to an examination of the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act and the
1978 Amendments to see whether Congress intended to limit the broad language of
section 504. 7" The court observed that the Act's 1973 legislative history contains no
indication that Congress sought to exclude employment discrimination from the scope of
section 504. 8" On the contrary. several direct indications could be found that Congress
intended t hat section 504 prohibit employment discrimination as well as discrimination in
housing and access to other federally funded services." The court. supported its reliance
on these remarks by pointing out that if a contrary intent were present among members
of Congress, it is highly likely that opposition to coverage of employment practices would
have been voiced given the legislation's express inclusion of mandated affirmative action
" 687 F.2d at 770 - 71. The court also stated that the question of whether section 604 of Title VI
limited private action was unlikely to even have occurred to Congress since a litigant would only he
likely to bring an employment discrimination claim under Title VI if he failed to meet the procedural
requirements under Title VII. Id. at 771.
" Id. at 77 I.
" Id. Set' Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 590 F.2d at 89.
" 687 F.2d at 771.
" Id.
7' See 102 S. Ct. at 1917.
" 687 F.2d at 771.
8 ° Id. at 773.
" Id., quoting Senator Cranston who chaired the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the
Committee m Labor and Public Welfare for consideration of the Rehabilitation Act ("Such problems
as unfounded discrimination in employment and in housing, difficulties of access to places of work
and treatment centers ... were voiced repeatedly to the committee,,.. Discrimination in placement,
hiring and advancement continue to limit the vocational rehabilitation program's ability it) effectuate
successful rehabilitations .... The expenditure or money on vocational programs is not well spent if
we do not at the same time take meaningful steps to eliminate architectual barriers and provide
substantial accomplishments in employment for handicapped individuals.") 119 Coxe.. REC. 5882,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess (1973); and Senator Taft ("The basic purpose of vocational rehabilitation
continues to be to help physically and mentally handicapped individuals achieve the ability to work,
earn, and live independently in their communities,... Too many handicapped Americans are not
served at all, too many lack jobs, and too many are under employed— utilized in capacities well below
the levels of their training, education, and ability. However, if we are to assure that all handicapped
persons may participate fully in the rewards made possible by the vocational rehabilitation program,
we must devote more of our energy toward the elimination of the most disgraceful barrier of all —
discrimination.") 119 Cow.. REG. 24587, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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programs to encourage hiring of t he handicapped by the federal government and federal
coot ract ors."
The court then examined I he legislative history of the 1978 Amendments Co deter-
mine whether Congress intended to restrict the scope of section 504 by adding section
505(a)(2)." As in the 1973 legislative history, the court found strong evidence that in
1978, Congress intended that the Rehabilitation Act., even as amended by section
505(a)(2), should encompass euq,iloyunent discrimination by federal grantees, regardless
of the purpose of the federal funcling. 84 In particular, the court noted that prior to
consideration of the 1978 amendments by the Senate Committee on Hu man  Resources,
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, pursuant to an executive order
directing the HEW to coordinate the issuance of regulations enforcing section 504 by all
federal depart ments and agencies," promulgated regulations designed to enforce section
504. 8 " These regulations interpreted section 504 to encompass employment discrimina-
tion by federal grantees." The Senate Committee on Human Resources made express
reference to the HEW regulations and stated that the 1978 Amendments "cocki[y]
existing practice as a specific statutory requirement." 98 Additionally, the court noted, the
Committee report contains no indications that HEW had exceeded its statutory author-
ity,'" The court found further support for its reading of the 1978 legislative history in
several other proposed amendments to the Rehabilitation Act ,"" Fur example, an
amendment was proposed to exclude alcoholics and drug abusers not qualified for
employment from the definition of handicapped persons."' In the Le Strange court's view,
such an amendment would have been unnecessary if section 504 were not intended to
cover employment practices."'
Finally, the court found Further support for its holding in post-enactment. statements
by the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources"' and by the Attorney General
concluding that Trageser was decided erroneously." The court concluded its reasoning,
" 687.F.2d at 773-74.
" 3 Id. at 774.
" Id. at 776.
" 687 F.24 at 744.
" See 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 et seq.
81 Id., cuing 45 C.F.R. § 84.11. Section 84.11(a) of 45 C.F.R. provides: "No qualified handi-
capped person shall, on the basis of handicap he subjected to discrimination in employment under
any program or activity to which this part 'applies,"
" Sex. REP. No. 95-890, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., at 19 (1978).
" 687 F.2d at 744. See also SEN. REP. NO. 95-890, supra note 88.
"" 687 F2d at 775.
"' Id„ citing 124 CoNG. REc. 30322.
" 2 687 F.2d at 775.
" 3 Id. at 776. quoting S. REP. No. 316, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., at 13 (1979) ("[Trageser] is not
consistent with Congress' original and continuing intent that handicapped individuals be empowered
to bring suit in Federal District Court for alleged employment discrimination in violation of [section
504], regardless of the designated use of the Federal funds received by the employer in question.").
" 4 687 F.2d at 77(1, quoting Nondiscrimination Based on Handicap in Federally Assisted Pro-
grams — Implementation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Executive Order
11914, 45 FED. REC.. 37620, 37628 (1980) ("Mlle Department believes that the employment practices
of recipients of Federal financial assistance are covered by section 504 regardless of the purpose of
the assistance . . The Attorney General's comments further critiqued Trageser and Carmi as
inconsistent with the legislative history of the Act. See id. Executive Order 12250 transferred
responsibility for coordinating the enforcement of section 504 by federal agencies and departments
from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to the Attorney General. Executive Order
12250 (1980).
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stating: Trio eliminate protection against discrimination in employment. by federal
grantees would eliminate a substantial portion of the small amount of protection afforded
the handicapped. What is a commonsensical approach to Title VI, thus, becomes a
devastating blow within the context of the Rehabilitation Act."'
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Jones v. Metropolitan Atlantic Transit
Authority ,"" reached an outco me similar to Le Strange by holding that. section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act is not limited by section 604 of Title VI."' The plaintiff in Jones,
William Jones, like Thomas Le Strange. was a recent amputee who was denied his former
position with the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA)." Prior to the
amputation of his left leg, Jones had been employed by MARTA as a bus driver for fifteen
years." Jones was rehired as a traffic checker, but was denied reinstatement as a bus
driver."' MARTA received federal funds in the form of engineering and construction
grants and operating subsidies from the United States Department of Transportation.'°'
A portion of this funding was used to subsidize wages of certain MARTA employees,
including traffic checkers and bus drivers."' The United States District. Court for the
Northern District of Georgia found that the federal funds received by MARTA were not
primarily intended to provide employment and accordingly, dismissed Jones' section 504
claim holding that such a showing was necessary to maintain a cause of action under
section 504. 113
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that
in order to maintain a cause of action under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a
plaintiff need only establish that he is an intended beneficiary of the federal funds
received by his employer, and he is not required to show that the primary purpose of that
funding is to provide employment. 10 " The Jones court like the Le Strange court 101
 reached
t his holding largely by analyzing the statutory language and the legislative history of the
Rehabilitation Act, as amended."° in contrast to the Third Circuit, however, the Eleventh
Circuit did not rely on the Supreme Court's North Haven opinion for support."'
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis in Jones by focusing on the plain language of
section 504. 198
 The court concluded, as did the Le Strange court,"° that the language of
that provision unambiguously states that the prohibition against discrimination against
the handicapped applies to any program or activity receiving federal funding.'" There is
no indication on the face of' section 504, the court reasoned, that its scope is limited to
kderal grantees receiving federal assistance for the primary purpose of providing em-
,5
 687 F.2d at 776.
9"
 681 F.2d 1376 (11th Cir. 1982), 29 HP Cases 729.
" 681 F.2d at 1382.
"" Id. at 1377.
"
'" Id.
un Id. at 1376.
102 Id.
103
 Jones v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 552 F. Supp. 370, 376 (N.D. Ga.
1981).
' 1' 1 681 F.2d at 1382.
t" See supra notes 55-92 and accompanying text.
1 " See 681 F.2d at 1377-82.
"" See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
"" Jones, 681 F.2d 1376, 1379.
'°° See Le Strange 687 F.2d at 769-70.
11 " Jones, 681 F.2d at 1379.
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ployment.'" 'Melones court considered the plain language of the statute to be conclusive,
but nonetheless, in light of recent authority to the contrary, turned to an examination of
the legislative history.'"
The court first turned to the 1973 legislative history and observed that there was not
"even a scintilla of evidence indicating that Congress intended to incorporate section 604
of Title VI into the Rehabilitation Act," 13 and thus limit the scope of section 504 to
federal grantees receiving funds for the primary purpose of providing employment.' 14 in
fact, the court observed the 1973 legislative history contains no reference to Title Vl. 15
The court then proceeded to examine the legislative history accompanying the 1974
Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act." 6
 That legislative history does contain one refer-
ence to Title VI; the Senate Report noted that section 504 was "patterned" after section
601 of Title VI."' The Jones court noted that in Carini,'" the Eighth Circuit had relied on
this reference to Title VI to conclude that Congress had intended to incorporate the
limitations of section 604 into the Rehabilitation Act.'"
The Eleventh Circuit, however, rejected this inference in Jones stating that the
reference to Title VI was simply an acknowledgement that section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act employed the same expansive language as section 601 of Title VI."" The court
also noted that had Congress originally intended the Rehabilitation Act to incorporate the
provisions of Title VI, the 1978 Amendments making the "remedies, procedures. and
rights" of Title VI applicable to suits under section 504 would have heen unnecessary.' 2
Finally, the court noted that the Rehabilitation Act is remedial in nat ore, and thus under
canons of statutory construction should he accorded a liberal interpretation.'"
After concluding that section 504, as originally enacted, did not exclude discrimina-
tory employment practices from its reach, the court focused on the effect of the 1978
Amendments. 123 Examining the statutory language of the 1978 Amendments, the court
placed particular significance on the observation that section 505 does not simply state
that section 504 suits were controlled by Title V1. 124 Instead, the language of section 505
provides that only the "remedies, procedures, and rights" of Title VI are extended to the
Rehabilitation Am's Accordingly, the court concluded that section 604 of Title VI,
constituting a restriction rather than a "right, procedure, or remedy" was not incorpo-
rated into the Rehabilitation Act.""
The Jones court found further support for this conclusion in the legislative history of







1 " Id., citing S. REP. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1979).
11 ' See supra, note 43.
" 5 681 F.2d at 1397, citing Corral, 620 F.2d at 675.
1211 681 1:.2c1 at 1397.





1" Id. at 1380-81.
121. Id. at 1381.
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ments was to expand the remedies available to handicapped individuals.'" Given this
purpose, the court reasoned it would be incongruous to construe section 505 as a
limitation on standing.'" Finally, the court relied on the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare regulations promulgated prior to the 1978 Amendments.'" As the Le
Strange court noted, these regulations, which interpreted section 504 to prohibit employ-
ment discrimination against qualified handicapped individuals by federal grantees re-
gardless of the purpose of the federal grant, were expressly approved by Congress."'
Thus, diejones court concluded that the 1978 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act did
not restrict the broad language of section 504 by incorporating the employment discrimi-
nation exception of section 604':of Title VI.'"
In contrast. to Trageser, the decisions in Jones and Le Strange both provide a well-
reasoned analysis of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and thus pave the way toward
establishing section 504 as a useful tool for eliminating employment. barriers to the
handicapped by federal grantees. The Trageser holding rests primarily on three conclu-
sions drawn by the Fourth Circuit: that section 504, even absent the 1978 Amendments,
can be construed as excluding a general prohibition of employment discrimination by
federal grantees;'" that section 604 of Title VI restricts private as well as agency ac-
tion;' 4 and that by incorporating the ''remedies, procedures, and rights" of Tide VI into
the Rehabilitation Act, Congress also intended to incorporate the restriction of Title
V I . 135
 Each of these findings are convincingly rebutted by Jones and Le Strange.
In Trageser, the Fourth Circuit stated that. the 1978 Amendments to the Rehabilita-
tion Act "simply confirms a plausible reading of section 504 as originally enacted,"' 3 t;
thereby implying that the court considered the language of section 504 to exclude em-
ployment discrimination from its reach. The language of section 504, however, providing
that "[Nio otherwise qualified handicapped individual ... shall ... be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," 137 does not on its face, as Jones
and Le Strange noted, limit coverage of employment discrimination to only those programs
receiving federal funding for the primary purpose of providing employment . 138 Fur-
thermore, as Le Strange states, the Supreme Court has construed this same language, as
used in section 901 of Title IX, to encompass a prohibition against employment discrimi-
nation.'" The Le Strange courts reliance on North Haven is particularly noteworthy
' 29 14. (emphasis the court's). The court cited comments of Senator Stafford ("The bill allows the
rehabilitation program to grow and serve more handicapped individuals and provide these individ-
uals with greater opportunities to maximize their potential.") 124 CONG. REC. S - 30311 (daily ed.,
Sept. 20, 1978); Id. at S-15591 (daily ed., Sept. 20, 1978) (Statement by Senator Cranston); Id. at
S-30303 (Statements by Senator Randolph); and 14. at FI-13901 (daily ed., May 16, 1978) (Statement
by Congressman Jeffords).
"9 681 F.2d at 1381.
L" 14. See supTa note 87.
nn 681 F.2d at 1381-82.5er S. Rep. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Scss. (1978); Le Strange, 687 F.2d at
744.
132 681 F.2d at 1382.




137 29 U.S.C. § 794.
'3"
	 supra, 681 F.2d at 1378; Le Strange, 687 F.2d at 770.
179 Le Strange, 687 F.2d at 796.
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because North Haven was decided subsequent to the decisions in the Trageser line of
cases' 4 " and thus potentially may provide the impetus for those circuits following Trageser
to reconsider their earlier holdings and guide the Supreme Court's review of this issue.
The Eighth Circuit in Cartni, after noting the similarities in section 504 and section 901 of
Title IX, had relied on cases construing section 901 as covering only direct beneficiaries of
federal funds and not extending to the employment practices of federal grantees in
reaching a similar construction of section 504.' 41 These cases have now been effectively
overruled by North Haven,
While North Haven provides highly relevant precedent for the construction of the
statutory language of section 504, analysis of the scope of the Rehabilitation Act also must
turn on the elfcct of the 1978 Amendments, if arty, on the broad prohibitions against
discrimination against the handicapped of section 504. Although both sections 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and section 901 of Title IX use the same language found in section 601
of Title VI,'" Title IX contains no provision comparable to section 505(a)(2) of the
Rehabilitation Act,' 43 Consequently, North Haven provides no comparable, guidance for
the proper construction of that provision.
As Jones and Le Strange state, Trageser concluded that by incorporating the "rights,
procedures, and remedies" of Title VI, Congress intended to incorporate the employ-
ment discrimination exception of section 604 and that section 604 limits private, as well as
agency action.' 44 Trageser does not provide any support for this latter assertion alt bough
the Trageser court did acknowledge that the language of section 604 refers only to action
by departments and agencies. 145 In contrast to the Fourth Circuit's unsupported assertion
that section 604 serves as a substantive limitation on private action under Title VI, the Le
Strange court examined the statutory scheme of which Title VI is a .part,'''' and reasoned
that since Tide VII provides a broad prohibition against employment. discrimination on
the basis of race, color, or national origin, it was unlikely that Congress would have even
considered it necessary to limit private action with respect to employment practices under
Title V1. 14 ' Furthermore, as Circuit judge Weiss concurring in Le Strange observed, it
would seem reasonable for Congress to limit agency but not individual action in order to
prevent overzealous administrators from invoking the fund termination sanction of
section 602, and thereby threaten the continuation of a valuable program upon the
occurrence of one act of employment. discrimination.'"
Even if section 604 was intended to limit private action under Title VI, it does not
follow that the 1978 Amendments incorporated this restriction into the Rehabilitation
Act. As the Jones court observed section 505(a)(2) does not provide that the provisions of
Title VI shall govern actions under the Rehabilitation Act. but rather states "the remedies,
procedures, and rights set forth in Title VI ... shall be available ."' to handicapped persons
140 The North Haven decision was handed down on May 17, 1982.
Caron , 620 F.2d at 675 n.6, citing, Junior College Disc v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.),
cea. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d. 424 (lot Cir.), tent.
denied, 444 U.S. 972(1979); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6111 Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 972 (1979).
t42
	
29 U.S.C. § 794 and 20 U.S.C. § 1681 with 42 U.S.C. § 20004.
' 43 See 20 U.S.C.	 1081 et seq.
Tragese r, 500 1.7 .2cl at 89.
WI Id.
14' See Le Strange, 087 F.24 at 770-71.
147 Id .
Id. at 778 (Weis, J., concurring).
140 29 U.S.C.	 794(a)(1).
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seeking to enforce the rights provided in section 504.' 50 Section 604, a substantive
restriction, cannot, as Jones states, be categorized as a right, a remedy, or procedure.
Moreover, any ambiguity in the statutory language can be resolved by reference to the
legislative history. AsJones correctly points out, the purpose of the 1978 Amendments was
to expand the remedies available to handicapped individuals."' This intent is reflected in
the language of section 505(a)(2) which provides that the remedies of Title VI shall be
"available" under the Rehabilitation Act."' This terminology evidences an intent to
expand, rather than contract. the scope of the Rehabilitation Act. The holding in Trageser
distorts this language by severely curtailing the remedies available to qualified individuals
denied equal employment opportunities because of a physical or mental handicap.
Handicapped individuals may be as likely as minorities and women to be faced with
the discriminatory barriers of fear and prejudice from potential employers.'" Unlike
the latter two groups, however, handicapped persons are not aided in their efforts
towards equal employment opportunities by a general statutory prohibition against dis-
crimination by private employers.' 54
 In 1978, Congress estimated the number of unem-
ployed qualified handicapped individuals at seven and a half million.'" The Rehabilita-
tion Act only prevents employment discrimination against the handicapped by the federal
government and federal grantees.'" To further limit this prohibition against employ-
ment discrimination to those federal grantees receiving federal funding for the primary
purpose of providing employment, as Trageser has done,'" significantly reduces the
number of handicapped individuals who can find relief in section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act.Jones and Le Strange provide a correct interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act as
prohibiting employment discrimination by all federal grantees regardless of the purpose
of the federal funding. This holding is consistent both with the statutory language of the
Rehabilitation Act and Congressional intent. Whether the holding off ones and Le Strange
will govern future actions under section 504 is now a question for the Supreme Court and
should be answered in a future Survey year.
A. *Extending the ADEA to th.e States — EEOC v. Wyoming'
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 2 employers are
prohibited from discriminating against any individual on the basis of age in their em-
ployment practices.' The Act provides, however, that it is not unlawful to discriminate on
1 " Jones, 681 F.2d at 1380.
"I Id, at 1381.
"2 29	 § 794(a)(1).
'" See, Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61
GEO. L.J. 1501, 1513, nn.81 - 83 (1973); Note, Affirmative Action Toward Hiring Qualyied Handicapped
Individuals, 49 S. CAI.. L. REV. 785, 807, nn.I04-105 (1976).
1 " See, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
1 " 124 CONG. REC. H - 3971 (daily ed., May 16, 1978) (Statement of Rep. Jeffords).
1 " See 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.
187
 See Trageser, 590 F.2d at 88-90.
* By Nancy Mayer Hughes, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976),
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) provides that: "It shall be unlawful for an employer— ( I) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;"
The Act protects workers between the ages of forty and seventy. Id. at § 631.
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the basis of age where age is a bona fide occupational qualification. 4 In 1974, Congress
amended the Act to extend the definition of "employer - to include state and local
governments.'' During the Survey year, the constitutionality of that amendment was
challenged in EEOC v. Wyoming.' The United States Supreme Court held that Congress
had acted constitutionally in extending the provisions of the A DEA to cover the states as
employers.'
At issue in EEOC v. Wyoming was the extent to which federal labor regulations may
govern the states in their employment practices. Determining the constitutionality of
federal labor legislation when applied to the states actually involves a two-step analysis.
First, the Court considers the constitutionality of the legislation itself. This does not
present a problem, however, since the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has
the authority to regulate labor practices under the commerce clause." The Supreme
Court has found, however, that the scope of Congress' commerce power may be limited
by other constitutional provisions." In National League of Cities v. Usery," for example, the
Supreme Court held that one limitation upon Congress' exercise of the commerce power
was the tenth amendment, which protects the sovereignty of the states." The second step
in the analysis, therefore, is to determine whet her the extension of the federal labor
regulations to the states is constitutional wit hin the limits imposed upon the commerce
power by the tenth amendment.
Prior to the Court's decision in EEOC v. Wyoming, the benchmark case on the issue of
the constitutionality of federal labor regulations as applied to the states was National
League of Cities. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that amendments extending the
Fair Labor Standards Act to the states were an unconstitutional exercise of Congress'
commerce power as limited by the tenth amendment.' By contrast, the Court in Wyoming
held that tenth amendment restraints upon Congress' commerce power did not preclude
the extension of the ADEA to state and local governments.' 3 The Wyoming Court did not
29 U.S.C. § 623(f) provides that:
It shall not he unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organiza-
tion — (1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e)
of this section where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of a particular business, or where the differentiation is based
on reasonable factors other than age;
Id,
5 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
" 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
Id. at 1064.
8 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the constitutionality of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219); N.L.R.B. V. Jones & Laughlin Steel Company,
301 U.S. 1 (1936) (upholding the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-168).
The Commerce Clause states that Congress shall have the power "to regulate commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CoNs -r., Art, 1, § 8,
cl. 3.
" See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 (1976) ("Congressional enactments
which may be fully within the grant of legislative authority contained in the Commerce Clause may
nonetheless be invalid because found to offend against the right to trial by jury contained in the Sixth
Amendment, United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).").
'" 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
" Id. at 842.
" Id. at 852.
13 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1064 (1983).
244	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 25:73
overrule National League of Cities, but distinguished the two cases. Any analysis of federal
labor regulations as applied to the states, therefore, must include principles from both
National League of Cities and Wyoming.
This chapter will examine the issue of the constitutionality of federal labor regula-
tions when extended to the states as employers. The first section of the chapter discusses
the doctrine of tenth amendment immunity, emphasizing the Supreme Court's decision
in National League of Cities, and the subsequent development of a three-prong test by the
Court in node( v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc.." Next, this section
considers the application of that test in a recent Supreme Court case, United Transportation
Union a. Long Island Rail Road Co. '' The chapter then presents the Court's decision in
EEOC v. Wyoming. This section demonstrates how the Wyoming Court both applied the
three-prong Placid test and utilized factors articulated in National League of Cities. After an
examination of the majority opinion in Wyoming, the second section presents the concur-
ring and dissenting opinions. Examination of the dissent demonstrates that the dissent
also applied the three-prong test of Hodel to the facts in Wyoming, yet reached an opposite
conclusion as to the constitutionality of extending the AREA to the states. Finally, the
third section of the chapter analyzes the Supreme COurt's decision in Wyoming, This
section lirst explains the test developed by the Court for determining the constitutionality
of federal labor regulations when extended to the states. This analysis reveals that the
third prong of the test, the center of disagreement between the majority and minorty in
Wyoming, is t he most difficult requirement to determine. This chapter submits that, while
t he Court reached the correct decision under this lest in Wyoming, determining the degree
of interference of federal regulations into state activities may be difficult. The chapter
concludes that when Congress attempts to extend federal labor regulations to the states as
employers in the future, it must demonstrate that no significant degree of interference
would result to the states from the legislation.
The Supreme Court first considered the impact of the tenth amendment upon
Congress' powers under the commerce clause in National League of Cities v. Ustay,"
National League of Cities involved amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act. (FL.SA)
which imposed minimum wage and maximum hour requirements upon almost all public
employees, including employees of state and local governments)* Various individual
cities and stales, the National League of Cities, and the National Governors' Conference
brought an action in federal district court challenging the validity of those amendments.' 8
The district court dismissed the complaint)" In reaching that decision, the court relied
upon an earlier case, Maryland v. Wirtz, 2 " in which the extension of those provisions to
certain public employees had been upheld. 21 The Supreme Court noted probable juris-
diction in National League of Cities? The Court then reversed the decision of the district
court, holding that, because of the limits imposed by the tenth amendment, the statutory
amendments were not within the power granted to Congress by the commerce clause.'
14 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
IS 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
'" 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
17 Id. at 838-39.
' 8 Id. at 836-37.
406 F. Stipp. 826. 828 (1974).
20 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
21 Id. at 188.
22 420 U.S. 906 (1975).
23
 426 U.S. 833, 852, 856 (1976).
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While recognizing that the commerce clause was a grant of plenary power to Con-
gress," the Supreme Court in National League of Cities began its analysis by noting that
there were constitutional limits upon the authority of Congress, even when exercising a
plenary power. 23 In that case, the Court found that the tenth amendment acted as an
affirmative constitutional limitation upon the authority of Congress, in that Congress
could not use the commerce power to override state sovereignty." it The Court recognized
that certain attributes of state sovereignty could not be impaired by Congress because the
Constitution, through the tenth amendment, prohibited the exercise of such authority by
Congress.27 According to the Court, the states' power to determine the wages and hours
of the people they employ represents one such attribute of slate sovereignty." Based on
its analysis of the interrelation between the tenth amendment and the commerce clause,
the Court in National League of Cities concluded that the amendments to FLSA imposing
minimum wage and maximum hour requirements upon the states were unconstitu-
tional."
In reaching its decision, the National League of Cities Court. expressed concern with
those congressional enactments which would regulate the states as states. 3 " By these
enactments, the Court meant legislation that would have a direct impact on the states' own
activities, and not federal legislation which might simply pre-empt an area of authority
shared with the states. Therefore, while it. would be appropriate for Congress to exercise
its plenary commerce power to regulate private individuals and businesses, Congress
could not exercise such broad power with respect to the states." In National League of
Cities, the legislation in question would have directly regulated the states in their employ-
ment. practices. Consequently, the legislation was not allowed to stand. 32
The Court wanted to protect the role of the states, stressing the importance of their
"separate and independent existence" in a federal system of govermnent. 33 As articulated
by the Court in National League of Cities, the test for the constitutionality of federal labor
regulations applied to the states concerned whether the federal government was interfer-
ing with functions which were essential to the separate and independent existence of the
states." Application of this test necessitates looking at the degree of interference, to
determine whether the legislation would have a significant adverse impact upon the
functioning of the states."
In determining the degree of interference imposed by the amendments to the Fair
24 Id. at 840.
2 ' Id. at 841-42. For example, the Court observed that the sixth amendment right to trial by jury
and the fifth amendment right to due process had at times acted as constitutional limits upon the
exercise of Congress' commerce power. The Court referred to United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968) (clause in Federal Kidnapping Act held unconstitutional because it imposed possibility of
death penalty only upon those defendants who exercised their constitutional right to trial by jury);
and Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (statutory presumption of guilt in federal statute
involving importation of marijuana held invalid because it denied defendant due process).
" 425 U.S. 813, 842-43, and quoting from Fry v. United States, 421 U.S 542, 547 n.7 (1975).
27 426 U.S. at 845.
25 Id.
2" Id. at 852.
" Id. at 845.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 852.
33 Id. at 844-45, (quoting from Lane Country v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76 (1869)).
34 426 U.S. at 845-46.
35 Id. at 851.
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Labor Standards Act, the Court looked at two factors. First, it considered the financial
costs to the states, including the extent to which the states might have to relinquish
important governmental activities because of lack of funds.'" Second, the Court consid-
ered the possibility that state policies would be displaced by the federal legislation. 37 The
Court found that the minimum wage and maximum hour requirements imposed by the
amendments would have an adverse impact upon the states, both in increased costs and in
displacement of state policies regarding employment. 33 The Court thus concluded that.
the amendments, extending the Fair Labor Standards Act to the states, impermissibly
interfered with essential governmental functions of state and local governments. 3" Since
the amendments exceeded congressional authority under the commerce clause, the
Supreme Court in National League of Cities held the amendments unconstitutional."
The decision in National League of Cities established a doctrine of tenth amendment
immunity to protect the states from federal legislation, enacted pursuant to the commerce
clause. Federal labor regulations, otherwise permissible under the commerce clause,
could not be extended to the states' own employment practices when they would interfere
to a significant degree with essential state functions.'
After the decision in National League of Cities, the Supreme Court further delineated
the immunity doctrine in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. 42
Hodel involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 (the Act)," by an association of coal producers." One issue
before the Court concerned whether Congress had exceeded the affirmative limitations
imposed by the tenth amendment on the exercise of its commerce power." The district.
court, relying upon National League of Cities, held that the Act interfered with a traditional
governmental function of the states in contravention of the tenth amendment." The
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction,'" and heard the case on direct appeal,' The
Court. upheld the Act in Hodel as constitutional.'
In reaching its decision in Bode!, the Supreme Court first reviewed its decision in
National League (-?f Cities, The Court then established three requirements, derived from
National League of Cities, that must be met in order to find that an exercise of congressional
commerce power violates the tenth amendment immunity doctrine:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the "States
as States. - Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are
indisputably "attribute[s] of state sovereignty." And third, it must be apparent.
that the States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair their
3' Id. at 846-47.
37
 Id. at 847-49.
38 Id. at 846-51.
39
 Id. at 851.
" Id. at 852.
4 ' Id. at 85 t .
42
 452 U.S. 264 (1980.
" 30 U.S.C. § 1203 et. seq. (1976).
44
 452 U.S. 264, 273.
1 " Id. at 268.
" Id. at 284-85.
" 449 U.S. 817 (1980).
" Jurisdiction was invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1252, providing for direct appeal to the Supreme
Court from any decision by a court of the United States invalidating an act of Congress in any suit in
which the United States, its agencies, officers or employees are parties. 452 U.S. at 274 n.15.
4 " Id. at 268.
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ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions."'"
Under this three-prong test, the federal legislation must do more than infringe upon
the states' regulation of the private sector. First., the legislation must directly regulate the
actions of the states themselves. Second, the subject matter of the legislation must involve
activities which are traditionally performed by the states, rather than the federal govern-
ment. Under the third requirement, a court asked to decide this issue must determine
whether the degree of interference would be such that the legislation would have a
significant adverse impact upon state functioning. In Hodel, the Court ruled that the
challenge to the federal law failed because the first requirement was not satisficd.'' Under
the Court's analysis, the act in question governed private individuals and businesses, and
did not regulate the states as states. 32
The Supreme Court subsequently relied upon the decision in National League of Cities
and the three-prong test developed in Hodel to reach its decision in United Transportation
Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co. 53 The issue in that case was whether the tenth
amendment doctrine of immunity prohibited application of the Railway Labor Act to a
state-owned and operated railroad engaged in interstate commerce.' The dispute arose
when collective bargaining negotiations between the union and the railroad failed." The
Railway Labor Act permitted strikes after a thirty-day cooling off period, while the state
law governing collective bargaining prohibited strikes by public employees. 36 The rail-
road argued that the federal law could not be applied to a state-owned railroad, basing its
claim upon the immunity doctrine of National League of- Cities." The union brought suit in
federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that the labor dispute was governed
by the Railway Labor Act, and not the state law." The district court held that the federal
Act was applicable, so that the employees had a federally guaranteed right to strike.'" The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the opera-
tion of the railroad was an integral state governmental function."
In reaching its decision in United Transportation, the Supreme Court relied upon the
three-prong test of Hodel, finding that the third prong was the key one."' Under that
requirement, the Court had to determine whether the federal law would directly impair
the state's ability to structure its traditional government functions." The United Transpor-
tation Court concluded that the operation of a railroad engaged in interstate commerce
was not a traditional state activity, but rather, had traditionally been a function of private
industry." Since the federal regulations did not impair the state's ability to structure its
5" Id. at 287-88 (citations omitted),
51 Id. at 288.
52
 Id.
53 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
54 Id. at 680.
Id.
50 Id. at 681.
' Id. at 683.
' 8 Id. at 684.
5" United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 509 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
"" 634 F.2d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 1980).
"L Id. at 684.
62 Id.
"3 Id. at 685-86.
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traditional functions, the Court ruled that the state could not claim immunity from
application of the Railway Labor Act."
In summary, the Court's decision in National League of Cities established the doctrine
of tenth amendment immunity to limit the federal regulations that could be applied to the
states. In thole', the Court then clarified the relevant. factors from its decision in National
League of Cities into a three-prong test. When the three requirements of the Hodel test are
met, the Court will refuse to extend the federal legislation to the states, in order to
prevent the federal government from interfering-
 in traditional state government func-
tions.
During the Survey,
 year, in EEOC v. Wyoming,' the Supreme Court was again asked
to resolve an issue regarding application of federal labor regulations to the states. Ai issue
in the case was whether Congress acted constitutionally when it extended the definition of
employer in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 66
 to include slate and
local governments."' The Supreme Court held that the amendment was constitutional."
Wyoming involved the mandatory retirement of a fifty-five year old District Game
Division Supervisor for the Wyoming Game and Fish Department."" After being involun-
tarily retired, the dismissed employee filed a complaint with the EEOC, charging that the
Game and Fish 'Department had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment. Act.'"
The EEOC brought an enforcement action against the slate of Wyoming, seeking injunc-
tive and declaratory relief, back pay and liquidated damages." The district court, upon a
motion by the defendants," dismissed the EEOC's complaint." The court held that the
amendment to the ADEA violated the doctrine of tenth amendment. immunity from
National League of Cities, and was therefore unconstitutional."
Because of the district court's rejection of its complaint., the F,E0C filed a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court. 73
 In a five-to-four decision," the Supreme Court reversed
the district court. decision, holding that the 1974 amendment to the ADEA, which
extenclecl the Act's provisions to state and local governments, was constitutional." The
opinion of the Court, written by justice Brennan, began with a review of the legislative
history behind the enactment of the ADEA, emphasizing the purpose of the Act. to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination." The Court noted that all prior decisions in the
lower federal courts had upheld the amendment. extending the ADEA to state and local
" 4 Id. an 686.
" 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
" 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1057 (1983).
" Id. at 1064.
" Id. at 1059.
70
Ti Id. at 1059-60.
72 514 F. Stipp. 595, 596 (1981). The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim.
73 Id. at 600.
74
 Id.
7" 103 S. Ci. 1054, 1057 (1983). The direct appeal was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1252. Id.
7 " The opinion of the Court was written by justice Brennan, joined by justices White, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens. justice Stevens also filed a concurring opinion. Chief Justice Burger filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined. Justice Powell also
filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which Justice O'Connor joined.
77 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1057, 1064 (1983).
78 Id. at 1057-58.
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governments as a constitutional exercise of Congress' power under either the commerce
clause or section five of the fourteenth amendment.'" The Court acknowledged that
Wyoming did not argue that the enactment of the ADEA exceeded Congress' power
under the commerce clause."" Rather, the Court noted, the state of Wyoming relied upon
National League of Cities to argue that the tenth amendment limitations upon Congress'
commerce power precluded application of the AREA to state and local governments."
In response to this argument, the Court analyzed its recent decisions regarding tenth
amendment. constraints upon Congress' exercise of commerce power. The Court first
emphasized that the purpose of the immunity doctrine front National League of Cities was
to protect certain core state functions from federal interference."'-- The Court then
reaffirmed the three-prong test developed in Hodel that must be satisfied in order to find
that federal legislation enacted pursuant to the commerce power is invalid. 8" The Court
applied the three requirements of the Node! test to the facts in Wyoming to reach its
decision.
Applying the flmlel test, the Court found that the first requirement, that the statute
regulated the states as states, was clearly met." The amendment in question would
impose the provisions of the ADEA, prohibiting discrimination in employment on the
basis of age, directly upon the states as employers. Next, the Court. stated that it did not
need to resolve whether the second requirement of the node/ test, whether the statute
involved an attribute of state sovereignty, was met in Wyoming, because the Court focused
instead on the third requirement,' The Court, therefore, shifted immediately to consid-
eration of the third requirement, whether the statute would impair the states' ability to
structure their traditional governmental functions."
The Court admitted that the management. ()I' state parks was clearly a traditional slate
function." The Court noted, however, that it was the degree of interference imposed by
a federal regulation upon a traditional state function that must he determined."" In
Wyoming, the Court concluded that the degree of federal intrusion was sufficiently less
serious than in National League of Cities," and thus distinguished the decision in National
League of Cities from the holding in Wyoming. Because the Court found that the third
requirement of the Hodel test could not be met in Wyoming, the challenge to the amend-
ment's constitutionality failed."°
In determining whether the degree of interference was such that the states would he
adversely affected by the federal legislation, the Court looked at the two factors estab-
lished by National League of Cities.' First, the Court found that in Wyoming there was no
direct negative financial impact on the states from the application of the ADEA. 92 While
79 Id. at 1059 and n.ti.
8° Id. at 1060.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1060-61. See also note 49 supra and accompanying text,
" 103 S. Ct. at 1061.
8% Id. at 1061-62. The G4' )urt, however, did admit that a determination of the second require-
ment posed difficulty. Id. at 1061.
88 Id. at 1062.
" Id., citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851.
8 " 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
H9 Id..
90 Id.
"' Id. at 1062-64. See also notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
°'L 103 S. Ct. at 1063.
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older workers tended to be paid more, the Court found that fact offset by the filet that
those workers would not have to be paid pension benefits as long as they continued
working, and might receive pension benefits for fewer years when they finally did retire."
Second, the Court found that Wyoming was not attempting to pursue any social or
economic policies through its mandatory retirement statute, which might be overridden
by the imposition of the ADEA." Since the two factors from National League of Cities —
financial costs and displacement of state policies — were not present in Wyoming, the
Court concluded that the degree of interference from extension of the ADEA to the states
was not sufficient to satisfy the third requirement of the Rode! test. Thus, the Court ruled
that the extension of the ADEA to the states as employers would not directly impair the
states' abilities to structure their traditional functions."
In addition to the two factors from National League of Cities, another consideration
persuaded the Court that the degree of interference from the legislation would not. be
severe. The Court found that even with the extension of the ADEA to the states,
Wyoming could continue what. it had been doing." Under the ADEA, the Court noted,
Wyoming would he allowed to continue its policy of mandatory retirement at a specified
age, if it could comply with the provision in the ADEA that age be a "bona fide occupa-
tional qualification" for the job of game warden.•"
The Wyoming Court thus held that the extension of the ADEA to the states consti-
tuted a permissible exercise of Congress' commerce power." Under the Court's ruling,
the states would not he protected from application of these particular federal labor
regulations by the doctrine of tenth amendment. immunity. The Court relied upon the
tests developed in National League of Cities and Rode! to conclude that the ADEA, while
regulating the states as states, did not interfere with the states' traditional functions to
such a degree as to be unconstitutional.
justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion in Wyoming, took a broader view of the issue
before the Court. According to Stevens, the Court in Wyoming was construing the scope
of Congress' commerce power." Stevens argued in favor of a broad construction of the
commerce clause that would allow Congress ample power to regulate the labor market.'"
In addition, Stevens rejected the idea from National League of Cities that the tenth
amendment doctrine of immunity could limit the scope of Congress' commerce power."'
Ignoring the tests developed in National League of Cities and florid, Stevens simply found
that Congress had the power under the commerce clause to enact the legislation in
Wyoming. 1 "2
In arguing that Congress has broad power to enact labor regulations, Stevens
stressed the importance of the commerce clause in the Constitution, In Steven's view, the
commerce clause was the response of the framers of the Constitution to the central
problem at that time — to secure freedom of trade. 1 i 3 A broad construction of the
" Id.
" 4 Id. at 1063-64.
" Id. at 1062.
"" Id.
" 7 Id.
" Id. at 1064.
"" Id. at 1065.
"" Id. at 1066.
I"' Id. at 1067.
1 U 2 Id. at 1068.
"3
 Id. at 1065.
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commerce clause by the Court, Stevens stated, would reflect the intent of the framers to
confer adequate power on the federal governinent. 104 Stevens noted that there should be
universal agreement today that Congress has the power under the commerce clause to
regulate the terms and conditions of employment throughout the economy."' According
to Stevens, the interdependence of the various segments of the economy, and the
magnitude of government employment, may require that Congress have the power under
the commerce clause to regulate both the private and the public sector)"
In determining the scope of the commerce power, Stevens next considered the issue
of limitations imposed upon Congress' exercise of the commerce power by other provi-
sions of the Constitution. While agreeing that Congress could not exceed specific lim-
itations, he did not state what those limitations were)" Stevens found, however, no such
limitations applicable in Wyoming, including any limitation imposed by the tenth amend-
ment. 108 Instead, Stevens labeled the concept of tenth amendment restraints upon the
commerce power from National League of Cities a "pure judicial fiat.""" He argued that
National League of Cities was both incorrectly decided, and inconsistent with the central
purpose of the Constitution)'" Stevens, therefore, would have overruled National League
of Cities in Wyoming."'
In summary, Stevens agreed with the result reached by the Court in Wyoming,
holding the amendments to the ADEA constitutional. Stevens, however, simply con-
cluded that the federal labor regulations, as applied to the states, were a valid exercise of
Congress' commerce power because of the broad scope of that power. He found no need
to analyze the extent to which the regulations might infringe upon the states' sovereignty.
In a lengthy dissent, those justices who had been in the majority in National League of
Cities 12 argued that the ADEA was unconstitutional as applied to the states)" The
dissent, written by Chief Justice Burger, relied upon the three-prong test from Hodel to
determine that the legislation improperly intruded upon the tenth amendment rights of
the states. 14
Disagreeing with the findings of the majority, the dissenters argued that the second
arid third requirements of the Hodel test were met in Wyoming. With respect to the second
requirement — whether the ADEA dealt with matters that were attributes of state
sovereignty — the dissent stated that Wyoming's goal in enacting a mandatory retirement
system was to assure the physical preparedness of its game wardens."'' The dissent
argued that this goal was an attribute of state sovereignty for three reasons. First, the
dissent stated, recreation services had been identified in National League of Cities as a
traditional state act ivity. 1 ' 0 Second, the dissent argued that the essence of state power is to
104 Id. at 1066.
i" Id.
106 Id. at 1066-67.





112 Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Stewart and Blackmun had been
in the majority in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
1 " 103 S. Ct. at 1068.
1 " Id. at 1069.
1 " Id.
"6 Id., citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851 (1976).
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choose who is to be in state governme. ni: "7
 Finally, the dissent was persuaded by the fact
that other states had enacted mandatory' retirement laws, indicating that such laws dealt
with an attribute of state sovereignty. l" .
In considering the third requirement of the 1-lodel test, the dissent found several ways
in which the ADEA would interfere with the states' abilities to structure integral opera-
tions. First, the dissent asserted that imposition of the ADEA would lead to increased
employment. costs for the states."" Increased casts would result, in the dissent's view,
from the higher pay levels of older workers, from higher pension costs, and from higher
health and disability insurance costs. 121' Second, the di'ssent found noneconomic hard-
ships stemming- From extension of the ALMA to the staies. 12 ' The legislation would
prevent employers from hiring workers physically hest able for the job, according to this
argument, and would impede promotion and affirmative action programs by the states.'"
The dissent thus concluded that the extension of the ADEA to the states was
unconstitutional because the three requirements of the 1-lodel test were met. In addition,
the dissent considered two other points in support of its view. The dissent rejected the
idea that provisions in the ADEA permitting age discrimination, where age was a bona
fide occupational qualification,' 23
 constit uted an adequate method for avoiding significant
interference with the states' operations.'" The states would be burdened by meeting a
high standard of what. constituted a bona fide occupational qualification, the dissent
asserted, and by the need to draft new laws on insurance and retirement plans for older
workers.''`' Second, the dissent considered a balancing test between the federal and state
interests,'" Weighing the interests involved in Wyoming, the dissent concluded that the
federal interest in protecting employees against age discrimination was not sufficient to
outweigh the states' rights to set standards to meet local needs.'"
Finally, the dissenters addressed the fourteenth amendment issue riot reached by the
majority in Wyoming. That issue concerned whether the amendments to the ADEA were a
constitutional exercise of Congress' power to enact legislation affecting the stales under
section five of the fourteenth amendment. 1 !" The dissent argued that neither the Court.
117 103 S. Ct. at 1069.
118 Id.
in ' Id. at 1070.
128
"' hi. at 1071.
122
12 ') 29 U.S.C.§ 623(0(1) provides that age discrimination may he permitted "where age is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation (Ira particular business.
29 U.S.C: 623(f)(2) provides that an employer may "observe the terms of a Nina fide employee
benefit plan such as retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of this chapter. . . ."
". 4 103 S. Cr. at 1072.
127 Id. at 1071.
12© The balancing test had been alluded to by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion in
National League of Cities V. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976); and in a note by the Court in Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n.• Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 n.29 (1981). The Court in
EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1061-62, concluded that it did not have to reach the final balancing
step because it found that the legislation did not satisfy the three-prong test of fodd, and thus was
constitutional under that test.
1 " 103 S. Ca. at 1072.
'" Id. Section 5 of the finmectith amendment states that: "The Congress shall have the power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. Cti)s.:s-r. amend. XIV, § 5.
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nor Congress had ever determined that mandatory retirement plans violated any rights
protected by the fourteenth amendment.'" According to the dissent, equal protection
guarantees did not need to be extended to age classifications under the ADEA because no
fundamental right and no suspect class were involved.' 3 " In support of this argument, the
dissent referred to other Supreme Court. cases in which equal protection challenges to
mandatory retirement plans had been rejected.' 31 The dissent thus concluded that analy-
sis of the constitutionality of Wyoming's mandatory retirement system under the four-
teenth amendment would produce a similar result,' 32
Justice Powell included a separate dissent in order to challenge the view of history
expressed in justice Stevens' concurring opinion.' 33 Powell disputed the central impor-
tance of the commerce clause in the Constitution given it by Stevens.' 34 He also em-
phasized the role of the states in the federal system of government created by the
Constiunion. 135
In contrast to Stevens' view, Powell argued that removing trade barriers was only one
purpose of the Constitution, not the central purpose as claimed by Stevens.' 36 In Powell's
view, the central purpose of the Constitution was to create a national government,'" The
most important provisions in the Constitution, therefore, were the first three articles
which established the government.'" Powell looked at the language and structure of the
Constitution to place the importance of the commerce clause in perspective.' 3" He noted
that it was only one in a list of enumerated powers granted to Congress.'" Thus, Powell
concluded that the commerce clause should not be as broadly construed as Stevens
advocated. 141
Second, Powell stressed that the Constitution established a federal system of govern-
ment in which certain powers were reserved to the states,'" Those reserved powers in
turn limited the powers of the national government, including Congress' power under the
commerce clause.' 43 Powell concluded by voicing concern that Steven's view of the
prominence of the commerce clause would allow Congress to override almost any state
sovereign function,'"
The decision in EEOC v. Wyoming addresses what continues to be an important issue
for the courts, namely, the extent to which federal labor regulations may be applied to the
states. More broadly, the Supreme Court's decision in Wyoming, and in the earlier cases of
National League of Cities and Hodel, involves the extent to which the doctrine of state
sovereignty front the tenth amendment can protect the states against federal intrusion. In
"9 103 S. Ct. at 1073.
130 Id.
' 3 ' Id., referring to Massachusetts Board of' Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); and
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
132 103 S. Ct. at 1073,
'" Id. at 1075.
1 " Id. at 1075-76. See also notes 135-40 infra and accompanying text.
'" Id. at 1077-83. See also notes 141-43 infra and accompanying text.
' 3" Id. at 1076.
127 id .
1214
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concluding that it was constitutional to require that the states as employers not arbitrarily
discriminate on the basis of age, the Wyoming Court settled the issue only with respect to
the ADEA.
While limited in scope, however, the decision in Wyoming demonstrates that the
doctrine of tenth amendment immunity, first recognized in National League of Cities. ,
remains intact.. The Wyoming Court again recognized that the tenth amendment operates
as a limit on Congress' exercise of its plenary commerce power." 5
 On this point, the
majority and dissenting opinions in Wyoming agreed.'" The only disenchantment with
the doctrine of tenth amendment immunity was expressed by Justice Stevens in his
concurring opinion, in which he argued that the doctrine was merely a judicial cre-
ation."'
Since the Supreme Court recognizes tenth amendment limitations on the commerce
clause, future attempts by Congress to extend kderal labor regulations to the states will
undoubtedly face constitutional challenges similar to those raised in National League of
Cities and Wyoming. Clearly, the Court has not established an absolute rule holding all
federal labor regulations to be either applicable or inapplicable to the states. Indeed, in
National League of Cities, the Court refused to allow the Fair Labor Standards Act to be
extended to the states.'" Yet in Wyoming, the Court found the extension of t he ADEA to
the states to be a valid exercise of Congress' commerce power."" This chapter will now
examine the test. that the Court uses in analyzing the constitutionality of federal labor
regulations when extended to the states.
The lest for constitutionality revolves around the extent to which the states can claim.
protection against federal legislation by virtue of the tenth amendment, designed to
protect the sovereignty of the states. The starting point in the Court's analysis is the
three-prong test stated by the Court in Hodel, but actually originating in National League of
Cities. In order for the federal legislation to be declared unconstitutional in its application
to the states, all three requirements of the test most be met. If Congress seeks to extend
federal labor regulations to the states, the proposed legislation must fail to satisfy at least
one of the requirements in order to he upheld as constitutional. This section of' this
chapter considers those three requirements, and their implications for Congress, in
more detail.
Under the first requirement, the legislation must be shown to regulate the states as
states. Federal labor regulations that directly govern the states' own employment prac-
tices, therefore, will meet this requirement. Both the Fair Labor Standards Act in National
League of Cities and the ADEA in Wyoming, for example, directly dictated certain employ-
ment practices to the states as employers.'" On the other hand, legislation which solely
regulates private individuals or businesses, or infringes upon the states' own regulation of
the private sector, would not meet the first requirement of the test."' That legislation
would therefore be upheld as a constitutional exercise of Congress' commerce power.
41 Id. at 1060.
"" Id. at 1060, 1069.
'" Id. at 1067.
1 " National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840 (1976).
"9 103 S. CI. at 3064.
' 5" National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 835-36 (1976) (employers must pay
minimum hourly wage and pay one and one-half limes regular rate for hours in excess of limy);
EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1056-57 (1983) (unlawful for employers to discriminate on basis
of age).
"' See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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The second prong of the test requires that the legislation address matters which are
attributes of state sovereignty. This issue is more difficult to define, and in fact, the
majority in Wyoming did riot resolve the issue in reaching its decision.'" The dissenting
opinion in Wyoming, however, suggested several factors to be considered in analyzing
what constitutes an attribute of state sovereignty.'" First, the Wyoming dissent noted,
several traditional state activities were identified by the Court in National League of
Cilics.' 54 If the federal legislation deals with one of these activities, in the view of the
dissenters, it is considered to be addressing an attribute of state sovereignty.'" Another
factor, according to the dissent, involves whether other states have enacted laws on that
subject.. 156 Finding that other government entities have enacted similar legislation creates
a presumption that the matter is an attribute of state sovereignty.'" When federal
legislation does involve an attribute of state sovereignty, then it may be found unconstitu-
tional as a violation of the tenth amendment.
For the third requirement of the test to be met, the federal legislation must. directly
impair the ability of the states to structure their traditional government functions. This
concern, to protect core state functions against federal intrusion, prompted the Court's
decision in National League of Cities. National League of Cities established that the degree of
interference must. be significant fur the third requirement to be satisifed.' 58 The National
League of Cities Court relied upon two factors to determine whether the degree of
interference was significant: the financial costs that would be imposed upon the states by
the legislation, and the possibility that state policies would be displaced by the federal
legislation.'" To those two factors, the Court in Wyoming added a third factor to be
considered. That factor concerned whether provisions in the legislation allowed the state
to continue doing what it had been doing. In Wyoming, for example, the Court found that
the ADEA provided an exception for age discrimination such as Wyoming's mandatory
retirement plan, if age could be shown to be a bona fide occupational qualification.'"
Comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions in Wyoming that each
relied upon the test. just described. The three-prong test from Hodel, therefore, must be
accepted as the correct means for determining the constitutionality of federal labor
regulations when extended to the states. Nevertheless, the majority and dissent reached
opposite conclusions as to the constitutionality of the amendments extending the ADEA
to the states. The area of disagreement between the majority and dissenting opinions
centered on the third requirement of the Hodel test. Both opinions correctly agreed
that the essence of the third requirement is the degree of interference imposed by
the federal legislation upon the states."' Thus the majority and the dissent agreed that
the doctrine of tenth amendment immunity protects the states against too much interfer-
ence by the federal government. 102
1 " 103 S. Ct. at 1061.
153 Id. at 1069.
'" Id., citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851 (1976). The traditional state
activities identified by the Court were fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and
parks and recreation.
155 103 S. Ct. at 1069.
'" Id.
157 Id.
1 " 426 U.S. at 851-52.
159 Id. at 846-51.
'" 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
161 Id. at 1062, 1070.
'O2 Id. at 1060, 1069.
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In analyzing the third requirement in Wyoming, moreover, the majority and dissent-
ing opinions relied upon the same three factors that were established by the Court in
National League of Cities and in Wyoming. They reached opposite results, however, for each
factor. The majority concluded that the ADEA, if extended to the states, would not cause
increased financial costs or displace state policies. 163 The dissent, by contrast, argued that
extension of the ADEA would create substantial economic and noneconomic hardships
for the states."' In addition, the majority found that Wyoming could continue its
mandatory retirement plan, provided that age was established as a bona fide occupational
qualification, 1 " 5
 whereas the dissent found that to be an impossibly difficult standard to
meet.'" Neither side, however, supported its views on these factors with statistics or
evidence from the states as to the effect of the legislation.
Since the majority and the dissent reached opposite results when considering the
same three factors, determining the degree of interference imposed by federal legislation
poses problems. The Court has neglected to demonstrate how each factor is to he
measured, The Court has not clearly established the point at which the degree of
interference becomes significant, so that the federal legislation should be deemed uncon-
stitutional as applied to the states. Thus, the degree of interference, while the correct test
for the doctrine of tenth amendment immunity, may be an elusive standard.
Nevertheless, this chapter submits that the majority in Wyoming correctly concluded
that the degree of interference imposed by the ADEA upon the states' activities would not
be significant. First, as stated by the majority, any financial burdens imposed on the states
by the ADEA would be minimal."' That Act does not directly impose any financial
expenditures upon the states, as did the minimum wage requirements of the Fair Labor
Standards Act in National League of Cities.'" Second, the dissent did not give adequate
support for their contention that the ADEA would cause non-economic hardships for the
states. The dissent failed to show how the ADEA would affect any specific state policies
regarding either promotion or affirmative action, Finally, the majority correctly found
that the ADEA permitted mandatory retirement plans by the states, where age could be
shown to be a bona fide occupational qualification .'"" This provision mitigates the degree
of intrusion imposed upon the states' own activities.
Moreover, this chapter submits that. the majority correctly concluded that the degree
of intrusion imposed by the legislation in Wyoming was less serious than that. imposed by
the federal labor regulations in National League of Cities. As previously stated, the financial
costs involved in the minimum wage requirement of the Fair Labor Standards Act in
National League of Cities imposed a direct burden upon the states."" In addition, the
National League of Cities Court was able to present specific state policies that would be
affected by the Fair Labor Standards Act."' In Wyoming, however, extension of the
ADEA to the states would not impose a substantial financial burden upon the states, nor
would it significantly affect state policies regarding retirement and promotion. Thus,
these two decisions, while reaching opposite conclusions regarding the constitutionality of
1i3 Id. at 1063-64.
Id. at 1070-71.
115 Id. at 1062.
1 " U. at 1071-72.
1 " Id. at 1063.
"8
 426 U.S. at 846.
1611 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
178 426 U.S. at 846.
' 71 Id. at 847-51.
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federal labor regulations extended to the states, are consistent. In addition, the Wyoming
Court added another factor to help determine the degree of interference with state
activities." That factor concerned whether some provision in the proposed legislation
would permit the states to continue doing what they had been doing.'" The ADEA has
such a provision whereby the states, or any other employer, may have a mandatory ,
retirement plan if' age can be shown to be a bona fide occupational qualification. 174 No
such provision existed inthe legislation involved in National League of Cities. The mini-
mum wage and maximum hour provisions would have been absolutely binding upon the
states.''" Based upon that new factor, therefore, the Wyoming Court correctly held that
the degree of federal interference was more severe in National League of Cities. "a
Finally, this chapter concludes that Justice Stevens' opinion, although concurring in
the majority's holding, erred in its premise that the commerce clause reflected the central
purpose of the Constitution to secure freedom of trade. Justice Powell's dissent, written in
response to Stevens' opinion, is more accurate historically. Powell places the importance
of the commerce clause in correct perspective by pointing out that. it is only one in a list of
enumerated powers granted to Congress. 177 Furthermore, Powell correctly emphasizes
that the Constitution established a federal system of government in which certain powers
are reserved to the states.'" This federal system of government protects the sovereignty
of the states against too much federal intrusion. The recognition of the stales' role in the
federal system is crucial to the doctrine of tenth'amendment immunity established by the
Supreme Court in National League of Cities, Ilodel, and reaffirmed by its decision in
Wyoming. The Court's decision in Wyoming, upholding the constitutionality of the
amendments extending the ADEA to the slates as employers, achieves a proper balance
between the federal system of government and t he sovereignty of the states.
In concluSion, Congress, in attempting to extend federal labor regulations to the
states in the future, should he aware of the test established by the Supreme Court through
its decisions in National League of Cities, Hodel, and. Wyoming. 'The Court will first look to
whether a core state function is involved in the legislation. If so, then the states will be
protected by the tenth amendment against congressional regulation in that area. Second,
the Court will look at the degree of intrusion imposed by the federal regulations upon the
states' activities. The states thus will be protected only when the degree of federal
intrusion into a traditional area of state functioning would be significant. Where the
degree of federal interference is slight, as in EEOC v. Wyoming, the states will not be
granted protection by the tenth amendment immunity doctrine of National League of
Cities.
177 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
173 Id.
'" 29	 § 623(0 (1976).
"' 426 U.S. at 847-48.
176 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
"7 Id. at 1077.
178 Id.
